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Introduction 
   
Part I: Historiography 
Historians have long been drawn to the story of Barbados and the tales of 
sugar, slavery, empire, and wealth that defined the colonial history of this small West 
Indian island lying on the southeastern margins of the Caribbean Sea.  First settled by 
the English in 1627, it quickly developed into ‘one of the richest Spotes of ground in 
the wordell’ after the introduction of sugar cane agriculture in the early 1640s and, 
by 1660, had become one of the most valuable and influential colonial possessions in 
the western hemisphere.
1
  Barbados was famous in its own time, especially after 
Richard Ligon, a three year resident on the island from 1647 to 1650, wrote his 
popular A True and Exact History of the Iland of Barbados in 1657.  In this work, he 
vividly described a range of topics that included the island’s exotic flora and fauna, 
the methods used to convert cane into sugar, the trials many experienced in adjusting 
to life in the tropics, and the arrival of enslaved Africans for a public eager to receive 
such information on the distant domains of a growing empire.  Contemporary 
scholars followed Ligon with other works in which Barbados figured prominently, 
such as John Oldmixon’s The British Empire in America (1708) and two important 
natural histories by Hans Sloane (1708) and Griffith Hughes (1750).  It also served as 
the setting for many popular works, including a brief poem by the well-known 
English bard Richard Flecknoe and Richard Steele’s famous newspaper serial ‘Inkle 
and Yariko.
2
   
                                                          
1
 Henry Whistler, quoted in Richard Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British 
West Indies, 1623-1775 (Barbados: Caribbean Universities Press, 1974), 124-125. 
2
 Flecknoe’s poem is short and inane, but specifically mentions the famous planter James Drax and 
outlines the great wealth of Barbados in 1670.  ‘How rich Barbados is, and how much worth/ We well 
may see by Sugars, it brings forth/Of all the rest, the Richest Merchandize/And if by th' patern, we 
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 Academic interest in the island’s past has also remained high since the 
eighteenth-century, with historians consistently drawn to Barbados’ integral role in 
the development of sugarcane agriculture based on enslaved African labour and the 
influence this had on England’s imperial mission.  As B.W. Higman explains:  
the colonial history of the Caribbean is commonly characterized by 
the intimate relationship of sugar and slavery…and the defining 
moment of that relationship is located in the sugar revolution, 
beginning in Barbados in the middle of the seventeenth century.  It is 
the sugar revolution above all which has come to represent the vital 
watershed, starkly separating the history of the islands from that of the 
mainland, not merely in terms of agricultural economy, but in almost 
every area of life, from demography, to social structure, wealth, 




Higman’s quotation highlights the important work on the island’s past that has 
already been completed by modern historians, especially in regard to sugar, slavery, 
and their combined effects upon the economic and political relationships that 
dominated the planters’ lives.  Richard Dunn, for example, notes that ‘we have 
detailed political and institutional histories of the several Caribbean colonies in the 
seventeenth centuries and excellent studies of Stuart colonial policy in the West 
Indies.’
4
  Books such as those written by Dunn, Vincent Harlow, Gary Puckrein, 
Larry Gragg, Noel Deerr, Richard Pares, Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, Richard 
Sheridan, Russell Menard, and Hilary Beckles have successfully highlighted the 
importance of Barbados’ place within the sugar-producing Caribbean and have 
helped to contribute to the further understanding of the relationship between the 
development of the plantation complex, the growing power of the West Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
may judge ot'h' piece/How Rich it is in men, we well may see/By bringing forth brave Drax such men 
as thee.’ Richard Flecknoe, ‘On the Riches o'th' Barbadoes,’from Epigrams of all sorts, (1670).  
3 B. W. Higman, ‘The Making of the Sugar Revolution,’ in Thompson, Alvin O., In the Shadow of the 
Plantation: Caribbean History and Legacy (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2002), 40-41 and ‘The 
Sugar Revolution,’ Economic History Review, vol. 53, no. 2 (May 2000), 213-236. 
4
 Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-
1713 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 47. 
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planter, and the forced enslavement of a large African population.
5
  Combined, these 
authors adequately cover most of the important events in Barbadian history, ranging 
from the early settlement period and the emergence of sugar to the emancipation of 
the enslaved in 1834.  Nevertheless, gaps in the historiography still exist, leaving 
several significant periods of the island’s history under-analyzed and misunderstood.   
One such lacuna exists for the twenty-year period between 1680 and 1700, a 
vital two decades that represented great tragedy, violence, and change throughout the 
English empire from an ugly combination of rebellion, revolution, and war.  These 
events profoundly influenced and altered the lives of the 66,000 people living on 
Barbados.  Yet, many historians gloss over this period in favor of either the island’s 
early settlement period or later emancipation era.  They often avoid the 1680s and 
1690s by hastily contending that the two decades were a period of relative decline 
defined by a combination of low prices, limited supply, infertile soil, war, and 
disease.  Historians often attempt to justify these assertions by pointing to two 
contemporary documents that, when read in tandem, appear to paint a dismal picture 
of island conditions during this era.  The first of these is the 1680 census, a 
compilation of demographic statistics collected by each parish vestry at the request 
of Governor Sir Jonathon Atkins in 1679.  Under intense suspicion from the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations for not following the proper protocol concerning colonial laws 
and for refusing to send requested information back to England, Atkins demanded 
                                                          
5
 Noell Deerr, The History of Sugar, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949), Larry Gragg, Englishmen 
Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), Gary Puckrein, Little England: Plantation Society and Anglo-Barbadian Politics, 1627-1700 
(New York: New York University Press, 1987), Vincent Harlow, A History of Barbados, 1625-1685 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), Hilary Beckles, White Servitude and Black Slavery in 
Barbados, 1627-1715 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1989), Carl and Roberta 
Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line:  The English in the Caribbean, 1624-1690 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), Richard Pares, Merchants and Planters (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), and Russell Menard, Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation 
Agriculture in Early Barbados (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). 
10 
 
the name, location, acreage, and labor force of every landowner living on the island.  
He also collected specific accounts of the militia, island fortifications, and 
emigration, while receiving tallies of the Anglican baptisms, deaths, and marriages 
that occurred in each parish.  Many historians use these demographic statistics to 
draw important conclusions about Barbados, including the continuing consolidation 
of the island’s limited acreage by the elite, the wealthy’s dominance of politics and 
the military, the lopsided burial to baptism rate, the high number of white emigrants, 
and the near-complete replacement of indentured servants by enslaved Africans.
6
   
Edward Littleton, a successful and wealthy former planter working as an 
island agent in London, wrote the second influential document from this period, 
Groans of the Plantations, in 1689.
7
  First arriving in 1666 as a secretary to Governor 
Willoughby, Littleton married a wealthy heiress and by 1673 owned six hundred 
acres of land in St. James’ parish.  In both 1674 and 1676, his fellow planters elected 
him to a seat in the assembly and he acted as judge at Holetown from 1670 until 
1683 before returning to London to work as an agent for Barbados.  Paid to represent 
the planter elite at Whitehall, he shamelessly depicted his fellow Barbadians as loyal, 
dutiful, and deferential colonists who were quickly being driven to ruin by the 
tyranny of Parliament, the King, and the monopolistic Royal African Company 
(RAC).  Littleton’s original intent for his pamphlet was to depict how severely the 
                                                          
6
 DAB, BS 19, 1680 Census.  Ironically, the Board relieved Atkins of his position as a direct result of 
this census because the numbers did not match up with previous accounts from the island.  Atkins also 
omitted vital details, including the total number of white inhabitants and some import/export figures.  
TNA, CO 391/3, 6 August, 1680, Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, and Richard Dunn, ‘The 
Barbados Census of 1680: Profile of the Richest Colony in English America,’ William and Mary 
Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1 (Jan. 1969), 3-7. 
7
 TNA, CO 1/30, 28 May, 1673, Colleton to Council of Trade, CO 31/1, 8 January, 1674, Council 
Minutes, and 2 December, 1674, Council Minutes.  
11 
 
planters would suffer from the addition of burdensome impositions to exported sugar 
implemented by James II upon his ascension to the throne in 1685.   
However, after a brief introduction, Littleton instead challenged the Stuart’s 
overreaching imperial policies of political and economic centralization that had 
threatened the islanders’ ability to trade freely and that had cut deeply into their 
dwindling profits.  This proved to both Littleton and his fellow planters that 
England’s government saw them as inferior and their island as little more than a 
colonial dependency.  Calling the English ‘Egyptian Tax-masters’ who ‘would bring 
us into the State of Villenage,’ Littleton further complained that the Barbadians could 
do little to assert their own position or fairly defend themselves, given that ‘we have 
none to represent us in Parliament.’  Thus, he wanted to show the world ‘By what 
cruel Methods, and by what fatal Degrees, the once flourishing English Colonies 
have been brought to ruine.’
8
  To do this, he evoked the spirit of earlier petitions and 
grievances from the Barbadian government and renewed the complaints that centered 
on more traditional issues, such as the English government’s habit for meddling in 
island affairs, the monopolistic nature of the RAC, and the restrictions placed on free 
trade through the Navigation Acts. 
Littleton’s Groans and Atkins’ census are influential and important 
contemporary sources because they have specifically shaped and informed the 
historiography that has stigmatized the late-seventeenth century as an era of 
declining economic, political, and social conditions across the island.  Richard Dunn, 
for example, has studied the 1680 census extensively and claimed that by using the 
document ‘as a base, one can trace the political collapse of the big planters during the 
                                                          
8
 Edward Littleton, Groans of the Plantations, (1689), 1 and 19. 
12 
 
succeeding decade.’  He further concluded that this collapse led to a ‘paralyzing 
crisis’ by 1690, as the planters suffered from a ‘deteriorating economic…situation on 
the island’ that led to ‘signs of soil exhaustion,’ a decline in annual exports, and 
profits that were ‘eroded by the steady drop in sugar prices.’  He also used the census 
to argue that Barbados was socially unstable for both white and black populations, as 
neither group could maintain a steady rate of natural increase, with many islanders 
dying young, unmarried, and childless.  According to Dunn, this made Barbados a 
demographic catastrophe, as mortality rates easily exceeded baptismal rates among 
all of the island’s social groups.
9
   
Many other historians have echoed Dunn’s assessment of this period in 
Barbadian history, and allied themselves with Littleton’s infamous depiction.  Carl 
and Roberta Bridenbaugh wrote off the era as one of ‘deep depression,’ full of 
‘moderate to severe hardships’ for those on Barbados.  Otis Starkey further labelled 
the second half of the 1680s as ‘a period of depression’ and the 1690s as the 
beginning of ‘a half-century of crises’ and ‘uncertainty.’  Vincent Harlow provided a 
particularly damning account of the island, citing ‘the exhausted condition’ of the 
soil as the central issue that eventually led to severe ‘losses by emigration,’ a 
reduction of the militia ‘to such low numbers that the dangerous expedient of arming 
negroes had been resorted to,’ a government ‘nearly at a standstill,’ a ‘public debt 
that amounted to 1,200,000 pounds of sugar,’ forts ‘lying in decay,’ and commercial 
restrictions that threatened to eliminate ‘the little…trade now left.’  He further argued 
that the sugar trade, which had once ‘brought great wealth to the island,’ was now 
‘beginning to affect that social and economic decay which is so striking a feature of 
                                                          
9
 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 101-103 and 300-334. 
13 
 
West Indian history.’  The reason for this was that the price of sugar had reached 
historic lows during the 1680s, therefore threatening planters’ profits.  Muscovado 
sugar, for example, once costing £23.5 per hundredweight, had dropped to £17.25 by 
1684, and reached a nadir of only £16.75 by 1686.  Thus, by the 1680s, as Richard 
Sheridan claimed, Barbados had dramatically devolved from ‘the fair jewell’ of 




 Many historians have also approached the 1680s and 1690s through an overly 
imperialistic lens and, mirroring Littleton, perceived all seventeenth-century 
Barbadians as subordinated and powerless participants of an increasingly centralized 
empire. Historians who take this approach implicitly contend that the islanders 
lacked the ability to control their own lives and to supply their own needs, placing 
them at the heart of a conventional mercantilist model that allowed for the metropole 
to profit at the expense of a passive and dependent periphery.  Lawrence Harper, for 
example, maintained that England’s mercantilist legislation represented ‘English 
measures designed for English ends...that contributed to England’s commercial and 
maritime development.’
11
  George Louis Beer stated that since ‘England assumed the 
heavy responsibilities incidental to the establishment of a colonial empire, 
counterbalancing advantages must be derived in some other way.’  This benefit came 
from acting as additional marketplaces for ‘the quickening of English commerce and 
of freeing England from a…dangerous dependence on rival nations,’ and by 
                                                          
10
 Otis Starkey, The  Economic Geography of Barbados: A Study of the Relationships Between 
Environmental Variations and Economic Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 
79-88, K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1957), 366, 
Harlow, History, 259-268, Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 398-411, Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh,  No 
Peace, 124 and 295-311 and TNA, CO 1/20, 12 May, 1666, Willoughby to the King. 
11
 Lawrence Harper, The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-century Experiment in Social 
Engineering (New York: Octagon Books, 1964), 240-245 and 376. 
14 
 
developing ‘English industry and trade by creating a self-sufficient commercial 
empire in which the colonies were to supplement the economic activities of the 
mother country.’
12
   
Mercantilist historians assume that Barbados, as an isolated colony of 
England, inevitably fell into the expected metropole-periphery model that formed the 
framework for this system.  Both Charles II and James II attempted to tighten the 
government’s control over the colonies through a variety of economic and political 
maneuvers that eventually led to both money and power flowing back into England.  
Charles II created the most permanent and influential of these measures when he 
implemented a series of three Navigation Acts in 1660, 1663, and 1673 and the 4.5% 
duty on all Barbadian sugar in 1663, both of which came to define the colonial-
metropole relationship throughout the seventeenth-century.  Furthermore, he also 
established the Royal African Company, once in 1663 and again in 1672, and created 
the powerful Lords of Trade and Plantations in 1675.   
While James II added only a few new policies to the administration of the 
English West Indies, including the aforementioned additional duties and a desire to 
create a monopolistic company to regulate the Caribbean sugar trade, he also stressed 
greater levels of obedience and empowered his island governors to more aggressively 
uphold all rules and regulations.  This oftentimes created great strife in Barbados, as 
overzealous governors, such as Sir Richard Dutton and Edwin Stede, came into 
conflict with outspoken planters like Edward Littleton who resented the increased 
interference in their production of sugar.  Yet, as Dunn suggests, the late Stuarts’ 
                                                          
12
 George Louis Beer, ‘The Early English Colonial Movement, I’ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 23, 
no. 1 (March, 1908), 81-83, ‘The Early English Colonial Movement, II’ Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 23, no. 2, (June, 1908), 242, and The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754, Part I: The Establishment 
of the System, 1660-1688(New York: MacMillan, 1912), vii. 
15 
 
attempts at consolidation only represented what many historians believed that island 
planters had always desired: ‘closer unity with the home government.’  Dunn also 
claims that ‘the pre-1675 style of political and economic autonomy had isolated 
[Barbadian planters and farmers] from the English business community.’  Many 
historians therefore believe that elite Barbadians sought compromise with the 
metropole, as many planters were willing ‘to jettison some of their old local 
independence in exchange for better connection with Whitehall officials and London 
merchants.’
13
   
Many other historians provide similar interpretations of the mercantilist 
relationship between Barbados and England.  Richard Pares described a white 
Barbadian population that eventually grew to know its role within England’s imperial 
model.  At first, the exclusion of foreign ships and merchants from the island’s coast 
‘drew the bitterest complaints from the colonists.’  Yet, within a few years, the 
planters ‘understood… the necessity of confining [trade] to the markets of the mother 
country,’ a relationship that had ‘begun to look natural and almost convenient’ by the 
beginning of the eighteenth-century.
14
  Harper argued that the advantages offered by 
mercantilism represented the best economic relationship for Barbadian planters at the 
time, as the English protected the island’s sugar trade, ‘which found [its] best market 
within the British Empire.’
15
   
These beliefs also imply that most white and black Barbadians developed a 
strong dependency on England for its necessary imports.  Harlow wrote that by the 
1670s and 1680s, Barbados relied on London ‘almost entirely for her supply of food 
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  Sheridan echoed this interpretation, arguing that all 
Barbadians had to sacrifice their earlier independence, as they were becoming 
‘increasingly dependent on imported supplies as more and more resources were 
devoted to sugar production,’ and could no longer supply even a quarter of the 
provisions necessary for their survival.
17
  Puckrein added that mercantilist leaders in 
London believed ‘that the metropolis would supply [Barbados] with food, clothing, 
and equipment while monopolizing those colonial commodities that the mother 
country could not produce by itself.’
18
  Larry Gragg has argued that the island’s 
‘powerful planters’ understood ‘their political dependence on the mother country’ 
and ‘found themselves dependent’ on England ‘for many of their necessities,’ 
including food, alcohol, lumber, livestock, and clothing.
19
  Although it represented a 
closed system of trade that limited expansion and caused prices to increase in the 
metropole’s favor, imperialist historians have maintained that Barbadian planters and 
merchants inevitably desired to participate in a mercantilist structure that appeared to 
provide enough benefits to overcome the lack of independence that resulted.  Thus, 
when paired with the accompanying claims that Barbados was a society in social, 
economic, and political decline by the 1680s and 1690s, a disturbing portrait of the 
island emerges that portrays a formerly wealthy colony struggling with 
impoverishment, a lack of production, limited self-sufficiency, and little influence 
over its own welfare.   
Recently, however, a small group of historians have revisited this era and 
have posited that the 1680s and, to a lesser extent, the 1690s were a period of both 
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continued growth and high profit.  Russell Menard and John McCusker, for example, 
contend that the standard ‘story of stagnation and decline is a myth…encouraged by 
planters who hoped to use tales of their difficulties to strengthen their case for 
various concessions from the metropolitan government.’  In actuality, these were still 
‘the halcyon days’ that saw returns of ‘as much as 20 percent’ on capital.
20
  David 
Eltis also postulates that this era ‘was something of a boom period in Barbados.’  His 
analysis of the Customs Records shows that the island’s per capita income reached 
figures during the 1680s and 1690s that were well above the traditional peak of the 
Barbadian sugar trade in the late 1650s and early 1660s.
21
   
Other historians have also begun to revise the Anglo-centric mercantilist 
interpretation of Barbados as a dutiful and dependent colony operating within a well-
ordered and highly regulated imperial world, claiming that this model is no longer 
sustainable.  Instead, they have shifted towards the opposite end of the spectrum, 
depicting an Atlantic economic society that was predicated on free trade and a near 
lack of centralized control.  As Alison Games argues, ‘the English Empire was not 
constructed and shaped at the imperial center….It was an empire whose ultimate 
configuration depended not on the coherent vision imposed by a monarch or the 
Board of Trade but instead on the experiences of men who lived around the globe in 
a series of overseas experiments.’
22
  William Pettigrew even goes as far as arguing 
that the terms ‘metropole’ and ‘periphery’ have no actual meaning in the 
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seventeenth-century Atlantic and that all attempts at separating economic and 
political interests by these terms are mere ‘interpretative fallacy.’
23
   
  Christian Koots echoes these views by openly supporting a porous Atlantic 
world dominated by private traders who frequently moved vast quantities of illegal 
merchandize between markets, regardless of the English economic regulations 
passed to prevent this.  As Koots maintains, ‘Instead of well-regulated and 
accountable shipping, we would find individuals acting improvisationally in the 
pursuit of personal and colonial profit…and the endurance of cross-national 
cooperation in the Atlantic that had been forged in the first decades of European 
settlement.’  In Koots’s interpretation, ‘the Atlantic Ocean itself, as opposed to 
European empires,’ stands at the center of any effective analysis, as ‘culture, goods, 
and entrepreneurial activities flowed across imperial boundaries in a more integrated 
circum-Atlantic economy than previously perceived.’  As such, Koots believes that 
modern historians need to think of Caribbean trade within terms of ‘Transatlantic 
communities’ instead of the older notion of ‘distinct empires.’
24
  Most recently, 
Abigail Swingen writes that ‘although many scholars acknowledge the mutability of 
mercantilism as a concept, few have explicitly recognized that imperial and 
commercial policies and the ideas and theories used to support them were highly 
contested.’
25
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While a step in the right direction, these new interpretations of Barbadian 
society between 1680 and 1700 still fail to provide an accurate depiction of the 
island’s economy.  This dissertation contends that the claims of Eltis, Menard, and 
McCusker do not go far enough in dispelling the Littleton myth that has informed 
much of the historiography and seeks to prove that the 1680s and parts of the 1690s 
were more than just another rapid, but temporary, economic ‘boom period’ for the 
Barbadian planters and farmers.  Instead, this work presents the 1680s as a peak 
moment for production and trade on the island, with the white Barbadians reaching 
the height of their seventeenth-century economic powers during this decade.  With a 
planter class that had formally established firm control over most forms of economic, 
social, and political power, the wealthy sugar planters of Barbados sat at the apex of 
colonial society, creating an insular world that faced little outside competition while 
manipulating the imperial system to reflect their own interests.  This was best 
demonstrated by the movement of goods into and out of the island during this era.  A 
detailed analysis of the Naval Office Returns shows that more ships, carrying greater 
tonnages, legally arrived at the island from a wider variety of origins than during any 
previous decade and carried away a consistently large quantity of sugar, rum, and 
molasses that rivalled, and often surpassed, the highest export totals from earlier 
peak periods.  Their success, however, extended beyond the movement of provisions, 
sugar, and manufactured goods, as Barbados also remained at the epicenter of the 
Caribbean slave trade.  Huge numbers of enslaved Africans entered Barbadian ports 
during this decade, where most quickly sold for historically low prices.  In fact, the 
island’s labor market became so glutted that enterprising planters and merchants 
attempted to reestablish the Spanish slave trade, while sending others to their 
20 
 
undersupplied neighbors.  Thus, the 1680s, as well as the post-war years of the 
1690s, represented an island at the peak of its seventeenth-century trading powers, 
with the wealthy planters legally importing and exporting goods and labor at rates 
greater than in any previous decade.    
Elite Barbadians were able to achieve such commercial success during this 
era because they inhabited a unique and important place within both the Caribbean 
and the English world.  First, it was during this decade that Barbados passed out of 
the final stages of its initial sugar boom, as the island’s soil became less fertile due to 
overwork, erosion, and nutritional deficiency.  These problems, however, encouraged 
Barbadian planters and farmers to innovatively adjust to the island’s new conditions 
and, in the process, created the first mature sugar plantation society in the Atlantic 
World.
26
  As Governor Dutton wrote in 1682, Barbados was no longer ‘in its 
infancy’ as a society; it could ‘now digest strong meats.’
27
  The planters and 
merchants of Barbados also began to understand that their irrepressible desire for 
wealth had transformed their environmental world and that the soil they had relied 
upon to effortlessly produce sugarcane in the past was now worn out and supplied an 
inferior product.  By the late 1670s and early 1680s, they had started to adapt to these 
changes and, through a series of innovations and experimentations, prolonged their 
success on the island.  Concurrently, the planters also attempted to gain a better 
scientific understanding of their environment and climate in order to learn how to 
both modernize production and overcome the natural limitations that regularly 
threatened their position of power within the Caribbean so that they could continue to 
produce sugar and generate great wealth on Barbados for years to come. 
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This interpretation once again challenges Barbados’ traditional 
historiography, as scholars, like Richard Sheridan, have written of the islanders’ 
‘ingrained hostility to innovation’ and their idealization of a ‘primitive and wasteful 
agrarian system.’
28
  Sheridan’s analysis, however, is inaccurate, as the early white 
settlers consistently attempted to decipher the many puzzles of their strange tropical 
island.  Gragg praised the elite Barbadians by calling them ‘remarkably adaptable 
and innovative,’ while Koots considered them to be creative entrepreneurs 
‘improvisationally adopting to their circumstances,’ and actively seeking ‘the best 
way to enhance their own wealth and satisfy their own demands.’
29
  Hilary Beckles 
further lauded the Barbadian planters for proving ‘to be remarkably adaptable and 
innovative’ and ‘good capitalists’ who were increasingly ‘sensitive to changing 
market requirements.’
30
   
This was especially true during the two decades between 1680 and 1700, as 
the planters realized that they could no longer wastefully plant their crops as in the 
past and that continued success would stem from a better understanding of how to 
manage their plantations and increase their self-sufficiency.  While many scholars, 
such as David Watts, J.H. Galloway, Michael Chenoweth, Matthew Mulcahey, and 
Russell Menard have identified a variety of the successful innovations implemented 
during the late seventeenth-century, this thesis brings them together into a single 
work in order to provide a better sense of the range of techniques the islanders used 
to produce high yields, regardless of declining conditions.  It also adds to this debate 
by positing how Barbadian planters and farmers attempted to control the weather by 
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forecasting future climatic conditions and how they creatively overcame the lack of 
local resources to consistently obtain the tremendous amounts of energy needed to 
produce their sugar.    
In addition, the elite Barbadians entered their peak moment at a very 
particular period in English history.  The last twenty years of the seventeenth-century 
were a chaotic time in England, as dangerous challenges to Charles II’s legacy, 
including the Popish Plot (1678-1681) and Monmouth’s Rebellion (1685), plagued 
his last few years in power, and James II’s tumultuous reign led to a domestic 
revolution (1688) that resulted in a Dutch Stadtholder assuming the throne and 
immediately launching the country into a prolonged international conflict (1689 to 
1697).  With England’s economic and political attentions occupied by this series of 
challenges, the metropole proved unable to provide significant support for the island 
throughout the 1690s and had to allow the Barbadians to frequently operate on their 
own volition.  For much of the 1690s white Barbadians relied on a vast commercial 
network, accumulated over the course of 50 years, which conveniently connected 
them to world markets in both hemispheres.  Cross-national in character, they 
depended on these neighbors for the alternative opportunities that they provided, 
sending large quantities of rum, molasses, and excess sugar to them in return for the 
provisions, wood, and manufacturing materials that they could not get from England.  
Thus, Barbadian trade was never a bilateral exercise between metropole and colony, 
as was the focus of much of the island’s early historiography, but was instead a part 
of a vibrant and extensive commercial network that extended throughout the Atlantic 
world.    
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Island planters and merchants desired this economic freedom, especially 
during the 1690s, and they energetically manipulated and shaped their trading 
networks to best suit their own needs and profit lines, oftentimes with little fear of 
punishment from a distracted metropole.  Utilizing a mixture of violence, cunning, 
and isolation, they frequently participated in an import and export trade that sent and 
received goods from as far away as Nova Scotia in the north to Suriname in the 
south, and from Vera Cruz in the west to Russia and Madagascar in the east.  When it 
benefited them, Barbadian planters and merchants openly disobeyed government 
regulations to illegally trade with foreign nations, oftentimes in collusion with those 
specifically sent by London to protect the metropole’s interests.  Yet, the extant 
records also show that these same Barbadians realized the value of working within 
England’s mercantilist system.  When the conditions allowed for it, they took 
advantage of the metropole’s guaranteed markets, chartered monopolies, government 
regulations, and naval protection that often led to vast quantities of goods at low 
prices and competitive rates for exported sugars.   
Thus, this dissertation offers a new model of the elite Barbadians’ 
relationship with the metropole that consequently challenges both the traditional 
mercantilist view of the island as a well-ordered and obedient plantation society that 
relied almost exclusively on England for supplies, protection, and markets, as well as 
the newer interpretation of Barbados as a center of free trade within an extremely 
porous and openly transnational Caribbean Sea.  Existing at opposite ends of the 
economic spectrum, neither approach effectively captures the nuance that 
realistically defined the trading relationship between the island and the metropole.  
Instead, the records show that late seventeenth-century Barbadian planters and 
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merchants inadvertently created a new economic mentality that was capitalist in 
nature, that operated according to their terms, and that was built around the idea of 
developing greater levels of self-sufficiency.  Yet, it simultaneously continued to 
take advantage of the government regulations and policies that best suited their own 
goals, showing that they at least partially believed in England’s imperial vision.  This 
allowed them, as Puckrein and the Bridenbaughs both note, to create a dynamic and 
creolized society that transformed, developed, and matured ‘in response to [the] 
wars, rebellions, and crop failures’ that defined life in the Caribbean.
31
  This attitude 
helped to bring about a peak moment of trade, production, wealth, and power that 
resulted in a Barbadian society that was far more adaptable and responsive to change 
than the one that Littleton had mythologized in his infamous pamphlet.   
 
Part II: The Sources 
 
 In order to offer a more well-rounded perspective of late-seventeenth century 
Barbadian society, this dissertation utilizes a variety of different source types from 
archives in the United Kingdom, Barbados, and the United States.  The Naval 
Officers’ Returns for Barbados, stored at the National Archives in Kew (henceforth 
TNA), provide a survey of the island’s import and export trade as recorded by the 
Naval Officer and represent the most important source used in this work.   First 
established in the Navigation Acts of 1673, the Council for Trade and Plantations 
introduced Naval Officers to the colonies in an effort to improve enforcement of the 
previous Acts passed in 1660 and 1663.  Appointed by the English Commissioners 
and placed at the head of a staff that consisted of collectors, surveyors, and surveyors 
general, the Naval Officers monitored the collection of the island’s plantation duties 
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and worked to eliminate illegal commerce.
32
  They kept quarterly shipping lists 
which cataloged vessels entering and leaving colonial ports in order to better track 
the 4.5% duty placed on all enumerated goods produced in and exported from 
Barbados.  In their most complete form, the Returns include information on dates of 
entry and clearance, ship’s name, home port, tonnage, ship build, captain’s name, 
number of guns, imported goods being carried, last port of clearance, next destination 
, and the plantation goods exported by each vessel.
 33
   
 Unfortunately, the Naval Office Returns suffer from a variety of 
shortcomings.  First starting in October of 1679, they are incomplete, with significant 
gaps existing between 1680 and 1700, especially during the Nine Years War. All 
records are missing for 1693 and 1694, as are at least 50% of the returns for 1689, 
1692, 1695, and 1699.  Overall, only 48 out of a possible 84 returns (57%) have 
survived for this 21 year period.   Moreover, the information given for each recorded 
ship varies over time.  Early entries contain only the essential facts for each voyage, 
including the date, ship name, origin, captain’s name, and the goods that the ship was 
carrying.  The government introduced the tonnage of each ship in the last quarter of 
1680, the next port of call and island exports in 1688, the number of cannon on each 
ship with the outbreak of war in 1689, and build in 1690.  The Returns also do not 
provide any value for the goods being imported or exported and use various units of 
measure for the volume or weight of each item.  These amounts fluctuated 
dramatically based on the good and the size of the container used to ship it.  As 
freight was usually charged per container rather than by weight, the planters 
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regularly exceeded the traditional expectation that a hogshead of sugar contained 500 
pounds in an effort to minimize freight expenses.  Furthermore, many of the units of 
measure provide little detail concerning the actual quantity of a specific good.  The 
Returns contain such vague terminology as ‘a parcel,’ or ‘some,’ or just a list of the 
type of merchandise present on a ship (ex. ‘wood, staves, hoops, horses’).  Finally, 
and most importantly, the Returns only provide information on legal trade and ignore 
that which was not compliant with the Navigation Acts, a value that was certainly 
substantial.  Thus, all calculations that I have made in this dissertation represent 
minimums, as the actual quantity of imports and exports were probably much higher 
than the figures offered below. However, while the Naval Officers’ Returns are a 
severely limited source, they represent the best evidence available on Barbadian 
commerce during the 1680s and 1690s, and can offer a valuable indication of the 
scale and direction of legal trade for late seventeenth-century Barbados. 
 David Eltis et al’s’ Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (henceforth 
TASTDB) represents another important source used throughout this dissertation.  This 
online database incorporates more than 40 years of archival research and brings 
together images, maps, voyage logs, and other records of nearly 35,000 transatlantic 
slave ship crossings, laden with 10,125,456 enslaved Africans, which occurred over a 
352 year period between 1514 and 1866.  While many countries involved in the slave 
trade suffered from spotty administrative record-keeping throughout the late-
seventeenth century, England’s archives are particularly rich for this period, as the 
RAC carefully recorded information on its transactions in both Africa and the 
colonies.  For most Company owned vessels, the average English database entry lists 
the captain’s name, ship owner, make of the vessel, departure and arrival dates, costs 
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of the average enslaved individual, gender, days in the Middle Passage, ports of 
departure, region of enslaved purchase, and general outcome of the voyage.  When 
taken together, this information offers historians a broad picture of the economic and 
political dimensions of the slave trade and can be manipulated to show how the 
Atlantic-wide movement of enslaved labor affected specific locations, such as 
Barbados. 
 Like the Naval Office Returns, the TASTDB is also an imperfect source, 
containing two important flaws.  The biggest obstacle is that there is still data 
missing and much of what does exist must rely on calculated assumptions.  
According to Eltis: 
‘Because few voyages in the historical record contain complete 
information on the routes taken and the captives carried, we have to 
surmise where the vessel went and how many slaves it carried. Often 
we know where the voyage intended to go but not whether it actually 
arrived. For other voyages we might know the numbers purchased but 
not the number sold or vice versa, or in some cases we know only the 




As such, with many of the voyages missing information, most of the conclusions 
drawn from the database are conjecture at best.  The second weakness of the database 
centers on an uncertainty of ‘how many voyages are missing,’ as some ‘slave vessels 
did make voyages without leaving any historical trace of their activities,’ especially 
before 1680.
35
  Some of the gaps in the data are to be expected, as the interloper trade 
is particularly hard to trace.  When available, interloping statistics are included in 
period totals throughout this dissertation.  Yet, these are still fairly rare and all 
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subsequent calculations will therefore be less than the actual numbers involved in the 
trade.   
 Other omissions, however, are less expected and consist of RAC ships that 
have fallen through the gaps.  Fortunately, historians can turn to three other sources 
in order to piece together the remaining legal slave trade.  The first is the 
aforementioned Naval Office Returns.  Since the English viewed the enslaved as an 
imported good, the island’s Naval Officer recorded the number of Africans that 
arrived on board each ship.  The second source is the RAC’s Homeward Invoice 
Records (T 70/938-949).  Filled out by the island’s RAC agents, these documents 
kept track of arriving ships and the enslaved individuals they carried, as well as the 
outcome of the auctions held in Bridgetown.  Letters and transcripts from the RAC 
agents in Barbados to Company officials in London (T 70/1-16 and T 70/75) provide 
an additional perspective of the slave trade.  These letters, however, have mixed 
value, as they often deviate from strictly discussing matters of direct concern to the 
RAC.  Instead, island agents often shared general island gossip, including food and 
crop prices, weather, health, and the occurrence of interesting or unusual events.  
Hence, they only occasionally contain information concerning the quotidian business 
details surrounding the slave trade.  They are, however, a useful source for the 
manner in which they discuss island life and, consequently, provide historians with a 
limited, but important, window into how illicit trade operated.  Thus, unlike other 
historiographical accounts of the Barbadian slave trade, this dissertation combines 
the RAC’s letters and transcripts with the Homeward Invoice Records, the Naval 
Office Returns, and the trips archived in the TASTDB to provide a more accurate 
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account of the size, scope, and flow of the movement of enslaved African labor to 
Barbados during the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. 
This dissertation also uses four surviving censuses from Barbados that cover 
the 35 years between 1680 and 1715.  Conducted in 1679, 1683, 1711, and 1715, and 
referenced by the year in which they reached London (ie. 1680, 1684, 1712, and 
1716), these documents are of varying completeness and can often contain unique 
information.  The most famous of the Barbadian censuses is the aforementioned 1680 
version, ordered by Sir Jonathon Atkins in accordance with the Council of Trade and 
Plantations’ demand for information on the island. This is the most complete of the 
four censuses, as it contains a detailed account of the number of acres, indentured 
servants, and enslaved Africans owned by each landholder in Barbados, the total 
baptisms, deaths, and marriages that took place in each parish during the year, and a 
precise list of those emigrating.
36
  The 1684 version, implemented by Governor 
Richard Dutton, is less comprehensive overall, but includes the numbers of sugar 
works on the island, free white population totals, and the specific households in each 
parish, while also providing a meticulous breakdown of Barbados’ entire 
government.  This document serves as the most ‘economic’ of the censuses, as it 
contains a wider variety of commercial information that includes the duties collected 
both on imported liquor and sugar, shipping records, and the number of enslaved 
Africans and indentured servants imported into the island over the course of the 
year.
37
   
The two post-1700 censuses do not match the demographic detail of earlier 
examples, but both documents are useful for analyzing the island’s population totals.  
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The 1712 census, collected by Governor Robert Lowther, includes three fields of 
particular interest.  The census includes the first report on the number of enslaved 
Africans ‘fitt to Bear armes,’ a trend that represented changing views on the trust 
given to this segment of the population, and encloses a tally of the number of horses 
in each parish.
38
  Finally, the 1716 census, also ordered by Robert Lowther, is the 
least informative of the four, only providing figures for the white population, the 
total number of enslaved Africans imported into Barbados, and an inventory of the 
number of weapons available throughout the island.
39
   
These censuses are important sources for the modern historian, as they 
provide distinct windows into the lives of the inhabitants of Barbados at four specific 
and important moments in the colony’s history.  Dunn, famous for his work on the 
1680 census, maintains that they are especially important to the island’s 
historiography because of the insight they offer into the influence and power of the  
elite planters and ‘how they dominated the island’ both economically and politically 
during this period.
40
  In reality, though, their importance actually lies in the fact that 
they provide a passing glimpse into the lives of the17,000 other white inhabitants of 
Barbados.  While this information is often limited, they do appear as property 
holders, members of the militia, and as a part of the marriage, baptism, and burial 
totals, proving that they did exist as vital members of this colonial society.  
Moreover, they emphasize the fact that thousands of white families labored on both 
medium and small farms, growing many of the provisions and raising much of the 
livestock that helped the wealthy thrive, while others lived in towns and villages as 
artisans, seamen, or merchants.  The 1716 census even includes the ages of each 
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white Barbadian, proving that many had been permanent residents on the island for 
years, if not decades.
41
 
Yet, the censuses also suffer from a variety of shortcomings, the most crucial 
of which is the standard information that can be missing.  The 1680 census, for 
example, famously contains no population figures for either the free or unfree white 
inhabitants of the island and lacks important import and export statistics.  It is also 
missing a list of those individuals who immigrated to the island, as well as the 
number of windmills or sugar works in use at the time.  The 1712 census also does 
not record indentured servants and, strangely, has no data for Christ Church, one of 
the island’s largest and most productive parishes.  The 1716 census conveniently 
breaks down the free white population by gender and age, but offers no demographic 
information for the other social groups living on the island.  Other figures are 
purposefully inaccurate.  Atkins’ census, for example, reported that only 51 ships 
arrived at Bridgetown in 1679, a figure that the Lords of Trade and Plantations 
instantly recognized as ‘a mistake,’ as in most years ‘above 200 generally trade from 
Barbadoes every year and in one year 270.’
42
  It is also well-known that many 
planters underreported the amount of land they owned and the laborers that they 
enslaved in order to avoid costly taxes.
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  Thus, while the four censuses relevant to 
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this study provide a bevy of useful demographical statistics for late-seventeenth and 
early-eighteenth century Barbados, these numbers also must be analyzed with care, 
as, like most other sources, they only offer the data that the elite planters and 
merchants wanted to make public and, therefore, stop short of painting a truly 
accurate portrayal of the island’s social composition. 
 Maps have also been used in this project, as they provide a unique look at 
how contemporaries saw Barbados and what features they viewed as important and 
worth depicting.  Ever since Richard Ligon first published his own amateur sketch of 
Barbados in 1657, new editions of the island’s cartographic features regularly 
appeared in London.  Five maps survive for the fifty-two-year period between 1670 
and 1722.  The majority of these are unimportant to modern historians, as they 
contain little that differentiates them from one another and often appear to be updated 
copies of older versions.
44
  Two maps, however, contain especially valuable 
information and represent useful sources in any examination of Barbados.  The first 
of these is Philip Lea’s 1685 map, which not only accurately depicts the island’s 
geographical features, but also includes the location of each major plantation, as well 
as who owned it, how many mills were on each property, and whether they were 
cattle, wind, or water mills.
45
  A 1722 map, surveyed by William Mayo between 
1717 and 1721, similarly depicts every major planter and the number and type of 
mills each one owned, but offers a better map of Bridgetown and an index that aids 
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in finding specific planters.
46
  These two maps, when combined with the acreage 
figures present in the 1680 census, allow for a more accurate insight into planter 
settlement patterns, including how Barbadian planters utilized space, and the manner 
in which the population moved and changed over time.   
The only significant drawback to the Lea and Mayo maps are that they 
provide limited context for the information that they contain.  It is unclear how 
representative the maps are of the greater planter population, as the number of 
planted acres needed for inclusion was not defined.  Furthermore, the maps make 
inexact references to the plantations depicted, providing only a last name to signify 
ownership.  In some cases, this becomes confusing and difficult to track, as different 
generations of families held land throughout the island and deciphering who lived on 
each plantation can become complicated without very specific knowledge of 
Barbados’ genealogical history.  Finally, Mayo’s 1722 map is in fairly bad shape 
and, while not illegible, can be hard to read in some places.   
The final social sources used in this dissertation are the white islanders’ wills 
and deeds and general parish documents, both of which are stored in the Department 
of Archives in Barbados (henceforth DAB).  The wills and deeds are the more 
important of the two for this project, as the occasional inventories inserted into an 
otherwise formulaic legal script provide information about the types and quantities of 
goods owned by rich, middling, and poor white landowners.  While these inventories 
contained varying amounts of description, some included specific details of the 
different buildings on the property, and the name, number and value of each enslaved 
African, indentured servant, and any livestock present on the farm or plantation.  
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This dissertation contains information from over 40 inventories, culled from an 
examination of hundreds of wills and deeds between the years 1682 and 1696.  Since 
these documents exist for individuals from all social classes, they provide a 
particularly useful insight into the lives of the non-elite white population, a group 
that rarely appears in island records.  Yet, as existing inventories from poor and 
middling farmers and planters appear less frequently than those created by the elite, 
the figures are not completely representative of the Barbadian population and again 
emphasize the small number of wealthy merchants and planters at the expense of the 
poorer majority. 
The general parish records used in this dissertation include the historical 
marriage, baptism, and burial registers kept in Barbados.  While all three provide an 
important insight into life on the island, the latter are most useful for this specific 
project, as they add quantitative proof regarding the spread of disease and whether it 
affected the white population as dramatically as many contemporary sources attest.  
Although the majority of parish records for the seventeenth century have not 
survived, three parishes, St. Michael’s, St. Philip’s, and Christ Church, maintain 
almost complete sets between 1680 and 1700, while St. John’s run uninterrupted 
between 1685 and 1695 and then after 1700, and St. James’ begins after 1692.   The 
late start of St. James’ records is particularly disappointing since parish officials 
included the cause of death for those that passed from a diagnosable disease.  Once 
again, though, caution needs to be exercised with these sources, since the information 
that they contain is limited.  As an English colony, Barbados was nominally 
Anglican and, consequently, most parishes only married, baptized, and buried 
members of that religion.  Those who practiced another faith would not have been 
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included in any parish registry.  Thus, like most of the aforementioned sources, 
parish vestry records only suggest what life on Barbados might have been like during 
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, as they are often too incomplete 
and exclusive for historians to use to draw definitive conclusions about the island.  
Yet, when handled correctly, they can be utilized to provide a useful insight into the 
lives of a small group of islanders in a very specific region of the island.   
Overall, the sources combine to provide a window into what life might have 
been like on Barbados between 1680 and 1700.  While each set of documents 
contains a variety of flaws, especially in regard to their exclusivity and their lack of 
continuity due to the destructive natures of time, hurricanes, and humidity, they do 
manage to provide valuable insight into an otherwise isolated and enigmatic society 
that attempted to hide as much as possible from the metropole.  
 
Part III: The Dissertation’s Structure 
This dissertation seeks to prove three key points.  First, it challenges the 
established depiction of late-seventeenth century Barbados.  Instead of taking 
Littleton’s description of a plantation society plagued by depression and decline at 
face value, this dissertation redefines the era as one of growth, adjustment, and 
maturity for the island’s white population.  Living within a mature plantation society, 
Barbadian planters, merchants, and farmers experienced an economic peak moment 
during the 1680s, with more ships and greater tonnages arriving at island ports than 
ever before.  While the 1690s saw Barbados absorbed into England’s imperial 
conflict, the inevitable economic downturn that resulted for the island was, for many, 
only temporary and of limited import, as the planters and merchants rallied to 
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reestablish their high levels of production after the war’s opening stages by 
implementing a series of measures that paved the road to recovery and that, as the 
Returns prove, allowed the island to emerge from the bloodshed in 1697 with 
increased economic potential.  
Secondly, this dissertation shows that in order to defend their prosperity, 
Barbadian planters and merchants implemented a pragmatic, responsive, and flexible 
approach to Atlantic commerce, pursuing a policy that was neither as mercantilist nor 
as open and free in its outlook as previously argued.  These individuals were not 
driven by ideology and not interested in following any specific economic creed.  
Instead, they wanted to reshape England’s mercantilist rules in their own interests, 
insisting on moving goods in a way that first and foremost benefitted their own 
prosperity and survival.  Yet, imperial boundaries still mattered.  When all things 
were equal, most white Barbadians willingly traded within the confines of the 
Navigation Acts and gladly took advantage of the supplies and protected markets that 
the metropole offered.  Finally, this dissertation examines how the planters and 
merchants of Barbados utilized both scientific experimentation and innovation during 
the 1680s and 1690s to overcome the environmental and climatic difficulties of this 
era to such an extent that they remained at the forefront of English-Caribbean trade 
for decades.  Suffering from a variety of problems that included decreasing soil 
fertility, declining access to necessary natural resources, and consistently poor 
climatic conditions, Barbadian planters and farmers refused to let nature dictate their 
fate, and instead implemented a variety of creative innovations that increased output 
and reduced costs.   
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It is also necessary to stress what this dissertation does not attempt to include.  
Most notably, it does not seek to thoroughly analyze the social experiences and 
agency of the tens of thousands of enslaved Africans that lived and worked on 
Barbados.  This is not to say that this dissertation ignores the island’s enslaved 
population.  In fact, this work does not shy away from recognizing the brutal 
conditions and systemic exploitation that they experienced at the hands of their white 
masters when relevant and appropriate.  It also recognizes their integral role within 
the sugar production complex and acknowledges that it was a combination of their 
labor and knowledge of tropical conditions that specifically allowed for the 
emergence of the matured plantation society examined throughout this dissertation.  
Finally, this work looks at the enslaved as an essential island community and 
includes them in all analyses that touch on local health, nutrition, and supply.  Yet, 
no single chapter focuses solely on the island’s black population and its agency 
within a late-seventeenth century plantation society. 
This dissertation deliberately omits the plight of the Barbadian enslaved for 
three crucial reasons.  First, the purpose of this work is to offer an economic study 
that primarily focuses on the planter and merchant elite, with a smattering of detail 
and data from the lives of the island’s black and less-wealthy white inhabitants, for a 
very specific period of time within Barbados’ history.  While slavery represents an 
important element of any plantation society, this work approaches the inhumane 
practice through an economic methodology that has been filtered through the 
perceptions and biases of white Barbadian planters and farmers, which often meant 
that the poor black men, women, and children that arrived from Africa were 
dehumanized and viewed as little more than commodities to bought and sold.  Most 
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of the records consulted for this work portray them in precisely this manner, as either 
numbers in the Naval Office Returns or as prices in the Royal African Company 
Invoice books.  While this approach inevitably strips the enslaved of their own 
agency and humanity, there is an important purpose to this practice, as it does allow 
for an important insight into island life for both races:  By looking at the institution 
through a white economic perspective, historians can gain a better understanding of 
the size, movement, and detailed intricacies of the slave trade, the transformation of 
the ideology behind slavery on Barbados, and how white planters and farmers 
internalized the incorporation of a population of unfree laborers into their own world 
when it became clear that they were a required component of establishing a 
profitable sugar production complex.   
Secondly, this dissertation argues for the ‘maturation’ of seventeenth-century 
Barbadian society, a process that unfortunately did not really affect the island’s 
enslaved population in a positive or productive manner.  While they gained access to 
slightly larger quantities of salt fish, they ultimately did not benefit from the 
expanding trade networks and the great increases in imports, as few of these went to 
unfree laborers.  They also certainly did not profit from Barbados’ emergence as the 
largest marketplace for enslaved Africans in the Caribbean, as they became further 
dehumanized and commodified as a result.  Even more universal improvements, such 
as a better understanding of the island’s climate, environment, and diseases or 
technological advancements in the sugar production process, only made their lives on 
the island more difficult, as their better health allowed them to work longer and 
harder than ever before.  This realization, however, leads to perhaps one of the 
cruelest ironies of slavery: the industry and knowledge of the enslaved Africans 
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provided the money, understanding, and conditions that were necessary for the 
development and maturation of Barbados’ plantation society, changes that inevitably 
led to the creation of great fortunes and important political careers for many of the 
island’s white planters, merchants, and farmers.  In order to maintain this success and 
to keep up profits, white islanders were consequently forced to expand the practice of 
slavery, while establishing greater measures of control and oppression.  Thus, the 
enslaved, while largely responsible for much of the maturation of Barbadian society, 
helped to create the very conditions that allowed for both the intensification of their 
exploitation and their further dehumanization within a society that had already 
widely commodified them.  This leaves much of the black experience outside of the 
scope of a dissertation that focuses on the ‘positive’ maturation of a transforming and 
expanding sugar plantation society. 
  Finally, while Barbados has few works that appropriately cover the island’s 
economic, cultural, or political history between 1680 and 1700, its historiography in 
regard to enslaved culture and the black population’s social agency is particularly 
rich and diverse, as an array of authors have worked hard to show how the island’s 
unfree black laborers fought to establish a life that was at least partially built on their 
own terms.  Economic and social historians have frequently addressed the conditions 
of the enslaved on Barbados in a variety of different ways.  A few authors, such as 
Karl Watson and Pedro Welch, have looked at the trials and tribulations of black life 
and urban slavery in Bridgetown and how these individuals carved out a space for 
themselves in the metropolitan heart of Barbados.  Others, such as David Eltis, Jason 
Sharples, and Hilary Beckles have looked at how the enslaved often incorporated 
acts of both violent and non-violent resistance into their daily lives in an effort to 
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challenge white supremacy.  Beckles, Watson, and Welch have shown how both 
enterprising enslaved laborers and freed blacks negotiated ‘room to maneuver’ 
within the white/black relationship and were able to use this space to achieve control 
and power over their own fate and to better their own lives.  Finally, Jerome Handler 
has also published numerous works that specifically focus on the lives of the black 
population and that attempt to understand them as separate social beings.  His articles 
address their approach to food and shelter, as well as their understanding of disease, 
medicine, and the environmental world in which they lived. 
47
  Overall, these works 
highlight the many ways in which the enslaved created vibrant creolized 
communities of their own, and how they were able to establish, through the shared 
experiences of dehumanization, maltreatment, and exploitation, powerful local bonds 
that white owners could never adequately break.    
When this ample historiography is combined with the limitations of the 
primary sources used in this work and general overall paucity of enslaved records, it 
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becomes evident that a substantial incorporation of black agency within this 
dissertation would have likely consisted of either a general summary of the current 
literature or a forced attempt at inclusion that could potentially come across as 
arbitrary and ineffective within this specific narrative.   Thus, with these cautions in 
mind, it remains the goal of this work to depict the political and economic conditions 
of late-seventeenth century Barbados and to maintain a focus on the white planter 
and merchant elite, with some references to the island’s enslaved black, 
impoverished white, and middling farmer populations, but only when their 
experiences fit into its general argument and conclusions. 
In order to more efficiently examine the three aforementioned conclusions, 
this dissertation is divided into five chapters, the latter three of which correspond to a 
specific area of life that would have been of integral importance to most late-
seventeenth century white Barbadians.  The first chapter serves as an introduction to 
the island’s environment and climate and provides a detailed description of what 
these were like for those living on Barbados.  By using a combination of sources that 
includes the Colonial Office Records, transcripts and letters from the appointed RAC 
agents, and William Sharpe’s journal, a year-by-year reconstruction of the island’s 
weather conditions has been created to show what the Barbadian planters and 
farmers would have experienced throughout the era.  This chapter also addresses the 
profound environmental and climatic changes that occurred during the 1680s and 
1690s and how the island’s planters and farmers used a more scientific approach to 
understand these new conditions and to fix the problems that inevitably resulted from 
them.  The second chapter also concentrates on providing an in-depth look at late-
seventeenth century life on the island, but does so from a demographic perspective.  
42 
 
The 1680 and 1684 censuses form the backbone of this analysis, showing settlement 
patterns, trends among the different social classes, and the growth of the unfree labor 
force.  The chapter also provides insight into the changing perception and 
understanding of health and disease on tropical Barbados and utilizes the parish 
vestry records to identify specific health tendencies among the different races present 
on the island.    
Chapter 3 concerns the white Barbadians’ relationship to the slave trade and 
how it expanded and changed between 1660 and 1720, with an especial focus on the 
period between 1680 and 1700.  By 1680, enslaved Africans dominated the island’s 
population and formed nearly 95% of its workforce, making them an integral 
component of plantation life.  Over the course of the next four decades, the RAC, in 
conjunction with the work carried on by rival interlopers, annually delivered a 
considerable, but ultimately unknown, number of unfree black laborers to Barbados’ 
well-stocked market.  By combining information from known slave voyages already 
archived in the TASTDB with additional ships from the Naval Office Returns, the 
RAC’s Homeward Invoice records, and its letter book, this chapter updates the 
historiography’s traditional figures and posits a series of more accurate totals for the 
number of Africans sold.  These calculations are used to prove that the islanders were 
better supplied with enslaved labor, at cheaper prices, than any other island in the 
Caribbean.  Finally, this chapter utilizes the RAC’s letter books and Homeward 
Invoice records to show that the Barbadians were not simple pawns of a monopolistic 
company and explores how they attempted to manipulate and manage this trade on 
their own terms and to meet their own financial goals, especially in regard to the 
interloper and Spanish trades.   
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Chapter 4 addresses Barbados’ import and export trade and looks at its 
development and expansion during the late-seventeenth century.  This is done in two 
distinct ways.  First, by using data from the extant Naval Office Returns, it is shown 
that the islanders reached a peak economic moment in their early history by 
positioning themselves at the nexus of a complex system of trading networks and 
relationships that spread across the Atlantic world by the 1680s.  The Revolution of 
1688 and the ensuing Nine Years War, however, challenged these connections and 
resulted in a temporary halt to the expansion of trade.  This research shows, however, 
that the planters and merchants of Barbados quickly adjusted to their new economic 
reality in the early 1690s and reestablished a considerable level of trade through a 
combination of their own ingenuity and some delayed support from London.  
Secondly, by overlaying the economic data gleaned from the Naval Office Returns 
onto maps of the Atlantic world, as well as through the inclusion of a variety of 
graphs, tables, and charts, this chapter also provides a series of visualizations that 
emphasize how trade moved and shifted throughout the 1680s and 1690s. 
The fifth chapter provides substantial insight into the islanders’ various 
energy requirements and addresses their constant struggle to overcome Barbados’ 
limited resources and to attain the huge quantities needed to run the sugar 
plantations.  Both planters and farmers alike needed access to a variety of different 
inputs in order to successfully produce their crops. Obtaining this energy, however, 
became increasingly difficult for these Barbadians during the 1680s and 1690s, as 
resource depletion, growing competition, and the Nine Years War made previous 
strategies both risky and expensive.  One way to counter this was to find local 
alternatives to these larger imperial problems.  This chapter specifically considers the 
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levels of self-production present on Barbados during the late-seventeenth century in 
regard to nutritional energy, animal power, fertilizer, and fuelwood, and how they 
innovatively approached the task of accruing a part of what they still needed by 
manipulating their tropical surroundings, while also taking advantage of new goods 
that London had to offer.   
This final chapter is followed by a conclusion that briefly summarizes what 
this dissertation has argued and how it redefines the current historiography’s 
portrayal of Barbados during the late-seventeenth century.  The conclusion also takes 
a quick assessment of the island’s overall condition after 1700, especially in regard 
to its place within colonial trade and its relationship to the greater imperial system at 
this time.  Emerging from the Nine Years War as a strong and vibrant colony that 
remained at the forefront of the English sugar trade, the declining conditions within 
the island, as well as greater competition from national and international rivals, 
eventually checked this advance and levelled off production.   In time, these changes 
caused Barbados to lose the edge that had made it so unique and prosperous during 
the seventeenth-century, and forced the island into a role as a second or even third 
rank producer of sugar for the English.  Luckily for the Barbadian planters and 
merchants, though, it would take another two decades, a second long international 
war, and the continued development of rival plantation colonies before this occurred, 
leaving this as a problem for a future generation.  Instead, these planters and farmers 
stood at the center of England’s Atlantic Empire, and, because of the island’s peak 
economic moment and great trading successes of the 1680s and late 1690s, remained 




Chapter 1:  An Overview of Late-Seventeenth Century 
Barbados: Climate and Environment 
 
The island of Barbados, located on the southeastern tip of the Lesser Antilles 
island chain, appears, at first glance, to possess the expected characteristics of any 
other tropical island in the Caribbean.  It contains the same hot and humid weather, 
seasonal patterns of precipitation, sandy beaches, and tall, shady palm trees that were 
found throughout the seventeenth-century tropics.  It was also, however, plagued by 
the same dangers, as deadly diseases and destructive climatic patterns were also 
common features of island life and claimed the lives of many settlers.  Yet, Barbados 
possessed a series of unique geological and geographical traits that differentiated it 
from any other island in the Caribbean and helped it to become England’s first 
important producer of sugar in the 1640s.  Such initial success, however, eventually 
proved to be dangerous to Barbadian planters, as it led to decades of aggressive 
exploitation that, along with naturally shifting weather patterns, permanently 
changed the island’s environmental conditions and made sugar production 
increasingly difficult.  Since this dissertation addresses the maturation and expansion 
of Barbados’ plantation complex during the 1680s and the problems that threatened 
their profitable sugarcane agriculture throughout the 1690s, it is necessary to look at 
the specific geological characteristics and climatic patterns that led to so much 
wealth, power, and success for the Barbadian elite.  Moreover, it is also important to 
recognize how the environment and climate both dramatically transformed during 
this period and the additional challenges these changes brought to the islanders 
between 1680 and 1700.   
Barbados is a small island by Caribbean standards, measuring only 21 miles 
in length and 14 miles in width, for a total area of 166 square miles or 106,240 acres.  
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It is flat in comparison to most of its neighbors, as the topography slowly rises 
towards a central highland region crowned by Mount Hillaby at just over 1,100 feet 
above sea level.  Unlike many other Caribbean islands, this peak is not a volcano, but 
the summit of an elongated submarine mountain range formed by the subduction of 
the South American tectonic plate under its Caribbean neighbor.  Forced above 
water, this ridge exists as the chalky and rocky Scotland district that extends through 
significant portions of St. John’s, St. Joseph’s, and St. Andrew’s parishes.  The rest 
of the island is primarily made up of fossilized remains of coral and other organic 
compounds, resulting in a unique blend of soil that differs significantly from other 
Antillean islands.  Most of Barbados can be classified as rendzina limestone, a dark, 
grayish-brown or black hummus-rich intrazonal soil formed by the progressive 
weathering of the island’s carbonate limestone base.  It is frequently clayey, grainy, 
and often very fertile due to large amounts of potash in its composition from past 
eruptions of nearby volcanoes.
48
   
The first English settlers further contributed to this nutritional stockpile by 
their rapid clearance of the island’s forests.  J.R. McNeil highlights the important 
role of deforestation in Barbados’ initial fecundity: ‘For a century or two before 
felling, tree roots had been pulling nutrients up from deep beneath the surface; from 
depths which neither sugar nor cotton roots could ever reach.’49  The huge trees 
became ‘nutrient towers,’ storing vast amounts of minerals in their wood and bark.  
When felled and burned, an abundance of nitrogen, calcium, magnesium, 
phosphorus, and potassium entered the soil, mixing with the potash and volcanic ash 
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already present.  This created a new blend of topsoil that was unique to Barbados and 
exceptionally favorable for early sugarcane growth.  While the soil’s composition 
benefitted the early planters, leading to many quick and easy fortunes, it would 
become a limiting factor for those that came later, as the ash and potash-heavy 
mixture hid a remarkably thin layer of loam that was largely unproductive without 
heavy fertilization.50    
Location also played a significant role in the island’s ascendancy as an early 
center of sugar production.  With its position at the far eastern edge of the Caribbean, 
Barbados was geographically isolated from both the European Atlantic world and the 
rest of the Lesser Antilles island chain.  The nearest neighboring settlements, St. 
Vincent to the west and St. Lucia to the northwest, were both over a hundred miles 
away and sparsely populated for much of the seventeenth-century.  The nearest 
island with a significant population was Martinique, a French colony 140 miles to the 
northwest.  This isolation benefitted Barbados in a variety of ways.  First, it helped 
protect the island from rival European powers, as the natural westward flow of the 
currents made it exceedingly difficult and time consuming to approach from other 
Antillean islands or the Spanish Main.  Secondly, the North Equatorial current flows 
directly from Northern Europe to the southern tip of the Lesser Antilles.  As the 
easternmost island of the chain, Barbados served as a natural first port of call for 
many vessels traveling from England or West Africa, and became a key distribution 
center for goods, people, and ideas from throughout the Atlantic world.51 
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Finally, Barbados’ average climatic patterns also supported the planters’ 
widespread shift to sugar cultivation, as the consistent and predictable mixture of 
rain, heat, and humidity created the conditions that allowed the crop to thrive during 
the late 1640s, 1650s, and 1660s.  The weather on Barbados is generally hot and 
humid all year long, with an annual mean temperature that varies little between 
winter and summer months, ranging from an average of 28 degrees Celsius in July to 
26 degrees in February.  Nighttime temperatures generally only dropped by about 3 
degrees.  The real seasonal differentiation results from changes in the frequency of 
precipitation.  A normal year neatly divides into two distinct seasons: a dry season 
from January through May and a wet season from June through December.  During 
the dry season, rainfall averages 43.5 millimeters (mm) per month, ranging from 
January’s high of 57 mm to March’s low of 33 mm.  Planters used these five months 
of drier weather to harvest and grind their sugarcane, as wet plants were tough to 
handle and process.  Conversely, the wet season averages 147 mm of precipitation, 
with a high of 178mm in October, November, and December.  These seven months 
served as the perfect opportunity to plant cane, since the young sprouts needed plenty 
of water to grow.52  Overall, the island receives an average of 1,136-1,247 mm of 
rain a year, a moderate amount when compared to many of its neighbors, but ideal 
for sugarcane’s growing cycle.53     
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Map 1.1: Eastern Coast and the Scotland District, 1685 
 
Map 1.1: TNA, CO 700/Barbados3, Phillip Lea (1685).  This map highlights the predominant use of the 
windmill throughout the Scotland District, as there are only a few animal mills present in this part of the 
island by the mid-1680s.  Particular points of interest include three separate plantations owned by Roots, 
Richards, and Thorne that continued to utilize cattle mills during this era and William Sharpe’s plantation, 
sitting on a hill just to the west of the Scotland district. 
Another important climatic trait unique to Barbados was the northeast trade 
winds that regularly swept across the island.  Traveling at moderate speeds 
throughout much of the year, these winds carry great quantities of advective energy 
and help control the rains that fall on the island.  Most planters realized the energy 
inherent in these winds and, by the 1680s, had built large windmills in an effort to 
capture and convert the near-constant breeze into a source of power for the cane-
crushing rollers, consequently freeing the islanders from a reliance on expensive 
animals.  According to Philip Lea’s 1685 map of the island, which details the number 
and type of mills each planter owned, the island’s 314 plantations contained 412 total 
windmills.  In comparison, planters maintained only 35 animal powered mills and, 
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due to the near-complete lack of rivers, no water mills.54  Map 1.1, showing St. 
Joseph’s and St. Andrew’s parishes from Lea’s map, depicts the omnipresence of the 
windmill, as almost all plantations have at least one, while the wealthy, such as 
Richard Rich, Thomas Merrick, or George Andrews, might have two or three.  Thus, 
as the only other English island besides Antigua to receive consistent, moderate 
winds, the Barbadians found themselves with a competitive advantage in the sugar 
trade, which the island’s planter’s gladly utilized in an effort to both save money and 
maximize their production capabilities.    
In order to provide a more detailed look at the island’s ‘normal’ weather 
conditions, the wind and rain patterns for a four month period in 1680 will be 
addressed in greater depth.  In general, 1680 represented a climatically stable year, 
with weather that was ‘well and peaceable’ overall.  Since the island’s planters and 
farmers witnessed such unremarkable weather patterns, few other climatic 
descriptions exist.  Luckily, Colonel William Sharpe, a wealthy planter owning 480 
acres of land split between St. John’s and St. Thomas’ parishes, kept a journal in 
which he recorded the daily weather conditions for a 128 day period from 18 April to 
the 24 August.  Asked to experiment with a barometer given to him by the Royal 
Academy, Sharpe diligently cataloged the wind speed, intensity of rainfall, and 
barometric pressure for each day.  Graphs 1.1 and 1.2 show the results of his 
observations and can be used to suggest what a ‘standard’ spring and summer might 
have looked like in late seventeenth-century Barbados.
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Graph 1.1: Days and Intensity of Rain, 18 April to 24 August, 1680 
 
Graph 1.1: RS, LBO/VIII, 127-134.   
Graph 1.1 shows Barbados to be generally dry from the middle of April to the 
end of August, with Sharpe reporting rainfall on only 50 of the 128 days (39.06%), 
with the remaining 78 days being completely dry.  To some extent, this is to be 
expected based on when Sharpe recorded his observations, as the first 50 days 
occurred during the island’s dry months and the record ended before the arrival of 
the year’s wettest months.  When broken down further, June proved to be the rainiest 
month, with 13 days of precipitation, and August, surprisingly, was the driest, with 
only three days of rain, all flanking the tropical storm/hurricane in the middle of the 
month.  When precipitation did occur, it was usually fairly brief and light. Sharpe 




















Graph 1.2: Strength of Wind between 18 April and 24 August, 1680 
 
Graph 1.2: RS, LBO/VIII, 127-134 
showers.’56  Only rarely did the Barbadians experience ‘many’ or ‘great showers’ and 
violent storms hardly developed at all.  Thus, Barbados, even during its rainy season, 
did not have a particularly wet climate in 1680, as some months barely saw 
precipitation.  When rainfall did occur, it happened on less than half of the days 
observed and tended to be gentle rain showers of minimal duration and intensity.   
Colonel Sharpe also made daily observations on the wind speeds he observed 
from his plantation.  The journal highlights the famous constancy of the wind, with 
there being only three days out of the 128 on which he classified conditions as either 
‘calm,’ or ‘no winds.’  For the majority of the sample, wind force varied between 
‘Little to Soft Winds’ (29 times) and ‘Moderate to Strong Winds,’ (72 times), which 
reflects the gentle and refreshing breeze that continues to blow across the island at 





















eight to ten miles per hour.  As spring turned into the summer rainy season, Sharpe 
witnessed a change in wind patterns.  It was during this time that he recorded thirty 
days of ‘Strong Winds,’ the second most frequently used descriptor in his journal, as 
well as 19 days of ‘Very Strong to Fierce Winds.’  There were also five storms that 
occurred in the early rainy season, with two classified as particularly violent and one 
as a hurricane, which swung to the north of the island and just missed making 
landfall in St. Lucy’s.  Overall, Sharpe catalogued significant wind speeds for 125 
out of the 128 days of his experiment (97.66%), suggesting that wind defined the 
standard Barbadian climate from April to August to a much greater extent than rain.  
Thus, Sharpe’s journal from 1680 demonstrates the moderate nature of weather in 
Barbados, depicting consistently mild conditions that rarely swung to extremes, and 
wind patterns that were always present, but that generally lacked the strength to 
damage the island’s agricultural infrastructure.  When combined with the expected 
heat and humidity of its tropical location, the meteorological situation on Barbados 
favored the large-scale production of sugar. 
Unfortunately, these conditions did not last, as by the mid-1680s, the 
Caribbean underwent a widespread meteorological shift that resulted in rapidly 
changing climatic patterns, forcing Barbadian planters and farmers to deal with over 
two decades of unstable and unpredictable weather that regularly threatened their 
annual crops.  While the cause is uncertain, many historians speculate that these 
changes resulted from one of the infrequent, prolonged cold spells that defined the 
Little Ice Age.  This environmental epoch, which lasted from approximately 1450 to 
1850, consisted of an unbroken run of cold winters and cool, wet summers that 
caused the global mean temperature to drop and remain about 1.5 degrees Celsius 
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below the historical average.  The Little Ice Age, however, peaked between 1550 and 
1700, with particularly severe spells in the 1590s, 1640s, and especially the 1690s, in 
which the mean temperature dropped by another 1.5 degrees.
57
  Scientists are not 
entirely sure why the Little Ice Age culminated in this latter decade, but some believe 
that a historically low number of recorded sunspots led to a sizable reduction in both 
the sun’s production of solar energy and its surface temperature.58   
Others speculate that the poor weather resulted from increases in the 
occurrence of El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events, in which easterly winds 
shift their trajectory and blow westward from Asia towards America, bringing with 
them cool air and large amounts of rainfall.  This would result in long, heavy rains 
that led to intense flooding throughout the Caribbean, especially during the summer 
months when planters would first begin to plant fragile sugarcane sprouts. 
Environmental historians postulate that ENSO episodes transpired in 1687-88, 1692, 
1694-5, and 1697 by one measure, and in 1681, 1687-88, 1696, and 1701 by another.  
The nearly continuous run from 1692 to 1697 is unprecedented—such events have 
historically appeared on average every 3.8 to 5 years—and matches up well with 
some of the worst weather experienced on the island.59 
 The resulting colder temperatures and wetter conditions dramatically affected 
the crop cycles that sugar planters and provision farmers relied upon for their living.  
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According to Geoffrey Parker, a 0.1-degree drop in temperature would equal a one 
day delay in the sugarcane growth cycle, while Karen Kuperman argues that the rate 
is actually twice this.60  Thus, in an average year during the 1690s, crops would be 
ready 15 to 30 days later than usual, with a 30 to 60 day setback in particularly bad 
years.  The ensuing delay would have been detrimental to both Barbadian planters 
and merchants because so much of their success came from a well-planned growing 
schedule that helped get their product to market before their competitors.   
The climatic instability also affected and altered the island’s valuable trade 
winds.  The nearly constant breeze that had been blowing in an easterly direction 
since the English arrived in the Caribbean, inexplicably changed direction to the 
north in the late 1670s or early 1680s.  In 1698, John Wallis, a member of the Royal 
Society, wrote to Dr. Hans Sloane about a conversation he had with Michael Glyde, a 
Barbadian lawyer, about twenty years earlier.  Glyde claimed that at that time the 
trade winds had started to shift their course dramatically, first moving ‘two or three 
points toward the South; but hath since viered gradually, till it became full East, and 
is now come to be 3 or 4 points to the Northward.’61  Governor Atkins also 
complained of strange and random ‘cross-winds’ that developed in late summer of 
1679 that caused government letters to ‘come so confusedly to me that it is 
impossible to answer them in order’ and prevented merchant from arriving to take 
away the year’s sugar crop.62  Thus, the culmination of destructive events during the 
1680s and 1690s, including the shifting wind patterns, increased ENSO events, and a  
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Table 1.1: Climatic Conditions, English Caribbean, 1680-1700 










Late and short of 
expectation 
c. 10,000 
1681 Greate raines NA Two Hurricanes 
The raines have put 
the crop back 
7,150 
1682 
Bad weather, much 
rain 
Droughts  drought Good Cropp 11,145 
1683 NA NA Fine weather 
Hopes of a Good 
Crop 
c. 14,000 












Long continuance of ill 
weather 
NA NA 




Long and unknown 
cold weather, drought 
NA NA 
Late, small Cropp, 
cane spoiled, no juice 
NA 













Had great crops NA 
1690 Dry 
Drier and hotter 
than usual 
NA 



























NA Good Cropp NA 
1694 Deadly Hurricane Hotter weather NA NA NA 
1695 NA NA NA NA NA 
1696 NA NA NA NA 9,856 




1698 Very Healthy Year NA NA A Slender crop 20,190 
1699 






Sugar Failing this 
year 
11,888 
1700 Weather fine NA NA 
1/3 of lands lie 
uncultivated 
15,399 
Table 1.1: TNA, CO 28/2,CO 28/3, CO 29/2, CO 29/3, CO 29/4, CO 31/2, CO 31/3, and TNA,  T 70/10 and T 
70/12.  The report of ‘two small hurricanes’ in 1699 comes from TNA, ADM 106/525/137, 27 October 1699, 
Jedidiah Barker to the Navy Board.  For each year, I pulled quotations from letters and communications sent 
primarily by the governors or Council/Assembly of each island and used the descriptions that shared 
conditions for each particular location. The fifth column, labeled ‘Sugar Production,’ specifically refers to 
Barbados and does not reflect the situations on either Jamaica or the Leeward Islands.  Sugar exports are 
calculated in tons. 
lack of sunspots, led to many instances of extreme weather and general crop failures 
that made the few good years stand out as anomalies.   
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Analyzing yearly weather patterns on a specific island during the 1680s and 
1690s is tricky, as no official meteorological records exist that date back to this era 
and accounts that do focus on the climate are limited and brief.  Nevertheless, a chart 
of the weather for the period between 1680 and 1700 has been pieced together by 
aggregating descriptions found in sources like the Colonial Office papers, the RAC’s 
letter book, and personal journals and letters.  Summarized above in Table 1.1, these 
records add further support to the claim that the island’s weather patterns underwent 
a significant transformation after 1680.  First, while Kuperman and Parker both claim 
that the 1690s represented one of the most severe decades of the Little Ice Age, the 
records appear to show that the 1680s were just as difficult for those on Barbados, as 
the 1690s lacked the prolonged stretches of miserable conditions that plagued the 
previous decade.  The longest stretch of bad weather in the 1690s occurred during the 
first three years, when a long drought was suddenly ended by a series of great rains 
that flooded the island in 1692.  After that year, there were ‘normal’ periods with 
good weather and exceedingly high levels of sugar production spaced between the 
more difficult ones.  In 1693, for example, Governor James Kendall reported of a 
year ‘never more seasonable,’ and in 1698 Governor Ralph Grey wrote of a ‘very 
healthy year.’   
By contrast, the Barbadians experienced a long stretch of cold weather that 
oscillated between exceedingly wet and prolonged drought throughout the 1680s that 
consequently challenged planter production.  In 1681, for example, the island 
experienced ‘great raines’ that ‘put the crop back,’ as merchants shipped only 7,150 
tons of sugar that year.  1685 was also a particularly bad year, as ‘very unseasonable’ 
weather and a prolonged drought caused a widespread ‘loss of this year’s crops,’ 
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while another drought in 1687, coupled with unseasonable cold, resulted in a ‘Late 
and small Cropp’ with the ‘Cane spoiled’ and producing ‘No Juice.’  The 1687 
drought was especially bad, as Edwin Stede reported to London that, ‘we are in great 
straits for want of rain, which we have been without for five months….Everything is 
scarce and dear, and we are in danger of losing the most hopeful crop of corn for 
these many years for want of rain to wash off the caterpillars. We are past all hopes 
of any considerable quantity of sugar for the next two crops.’63  The island’s RAC 
commissioners also wrote to London that year complaining of ‘miserable distresse’ 
in Barbados, with planters ‘terrified’ and ‘frighted,’ for an ‘island in a poore 
condition.’64  By 1689, the weather seemed to reach its nadir, with ‘supernatural’ 
conditions bringing a combination of storms, cold winds, and drought, although these 
surprisingly seem to have had little effect upon the year’s sugar crop.65  By this point, 
however, the planters were growing tired of the unpredictable conditions.  Littleton 
wrote that the contemporary Barbadians ‘sometimes…suffer by extreme Droughts, 
and sometimes by continual violent Rains.’  He also mentions that unexpected 
‘sudden Gusts’ of violent wind were commonplace during the 1680s and that they 
would often ‘tear or maim our Windmills.’66  As such, the uninterrupted run of bad 
weather in the mid- to late-1680s seemed to pose a great meteorological challenge to 
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all planters and farmers, as both struggled against a changing climate, strange cycles 
of intense rain and drought, and unusual winds. 
The second important point to take away from Table 1.1 was the increasing 
frequency of hurricanes across the Caribbean.  According to Michael Chenoweth, the 
historical rate for Caribbean hurricanes has been one every 2.4 years, with a major 
storm every 5.3 since 1638.67  However, from 1680 to 1700, thirteen hurricanes made 
landfall within the Lesser Antilles, meaning that one occurred every 1.61 years, with 
five of them (one every four years) classified as major.  And while only seven of 
these actually affected the English West Indies, four were large tempests that caused 
significant amounts of damage.  Two of these hit the Leeward Islands, which 
regularly dealt with large storms, in 1680 and 1689.  A third mercilessly made 
landfall in Jamaica in 1692, shortly after an earthquake sank most of Port Royal.  The 
fourth hurricane swept over Barbados in 1694, allegedly killing over 1,000 people 
and damaging or sinking at least 26 ships that were sitting helplessly in Carlisle 
Bay.68  For the Barbadians, the 1694 tempest represented the beginning of a decade 
of frequent hurricanes, as unpredictable weather seems to have aided in making them 
a regular feature of the island.  The islanders experienced two small hurricanes in 
1699, a third in September of 1700, a fourth in 1701, a fifth in 1702, and a surprising 
hurricane in 1705 that killed six people, damaged or sunk 21 more ships, and resulted 
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in ‘the tops of severall mills being blown off and plantain trees and the corn in many 
parts destroy’d.’69   
The Barbadian planters and farmers, however, had become increasingly 
effective at predicting hurricanes by this point and, besides for the 1705 tempest, 
experienced minimal damage from the steady stream of storms that plagued the 
island in the 1690s and 1700s.  William Sharpe’s aforementioned experiments, for 
example, showed that a barometer could be used to accurately forecast short-term 
weather conditions.  His lowest readings of 28.75 and 28.5 p/atm coincided with 
worsening weather over Barbados and the beginning of a hurricane just to the 
island’s north.  Thus, he concluded that sudden drops in atmospheric pressure often 
signaled the onset of bad weather and could therefore be used to anticipate 
approaching storms.  He further discovered that he could predict the length of the 
‘continuance of the violence of the storm,’ which ‘may be as beneficial as that of its 
approach,’ by observing how long it took for the atmospheric pressure to begin to 
rise back towards the standard 29.3 p/atm.  Satisfied with his scientific experiments 
and the barometer’s usefulness in helping his fellow Barbadian planters predict 
changes in the weather, he wrote back to the Royal Society that he was ‘sufficiently 
convinc’t of the Exactness of that instrument.’70 
Captain Langsford, an English seaman closely associated with Barbados, also 
took a more scientific approach to forecasting the arrival of bad storms.  Taking hints 
from the natural world, he wrote an essay for the Royal Society’s Philosophical 
Transactions in 1698 that described how his encounters with four major hurricanes 
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gave him the knowledge and ability to foresee their arrival up to two weeks in 
advance.  He began by criticizing the Barbadians’ traditional methods: sending 
messengers each June to the native Carib Indians in St. Vincent to request an 
advanced warning of the arrival of any storms for that year.  The Caribs, whom the 
white Barbadian believed used ‘Witchcraft and Councell with the Divel’ to inform 
their predictions, generally complied, arriving ten to twelve days before a storm 
formed.  This gave the islanders a valuable alert, as the Indians seldom failed in their 
prognostications.  Langsford, however, neither believed in the Carib’s mystical 
powers nor in their communication with the Devil.  He instead relied upon the power 
of natural observation.  His experiences showed that, ‘hurricanes come either on the 
day of the full, change, or quarters of the Moone.’  Langsford then recommended 
looking for numerous different environmental anomalies: 
That day you will see the skies very turbulent, the sunn more red then 
at other times, a great calme and the Hills clear of Clouds, or Fogs 
over them….Likewise, in the Hollows or Concaves in the Earth or 
Wells, there will bee a great noyse as if you were in a storme, and at 
nights the stars looking very bigg with Burrs about them and the 
Northwest sky very black and the sea swelling stronger at other times, 
as usually it does in great stormes, and sometimes that day for an hour 
or two the wind blows very hard Westerly, out of its usual course 
and…a great Barr about the Moone and many times about the Sunn.71 
 
He continued by maintaining that these signs were foolproof indicators of a 
hurricane and that by following them ‘I have not lost a saile, yard, nor mast’ 
in any of the storms that he encountered.72  While Langsford’s methods were 
not as scientific as William Sharpe’s barometric experiments, they do still 
show an empirical mind at work.  Together, both Sharpe and Langsford offer 
insight into a late-seventeenth century plantation society filled with planters 
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and farmers who were making an active effort to develop a greater scientific 
understanding of their changing environment and to take greater control over 
their own lives.   
Overall, the white Barbadians’ relationship to their environment was a 
difficult one during the late-seventeenth century.  In more stable times, they 
lived in conditions that promoted both sugar production and trans-oceanic 
trade, as the warm and moderately wet weather was ideal for cash-crop 
agriculture, while the currents and wind patterns created easily navigable 
waterways that connected island plantations to markets in both England and 
the mainland colonies.  However, the transformation of long-term weather 
patterns during the 1680s and 1690s, including a shift in wind direction, an 
increase in drought, unpredictable quantities of precipitation, and variable 
temperatures that dipped into unexpected lows, threatened plantations across 
the island and forced planters to seek a more scientific approach to the natural 
world around them if they hoped to remain competitive within the 
Caribbean.73  They innovatively attacked this problem by utilizing scientific 
experimentation and observation in order to better control their world and 
come to a more extensive understanding of their environment.  Sharpe’s 
barometric experiments and Langsford’s observations provide evidence of a 
growing realization that the natural world was not as mysterious and random 
as was once thought, and that it could be successfully understood.  This 
belief, along with an ability to redefine their approach to agriculture and a 
willingness to experiment with different techniques, which will be discussed 
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in greater depth later in this dissertation, allowed both planters and farmers to 
maintain, and occasionally enhance, their productive capabilities regardless 











































Chapter 2: An Overview of Late-Seventeenth Century 
Barbados: Demographics and Disease 
 
In 1641, Governor Philip Bell passed legislation through his newly 
established Assembly that legally divided Barbados into eleven parishes, while 
endowing each of these with an Anglican church run by a vestry empowered to 
oversee provincial affairs and parochial Justices to protect island residents.  These 
parishes became a point of identity for many white Barbadians and served as a local 
social and political center for those that lived in each region of the island.  
Furthermore, the Assembly and Council used them as an organizational tool that 
helped to facilitate and systematize their task of administrating the island.  The 
parochial divisions were particularly useful when the Assembly and Council 
attempted to collect specific information concerning island demographics, as parish 
vestries would occasionally be assigned to gather these local statistics in order to 
streamline the procedure and ensure greater accuracy.   
The censuses that derived from this process are useful to modern historians, 
since they provide quantitative data for a diverse group of inhabitants and can offer 
detailed accounts of important island statistics that range from population totals and 
details on land ownership to immigration and emigration registers.  This second 
chapter uses the valuable 1680 and 1684 censuses, as well as a variety of important 
vestry records, such as marriage, baptismal, and burial registers, to provide a 
quantitative view of life and death on Barbados between 1680 and 1700.  The first 
section in this chapter uses specific data from the two aforementioned censuses to 
create a demographic baseline for what Barbadian society looked like during the 
early 1680s through an analysis of settlement patterns and the island’s existing social 
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structure, while also providing evidence of continued expansion and development.   
The second portion of this chapter looks at vestry records and the Colonial Office 
Papers to evaluate the island’s relationship with different Caribbean diseases that 
threatened to upset the demographic expansion of the era and looks at how the 
Barbadian government attempted to manage some of these deadly scourges.  Overall, 
this chapter suggests that the Barbadians lived within a dynamic, creolized, and 
mature plantation society by the 1680s and were able to adapt to many of the difficult 
demographic challenges that they faced during the late-seventeenth century.        
 
Part I: The 1680 and 1684 Censuses 
This dissertation, covering the two decades between 1680 and 1700, takes an 
especial interest in the conditions of the island that led to both the expansion of the 
Barbadian economy and the peak moment that resulted.  As such, it is useful to 
provide a basic summary of the important demographic conditions and social trends 
on the island for the beginning of this period.  When examining Barbados in the 
1680s, many historians primarily rely on the famous 1680 census sent to England by 
Governor Atkins.  The comprehensive nature of the census has provided a wide 
range of valuable data that can be used to provide an in-depth quantitative 
introduction to life within a mature plantation society.  A quick analysis of the census 
reveals four important themes running through its content:  the Barbadians’ general 
settlement patterns, elite domination of political and economic life, the islanders’ 
near-complete reliance on enslaved Africans as a source of unfree labor, and the 
prevalence of a large free white population,  made up of both middling and poor 
planters, throughout the island.   
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Map 2.1:  The Island of Barbados: Parishes and Towns 
 







Table 2.1: Demographic Information Compiled from the 1680 Census 









St. Peter's 208 6,651 375 3,977 24 184 
St. John's 124 7,659 156 3,303 26 98 
St. Andrew's 109 5,597 47 2,248 22 87 
St. George's 122 6,155 78 2,963 31 91 
St. Lucy's 437 6,800 118 1,965 10 427 
St. Joseph's 88 4,868 72 2,072 15 73 
St. James’ 183 6,742 113 2,895 21 162 
St. Thomas's 192 7,485 226 3,396 26 166 
St. Michael's 1,031 7,141 715 5,071 23 1,008 
Christ 
Church 
410 12,979 178 4,723 36 374 
St. Philip's 407 12,158 115 4,702 39 368 
       
Totals 3,311 84,233 2,193 37,315 271 3,040 
Table 2.1: DAB, BS 19, 1680 Census. ‘Acres’ represents the acreage used by the colonists in some productive 
manner.  By 1680, the Barbadians had still not cultivated between fifteen and twenty thousand acres on the 
island, although some were not arable due to soil types, topography, or the construction of a town or village 
on the site.  Furthermore, ‘Large Plantations’ can be defined as those that are made up of 100 or more acres 
and/or have at least 60 enslaved individuals working on them.  Some wealthy planters owned multiple 
plantations in different parishes.  Francis Bond, for example, owned 105 acres in St. George’s parish, 120 in St. 
James’, and 160 in St. Michael’s.  I counted each of these as individual plantations, as they would have 
functioned as such. 
First, the census can be used to gain insight into how English colonists 
approached settlement on Barbados and how they utilized the different types of land 
available throughout the island.  Out of a total of 106,240 acres, the Barbadians 
owned and cultivated approximately 84,233 (79.29%) by 1680, signifying that the 
island was densely settled by contemporary Caribbean standards and had little 
available space remaining.  The most heavily cultivated sections of Barbados were 
generally located in the southern half of the island, where planters and farmers found 
ideal rainfall and highly fertile soil.  Unsurprisingly, many of the most successful 
planters inhabited this region of the island, as Table 2.1 shows that they owned 36 
large plantations in Christ Church and 39 in St. Philip’s.  Smaller planters followed  
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Map 2.2: Plantations in St. Michael’s, St. George’s, Christ Church Parishes 
 
Map 2.2: TNA, CO 700/Barbados3, Phillip Lea (1685).  Lea drew Barbados on its side, as the island’s western 
coast stretches across the top of the map.  Thus, the image in Map 2 depicts about half of Barbados’ southern 
coast.    
suit, as the two parishes each contained over 400 households and 12,000 acres of 
cultivated land by 1680.  As Map 2.2 depicts, the generally flat and fertile landscape 
of these southern coastal parishes became congested with planters and their 
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sprawling plantations, joining the hundreds of cotton farmers who also lived and 
farmed in this region.
1
 
Directly to the north, St. Michael’s, St. George’s, and St. John’s parishes also 
drew many settlers, as they were particularly renowned for their deep black and red 
soils.  The wealthy, especially, flourished in these three parishes, as they contained a 
combined total of 80 large plantations.  Two specific areas within St. George’s and 
St. John’s consisted of exceptionally coveted farmland and accommodated many of 
the biggest plantations on the island.  The first of these was found along St. George’s 
Valley, a six-mile strip curving eastward towards St. Philip’s Parish Church, and 
possessed deep, black soil of a high quality.  Here, a host of great planters from the 
island’s early settlement period lived on large plantations of hundreds of acres, 
including Robert Davers (305 acres), Robert Hackett (440), Rowland Buckley (380), 
the Willoughby’s (317), and the Sylvesters (515).   
The flat central highlands at the top of St. George’s valley formed a second 
area of particularly fertile soil.  This represented the most prestigious region of the 
island and many of Barbados’ most famous planters lived here.  Sir Peter Colleton 
(425 acres), Christopher Codrington (618), Henry Drax (705), Sir Peter Leare (336), 
John Hallett (163), John Hothersall (528), and Henry Walrond (424) all benefitted 
from the exceedingly productive red soil and high average rainfall that allowed for 
the production of high-grade sugar.
2
  Map 2.2 distinctly shows the ridge that divided 
the valley from the highlands as a small range of hills can be seen in the lower right-
hand corner.  Everything to the left of the hills sat in the prosperous valley, while 
those plantations to the right occupied the higher ground.  These two stretches of  
                                                          
1
 Patricia Molen, ‘Population and Social Patterns in Barbados in the Early Eighteenth Century,’ 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2 (April, 1971), 292. 
2
 Dunn, ‘The Census,’ 15 and Starkey, Economic Geography, 45-50. 
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Map 2.3: Bridgetown in 1722 
 
Map 2.3: TNA, CO 700/Barbados5, William Mayo, (1722).  This map shows the extent of Bridgetown in the 
early eighteenth century.  The map’s poor condition in the upper portion of the picture obfuscates the town’s 
main bridge, the swamp just to its south and the parish church to the southeast.  The map has been turned 
180 degrees to show how the town is actually situated along the coast. 
land contained seven of the ten largest plantations on the island, including those of 
John Peers (910 acres), Drax, Seger DeHem (632), Codrington, and Grace Sylvester.    
The five southern parishes also contained two of the four largest population 
centers on the island.  Bridgetown, located along Carlisle Bay in St. Michael’s 
parish, served as one of the largest and busiest metropolitan port towns in the English 
colonial world and was a vital hub for all Atlantic trade.  By 1680, it housed a 
population of nearly 3,000 people, had 603 separate households, and contained well 





  In 1700, a French visitor described Bridgetown as ‘fine and 
noble; its streets are straight, long, clean, and well intersected.  The houses are well 
built…with many glass windows; they are magnificently furnished.  The shops and 
the merchants warehouses are filled with all one could wish from all parts of the 
world.  One sees numerous goldsmiths, jewelers, clockmakers, and other  
artificers.’
4
  As Map 2.3 depicts, Bridgetown had three long main thoroughfares 
running north/south for the length of the town before stopping near a large swamp.  
Cheapside/Broad St. was the town’s primary road and widest thoroughfare, followed 
by Swan St. to the east and James St. to the far east.  A large number of smaller 
streets running east to west allowed access to the magazine on the eastern edge of 
town and the warehouses along the waterfront.  Bridgetown served as the primary 
port for the island’s sugar trade, with two large forts, Fort James and Fort 
Willoughby, guarding the entrance to Carlisle Bay.  The town also functioned as a 
primary market for the English slave trade, a home for the governor, who lived on 
Fontabelle Plantation just to the northeast of the town, and a religious center, as a 
large church sat at each end of Cheapside/Broad St.   
Oistins, the second important population center, was a coastal community in 
Christ Church that emerged as an important fishing village of about 20 households at 
this time.  Named after a plantation owner with the surname Austin, who Ligon 
described as ‘a wilde mad drunken fellow, whose lewed and extravagant carriage 
made him infamous in the Iland,’ the village possessed a small bay that could be 
                                                          
3 Michael Stoner, and L. Brett Brinegar, ‘Archaeology in the Heart of Bridgetown: Material Culture 
from the Mason Hall Street Project,’ in Welch and Woodville Marshall ed. Beyond the Bridge: 
Lectures Commemorating Bridgetown’s 375
th
 Anniversary (Cave Hill, Barbados: Barbados Museum 
and Historical Society), 95-96. 
4
 Father Labatt, as quoted by Pedro Welch, ‘Celebrating Bridgetown: The First 100 Years,’ in Welch, 
Pedro and Woodville Marshall ed. Beyond the Bridge: Lectures Commemorating Bridgetown’s 375
th
 
Anniversary (Cave Hill, Barbados: Barbados Museum and Historical Society), 20-21. 
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used by transatlantic shipping.
5
  Overall, the demographic data shows that the five 
southern parishes functioned as the economic, political, and social heart of Barbados, 
as they contained 63% of all island households, 55% of the cultivated acreage, 57% 
of the elite plantations, and 57% of the enslaved population.  Moreover, the regions 
numerous large plantations, proximity to the island’s government, and easy access to 
important market towns and villages also made the southern regions the wealthiest 
and most politically important part of the island. 
The remaining six western and northern parishes represented a wide range of 
agricultural characteristics and geographic growth patterns.  The parishes of St. 
Thomas, St. James, and St. Peter, the latter two located along the gentle Caribbean 
coastline, featured a mixture of shallow black coastal soil and sandy red soil inland 
that only allowed for limited productivity.  In most years, the island’s central region 
produced good crops, but the land suffered severely in times of drought and cost 
more to maintain than in any other district.  The in-land red soil was more 
productive, and, as Map 2.4 shows, most successful planters worked in the gently 
sloping eastern section of these regions.
6
  With less productive land available, these 
three parishes averaged 6,959 acres, 194 households and 23 elite plantations each, 
quantities far behind the five southern parishes, but significant nonetheless.  Planters, 
such as Sir Timothy Thornhill (521 acres), Benjamin Knight (300), Edward Littleton 
(205), John Sampson (327) and John Foster (240), could still hold considerable 
amounts of land and dominated the region economically and politically, but were 
generally less successful than their southern brethren.   
 
                                                          
5
 Ligon, History, 25-26. 
6
 Starkey, Economic Geography, 34-49. 
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Map 2.4: St. James’ and St. Thomas’ Parishes, Lea Map, 1685 
 
Table 2.4: TNA, CO 700/Barbados3, Phillip Lea (1685).  This map shows the congested nature of the Caribbean 
coastline in St. James’ parish.  The map includes the location of both Holetown and St. James’ Parish Church, 
as well as Sir Timothy Thornhill’s extensive plantation (521 acres) in St. Thomas’.   
Furthermore, individuals of such high stature were rare in this part of the 
island, and plantations tended to be smaller than in the south, with few encompassing 
more than one hundred acres of land.  The island’s second and third largest villages, 
however, could both be found in this region.  Speightstown, nicknamed Little Bristol 
and home to a significant international port that specialized in the shipment of cotton, 
and Holetown, the site of the first settlement, were located along the gentle 
Caribbean coast in St. Peter’s and St. James’ respectively.  In 1680, Speightstown 
had 95 separate households, while Holetown had 15.  
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The three remaining parishes are more geographically interesting than their 
southern and western neighbors, with their location greatly limiting agricultural 
productivity and altering their patterns of settlement.  The eastern parishes of St. 
Joseph’s and St. Andrew’s contain a combination of the hilliest, most isolated, and 
least arable land in the shared Scotland District, as well as the few remaining pockets 
of virgin forest.  This elevated region was also notorious for its heavily eroded soil, 
intense Atlantic winds, non-coralline landscape, and frequent landslides, causing few 
people to settle in either parish.  Those that did congregated in the sheltered valleys 
along the Atlantic coastline, where even the most successful local planters paled in 
comparison to those residing to the south and the west.  John Gibbs, for example, 
scion of one of the most important early white Barbadian families, barely held over 
200 acres in St. Andrew’s.
7
  Moreover, the neighboring parish of St. Joseph’s 
contained only 88 separate households and 15 elite plantations, proving that it was 
also comparatively hard to plant.  The most interesting feature of this region is that it 
became the site for an important local pottery industry, as many settlers took 
advantage of the substantial clay deposits found in the hills of the Scotland District, 
especially those near the village of Chalky Mount, and produced many of the sugar 
pots and drips used by island planters.
8
  Overall, though, these two hilly eastern 




The northern-most parish of St. Lucy’s was even more rugged and less 
conducive to the production of sugar than the hilly Scotland District.  The isolated  
                                                          
7
 DAB, BS 19, 1680 Census. 
8 Jerome Handler, ‘A Historical Sketch of Pottery Manufacture in Barbados,’ Journal of the Barbados 
Museum and Historical Society, vol. 30, no. 3, (November, 1963), 129-153. 
9
 Starkey, Economic Geography, 44-49. 
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Map 2.5: St. Lucy’s Parish 
 
Map 2.5: TNA, CO 700/Barbados3, Phillip Lea (1685).  This map includes the northern portion of St. Peter’s 
(All Saint’s) Parish. 
area’s shallow black soil and slight rainfall meant that the region often suffered 
severely from drought.
10
  Importantly, though, it contained more households than any 
other parish, aside from the partially urbanized St. Michael’s, and stood out as the 
most paradoxical part of the island.  With a soil that was thin and arid, it was nearly 
abandoned by the elite sugar producers.  As Map 2.5 shows, planters did establish 
sugar plantations along the rugged northern coastline, but few attempted to settle 
inland.   Instead, the island’s small and middling farmers, pushed out of more tillable  
                                                          
10
 It was possible to maintain large sugar plantations in this parish, as three out of the ten large 
landholdings contained over 300 acres.  Colonel Simon Lambert and Major Samuel Tidcombe both 




Table 2.2: Landholding Patterns, 100+ Acres (1680) 
Parish Land Owners 
Enslaved 
Africans 
Avg. Enslaved per 
Household 
% of Enslaved for 
Group 
St. Peter 21 1,503 72 48 
St. Andrew 20 1,395 70 65 
St. Thomas 24 2,147 89 66 
St. John 24 2,204 92 69 
St. Lucy 8 788 99 40 
Christ Ch. 29 2,858 99 61 
St. Philip 28 2,224 79 50 
St. James 21 2,163 108 72 
St. Joseph 15 1,533 102 72 
St. George 29 3,299 114 77 
St. Michael 20 1,919 96 52 
     
Totals 239 22,033 92 61 
Table 2.2: Puckrein, Little England, 148 
areas by the elite, flocked to Barbados’ northern tip, where they set up small farms 
specializing in provisions, livestock, cotton, and ginger. Other inhabitants were 
former indentured servants, or their descendants, who eked out a living as 
subsistence peasants on the infertile, rocky, sandy lands of the north.  Since many 
were Irish Catholics, shunned and distrusted by an English Protestant majority, they 
formed their own communities in St. Lucy’s back country, with smaller groups 
moving to St. Joseph’s and St. Andrew’s.  The resulting community of small farmers 
and minor cash-crop producers, with a correspondingly small enslaved population, 
likely gave this rugged area a feeling of social equality that was missing from most 
other parts of the island.
11
 
The census shows, however, that St. Lucy’s association with the small farmer 
was unusual for Barbados and that for most of the island a well-defined social, 
political, and economic hierarchy, based on land ownership, already existed by the 
                                                          
11
 Dunn, ‘The Census,’ 15-16. 
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1680s.  For this study, the free white population has been divided into three groups 
based on acreage: the planter elite (100+ acres), freemen (10-99 acres), and the 
disenfranchised poor (0-9 acres).  The planter elite formed the most important group 
and are represented in Table 2.2 as those individuals who held at least 100 acres of 
land.  239 households, most of which were centered in the southern five parishes 
(54.39%), fit this qualification, meaning that only 7.22% of Barbados’ landowners 
controlled about 60% of all cultivatable land.  Moreover, the planter elite combined 
to own over 59% of all enslaved Africans (22,033 out of 37,315), for an average of 
92 per plantation.  Entering this social group was difficult to do by the 1680s, as a 
majority of these planters were of second-or third-generation families, whose fathers 
and grandfathers had established successful plantations during the early halcyon days 
of sugar production.  40% of the elite’s families, for example, had settled on the 
island in the 1630s, while another 20% had arrived before the Restoration.
12
  As 
such, the planter elite, entrenched within a society that remained hierarchical in 
nature, quickly came to control both political and economic power within the island 
and handed it down within certain familial groups.  They used their position of power 
to access a majority of local resources, while jealously excluding the non-elites from 
sharing in the wealth they generated. 
As the census also demonstrates, the planter elite held command over 
Barbadian politics, repeatedly filling out the ranks of government throughout the 
decades.  Barbados’ political system, installed by 1641, was complex and extensive 
for such a small island.  The reigning monarch chose a governor and his Council of 
eleven wealthy plantation owners, who were to represent the metropole’s interests 
                                                          
12
 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 84-96 
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and protect the king’s prerogative on the island.  Working with the Council was a 22 
member Assembly, which was made up of two individuals from each parish elected 
by a narrow franchise of all men who held at least 10 acres of land (1,218 
individuals, or 67.29% of free white men could vote in 1680).  The Assembly 
functioned much like the House of Commons in England, as all laws originated in 
this house and it held considerable power through its control of the governor’s salary.  
To further counter the Assembly, the King chose eight individuals of proven loyalty 
to additionally represent the Crown on the island, three of whom were to serve as 
Barons, while the other five held the positions of Attorney General, the King’s 
Retainer, Auditor, General Escheator, and Chief Justice.   
Barbados also maintained five separate judicial districts that consisted of 25 
judges, 10 clerks, and 13 marshals.  The courts then appointed 24 Justices of the 
Peace to monitor behavior across the island.  Added to this total of 114 posts, the 
islanders also created a variety of other elected positions of lesser power and 
responsibility, including constables, churchwardens, vestrymen, and tithingmen.  
When combined with the 243 commissioned militia officers on the island, there were 
hundreds of available political positions open almost exclusively to the Barbadian 
planter elites who most ably yielded the required wealth and influence.  In the early 
1680s, 77 of the wealthiest 175 planters held at least one civil or military post, with 
many holding multiple positions in different parishes.  Archibald Carmichael, for 
example, held the positions of Deputy Auditor, Marshall for the court in 
Speightstown, both Marshall and Clerk for the court in the Scotland precinct, and 
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Captain in the militia, while Stephen Gascoigne served on the Council, represented 
England as a Baron, and worked as an agent for the RAC.
13
        
 The 1680 census also depicts the widespread use of unfree labor throughout 
Barbados.  As the first English society with economic and social systems completely 
built around the institution of unfree labor, the elite planters, small farmers, artisans, 
merchants, and urban dwellers relied heavily on both indentured white servants and 
black enslaved Africans.  By this decade, however, indentured white servitude 
appeared to be in severe decline, as only 2,193 remained on the island by 1684.  
Once the preferred worker for the island’s early tobacco and cotton farms, most 
plantation owners had pulled their white servants out of their fields with the switch to 
sugar, and either promoted them to act as plantation supervisors, or sent them into 
town to work as artisans or domestics.  Most planters and farmers viewed white 
servants with a mixture of distrust and disdain, as they were valuable as members of 
the island’s militia, but considered to be expensive, lazy, and ill-prepared to work in 
the tropics.
14
   
In 1685, the Assembly wrote a letter to England in which its members 
maintained that an ideal plantation required one servant for every 14.2 acres of land 
to maintain optimum efficiency.
15
  Few planters, however, bothered to meet this 
ratio, as only a single parish, St. Peter’s, came close to doing so, maintaining one 
servant for every 18 acres.   For the remaining ten parishes, there was little 
correlation between the number of large plantations and servants.  Unsurprisingly, 
the two parishes with the largest urban centers on the island had the highest 
indentured servant population, with St. Peter’s housing 375 and St. Michael’s 715.  
                                                          
13
 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 84-96 and NLC, Ayers MS 827, 1684 Census. 
14
 TNA, CO 1/37, 15 August, 1676, Atkins to Lords of Trade and Plantations 
15
 TNA, CO 31/3, 16 September, 1685, Assembly to Lords of Trade and Plantations 
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These numbers were far in excess of any other region on the island and combined to 
form just under 50% of the entire indentured servant population, suggesting that most 
white servants worked in urban centers by this time.
16
       
Unfree black labor, however, followed a far more predictable pattern, as the 
parishes with either the greatest accumulation of large plantations or important towns 
and villages had the highest number of enslaved laborers.  Christ Church and St. 
Philip’s, for example, with more than 35 large plantations apiece, each contained 
over 4,700 enslaved individuals, while St. Lucy’s had only ten and 1,965 
respectively.  By 1680, all planters preferred an enslaved black workforce, arguing 
that they were a more cost effective option than white servants and better suited to 
tropical conditions.
17
  Richard Howell and Richard Guy maintained the largest group 
of enslaved workers on the island, as they co-owned 405 on their 605-acre plantation 
in St. Michael’s, with Henry Drax’s 327 coming in a distant second.  Ownership on 
this scale, however, was rare during the 1680s.  Only the 16 most successful planters 
owned over 200 enslaved workers, with 59 other planters owning between 100 and 
199, and100 more between 60 and 99.
18
  Overall, the census lists a total of 37,300 
enslaved blacks across 3,311 households for an average of over 11 per home.   
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 depict how ubiquitous enslaved labor was for even the 
smallest landholders on the island.  Table 2.3 shows the ownership trends of the 979 
freeman, who owned 11,865 enslaved Africans, or 12 per household.  Many of these 
planters would have lived on small-to-mid size sugar plantations, especially in St. 
George’s, St. Joseph’s, and St.John’s parishes, where the average enslaved per  
                                                          
16
 Beckles, White Servants, 130-134 
17
 Edward Rugemer, ’The Development of Mastery and Race in the Comprehensive Slave Codes of 
the Greater Caribbean during the Seventeenth Century,’ William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 3 
(July, 2013), 429-458. 
18 TNA, CO 31/3, 16 September, 1685, Assembly to Lords of Trade and Plantations. 
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Table 2.3: Landholding Patterns, 10-99 Acres, (1680) 
Parish Land Owners Enslaved Avg. Enslaved 
St. Peter 90 1,190 13.22 
St. Andrew 43 633 14.72 
St. Thomas 74 982 13.27 
St. John 49 860 17.55 
St. Lucy 145 1,032 7.12 
Christ Church 154 1,503 9.76 
St. Philip 184 1,978 10.75 
St. James 57 727 12.75 
St. Joseph 31 550 17.74 
St. George 52 932 17.92 
St. Michael 100 1,478 14.78 
    
Totals 979 11,865 12.12 
Table 2.3: Puckrein, Little England, 148 
household reached over 17.5.   Others, often on smaller plots of land, grew 
provisions or raised livestock, using enslaved labor to help in this capacity, as well.  
Table 2.3 further suggests that the fertile southern parishes of Christ Church and St. 
Philip were home to many provision farmers, with lower averages of 9.76 and 10.75 
enslaved Africans per household, while to the far north St. Lucy’s, famous for its 
small farms, had only 7.12.   
Furthermore, as Table 2.4 shows, the 592 Barbadian landowners who had 
between zero and nine acres of land still maintained an overall black workforce of 
2,176 enslaved blacks, or 3.68 per household.  These ranged from an average of 1.96 
per landowner in St. Lucy’s to 5.03 in St. Peter’s and 5.06 in St. George’s. With little 
land to work, many poorer Barbadians found creative ways to profit from their 
unfree workers.  Some, for example, took advantage of the high demand for labor by 
hiring out their enslaved to planters that needed additional help with crops or to the 
parish or island government to work on a specific local project.  Henry James and  
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Table 2.4: Landholding Patterns, 1-9 Acres (1680) 
Parish Land Owners Enslaved Avg. Enslaved 
St. Peter 93 468 5.03 
St. Andrew 36 102 2.83 
St. Thomas 37 130 3.51 
St. John 28 127 4.54 
St. Lucy 78 153 1.96 
Christ Church 107 344 3.21 
St. Philip 89 279 3.13 
St. James 36 122 3.39 
St. Joseph 12 47 3.92 
St. George 16 81 5.06 
St. Michael 62 293 4.73 
    
Totals 592 2,176 3.68 
Table 2.4: Puckrein, Little England, 148 
John Swinsteed, for example, both had 40 enslaved Africans that they hired out for 
small fees, as neither owned any actual land on Barbados.
19
  Others would teach their 
enslaved different artisanal crafts and would help themselves to the money that the 
black craftsman earned.  Overall, these figures demonstrate a pervasiveness of the 
institution that was contemporarily  unique to Barbados, as all free white inhabitants 
looked to own at least one unfree worker.
20
  Besides their capacity for work, white 
Barbadians also saw the enslaved as an important investment, representing a better 
value than land due to their mobility and high liquidity.  Thus, almost all free white 
settlers participated in this institution, regardless of whether they maintained large 
sugar plantations, small cotton or provision farms, or, in the case of merchants and 
artisans, owned no land at all, making slavery a systemic institution on Barbados that 
permeated all social classes and formed the sinews that drove all types of manual 
labor on the island. 
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 DAB, BS 19, 1680 Census. 
20
 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 126-131. 
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Along with the returns from individual plantations, Governor Atkins also 
provided a glimpse into the island’s slave trade by including a separate letter 
attesting to the number of enslaved Africans transported to Barbados in 1679.  
According to these numbers, the Barbadians bought 1,425 enslaved blacks from the 
RAC for £20,520, or about £14.4 per head.
21
  While the price appeared to be 
favorable to the planters and would seem to signify oversupply, the RAC actually 
underperformed and sent Barbados an unusually low number of enslaved workers for 
this era.
22
  The reason for the RAC’s lack of effectiveness is unknown, but it is 
possible that 1679 was a particularly busy year for interlopers, and that the islanders’ 
demand was already met by the time the Company’s slave ships arrived in 
Bridgetown.  This would help to explain the combination of low supply and low 
prices.  It is also well known that Governor Atkins, in league with the elite planters 
on the island, often turned a blind eye to illegal commerce.  Thus, this letter offers 
one last view of the slave trade under the planter-friendly Governor Atkins before his 
replacement by the Crown with a series of progressively more loyal and monopoly-
friendly administrators.   
Finally, the census also reveals the considerable presence of middling and 
small farmers on the island and demonstrates how much of white Barbadian society 
did not revolve around the large-scale production of sugar.  While Atkins did not 
record the total white population, it can be reasonably inferred from the1684 census 
that the island housed approximately 17,000 free white inhabitants in 1680, more 
than in any other contemporary English colony in the western hemisphere except 
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  Importantly, it was the non-elite farmers and white 
townspeople that constituted most of the island’s free population, making up over 
90% of all households.  The majority of islanders lived modest rural lives, each 
owning, on average, 22.02 acres of land, with a median size of only ten acres.  
Middling and poor planters could be found scattered across the island in settlement 
patterns that were similar to the larger sugar plantations.  Numerous white farmers 
settled in the more fertile parishes of St. Philip’s, St. Michael’s, St. Peter’s, and 
Christ Church, while few lived in hilly St. Andrew’s and St. Joseph’s.  The only two 
parishes that differed significantly were St. George’s and St. Lucy’s, for reasons 
discussed above.   
Moreover, members of these two social groups held both land and labor and 
could use these to generate reasonable levels of wealth when compared to individuals 
of similar social standing in other colonies.  Thomas Richards, for example, owned 
only 40 acres of land and 27 enslaved Africans in St. James, but still produced 
enough sugar to require his own windmill and boiling house, and had enough 
leftover molasses to also justify a still house.  Richards’ operation was valuable 
enough to sell for £543 to Edward Parsons, a Barbadian merchant, in the spring of 
1692, an impressive sum for a moderately sized farm in Barbados at the height of a 
war.
24
  Furthermore, Richard Townshend, of St. Philip’s rented a 64 acres cotton 
farm with eight enslaved Africans for £87.5 per year, while Michael Wiley’s 10 acre 
provision farm in St. George’s generated enough money for him to build a 40 ft. 
dwelling house, a corn house, an extra kitchen, a hen house, a stable for his four  
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Table 2.5: Demographic Information Compiled from the Census of 1684 











St. Peter's 577 6,529 1,977 212 4,199 41 536 
St. John's 165 7,319 846 191 3,710 32 133 
St. Andrew's 172 7,049 946 109 3,374 38 134 
St. George's 200 9,884 1,032 274 5,221 48 152 
St. Lucy's 462 6,825 2,222 75 2,536 16 446 
St. Joseph's 151 4,825 845 90 3,460 20 131 
St. James 204 6,578 999 210 3,582 29 175 
St. Thomas's 275 7,738 1,854 258 4,070 39 236 
St. Michael's 915 7,514 3,203 451 5,663 25 890 
Christ 
Church 
425 12,854 1,854 305 5,605 39 386 
St. Philip's 510 13,400 2,365 206 5,181 31 479 
        
Totals 4,056 89,306 17,187 2,381 46,602 358 3,698 
Table 2.5: NLC, Ayers MS 827, 1684 Census 
cattle, and houses for at least five enslaved Africans.
25
  Similarly, thousands of other 
middling and small farmers, artisans, merchants, sailors, and townspeople labored in 
relative anonymity, and, like Richards, Townshend, and Wiley, made a decent living, 
while providing many of the basic provisions and services necessary for the elite to 
continue to grow sugar and pursue great wealth.   
Only four years later, Governor Richard Dutton asked for the parish vestries 
to conduct another census of the island in order to update the records of the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations and give them a more accurate depiction of life on Barbados 
under a new government and a more trusted governor.  This census is less 
comprehensive than its predecessor, but included important information missing 
from Atkins’ 1679 edition, including the free white population, the total number of 
operational sugar works, and a meticulous breakdown of the local government.  
Dutton also sent back details on some economic statistics, including the duties 
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collected both on imported liquor and sugar, shipping records, and the number of 




 Like its predecessor, the 1684 census highlights numerous themes that are 
worth mentioning and that depict how the island changed in only four short years.  
First, the figures depicted in Table 2.5, when compared to those in Table 2.1, reveal 
an insular society that was still expanding during the 1680s, as the census displays 
quantitative growth in almost every statistical measurement.  One key area of 
development was in the islanders’ cultivation practices, as they brought an additional 
5,073 acres of land into use.  With this increase, the Barbadians established 745 more 
households throughout the island, causing drastic demographic transformations in 
most of the island’s eleven parishes.  St. Joseph’s increased from only 88 households 
in 1680 to 151 in 1684, a 72% increase, while St. George’s experienced a 64% 
increase in households, with an additional 3,730 acres placed under cultivation.  St. 
Andrew’s also grew significantly in both acreage (26%) and households (58%).  
Interestingly, people moved away from the island’s urban center at Bridgetown, 
causing St. Michael’s population to drop by 11%, but to Speightstown, which 
experienced a 177% increase.  Oistin’s and Holetown evidently grew as well.  One 
draw to the smaller towns of Barbados, according to Dutton, was the refurbishment 
of many of the original houses, which were being ‘rebuilt with stone or brick and 
covered with tiles, slate, or shingles, and built after the English fashion for 
commodiousness and decency as well as strength.’  This rebuilding program suggests 
that the Barbadians were creating a permanency for themselves in these small 





settlements, and within the island as a whole, as the new homes were meant to 
withstand ‘time, fire, or hurricanes.’
27
   
The 1684 census also suggests that with the shifts in population, more sugar 
plantations also began to appear in the booming northern regions, creating balanced 
production throughout the island.  While St. George’s parish remained at the heart of 
the industry, with 48 sugar works, the number of mills in St. Andrew’s, St. Thomas’, 
and St. Peter’s also appear to have expanded significantly.  St. Peter’s possessed 41 
sugar works in 1684, the second most on the island, and St. Thomas, St. Andrew’s, 
and St. James’ now ranked third, fifth, and seventh respectively.  Consequently, the 
number of plantations in the south seemed to have either stabilized or declined 
slightly, as St. Philip’s, St. Michael’s and Christ Church remained approximately the 
same.    
The enslaved African population had also grown substantially by 1684.  The 
census shows an increase of almost 10,000 in the four years since 1679, with gains 
most pronounced in the regions of both high population and extensive sugar 
production.  St. George’s, for example, experienced a 2,258 person increase, while 
St. Andrew’s grew by 1,126, Christ Church by 882, and St. Michael’s by almost 600.  
However, while most Caribbean ‘slave societies’ underwent drastic population 
transformations that left many islands with enslaved African to free white ratios 
approaching a 10:1 discrepancy, Barbados stood as a meaningful exception.  Even 
with the massive influx of enslaved Africans, Table 2.6 shows that Barbados’ ratio of 
enslaved black Africans to free white settlers stood at just 2.7:1 in 1684 and did not 
officially push past the 3.0:1 threshold until the middle of the eighteenth-century.   
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Table 2.6: The Free White Population in Barbados, 1655-1748 
Year Free White Population Enslaved Black Population Ratio of Black to White 
1655 23,000 20,000 0.87:1 
1673 21,309 33,184 1.56:1 
1676 21,725 32,473 1.49:1 
1684 17,187 46,602 2.71:1 
1712 12,528* 41,970 2.48:1 
1715 17,018 NA NA 
1748 15,252 47,132 3.09:1 
Table 2.6: TNA, CO 1/30, 28 May, 1673, Colleton to Council for Trade, TNA, CO 29/2, 13 February, 1676, Atkins 
to Lords of Trade and Plantations, NLC, Ayers MS 827, 1684 Census, DAB, Pam. C283, 1712 Census, and DAB, 
BS 19, 1715 Census. The asterisk next to the 1712 population figures signifies an incomplete data set, as the 
totals from Christ Church were not included in the final tallies.  Asa fertile and well-settled area of the island, 
Christ Church likely had between 1,800 and 2,000 free whites (1,914 in 1715), which would push the 
population up to almost 14,500 and would have caused the ratio to rise to 2.89:1.   
These figures suggest that, while undoubtedly a ‘slave society’ by the 1680s, 
Barbados retained a significant white population throughout its first century that did 
not fit within the established stereotype of eighteenth-century plantation societies. 
These ratios were possible because the island’s free white population 
remained consistently high for a Caribbean plantation society throughout the late-
seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  Assuming that the 1673 and 1676 totals 
from Table 2.6 include the island’s indentured servants, which the sources suggest 
and which would have consequently added at least 3,000 more inhabitants to the 
total, Barbados’s free white population remained between 17,000 to18,500 for most 
the 42 year period between 1673 and 1715, regardless of the limitations caused by 
two wars, frequent outbreaks of disease, periods of unstable weather, and a 
preference for enslaved black labor.  The only exception to this constancy was in 
1712, when the census returns added up to only 12,528 free whites, although this 
total lacks the sizable figures for Christ Church.  Thus, the free white population in 
the period covered by this dissertation showed little change, as the 17,187 present in 
1684 was nearly identical to the 1715 total of 17,018, even though nearly twenty 
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years of warfare occurred between these two eras.  These numbers therefore suggest 
that modern historiographical claims of the island promoting white flight and 
representing a white ‘demographic disaster area’ are exaggerated, as a significant 
free white population remained on the island throughout its early history.
28
     
Overall, the censuses of 1680 and 1684 provide a varied look into white 
Barbadian society during the last quarter of the seventeenth-century and portray three 
distinct images of life on a Caribbean island.  On one hand, they provide the first 
quantitative look at a mature plantation society, with a few important urban centers 
and a small group of elite planters who controlled the political, economic, and social 
aspects of Barbados.  These leading planters welcomed the establishment of a fully 
developed ‘slave society,’ England’s first, where unfree black labor had effectively 
replaced white indentured servitude.  On the other hand, these censuses portray an 
island community with over 17,000 free whites, most of who lived rurally, worked as 
middling or poor planters and farmers, and owned unfree labor.  They represented 
the ‘truest’ depiction of a white Barbadian population: creolized individuals who 
lived their entire lives on the island, where they worked, married, had children, and 
died.  These were the representatives of a society that was now ‘part European, part 
African, and uniquely Barbadian.’
29
   Finally, the censuses show that by the 1680s, 
Barbados was flourishing as an economic and social power in the Caribbean.  Its 
white population appeared to still be growing, slavery was becoming more prominent 
across all social classes, and sugar production continued to expand in most parishes.  
Thus, by the late 1670s and early 1680s, the censuses suggest that the conditions on 
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Barbados were ideal for a peak economic moment to occur during the late-
seventeenth century.  
 
Part II: Disease on Barbados during the 1680s and 1690s 
While the 1680 and 1684 censuses generally depict a society on the 
ascendency, they also contain a startling series of statistics that reveal how dangerous 
the tropics could be for its inhabitants.  In 1680, for example, 1,058 burials occurred, 
compared to only 630 baptisms, for a ratio of 1.68:1.  By 1684, conditions appear to 
have become worse, as there were 1,026 burials and only 407 baptisms, leading to a 
troubling ratio of 2.52:1.  Contemporaries recognized the deadly nature of the late-
seventeenth century tropics and most realized how abruptly life could be taken by 
pestilential forces not yet properly understood by the island’s inhabitants.  In 1684, 
Thomas Tryon, in a pamphlet offering advice to English planters, posed a rhetorical 
question concerning the very real fear that gripped both black and white Barbadians: 
‘Do not we see how men are cut off by Diseases in the prime of their Years, and very 
few attain to old Age? Soon Ripe, Soon Rotten.’
30
  Tryon’s question would have 
likely been answered in the affirmative by many living on the island, as the threat of 
disease became one of the defining factors of life in the tropics.  Yet, regardless of its 
prominence, it continued to be woefully misunderstood by those who experienced it.   
Part of this confusion derived from the fact that seventeenth-century scientists 
still believed in a Hippocratic theory of health that centered on the existence of four 
humors that controlled the body’s overall condition.  Blood, yellow bile (choler), 
phlegm, and black bile (melancholy) needed to remain in perfect balance for an 
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individual to maintain good health; however, each specific climate created its own 
characteristic humoral mix, causing new arrivals physical distress while their bodies 
adjusted to a novel environment.  Choler, corresponding to fire, was understood to be 
exceedingly prevalent in the hot and humid Caribbean.  According to Thomas 
Trapham, a planter and doctor in Jamaica and author of the first English book on 
tropical medicine, ‘That Choler abounds between the Tropicks, is but reasonable as 
well as matter of fact; for the inflaming Sun must needs kindle its like on its nearest 
subjects.’
31
  The resulting sickness, and its accompanying discharges and excretions 
that most experienced upon arriving in Barbados, was believed to be the body’s 
natural adjustment to the new conditions.
32
   
To counter the effects of a rapid transition to a Caribbean climate, West 
Indians recommended that each new arrival undergo a period of seasoning, a one-to-
two-year acclimation cycle that prepared one for a healthier life in the tropics.  
During this time, a person could expect to suffer from serious illness, but in 
surviving this ordeal built up immunities to prevalent diseases and reduced the risks 
of catching others in the future.  The new arrival could also use this time to slowly 
adjust to the island’s unique dietary and work regimes and begin to accrue the 
knowledge necessary for survival.
33
  Timing was also important, as the Caribbean 
year had eight ‘healthful months…from the middle of September to the middle of  
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Table 2.7: Reports of Outbreaks of Disease in Barbados, 1684-1700 
Year Reports of Disease in Barbados 
1680 
‘It hath pleased Providence to send a great morality…which swept away many of our people and 
slaves.’ 
1684 Widespread reports of the dry bellyache 
1685 Great mortality among negroes and servants through small pox, fevers, dry bellyache 
1686 Small pox, violent feaver killed many of our best, belly-ache amongst all sorts of people 
1687 
Fever and ague among us, great mortality among Christian servants, negroes, and cattle, Small 
pox 
1688 NA 
1689 Bloody flux 
1690 Mortality among men has been little less violent than among beasts 
1691 Epidemic Fever 
1692 Sickly time, the island continues sickly, fever 
1693 In a Perfect State of Health (Winter), Sickly seasons, fever (Summer) 
1694 Increased...sickness...now rages among us, Bridgetown also is very sickly, fever 
1695 Sickness increases...with greater malignancy than ever, dry bellyache returns, fever, small pox 
1696 
Very sickly more than ever it hath been, the People die very fast in Towne and Country, very 
unhealthy 
1697 A succession of deadly seasons, the mortality among the white men had been very great 
1698 Fever 
1699 The island was sickly with the distemper that has for long reigned in these parts of the world 
1700 
The continuance of the pestilential fevers and great mortality in Barbados, especially among the 
negroes, had resulted in a declining trade, A Rageing and Violent Sickness 
Table 2.7: The information for this table comes from descriptions of island conditions contained in letters 
between Barbadian governors and the English government, now kept in the CO papers. The 1696 
descriptions, however, come from TNA, ADM 106/494/24, 26 July 1696, Reeves to the Commander of His 
Majesty’s Navy and TNA ADM 106/49/51, 10 September 1696, Reeves to Ibid. 
May,’ and four ‘unhealthy months from the latter end of May to the middle of 
September.’  For many, the hot and humid summer weather represented the perfect 
conditions for the rapid spread of deadly fevers caused by the ‘intemperate and 
pestilent’ midday summer air and the dewy moisture-laden nights that followed.  As 
such, it was best to ‘arrive some little time before those four months,’ as it gave the 
newest islanders a chance to begin the seasoning process, ‘so that the change of 
weather seldom affects them.’
34
  Surviving this period meant that one’s body had 
sufficiently adjusted to the new environment in a variety of ways: the blood would 
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have adequately paled and thinned, choler levels would have appropriately increased, 
and the four humors would have rebalanced themselves in a way more suitable for 
life in the tropics.
35
  Unfortunately, this theory of health was erroneous and, 
regardless of how long their seasoning lasted, those living in seventeenth-century 
Barbados continued to struggle with the new diseases that they encountered. 
The range of deadly maladies that destroyed the ‘peace of Mind, health of 
Body, and outward Estates,’ was vast, and included ‘the Stone, Collick, windy 
distempers, palsies, Cramps, Leprosies, Kings-Evils, Gout, dry Belly-aches, dropsies, 
Consumption, and an hundred other Evils of this Nature.’
36
  Table 2.7 shows that 
outbreaks occurred for many of these illnesses at some point between 1680 and 1700, 
a period that can be best organized into three separate disease cycles. The records 
show that the first, 1681-1683, represents a relatively healthy sequence of years, with 
disease existing only at the individual level.  After Atkins’ claims of a ‘great 
mortality’ in 1680, island reports and governor letters remain silent on the issue, 
providing no evidence of any epidemical outbreaks in the early parts of the decade.  
While the 1684 census hints at the possibility of the prevalence of disease, as the 
figures from the burial registers convert to a crude burial rate of 53 deaths per 1,000 
free white inhabitants, a surprisingly high number given the economic expansion that 
occurred during the era, contemporary sources offer no additional information and 
show that the planters had no general fear of an epidemic.
37
  Thus, it appears that 
Barbados was a generally healthy society throughout the early 1680s with few 
substantial outbreaks of disease. 
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The second period spans from 1684 to1690.  In these years, a myriad of 
serious illnesses occurred that infected all social and racial groups on the island.  The 
outbreaks began in 1684 with a bad case of the dry bellyache developing among the 
free white population that turned into a minor epidemic for ‘all sorts of people’ by 
1686.  In that same year, a violent fever also broke out, threatening many of the 
island’s ‘best.’  Enslaved blacks and white servants both suffered from a three-year 
period of ‘Great Mortality’ that began with a severe case of smallpox in 1685.  
Finally, after a year of respite, the ‘Bloody flux,’ or dysentery, swept through the 
island for a short time in 1689.  After this, the outbreaks of disease subsided for a 
few years, although the records indicate that 1690 saw large numbers of animals 
perish from an undisclosed sickness.  Thus, while many different lethal diseases 
infected the Barbadians during the mid-1680s, the epidemics were relatively short-
lived.  Table 2.7 even suggests that three out of the last four years of this period were 
generally healthy for the human population. 
The final phase of this period, however, stands out as being marked by 
exceptionally deadly and prolonged fevers.  Mired in an era of historically cool and 
rainy weather between 1692 and 1700, the records suggest that mosquitos flourished 
on Barbados and annually spread their deadly maladies to a population already 
weakened by war and the subsequent lack of imported necessities.  Starting out as 
mere ‘sickly times’ with epidemic fever in 1692, the island had become, according to 
Governor Kendall, a ‘Region of Death’ by 1693.  ‘It was a sad and Reall Truth’ that 
within three years of his arrival ‘one halfe of the Inhabitants have since… paid their 
Tribute to that Sovereign Prince of Terrors.’
38
  In 1694, illness had spread to 
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Bridgetown, where the new Governor, Francis Russell, also witnessed the destructive 
power of tropical disease, admitting that ‘it is the Misfortune of this Island’ that the 
fever, in conjunction with a new outbreak of dry bellyache, ‘hath swept away some 
hundreds’ of island inhabitants.
39
  By 1695, the island experienced a ‘greater 
malignancy than ever,’ and became ‘very sickly, more than ever it hath been’ in 
1696, with people dying ‘very fast in Towne and Country.’  The last four years of the 
decade saw little relief from the deadly fever that gripped the island and, by the end 
of the century, had appeared to have spread , with a ‘great mortality,’ even breaking 
out within the enslaved black community.   
  What made the rapid spread of disease so terrifying during the 1690s was that 
it seemed to affect people of all social and racial backgrounds; few could escape the 
wide variety of sicknesses that tormented the island.  The Council and Assembly 
calculated in 1696 that the enslaved population, which had previously ‘approached 
70,000… now appears to be but 42,000’ and the white population, almost 17,200 in 
1684, had reportedly declined to barely 12,000.
40
  The planter elite also suffered, as 
wealthy Barbadians, such as Sir Timothy Thornhill and Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Reade, succumbed to the ravages of fever in 1693.
41
  High profile deaths like these 
caused a group of concerned elite planters to send a petition to King William III, in 
which they lamented the ‘miserable and dangerous condition of the said Island.’  
Furthermore, as a result of ‘the late Mortality,’ which, ‘having extremely dispeopled 
the Island,’ they had become ‘so impoverished that very many considerable families 
and Plantations are ruined.’
42
  Governor Russell further complained that the fever 
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had even reached his own plantation at Fontabelle, and that the sickness ‘reigns here 
very much,’ resulting in the recent burial of ‘three of my servants [with] five more 
lying sick at this time.’
43
  Thus, death was a powerful social equalizer, with the fear 
of disease and its devastating effects present in the minds of men and women from 
all classes and racial groups.   
As the varied descriptions presented in Table 2.7 suggest, the most worrisome 
diseases of the late-seventeenth century were the dry bellyache and fever.  
Historiographical and anecdotal evidence contend that fever, generally classified as 
either malaria or yellow fever, was the far deadlier of the two and was more 
prevalent throughout Barbados than any other malady during this sickly decade.  
John Oldmixon, an eighteenth century historian, claims, for example, that fever was 
so widespread during the 1690s that it killed almost a third of the colony’s 
population.
44
  These are only partial truths, however, as parish records suggest that 
neither malaria nor yellow fever actually affected the Barbadian population as much 
as the letters sent back home implied.  Malaria, for example, was almost non-existent 
in seventeenth-century Barbados, as Plasmodium Falciparum, transferred to humans 
through the Anopheles mosquito, could not yet find an adequate vector on the island.  
Much of the African population was highly resistant to this strand, with the frequent 
presence of either the sickle cell trait or a blood enzyme deficiency known as 
glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency, or G6PD, greatly limiting those 
susceptible to the disease.  Others possessed lesser-known blood variations, such as 
Hemoglobin C and the thalassemia trait, which further helped to protect those of 
West African descent.  The middling and poor white population, while highly 
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vulnerable, also had limited exposure to the contagion through herd immunity, while 
the wealthy had access to a cure made from the quinine-rich bark of the Peruvian 
cinchona tree.  Known as Jesuit’s Bark to most Europeans, its curative powers had 
become common knowledge to many in the medical profession by the 1680s, 
although it was expensive and difficult to obtain, as it grew high in the Andes 
Mountains.
45
  Moreover, the practice of penning animals, especially at night, at a 
significant distance from human habitation also limited any potential spread of the 
disease.  Anopheles mosquitos, preferring animal to human blood, would have been 
able to adequately feast on the large livestock population kept by the Barbadians, 
limiting the transmission of the protozoa.
46
  Thus, Plasmodium Falciparum, finding 




Yellow fever, on the other hand, was far deadlier, killing thousands in 
Barbados throughout the 1690s.  Originating in Africa and spread by the Aedes 
Aegypti mosquito, the disease took a brutal toll on the human body and killed 50% of 
those it infected.  The survivors suffered from fever, muscle cramps, nausea, 
jaundice, and some internal hemorrhaging.  In most lethal cases, however, ‘victims 
generally ooze blood through the nose and ears, suffer delirium, and vomit up 
partially coagulated blood, often roughly the color and consistency of coffee  
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1st Half of 
Year 
2nd Half of 
Year 
% in 2nd Half Overall 
Per 
1,000 
St. Michael's 18 3,260 3,736 53.00% 6,996 121 
Christ 
Church 
21 475 626 56.86% 1,101 28 
St. Philip's 21 308 368 54.43% 676 14 
St. John's 12 106 217 67.20% 323 32 
St. James' 8 97 154 61.40% 251 28 
       
Totals 21 4,246 5,201 55.00% 9,347 57 (22) 
Table 2.8: DAB, RL 1/1 (St. Michael’s), RL 1/29 (St. John’s), RL 1/25 (St. Philip’s), Ang. 14/1/1 (St. James) and 
RL 1/21 (Christ Church) These five parishes have extant records for most of the period between 1680 and 
1700.  Some, however, are incomplete, as St. Michael’s only runs through 1698, St. James’ begins in 1693, and 
St. John’s is missing through 1684 and from 1696-1699.  The parish ministers only recorded white Anglican 
deaths in their registries. 
grounds: the black vomit.’
48
  Unfortunately for those on Barbados, the sugar islands 
of the Caribbean were a near-perfect environment for this species of mosquito.  
Aedes Aegypti thrive in mild climates with temperatures hovering around 26 degrees 
Celsius, which would have likely been the norm in Barbados during the cool summer 
months of the 1690s, and were able to survive on sugar when a blood meal was 
unavailable.  Moreover, they favored wet, hot, urban landscapes, and reproduced 
easily within an island setting, using small catches of water in gutters, water barrels, 
jars, or clay sugar pots to lay their eggs.  Finally, with Bridgetown’s position as an 
important trans-Atlantic port and destination for English mariners and soldiers, a 
large number of young men arrived each year, populating the town with thousands of 
individuals who had never had the opportunity to acquire a previous immunity.
49
      
These conditions combined to quickly transform the bustling port town into 
one of the deadliest places in the world.  An analysis of mortality statistics from the 
five southernmost parishes of Barbados shows how deadly the area became by the 
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mid-1690s.  Table 2.8 demonstrates that almost 7,000 people died in St. Michael’s 
parish between 1680 and 1697, a number more than twice as high as the other four 
parishes combined.  Overall, the parish experienced an incredibly high crude burial 
rate of 121 deaths per 1,000 individuals, cresting well above 150 during particularly 
deadly years.  To put this statistic into context, Trevor Burnard calculates that 
contemporary mortality rates for the Chesapeake and Carolinas ranged between 50-
70 deaths per 1,000 people, London 45 per 1,000, and Philadelphia, another colonial 
port town, 46 per 1,000.  In Jamaica, St. Catherine’s and St. Andrew’s parishes 
peaked at 76 and 61 burials per 1,000 respectively during the 1690s.
50
    
Regardless of what the statistics reveal, however, yellow fever never really 
became a ‘Barbadian’ disease, as it instead mostly infected the soldiers and sailors 
who docked in Bridgetown during the Nine Years War and threatened few outside of 
St. Michael’s parish.  Thrust into a disease environment that they could not properly 
handle, it was these ‘unseasoned transients’ who were particularly susceptible to 
yellow fever and who made up the majority of those who died in St. Michael’s 
between 1689 and 1697.
51
  In 1693, for example, Governor Kendall complained of 
the unfortunate effects the fever was having upon the armed forces sent to protect the 
island.  Lamenting that ‘this late distemper has been severely fatall to the regiments 
rais’d for an expedition against the French,’ it was particularly disastrous because it 
killed ‘severall inferior Officers, and no inconsiderable number of common 
soldiers.’
52
  In 1694, Edward Cranfield also related how ‘the distemper…hath proved 
very fatall to the new Comers in the last fleet…and many of them are dead of it, and  
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Table 2.9: Mortality Figures Divided into Five Year Periods, 1681-1700 
Years St. Michael's Christ Church St. Philip's St. John's 
1681-1685 1,780 280 268 23 
1686-1690 1,120 213 149 161 
1691-1695 2,898 275 106 114 
1696-1700 902 302 73 25 
     
Totals 6,700 1,101 676 323 
Table 2.9: DAB, RL 1/1, RL 1/29, RL 1/25, and RL 1/21 
I fear few of the rest will escape.’
53
  The anecdotal evidence correlates well with the 
mortality statistics.  Table 2.9 shows that the five year period between 1691 and 
1695, which covers the height of the war, represented the single deadliest period in 
St. Michael’s, as there were over 1,000 more deaths during this time than in any of 
the other three five-year periods analyzed.  
The three neighboring parishes of Christ Church, St. Philip’s and St. John’s, 
however, experienced little or no increase in the number of deaths during this same 
period.
54
  As Table 2.9 indicates, St. Philip’s even experienced declining death rates 
during the 1690s, with total burials dropping from 268 in 1681-1685 to only 73 in 
1696-1700.  In St. John’s parish, the numbers also declined, falling from 161 in 
1686-1690 to 106 in 1691-1695.  The mortality rates for these four parishes, as 
shown in Table 2.8, were surprisingly low for both a tropical environment and an era 
defined by disease.  Outside of St. Michael’s, St. John’s had the next highest crude 
burial rate, at 32 deaths per 1,000 people, with Christ Church and St. James’ both 
following at 28 per 1,000.  St. Philip’s was last with only 14 per 1,000, which 
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dropped it below even New England’s famously low mortality rate of 15 per 1,000.
55
  
When St. Michael’s inflated numbers are removed from the calculations, the four 
parishes averaged a crude burial rate of 22 per 1,000 for the period, which compares 
very favorably to Puckrein’s extended historical calculations.
56
   
Instead, the Barbadians appear to have largely adapted to yellow fever by the 
end of the seventeenth century, with the disease killing far fewer local inhabitants 
than the government’s communications back to England contend.  The main reasons 
for this were two-fold.  First, infected children under the age of 14 were typically 
resistant to the disease and suffered from few of the harsh symptoms that their elders 
experienced.   Moreover, their survival guaranteed them a hereditary immunity for 
life.  This meant that a significant portion of the creolized white population had 
developed immunities by the 1690s, as many would have either caught the sickness 
in a mild form as a child or had ancestors who survived the 1647 outbreak and 
passed their immunities on to future generations.  As West Africans had been 
exposed to this contagion for centuries, the vast majority of enslaved blacks would 
have also had immunities passed down to them.  This allowed for a herd immunity to 
develop in Barbados among the creolized and African populations that could 
effectively kill off the disease through a lack of susceptible vectors.   
Secondly, Aedes Aegypti has a very limited range and short life span, making 
it rare for the insect to travel more than 300 meters from its birthplace, or port of 
entry.  This kept the disease in the Bridgetown area, with surrounding parishes 
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Fever Dry Belly-ache Small-Pox Other Disease 
Crude 
Burial Rate 
1693 21 0 0 0 0 21 
1694 18 0 0 0 0 18 
1695 48 0 0 14 0 48 
1696 38 0 0 3 0 38 
1697 14 0 0 0 0 14 
1698 28 0 6 0 0 28 
1699 42 1 4 0 2 Fitts 42 
1700 42 0 6 0 
1 worms, 1 
consumption, 1 
gout, 1 dropsey 
42 
1701 31 1 2 0 1 dropsey 31 
Totals 251 2 18 17 7 28 
Table 2.10: DAB, Ang. 14/1/1. The records in St. James’ Parish do not start until 1693 and only contain the 
burial information for the white Anglican population.  Therefore, enslaved blacks and Catholic indentured 
servants would not be included in this total. 
showing little evidence of its spread.  Table 2.10, for example, demonstrates that St. 
James’, directly to the north of St. Michael’s, had little contact with this disease, as 
the vestry ministers only recorded two deaths from any type of fever out of the 251 
that occurred between 1693 and 1701.  Thus, it was the large number of transient 
sailors and soldiers that arrived in Bridgetown each year as part of the English war 
effort that succumbed to the island’s deadly fevers and most heavily influenced the 
characteristically high death rates in St. Michael’s. 
There were two diseases, however, that did pose a much greater threat to the 
island’s rural population.  The first was smallpox.  Originating as a European disease 
that spread through human vectors via respiration, it was brought to Barbados by 
outsiders, usually through either infected children or adults that caught it from an 
imperfectly immunized society.  It was particularly dangerous because neither the 
enslaved Africans nor the creolized white population had any resistance to it.  
Luckily for both black and white Barbadians, epidemical outbreaks of smallpox 
104 
 
appear to have been infrequent.  Table 2.7 suggests that there were only two such 
occurrences between 1680 and 1700, although the records provide little detail about 
the extent of the disease’s spread.  The first appeared to be fairly serious, as it began 
in 1685, during a time of ‘great mortality,’ and remained on the island for three 
years, through 1687. The second outbreak, corroborated by the burial records from 
St. James, appeared in 1695 and lasted until the next year.  During this time, vestry 
ministers recorded that 17 free whites died from smallpox in St. James alone, 
constituting about 20% of the total burials for these two years.  The disease also 
likely infected a considerable portion of the black population, as their very limited 
exposure to the strain in Africa left few immune.  Yet, this second outbreak was short 
and the disease’s spread must have been narrowly confined to a few parishes, as 
smallpox soon disappeared from the seventeenth-century records.
57
  
The second disease, the dry bellyache, was perhaps the most paradoxical 
illness encountered on the island, as it was both extremely common and the most 
mysterious.   Existing in Barbados since at least the 1660s, planters had little 
knowledge of what caused the dry belly-ache before eighteenth century scientists 
identified it as lead poisoning and island doctors could not find a consistently 
successful cure for it.  The observable symptoms of lead poisoning were easy enough 
for most on Barbados to identify: initial chills quickly led to spasms of the abdominal 
wall muscles, excruciatingly painful intestinal cramps, and severe constipation.  As 
the disease advanced, limbs could become paralyzed, sometimes permanently, and 
the body could go into frequent and prolonged seizures that eventually led to coma 
and death.  Seventeenth-century Barbadians, however, could not fully understand the 
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long-term effects of the disease, and did not realize the extensive damage it caused to 
cognitive and behavioral function or the nervous system’s electrical conduction, 
which is what caused the mysterious paralysis and fatality.    
Many erroneously believed that the disease resulted from the digestion of 
unripe roots and fruit or from the juice of the sugarcane.
58
  Others, such as Thomas 
Tryon, blamed it on a lack of ‘Heat and Moisture in the Bowels’ for turning ‘the 
Excrement…into so hard a substance, that it cannot freely pass,’ but also admitted 
that ‘there is scarce a Doctor that hath yet found out a certain Remedy.’
59
  The best 
that Governor Russell could recommend upon diagnosis was to immediately ‘go into 
a cold climate if this distemper be not taken at the very beginning but suffered to 
hang upon any one but a little time, it is absolutely incurable, and the party grieved 
remains a Cripple during life.’
60
  In actuality, though, the pandemic nature of the 
disease resulted from the fact that lead was everywhere in Barbadian society, 
including in a variety of luxury goods and, more importantly, used to line both the 
cisterns and gutters built to collect rain water to drink and the distillery pipes used to 
turn molasses into rum.  Thus, since it inevitably ended up in both the water and the 
rum that the Barbadians drank, it affected individuals of all social and ethnic groups 
to a considerable degree.
61
     
As Table 2.7 illustrates, the dry bellyache was most prevalent in Barbados 
during two specific periods: from the mid-1680s, as Governors Dutton and Stede 
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reported annual outbreaks between 1684 and 1686, and in 1695.  Yet, it is likely that 
these only represent times when the disease was at its worst, since it was always 
present to some degree on the island.  Table 2.10, for example, shows that another 
outbreak occurred in St. James for an additional four-year period between 1698 and 
1701.  During this time, it claimed the lives of at least 18 free white inhabitants, the 
highest toll for any single identified disease in that parish.  An understanding of the 
scope of this ailment, however, is impossible without realizing just how many 
enslaved blacks also suffered from it.  According to Jerome Handler, the enslaved, as 
well as poor whites, were particularly vulnerable to the disease, as they drank most 
of the ‘low-wine’ rum, which was the cheaper product of the first distillation and 
would have passed through a series of lead pipes in its production.  Handler, based 
on his extensive research of the bones from the slaves who worked on Samuel 
Newton’s sugar plantation, concluded that 27% of the black enslaved population had 
enough lead in their blood to result in moderate to very severe lead poisoning.  If this 
proportion remained consistent throughout Barbados, nearly 12,000 enslaved blacks 
would have experienced at least some of the dry bellyache’s primary symptoms.  
When combined with the fact that a significant portion of the white population also 
maintained harmful levels of lead in their bodies, the dry bellyache represented the 
truest epidemic that the islanders had to face during the 1680s and 1690s, since it 
affected all groups of people, could be found in most parishes, and, given the general 
lack of knowledge about the disease, never actually disappeared.
62
 
 Unknown and misunderstood diseases, such as yellow fever or the dry 
bellyache, challenged the medical knowledge of the era and demonstrated how 
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grossly ineffective European medicine was in the seventeenth-century Caribbean 
world.  Continuing to rely on Galenic medical theory and traditional European 
practices, the majority of the medical cures prescribed by doctors centered on 
rebalancing the four humors.  The prevailing theories taught that a fever resulted 
from excessive heat and humidity, which caused the body to fill with extra blood.  As 
such, most European doctors endeavored to cure this illness through venesection: 
opening an artery in the arm and removing as much as 15% of the body’s blood at 
the onset of feverish conditions.  Other favorite techniques included emetics made 
from dangerous metals such as mercury, antimony, or zinc sulphate; laxatives; 
sneezing powders; enemas; blistering; poultices; and bezoars (crushed stones from 
the intestines of Persian goats).  These were generally ineffective and often left 
patients sicker and weaker than before their treatment.   
 Hans Sloane, the famous physician and visitor to Barbados, carried a 
medicine cabinet around the Caribbean that contained hundreds of different ‘cures’ 
for the disease that he expected to encounter.  The range of ‘cures’ that he kept with 
him showed the sad state of western medicine at the end of the seventeenth century.  
His compartments contained such random items as indigo, annatto, ambergris, 
rhubarb, coffee, egg, crushed cowrie shells, lace, cochineal, feces, a product called 
‘yellow’, and a variety of materials that even he did not recognize, including an 
‘unknown root,’ an ‘unknown seed,’ and a mysterious item that looked ‘like rice.’
63
  
While his ‘cures’ were largely ineffective, he remained skeptical of local medicine 
and its practitioners, ironically concluding that ‘they do not perform what they 
pretend…. Their ignorance of anatomy, Disease, Method, etc. renders even that 
                                                          
63
 BL, Sloane 3984, The Contents of what Sort of Drugs there is in my Trunck, 120-124.  
108 
 
knowledge of the Vertues of Herbs not only useless, but even sometimes hurtful to 
those who imploy them.’
64
  Yet, regardless of Sloane’s beliefs, the medical 
profession’s impotency in the Caribbean became famous, as many, such as Thomas 
Tryon, mocked these ‘Lip-Learned Doctors’ and ‘modern Fire-working Chymists or 
Vertuosi’ who seemed perpetually ‘confined to the old musty Rules of Aristotle or 
Galen.’
65
   
Many white Barbadians, however, began to realize that the natural world 
freely provided them with a variety of antidotes, and that the medicinal techniques 
and treatments perfected by the enslaved African population could be highly 
effective at fighting tropical diseases.  Making use of a mixture of West African 
traditions and locally available flora, the black population created a wide range of 
medicines that competently relieved many island ailments.  Tryon recognized that 
there were many Africans on the island ‘that God and Nature have endued with Gifts 
of knowing the Vertues of Herbs, and that can by genuine Skill, administer good 
Medicines, and perform greater Cures’ than Europe’s ‘famous Doctors, with their 
hard Words and affected Methods.’
66
  Table 2.11 contains some of the medicinal 
plants regularly used by the black population in Barbados during the pre-
Emancipation period, their contemporary applications, and how each is used today.  
Both white and black Barbadians, for example, learned to use small traces of poison 
from the Poison Wood Tree to ripen boils and tumors and to heal sores.
67
  They also 
learned that if they accidentally used too much poison, covering the afflicted area  
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Table 2.11: Pre-1834 Medicinal Plants Used in Barbados 
Pre-1834 Name Pre-1834 Medical Use Modern Medicinal Usage 
Aloe Burns, Purgatives, Swelling 
Burns, vulnerary, pain and 
swelling, purgative, worms in 
children 
Arrowroot Poison Antidote, dysentery, fevers, yaws Tea for diarrhea, teething aid 
Barbados Nut Purgative, dropsy, fresh wounds 
Purgative, burns, painful joints, 
boils 
Bearded Fig Tree Poison Antidote Manchineel antidote 
Blueweed Venereal Complaints NA 
Bread and Cheese 
Vine 
Yaws NA 
Briny Roots Purgatives, scurvy, deobstruent Purgative, deobstruent 
Cassia Fistula Purgative, opener of the veins NA 
Crab Eye Vine Consumptive and other coughs Tea 
Iron Vine Diarrhea, dysentery Diuretic, spinal trouble 
Lignum Vitae Dropsies, 'to purify the blood,'  Arthritis, rheumatism, abortifacient 
Loggerhead Weed Kills Worms in Children NA 
Milk weed ‘Cleanse the Blood' Tuberculosis 
Palma Christi Swelling, fevers Fever 
Pangwyn Fevers NA 
Paw Paw Ringworm and other skins disorders, fevers 
Roundworms, high blood pressure, 
skin ulcers, digestive aids 
Pigeon Pea Diarrhoea, dysentery NA 
Plantain Eye Inflammations, fevers, blisters NA 
Poison Wood Tree Ripen Boils and tumors, heals sores Ripen Boils, chronic Ulcers 
Red Trubba Colic, disorders of the stomach NA 
Soldier's Bush Vulnerary, inflammations, and swellings Sores, burns, swellings 
Silk Cotton Tree Fevers Fevers 
Varvain Deobstruent, aids menstrual flow, fever Fever and Ague, dropsy, diuretic 
Wild Basil Vulnerary Chest colds, wards off mosquitos 
Table 2.11: Jerome Handler and JoAnn Jacoby, ‘Slave Medicine and Plant Use in Barbados,’ Journal of the 
Barbados Museum and Historical Society, vol. 41, (1993), 74-98. Those treatments that modern medicine has 
shown to be ineffective are labeled with an ‘NA.’   
with a poultice made from the arrowroot plant would lead to rapid recovery.  To help 
combat fever, the islanders turned to flora such as the pangwyn plant, silk cotton tree, 
palma christi, and varvain with varying success.  Even when a particular cure did not 
have a positive effect upon an ailment (such as when an individual applied a plantain 
poultice to their forehead to relieve feverish symptoms) the results were rarely 
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harmful and never fatal, offering a pleasant alternative to the risks inherent in 
European medical practices.   
By the end of the century, white Barbadians were also beginning to 
rationalize and understand the origins of the diseases from which they frequently 
suffered and realized that simple changes to their sanitation methods could 
drastically improve the population’s overall health.  In May of 1700, an anonymous 
resident conducted a scientific survey of the island and attempted to discover why 
sickness broke out so easily and how it could be prevented in the future.  He claimed 
in his resulting report that his goal was not to show ‘how [disease] first came,’ as that 
‘may create Disputes,’ but to reveal some ‘real truths…which according to reason 
may be causes thereof.’  He proceeded to offer a list of ten variables that he believed 
helped to spread illnesses across the island.  The first three concerned general 
sanitation and included eating fresher food, especially fruits and vegetables at the 
expense of red meat and rotten provisions, sanitizing the hospitals, and keeping the 
streets of Bridgetown clean and tidy.
68
   
The seven remaining recommendation centered on the drainage of the 
numerous sitting bodies of tainted water that existed in Bridgetown’s general 
vicinity.  The worst example of this neglect was the harbor, as those living nearby 
showed little hesitation in ‘throwing overboard the Sweepings of rotten fish and 
other things of ill smells from the Vessells that lye within the Bar.’  This flotsam 
‘wholly choaked’ the harbor and ‘left it filled with stinking noisome smells…which 
is verily believed to be one great Cause of the late and present sickness.’  To reopen 
these blockages, the author asked for the creation of a ‘mote or deep Canall’ that 
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would connect the various bodies of sitting water within the town to the sea so that 
they could empty out and start flowing cleanly again.
69
 
The findings of this pamphlet were important, as they informed the Barbadian 
government of the squalid and filthy conditions across the island and inspired them 
to pass legislation ordering a variety of improvements.  In May, 1700, Governor 
Ralph Grey responded to these finding by declaring in an island-wide proclamation 
that the ‘violent and rageing sickness’ in Bridgetown resulted from ‘the filth and dirt 
lyeing in the streets, cellars, warehouses, storehouses, and other places and the great 
quantityes of decayed, putrifyed, and corrupt provisions.’  Those who owned rotten 
provisions had to remove them at least a ‘quarter of a mile’ from Bridgetown.   He 
further demanded that the Barbadians show more ‘dilligent and effective care’ in 
keeping the island ‘cleansed and purged from all filth, dirt and other nusiances.’  
Anyone who refused to obey these orders could be prosecuted and punished in 
Court.
70
  These initial improvements seemed to make a substantial difference, as by 
the end of the year, Governor Grey reported to London that ‘the Island is now 
blessed be God in a good state of health.’
71
  Many white Barbadians resorted to other 
measures to promote a healthier overall lifestyle.  They worked to eliminate the 
consumption of rancid foods by building cooler underground rooms for the storage 
of perishable goods and replaced tainted drinking water with rain collected in 
outdoor basins.
 72
   




 TNA, CO 31/5, 25 May 1700, Proclamation from Governor Grey.  Grey could not, however, 
completely distance himself from the peccatogenic approach to health.  On the same day that he 
issued his Proclamation, he also called for a fast and day of Thanksgiving to ‘implore the Grace of 
God’ to end the spread of disease ‘which our sins justly deserve,’ and to ‘remove [that] evil’.  CO 
31/5, 25 May 1700, Proclamation. 
71
 TNA, CO 28/4, 19 December 1700, Grey to Board of Trade.   
72
 Kuperman, ‘Fear,’ 229-234. 
112 
 
Unfortunately, this progress was only temporary.  By 1703, the arrival of war 
meant that the island again experienced an influx of soldiers and sailors, which 
allowed for the return of epidemical levels of yellow fever.  Governor Bevil 
Granville warned the Council of Trade and Plantations that ‘this island is more 
unhealthy then it was ever yet known to be, there being a very dangerous distemper 
all over the country as well as in the towns.’
73
  This caused the members of the 
Barbadian government to once again consider how to clean up their island. By July 
of 1705, the Barbadian Grand Jury had written up an official list of requests for 
Queen Anne that continued to focus on clearing up the common shore and all other 
clogged and stagnating water courses, which ‘overflowed…upon every great rain,’ 
flooding Bridgetown.  They also reiterated Grey’s suggestion that all residents 
regularly clean the ‘beastliness and filthiness of the streets of St. Michael’s,’ as ‘they 
are thereby rendered unhealthy.’  Furthermore, island leaders requested that money 
be set aside for the construction of a new mould and that the islanders cleaned up the 
sludge that clogged most wharfs so that they were ‘made navigable that boats may 
come into them.’
74
  Once again, acknowledging these problems appeared to bring a 
temporary improvement in some parts of the island, as by 1709 Governor Milford 
Crowe could write that besides for ‘St. Michaels, by reason of the small pox rageing 
in the Bridge Town…the Island is in general more healthy than for many years 
before.’
75
   
Thus, as the eighteenth century began, white Barbadians exhibited a greater 
understanding of the diseases that routinely threatened their lives and worked to 
better regulate their own health.  They still did not always understand their new 
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world, as they continued to believe that perspiration led to laxity in the muscle fibers 
and general bodily weakness and that the best way to adapt to the tropics was 
through the mass consumption of hard liquor and spicy peppers.  Furthermore, their 
actions often encouraged the spread of disease, as they routinely had trouble keeping 
Bridgetown and the surrounding waterways cleared of trash and continued to eat 
rotten provisions.  Yet, many at least realized that the diseases that regularly broke 
out in St. Michael’s parish were not sent by a wrathful God or caused by miasmatic 
imbalance.
76
  Instead, they began to understand that there were logical scientific 
explanations for the unhealthy conditions experienced on the island and viable 
solutions that could be easily implemented to overcome them.  Thus, by developing a 
better understanding of the natural world that surrounded them, white Barbadians 
had proved that they could adapt to their tropical environment and, by so doing, 
reconfigured preconceived notions of how the English, used to ‘the vigor and 
sprighfulness we have in colder climates,’ could survive and prosper in such a hot 





 This chapter depicts two very different demographical interpretations of life 
on late seventeenth-century Barbados.  On the one hand, the 1680 and 1684 censuses 
portray a matured plantation society showing distinct signs of rapid expansion and 
development.  Between 1679 and 1683, for example, a large free white population 
put thousands of additional acres of land into use for growing both sugar and 
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provisions and elite planters continued to increase their production capacity by 
building dozens of new plantations with recently constructed windmills towering 
over them.  White planters and farmers also showed an increased need for unfree 
labor, importing nearly two hundred indentured servants and 10,000 enslaved 
Africans during the short four year period.  The censuses further depict a group of 
elites that were able to maintain both their omnipotent grip on the island’s economy 
and their entrenchment within its government, while also describing a substantial and 
important free white population, over 17,000 strong, that managed to preserve their 
valuable roles within the island community as provision farmers, artisans, merchants, 
livestock breeders, seamen, and small cash-crop planters.  It was their names that 
most frequently appeared in the parish baptism, marriage, and burial registers, island 
immigration/emigration lists, and land deeds, making them in many ways the island’s 
quintessential white inhabitants.  979 landowners, for example, represented the 
middle class, who owned enough land to make a comfortable living and to vote in 
local elections.  592 others made up the lower class, eking out a more difficult 
livelihood on their small plots of land.  Finally, thousands of others held no land, but 
lived in island towns, such as Bridgetown or Speightstown, filling valuable niches as 
merchants, artisans, or shopkeepers, and showing that they too maintained an 
important role on the island.    
The island’s white inhabitants, however, still faced many struggles in their 
quest for continued success within the Caribbean.  The greatest challenge for many 
was figuring out how to best navigate the danger and discomfort of a new life in the 
tropics.  This became increasingly difficult by the mid-1680s, as the islanders 
experienced a dramatic transformation in their climatic patterns that likely led to a 
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concurrent rise in island epidemics.  While some of these diseases were merely 
discomforting or limited in their dissemination, others, such as small pox, were both 
highly contagious and very deadly.  The dry bellyache proved to be particularly 
problematic during this era, as contemporary Barbadians of all races used the toxic 
metal daily, but had no idea that a correlation existed between it and the debilitating 
disease that claimed thousands of lives across the island.  Many also continued to 
misunderstand the origins of the other sicknesses that they regularly encountered and 
instead believed in antiquated humoral and peccatogenic models of health that 
blamed an imbalance of the humors or the displeasure of God for Barbados’ 
problems.  They compounded these issues by favoring European doctors whose 
approaches to medicine rarely worked and often put their patients at considerable 
risk.  
Yet, by the late 1680s and 1690s, the white Barbadian approach to health 
began to change, as they looked to gain greater control over their tropical world.  The 
most successful actively focused on solving the problems around them by developing 
scientific knowledge through experimentation and observation.
78
  Some turned to the 
island’s native flora to find more effective medicines, experimenting with different 
combinations to find out what worked best, while paying attention to the enslaved 
Africans, who often had greater experience with life in a tropical environment.  This 
caused many white inhabitants to view concepts such as weather and disease as 
something truly scientific and that, like population figures and parish registers, could 
be quantified and controlled.  This new approach inevitably led to a reconsideration 
of island hygiene, in which new approaches to disease, treatment, and cleanliness 
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helped to further contribute to a society that was shedding many features of its 





Chapter 3: Barbados and the Movement of Unfree Labor, 
1660-1720 
 
In 1675, Governor Jonathon Atkins submitted the first substantial grievance 
concerning the newly re-chartered Royal African Company’s handling of the slave 
trade to Charles II in the hopes of convincing him to open this branch of commerce 
to all merchants:  
The Royall African Company…doe supply us very scantly with 
[slaves] and their price is become excessive.  Wee are well assured 
that Your Majesty established that company to enable them to buy 
cheaper and…sell dearer to Your own Subjects.  And doubtless they 
might afford them much cheaper then can be done in an open Trade, 
but contrariwise whereas before the Erection of the Royall company 
the usuall price of able Negroes in this place was about sixteen 
pounds per head, they are now sold for Twenty and Two, and Twenty, 
which rates wee can ill afford to give, our land being worne out, our 




This petition, however, inspired little real change in the Company’s handling of the 
slave trade, as fifteen years later Littleton’s Groans focused on a similar series of 
complaints.  Like Atkins, Littleton believed the Company to be harmful to the 
island’s planters and farmers and that the high prices would inevitably lead to ruin: 
‘we buy Negroes at the price of an Engross’d Commodity; the common Rate of a 
good Negroe on Ship-board being twenty pounds.’  Remembering times past, he 
further lamented that ‘Heretofore we might send to Guiney for Negroes, when we 
wanted them. And they stood us in about ten pound a Head.  But now we are shut out 
of this Trade and a Company is put upon us, from whom we must have our Negroes, 
and no other way.’
2
  Atkins and Littleton portrayed the RAC as both unresponsive 
and unreliable, while also failing to properly supply a growing plantation society 
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with enslaved labor and charging prices that were far too high for planters that 
perennially claimed to be one bad harvest away from ruin.   
Most recent historians of the Barbadian slave trade have since argued that 
both Littleton’s and Atkins’ depictions of this branch of late-seventeenth century 
trade were inaccurate and deliberately deceptive.  K.G. Davies wrote that while 
‘there were years of shortage…from 1681 to 1687 supplies were generally good 
[with] average prices well below 15 pounds’ before ‘a serious contraction in the 
supply of enslaved Africans occurred with the onset of the Nine Years War in 
1689.’
3
  Ann Carlos argues that the islanders experienced such a large influx of 
enslaved labor from the RAC that prices drastically ‘fell from 1672-1683,’ while 
Hilary Beckles and David Galenson both determined that a drastic 25-30 percent 
drop in price occurred by the mid-1670s with supply increasing ‘by over 200 
percent’ during the 1680s.
4
  Finally, Eltis postulates that the RAC was ‘probably 
carrying more slaves from Africa than all other Europeans put together by the 1670s’ 
and that for the Barbadians it was ‘during the seventeen years from 1672 to 1688’ 
that ‘the RAC monopoly was strongest.’
5
  Yet, while recent work on the slave trade 
has actively dispelled the Littleton myth, its extent is usually either imprecise or 
incomplete, and often relies on theoretical conjecture that does not accurately portray 
labor market conditions on the island between 1680 and the early 1700s.   
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Moreover, enslaved Africans were not the only workers utilized by Barbadian 
planters to power their plantations.  To supplement their unfree black workforce, the 
islanders continued to import and maintain a substantial white indentured servant 
population until at least the end of the seventeenth century.  While the island’s labor 
force had become 95% black by 1683, there were still 2,381 white servants who 
lived and worked on the island, a number that continued to increase throughout the 
1680s and 1690s and that reached nearly 3,000 by the end of the century.  Thus, 
indentured servants remained an integral and growing part of Barbados’ social fabric 
and not the dead or dying form of labor that is often described by the historiography.  
When this growing population is combined with the large number of enslaved blacks 
that also arrived during this period, late-seventeenth century Barbadian planters and 
farmers appear to have lived in a peak moment of labor defined by high supply and 
low prices that lasted, with a few exceptions due to domestic revolution and two 
international wars, until at least 1720.    
Since much of the historiography underestimates the extent of the unfree 
labor trade, this chapter offers a more precise assessment of the movement of 
enslaved Africans and indentured servants into and out of Barbados based on a 
comprehensive approach to the records of known voyages.  This chapter also posits 
that the four decades following 1680 represented a peak moment in island labor, 
when the RAC and private/interloping traders combined with the merchants who 
supplied white indentured servants to effectively meet the island’s labor needs. 
Chapter 3 is divided into three sections.  The first looks at the importation of white 
indentured servants into Barbados during the late-seventeenth century, suggesting 
that while they were not viewed as the ideal worker, they continued to arrive at 
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island ports in significant numbers throughout this era and were still considered to be 
an important laboring force on many plantations.  Secondly, by aggregating 
information from the slave voyages already archived in the TASTDB with additional 
ships from the Naval Office Returns, the RAC’s Homeward Invoice Records, and 
letters sent from island RAC agents, the next section presents an updated insight into 
the size and scale of the Barbadian slave trade between 1660 and 1720, with an 
especial concentration on the final two decades of the seventeenth-century.  When 
combined with the inevitable interloper traffic that pervaded Caribbean commerce, 
this section also posits that a significant labor glut occurred during the 1680s that 
caused prices to drop to historic lows by the middle of the decade.   
The final section further utilizes the RAC’s letter book and Homeward 
Invoice Records to show that the slave trade was anything but a simple bilateral 
commercial link between the RAC, Barbados, and the African coast.  Instead, 
Barbadian planters and merchants attempted to set up a Caribbean commercial 
network of their own that utilized both legal and illegal trade with the Spanish in 
order to meet their own financial goals.  While they officially failed in their attempts 
to secure this trade, they did manage to maintain an illicit relationship with colonial 
Spain, regardless of the metropole’s position on the matter.  Thus, overall, this 
chapter provides a more comprehensive and precise look at Barbados’ place as an 
Atlantic hub for the unfree labor trade during the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries, while providing some additional insight into the movement of 
the white servants and enslaved Africans that entered this market.    





Part I: Indentured Servitude during the Late-Seventeenth Century 
Although Barbadian history has come to be defined by the extensive 
prevalence of enslaved African labor, the island also represented a traditionally 
important destination for white indentured servants, especially during the early 
tobacco and cotton eras (1627-c.1645).  The conceptualization of indentured 
servitude as a labor option was not a colonial creation, but instead stemmed from a 
corrupted form of agrarian apprenticeship that English society expected of its 
middle-class farming youth.  According to Dunn, ‘for the children of English 
yeomen, husbandmen, and artisans, there was nothing demeaning about temporary 
servile status,’ as ‘indentured labor in a stranger’s household was the normal mode of 
socialization for boys and girls at adolescence.’6  This mentality led many youthful 
men, as well as a few women, who saw little opportunity for fortune and 
advancement at home, to voluntarily give up their basic freedoms and sign indentures 
to work as temporary servants in Barbados.  They initially poured into the island 
during the earliest decades of settlement, but continued to arrive even after the 
planters and farmers had largely switched to the use of enslaved black labor.   
According to Table 3.1, 2,922 men and women signed an indenture to serve 
in Barbados during the fifteen years between 1656 and 1670, placing it as the second 
most popular English colonial destination overall after the 3,369 laborers that 
migrated to the tobacco fields of Virginia.  Moreover, Table 3.1 also shows the 
importance of Barbados within England’s Caribbean empire, as the other five 
English islands combined for a total of only 1,057 indentured servants during the 
same fifteen year period.  However, as these thousands of individuals soon found  
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Table 3.1:  Colonial Destinations of Servants, 1656-1720 
Years Barbados Jamaica Leeward Islands Maryland Virginia New England 
1656-1660 2,186 0 175 5 859 25 
1661-1665 378 13 655 15 1,390 70 
1666-1670 358 17 197 18 1,120 33 
1671-1675 131 35 276 38 869 24 
1676-1680 89 63 92 75 603 22 
1681-1685 318 572 66 485 412 8 
1686-1690 32 39 3 0 15 4 
1691-1695 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1696-1700 19 0 3 0 568 44 
1701-1705 1 0 3 6 70 0 
1706-1710 0 0 0 0 4 0 
1711-1715 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1716-1720 15 22 1 210 85 0 
       
Totals 3,527 761 1,471 642 5,995 230 
Table 3.1: David Galenson, Traders, Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in early English America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 219-227. 
out, the institution of indentured servitude on Barbados varied greatly from both the 
system of apprenticeship in England and its counterpart on the English colonial 
mainland.  Without the same combination of mutual obligation and Christian 
morality that existed in other colonies, the Barbadian version of servitude became 
excessively capitalistic in its mentality, with the planters viewing their unfree white 
workers as both pieces of capital and property, while holding little regard for their 
humanity.7 
Legally, planters maintained absolute control over the lives of their unfree 
white workers and implemented a system of labor that rested upon the mass 
exploitation of this group of individuals.  They were ‘taxed as property, alienated in 
wills, used as currency in mortgage agreements, and attached to land to be sold as 
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  This culminated with Barbados’ government passing the Act for 
the Ordaining of Rights between Masters and Servants in 1661, an extensive piece of 
legislation that thoroughly outlined the rights that a servant possessed on Barbados.  
It limited their movement by requiring them to carry signed passes in order to leave a 
plantation, prevented them from engaging in any type of independent economic 
activity, outlined the punishments for those caught either stealing or damaging their 
owners’ possessions or those caught trying to run away, and even attempted to 
legislate against their ability to marry or have children.
 9
  Moreover, while the law 
guaranteed servants a basic supply of food and clothing, many quickly realized that 
there were few mechanisms of enforcement and that their welfare depended on the 
benevolence of specific planters.   
Henry Pitman, an indentured servant from the mid-1680s, complained that his 
owner, Robert Bishop, ‘would not give us any Clothes’ and that he had to work in 
near-nakedness, only covered by torn and dirty rags. His food, consisting of little 
more than basic starches, easily grown vegetables, and occasionally some tough 
salted beef or partially rotted salt fish, was bland and repetitious and provided little in 
the way of nourishment.
10
  In general, their labor was also difficult and redundant, as 
they followed the same standard pattern for most of the year, working a total of 10 
hours a day, with two five hour shifts separated by a two hour break for lunch.
11
  
This led one visitor to comment that ‘All [servants] are very badly treated’ and that 
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‘when they work the overseers…act like those in charge of galley slaves.’
12
  If a 
servant survived the four to seven year indenture, the law entitled them to receive ten 
acres of land, along with 400 pounds of muscovado sugar, and some basic 
provisions.
13
  In a colony with vast expanses of open space, such as Virginia or 
Maryland, this system worked and gave many indentured servants the opportunity 
they lacked in England.  For those in Barbados, however, the ten acres promised to 
them rarely existed, as elite planters had already purchased most of the productive 
land on the island by the 1660s, only leaving behind rocky outcrops or areas of thin, 
unproductive soil.    
Rumors of these terrible conditions soon reached England and persuaded 
many to stay away from Barbados and seek work elsewhere, making recruitment 
perennially harder.  Throughout the 1670s, only 220 servants, or about 9.5% of all 
those indentured to work in America, decided to migrate to Barbados, a paltry sum 
that contributed to the stagnation and eventual decline of the island’s white 
population.  Barbadian planters soon found themselves in a tenuous situation: while 
they desired the protection that indentured whites provided as militiamen and the 
skills that they brought as trained artisans, they disliked the fact that many of the 
migrant laborers were Catholic and that overall they represented a bad investment, 
since most had trouble working in the sweltering heat and humidity of the tropics.14  
To counter this, Barbadian planters often wrote home to the English government to 
request loosening the Navigation Acts so that they could more easily access Scottish 
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workers, who one resident called the ‘Sinews of a Plantation.’15  Nicholas Blake, a 
sugar planter, sent home one such letter in 1669, maintaining that those currently 
working on the island ‘are lazy all the year round and must rely for maintenance on 
the sweat of other men’s labors.’  His solution was to ‘have a free trade with 
Scotland,’ as ‘we should from thence be quickly recruited with lusty and able men, 
which would be a great strengthening to the place, and be better to us than soldiers.’16   
As the metropole refused to comply, the Barbadian Council and Assembly 
attempted to reinvigorate the trade with their own legislation, passing an act in 1678 
that helped to stabilize prices.17  They followed this with another act in 1682 that 
guaranteed that the local island government would buy any unsold indentures for 
£12.10 per head in an effort to encourage the continued transportation of Christian 
servants and voiced their willingness to reduce the terms of service if it would 
increase supply.18  The planters challenged this price as well, forcing the Assembly to 
pass another law that required the island’s treasurer to buy unsold servants at the 
decreased rate of £10 per man and £10.10 per woman.  These changes, however, 
failed to alter the situation much, as Barbados’ negative reputation and a planter 
preference for enslaved African labor continued to push many away.   Moreover, 
colonists in Virginia, Maryland, and eventually Pennsylvania, were willing to pay 
higher prices for servants and maintained a distinction for being ‘good poormen’ 
territories.  A lack of imported servants also led to substantial price increases on 
Barbados by the 1690s, rising to between £18 and £20 per person, plus dues, for only 
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three or four years of service.19  In 1699, for example, Nicholas Baker sold fifty 
indentures to the island’s treasurer for £990, or an average of £19.16s per head.
20
   
However, even with increasing prices and an altered conception of labor, 
indentured servants were still owned by many across the island.  A sampling of 
household inventories from late-seventeenth century wills and deeds show that 20% 
of the island’s plantations and farms contained at least one white servant.  Overall, 
they tended to be owned by large land holders, as there was greater need for 
overseers and slave drivers on big plantations.  While Philip Checke had only a 
single servant for his 240 acre plantation, James Cecil kept 5 on 204 acres, Michael 
Terrell 5 on 184 acres, John Barwick 3 on 256, and Timothy Mascoll 10 on 200.  
Anne Searle, owner of the largest plantation in this sampling, with 400 acres of land 
in Christ Church parish, maintained an indentured servant force of 14.
21
  Thus, as the 
end of the century approached, the residents of Barbados appeared to have a difficult 
relationship with indentured white labor.  Even though these laborers were 
expensive, served finite terms, and limited in the type of work they could do, many 
islanders still sought them out.  Yet, most free white Barbadians, especially small 
farmers, no longer viewed them as the most effective form of island labor, and 
Barbados’ servile population dropped from a high of over 13,000 in the early 1650s 
to barely 2,000 by 1679.22  
Most of the modern historiography similarly emphasizes the diminishing 
importance of white servitude in Barbados.  Dunn, for example, writes that Barbados 
had ‘gained the reputation of being a hell for the working class,’ leaving few laborers  
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Table 3.2: Indentured Servants in the Naval Office Returns, 1680-1700 
Year Number Location 1 Location 2 
1681 20 London NA 
1682 13 Carolina NA 
1684 38 Liverpool NA 
1685 27 Liverpool NA 
1686 104 Inverness (94) Waterford (10) 
1687 130 Scotland (80) Belfast (42), Waterford (8) 
1688 42 London (23) Dublin (19) 
1698 638 Ireland (230) Scotland (208), London (150), Virginia (50) 
1699 195 Ireland NA 
Total 1,207 - - 
Table 3.2: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1700 
willing to sign an indenture for this location. His limited work on Bristol’s servant 
trade shows that between 1680 and 1686 an average of only 11 indentures arrived 
each year from this key English port.
 23
  Beckles, in a similarly limited review of the 
data, found that only 99 indentured white servants entered the island from London 
between 1683 and 1686.
24
  Galenson’s more comprehensive calculations support 
these assertions, as the Barbadians only appear to have bought 369 servants during 
the 1680s and 1690s, a number considerably behind the totals of 427, 485, and 611 
that arrived in Virginia, Maryland, and Jamaica, respectively.  The percentage of the 
trade they commanded never again rose above 20% after 1675, and dropped to only 
3% by the 1690s.   
The Naval Office Returns, however, reveal a very different portrayal of the 
legal importation of servants during the last two decades of the seventeenth-century.  
Barbadian planters saw some value in the institution and actively worked to bring 
about a brief and moderate resurgence.  While Table 3.2 shows that Barbados 
received slightly more indentured servants in the 1680s than Galenson calculated  
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Graph 3.1: Origin of Indentured Servants, Naval Office Returns, 1680-1700 
 
Graph 3.1: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1700 
(374 compared to 350), the 1690s are a different story, with the Barbadians receiving 
over 800 more during this decade (833 compared to 19).  Combined, the Returns 
show that the islanders received a total of 1,207 white servants during the last twenty 
years of the century.  Thus, Barbados was still an important destination for 
indentured laborers and received more servants during this period of time than the 
956 who arrived in the previous twenty years between 1660 and 1679.  Graph 3.1 
further shows that while Ireland remained the most important source for white 
servants, especially after the Nine Years War, Scotland was also able to legally ship 
considerable numbers of unfree workers to Barbados, sending 94 from Inverness in 
1686 and 208 from unnamed ports in 1698 for a total of 302 by 1700.25  The colonists 
also sent indentured servants between colonies, as Virginia and Carolina both 
supplied Barbados with a small but meaningful quantity of unfree white workers. 
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The 1,207 servants mentioned in the Returns, however, only represented one 
source of the indentures signed during the 1680s and 1690s, as hundreds entered 
Barbados through other means.  A large proportion of these arrived in the winter 
months of 1686, when the Barbadians welcomed nearly 260 rebels who had 
supported the Duke of Monmouth during his 1685 rebellion and had been captured 
and subsequently convicted as traitors to the Crown by the infamous Judge Jeffreys.  
Sent to the colonies as an act of clemency by King James II, he offered these 
convicted traitors ‘as servants to the inhabitants of Barbados…to be kept there and 
continue to serve their masters for the place of ten years at least,’ with each costing 
the fairly expensive price of £15 each.
26
  The first two ships, the Betty and the Happy 
Returne, arrived on 8 January, 1686 with 169 servants onboard.  The elite planters 
quickly bought them all, with many of the wealthier landowners purchasing large lots 
for their sugar plantations.  Richard Williams, for example, bought 11 servants from 
the Happy Returne, while both John Hothersell and Ralph Lane invested in 6 each.27  
The third ship, the John, arrived on 3 February with 90 additional servants.  These, 
too, sold quickly and in especially large groups, as planters Walter Scott and Ann 
Gallop purchased 13 and 11 respectively.28  Overall, the importation of 259 
indentured servants proved to be a boon to Barbadian planters and farmers, as they 
saw their servile population grow by over 10% in less than a single month.   
Complementing the steady stream of indentured servants arriving at Carlisle 
Bay during the early-to-mid 1680s was an illegal trade that had not only survived 
earlier attempts by the English government to eliminate it but that also appeared to 
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have expanded during this prosperous decade.29  Barbadian planters’ and merchants’ 
active participation in an illicit servant trade had originally thrived during the early 
settlement period until the English government showed great alarm over the scale of 
these operations by 1660 and, through increased regulations and harsh fines, 
effectively limited this practice.  By the 1680s, however, the records suggest that 
people were again being ‘Barbadosed’ from the realm’s leading ports.30  The 
available evidence for the continuance of this illegal activity is scanty, but can best 
be shown through a petition sent to James II concerning the servile trade and a 
deposition given by a man illegally sent to Barbados as a servant.   
In November of 1682, a group of merchants, many of whom did business 
with Barbadians planters, sent a worried petition to King James II addressing the 
increased difficulties they were experiencing in legally sending indentured servants 
to the Caribbean.  Instead of promoting this trade, as the islanders often requested, 
many of the merchants were ‘of late prosecuted’ by the English government, ‘and 
others threatened for sending [unwilling] servants into the said Plantations.’ 31  They 
maintained that the illegal trade did exist, as Englishmen and women continued to be 
‘saduced by bad men, through drinke; and inticed into a servitude whereof when 
sober [they] repent.’  Yet, the merchants claimed that they were legal practitioners 
and the attacks on the legitimate servant trade was unfair, with some of the 
petitioners receiving ‘great Fines,’ which ‘hath so terrified all persons concerned in 
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the Trade of the said Plantations that none dare send Servants thither,’ resulting in ‘a 
total stop’ on the trade.  The merchants concluded by requesting that King Charles II, 
‘appoint such a way for examining whether such persons who bind themselves to goe 
into the Plantations does it voluntarily and without any force or fraud.’32   
 The relevant deposition came from Daniel Manning, a 21 year-old apprentice 
to a blacksmith and farrier named Walter Upham.  Manning was in Taunton when 
Monmouth marched through, but claimed that officers forced him to join the Duke’s 
army and fix damaged horseshoes.  He later escaped and joined the King’s army 
instead, but could not fight due to a lack of a weapon.  He returned to his master, 
who refused to take him back, as he did not want to get into trouble for associating 
with a potential traitor.  Manning proceeded to move to London, where he randomly 
met a man named John Peireson on Tower Hill.  This man ‘pretended to help him to 
an employment, telling of him he should gooe four miles over the River to serve a 
Gentleman, and being illiterate made him signe to an indenture for four yeares to 
serve in Barbados.’  Forced onto the Golden Lion by Captain William Stretton, 
Manning joined twenty-three other people on board this ship who had also been 
tricked into signing indentures and were now being transported to either Barbados or 
Nevis to work as servants for the next decade.33  
 The merchants’ petition and the deposition outlined above suggest that even 
as late as the1680s, ‘Spirits’ still existed within English port towns and illegally 
transported significant numbers of individuals to the colonies to work as indentured 
servants.  Edwin Stede, for example, reported to the Lords of Trade and Plantations 
that Barbados had received over 400 kidnapped individuals in a six month period 
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between June and November of 1685 from ‘Spirits’ who claimed that the white men 
and women they sent were willing servants and had forged contracts in order to 
prove it.34  In another case from 1685, a court found the mayor of Bristol guilty for 
partaking in the illegal servant trade and had made substantial profits by helping 
local merchants and ship captains kidnap and transport the town’s troublesome 
residents to Barbados.35  The English government discovered that it could do little to 
limit the sale of these unfortunate people once they left England’s coast and replied 
to a concerned letter from Stede by stating that they remain as servants because they 
had technically signed a contract and ‘in being kept to a strict performance of their 
duty they will in all probability live more peacefully than they did before.’36  Thus, 
with the aid of merchants, ‘Spirits,’ and other local accomplices, Barbados’ planters 
received hundreds of white laborers who had unwillingly signed the indentures that 
turned them into temporary servants subjected to years of hard work with little to no 
reward for those that managed to survive.   
 While the 1680s proved to be a decade of growth for the indentured servant 
trade, the 1690s at first represented a period of significant decline.  With the onset of 
the Nine Years War, it had become increasingly difficult to both encourage laborers 
to come to the island and to safely transport them across the Atlantic.  In fact, the 
Returns show that no servants legally arrived at the island during the conflict.  Other 
contemporary records also attest to the lack of new indentured servants.  William 
Bridges and Edward Littleton, for example, sent the English government a dispatch 
in 1692 that pointed out ‘the difficulty of getting white servants in peace and the 
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impossibility of getting them in war,’ and that this was problematic, as the ‘Island 
cannot furnish a militia’ because ‘the proportion of men formerly sent by a parish is 
now greater than the whole number of white men in the parish.’37  An anonymous 
letter, written in 1697, described ‘the diminution of the number of white men,’ 
especially white servants, as one of ‘the two great evils from which Barbados 
suffers,’ while the island’s agents calculated that ‘there are about two thousand 
wanting to supply the militia of the Island according to the present establishment.’
38  
Furthermore, Barbadian planters and farmers had a hard time keeping servants on the 
island, as the English navy would consistently impress their white laborers and carry 
them off ‘to the great prejudice of the inhabitants,’ to serve on ‘his Majesty’s Ships 
of War,’ without offering replacements, compensation, or a promise to return them at 
the war’s end.39  When England finally did attempt to help Barbados out by offering 
to send 50 women convicts to serve on the island in July of1697, the Barbadian 
government refused to accept them, as the island’s agents believed that they were 
‘altogether useless’ since ‘no English women are there put to work in the field, and 
the people will not be willing to take such as those into their houses.’40  Thus, the 
1690s represented an era of decline for the indentured servant on Barbados, as the 
Nine Years War discouraged potential migration, while the Royal Navy’s 
impressment tactics removed many who were already present on the island.   
With the war ending in 1697, the servant trade rebounded and large numbers 
were again legally transported to Barbados.  The totals from the Returns of 1698 and 
the first quarter of 1699, for example, show that 833 indentured servants arrived at 
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island ports in a little over a year, quickly replenishing the depleted ranks.  While this 
rebirth was temporary in nature, with the outbreak of another international war in 
1701 once again resulting in ‘the impossibility of getting servants…from England or 
Scotland upon any terms,’ it shows that Barbadian planters an d farmers still desired 
unfree white laborers during periods of peace and that they were also readily 
available.
 41
  Overall, however, it is difficult to assess how many servants were on the 
island at any one time and whether the population was actually expanding during this 
period, as import data is missing for too many years during the 1690s to make a 
meaningful hypothesis.   
The records do, however, allow for a reasonably accurate guess at the 
changing indentured population during the 1680s.  While the1684 census shows that 
there were 2,381 unfree white workers living on the island, it has also been posited 
earlier in this chapter that 341 servants legally entered the island after 1683.  When 
combined with the 259 convicted traitors Judge Jeffreys sent over in 1685 and the 
400 illegal servants that Stede claimed arrived later that year, neither of which were 
listed in either the Returns or Galenson’s calculations, this total reaches 1,000.  
When added to the 2,381 already living on the island and balanced with a mortality 
rate of 2% applied across the entire decade, as shown for years 1684 through 1688 in 
Graph 3.2, the island’s total reaches 3,107 by the beginning of the Nine Years War’s 
in 1689.
42
  As mentioned previously, wartime figures are too difficult to calculate, as 
it is impossible to properly gauge how many indentured servants the Royal Navy  
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Graph 3.2: The White Servant Population at 2% Mortality Rate, 1684-1688 
 
Graph 3.2: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14,1684-1688, CO 29/3, 10 October, 1686, Stede to Lords of Trade CO 1/59 
8 January, 1686 and CO 1/59, 3 February, 1686, Stede to Lords of Trade 
impressed or the Barbadian government drafted into the army, or how many died 
from privation.  Even if the indentured population declined by a third and no other 
servants arrived during the course of the war, the 833 new laborers that did land in 
1698 and 1699 would push the total back up to 2,845, an aggregate increase of 
almost 500 despite the many tumultuous years that separated the 1684 census from 
the end of the century.
43
         
While labor changed drastically over the course of the 73 years between 1627 
and 1700, especially with the massive expansion of enslaved blacks across the island 
after 1650, white indentured servitude still maintained an important place within 
Barbadian society.  This section proves that late-seventeenth century planters 
regularly desired and purchased a significant number of white servants during 
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periods of general peace during the 1680s and late 1690s.  They arrived in a variety 
of ways, some willingly choosing to try their luck in the distant Caribbean colony, 
while others had little say in the matter as a corrupt judicial system forced them 
abroad as traitors or allowed unscrupulous merchants and crooked planters to trick 
unwitting youths into signing illegal indentures.  This led to Barbadian planters and 
farmers importing at least 1,466 (and possibly as high as 2,000) white servants, a 
total that easily challenged and likely eclipsed both the 1,480 sent to the Chesapeake 
colonies of Virginia and Maryland and the 611 that arrived in Jamaica during the 
same period.  Thus, no matter how antiquated, unprofitable, or marginalized the 
historiography depicts late-seventeenth century indentured servitude, many white 
Barbadians, in actuality, desired to maintain a significant servant population well into 
the 1700s. 
 
Part II: The Barbadian Slave Trade 
Section I: Barbados’ Place within the Trade Compared to other Nations 
   
The practice of slavery on Barbados went as far back as the island’s initial 
settlement in 1627, as ten Africans, likely seized from a Portuguese prize ship, 
arrived with the first ninety settlers onboard the Olive.  For most of the pre-sugar era 
(1627-c.1645), planters viewed enslaved blacks as a supplement to the work force 
that they had built around indentured white servants, since the costs of importing 
laborers from Africa were too high and the initial investment too risky.  As late as 
1644, Barbadians owned as few as 800 enslaved Africans, while employing 
thousands of white workers.  This labor demographic quickly changed, however, 
with the introduction of sugar in the mid-1640s.  The planting, harvesting, and 
processing of sugarcane into granulated sugar required great quantities of cheap labor 
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and the mass importation of enslaved Africans offered one way for the planters to 
maximize the numbers in their workforce, while minimizing the costs needed to buy 
and maintain them.  This cruel mentality accelerated the replacement of the majority 
of white servants that had previously worked on the island’s tobacco and cotton 
farms with black enslaved Africans designated for the island’s new sugar plantations.   
The change made sense for the island’s planters, as most calculated that a 
fairly priced African bought as a perpetual bondsman was significantly cheaper than 
continually purchasing new indentured servants every four to seven years.   Galenson 
posits, for example, that the price of an indentured servant rose as high as £10.5 to 
£11.5 in the 1680s, without including the costs required for food, shelter, clothing, 
and freedom dues, while an enslaved African barely exceeded £16 or £17.
44
  The 
planters also felt that the physiological disposition of the two races favored the 
Africans, since climatic conditions in the Caribbean bore a greater resemblance to 
those in Africa than to the temperate climes of northern Europe.  This led to the 
belief that enslaved Africans could work harder and for a longer period of time, had 
immunities to many of the deadly diseases that ravaged the white European 
populations, and required less rest and nourishment to produce the same quality of 
labor.
45
  Moreover, there was a growing reluctance of potential indentures to 
immigrate to a land that offered little reward for their risk and sacrifice and that had 
become notorious for the deleterious way in which many planters treated their 
servants.  With few other options, the planters decided that black labor was the 
island’s future and began to purchase enslaved Africans at a tremendous rate, causing 
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England’s merchants initially played a minor role in providing Barbados with 
its black labor.  From 1640 until 1660, the English, distracted by civil war, lacked the 
capacity to regularly supply its American and Caribbean colonies, giving the 
islanders an opportunity to trade on their own terms.  As such, Barbadian planters 
and farmers relied heavily on Dutch ships for most necessary imports, including 
enslaved Africans, although Cromwell’s Act of Trade curtailed this commerce 
slightly after 1652.  With the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, the new king took an 
active interest in colonial affairs, scheming up plans of centralization and control 
through his London ministers in the hopes of deriving a steady stream of income 
from his wealthy colonies.  The slave trade formed an important centerpiece to this 
planned consolidation, with Charles II granting a charter in 1660 that formally 
established the Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa.  This Company initially 
struggled to turn a profit, as it was poorly financed, haphazardly run, and could not 
overcome its early focus on finding African gold.  In January 1663, the English 
government granted the Company of Royal Adventurers a new charter under the 
leadership of Charles II’s brother, James, then Duke of York.  This document 
showed that the members of the Company had learned from some of their previous 
mistakes, as they incorporated greater knowledge of African trade, introduced better 
methods of raising money, and, most importantly, centered its activity on the slave 
trade, although it still sought gold, ivory, malaguetta, dyewood, hides, and wax for 
import.  While white Barbadian worried that a monopoly on the African trade would  
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Sold in    
Barbados 
% Sold in  
Barbados 
1664 6 4 2 1,561 1,139 1,139 100.00% 
1665 9 8 1 2,166 1,624 1,624 100.00% 
1666 7 7 0 1,672 1,160 1,160 100.00% 
1667 1 1 0 272 207 207 100.00% 
1668 3 0 3 790 595 595 100.00% 
1669 1 0 1 251 174 174 100.00% 
        
Totals: 
CRA 
- 20 - 5,482 4,045 4,045 100.00% 
Totals: 
Interlopers 
- - 7 2,026 1,485 1,485 100.00% 
Overall 27 20 7 6,712 4,899 4,899 100.00% 
Table 3.3: Eltis et al., TASTDB, 1664-1669. These numbers only represent the legal slave trade between 
England and Barbados.  Dutch interlopers continued to trade with the Barbadians throughout this period. 
result in a smaller and more expensive supply of enslaved Africans, the Duke of 
York guaranteed the islanders that they would receive at least 3,000 per year at an 
average rate of £17 per head and offered company membership to any planter who 
wished to join.
47
   
The Royal Adventurers at first showed considerable promise, as they funded 
and built forts and depots at James Island in Gambia, Sherbro in Sierra Leone, and 
Kormantin on the Gold Coast.  Furthermore, the Company was able to meet their end 
of the deal by sending over 3,000 Africans to Barbados in a short seven-month 
period in 1663.  This rate, however, proved to be unsustainable, and this version of 
the Company also struggled financially, maintaining almost no power to consistently 
collect its debts.  The Company also struggled with a poorly organized governing 
body run by aristocratic Englishmen that had little experience in commercial matters.  
They attempted to take on the successful Dutch merchants by signing an ambitious 
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asiento to supply enslaved Africans to the Spanish in 1663 at a rate that it could not 
possibly fulfill and, in the process, neglected the needs of other English colonies.
48
  
The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) further complicated the trade, as the 
English struggled severely after de Ruyter’s dramatic raid on the Medway in 1667 
shattered much of the English navy and merchant marine.   
After the war ended in English defeat, trade with Africa showed little initial 
improvement for Barbadian planters and farmers, as inter-tribal conflict placed great 
limitations on commerce. Thomas Pearson, chief agent on the Gold Coast admitted 
that the slave trade was ‘a very dead trade at present, owing to an [inter-tribal] war in 
Arcanji.’
49
  The general relationship between the Company and most white 
Barbadians also appeared to have reached its nadir, as a frustrated Sir Ellis Leighton 
bristled at the planters’ suggestion that they be allowed to trade freely with Africa:  
‘That open markets and free trade are best for those that desire them is 
certain, and so it is to buy cheap and sell dear, and most of all to have 
commodities for nothing, and if all his Majesty's dominions and 
plantations were made only for Barbadoes, it might be expedient ; but 
since it is conceived that his Majesty will have regard to what may 
preserve the trade of the nation, and not only to what will gratify 
Barbadoes, they think their desire of free trade will prove as 
impracticable and pernicious to themselves as destructive to all other 
public interests…. They never pay for the negroes they have…and as 
it was testified they had so great a glut of negroes that they would 
hardly give them their victuals for their labor, and multitudes died 




Leighton’s assessment of the island’s market as glutted, however, appeared to be 
inaccurate, as the records show that most of the enslaved Africans that did arrive at 
Barbados were promptly shipped off to Spanish colonies instead of entering local 
markets, a trend that irked many across the island.  After receiving only a single 
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Company ship between 1667 and 1669, Simon Lambert, the Speaker of Barbados’ 
Assembly, penned a letter to Governor William Willoughby in order to ‘complain of 
the Royal Company, who have not complied with their proclamation to furnish 
negroes at £17 or 2,400 lb. sugar per head, but have sold the best to the Spaniard, and 
the refuse here at near double that sum.’
51
  While Leighton responded that the 
Company ‘never desired more than 17l. per head for negroes in times of peace,’ he 
admitted that the lingering effects of war did indeed cause the prices of enslaved 
Africans to rise.
52
    To counter these struggles, the Royal Adventurers began selling 
licenses to individual merchants who agreed to trade within the limits of the 
established monopoly, ushering in a short five-year period in which private traders 
handled the majority of commerce.
53
  This, however, brought little satisfaction to 
Barbadian planters, and they continued to campaign for an ‘open market’ and a ‘free 
trade with the Coast of Guiney for Negro Slaves,’ since this approach inevitably 
‘renders the most plenty’ and ‘the best Comodity.’
54
     
The Crown responded by re-chartering a third joint-stock venture, the Royal 
African Company, in 1672.
55
  The primary investors of the RAC experienced greater 
initial success, as they looked to focus primarily on the slave trade, with gold and 
ivory representing secondary items of import.  Moreover, the continuation of the 
Dutch War against France distracted rival middlemen and potential foreign  
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Table 3.4: The Slave Trade to Barbados, 1674-1679 









Avg. Cost  
1674 3 1 2 939 826 826 100.00% 22.93 (1) 
1675 6 4 2 1,670 1,271 1,271 100.00% 18.86 (3) 
1676 6 6 0 2,094 1,828 1,828 100.00% 19.32 (6) 
1677 7 3 4 2,057 1,639 1,639 100.00% 17.44 (3) 
1678 7 7 0 3,072 2,402 2,393 99.63% 18.98 (7) 
1679 8 5 3 2,233 1,501 1,489 99.20% 16.76 (4) 
         
Totals: 
RAC 
26 26 - 9,244 7,322 7,301 99.71% 18.84 (24) 
Totals: 
Inter. 
11 - 11 2,821 2,145 2,145 100.00% NA 
Overall 37 26 11 12,065 9,467 9,446 99.78% 18.84 (24) 
Table 3.4: Eltis et al., TASTDB, 1674-1679. Only a handful of the illegal private traders are represented in the 
above table.  Davies, taking the interloping trade into account, hypothesizes that over 4,000 enslaved Africans 
were annually arriving at the island by the end of the 1670s.  Davies, RAC, 45-46 and 363. 
interlopers from interfering with the Caribbean slave trade, especially after 1674.  
This allowed the RAC to land ships in Barbados more consistently, as 26 arrived in 
the six-year period between 1674 and 1679, inevitably resulting in the increasing 
availability and decreasing prices that the planters had requested from the previous 
Companies.  Table 3.4 shows that the RAC went from selling 826 enslaved Africans 
during its first year in 1674 to over 2,393 by 1678, with prices decreasing from an 
£22.93 to £16.76 by the end of the decade.
56
  Within such a market, the RAC had 
unquestionably helped to expand the unfree labor force in Barbados, with the number 
of enslaved living on the island rising from about 30,000 in 1670 to 37,315 by 1679.   
 The success experienced during the late 1670s solidified England’s premier 
place within the Caribbean slave trade, situating it at the head of a group of 
participating European countries that included France, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Spain, by the beginning of the next decade.  The Spanish maintained the most 
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interesting relationship within this commercial enterprise, as they operated strictly as 
buyers.  Spain possessed no territory in Africa as a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas 
in 1494, an agreement brokered by Pope Alexander VI that gave Spain all colonies 
west of the 46° longitudinal line and Portugal those to the east.  Since Africa fell into 
Portugal’s portion, the Spaniards could not settle on that continent and therefore did 
not import enslaved Africans directly to its colonies.  Instead, Spanish merchants had 
to grant contracts known as asientos de negros to foreigners who would then 
subcontract their obligations to other merchants.  These contracts paid well and 
became prized commodities within the Atlantic community.  Aside from the Spanish 
and English, the other two nations to figure prominently in the Caribbean during this 
time were France, whose planters were just establishing themselves on Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, and Saint-Domingue, and the Dutch Republic, active merchants and 
planters in the area since well before the English arrived.  The Dutch maintained 
colonial settlements on a series of islands, most notably Saint Eustatius, Aruba, 
Bonaire, and Curaçao, and at Suriname, Essequibo, and Berbice on the South 
American coast.  While they cultivated some sugar, their involvement in the slave 
trade mirrored their role as the middlemen of the Atlantic economy.  Generally 
selling to any interested buyer, the Dutch were major suppliers to the Spanish and 
had held a coveted asiento contract since 1662 that called for the West-Indische 
Compagnie to provide 4,800 enslaved Africans a year.
57
   
Within the congested waters of the Caribbean, however, the RAC emerged as 
the most successful dealer of enslaved Africans and Barbados, with its valuable 
market in Bridgetown, became the region’s commercial focal point for the slave 
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trade throughout the 1680s and 1690s.  Importantly, the increased efficiency of the 
RAC coincided with a distinct transformation in the way that many planters 
organized their enslaved labor force for the production of sugar.  Initially employing 
a task system, built around the handling of specific jobs, planters across the island 
favored the developing gang system, in which each enslaved African worked as a 
single part of a larger group under heavy supervision by 1680.  This approach further 
dehumanized black laborers by stripping them of their individuality and turning them 
into separate cogs of a great machine that worked from sun-up to sun-down each day.  
A driver, armed with a whip, doled out physical punishment to any part of this 
‘machine’ that failed to keep up with the rest of the group, as the planters believed 
that even a single slow worker could jeopardize the speed and efficiency that they 
strove to maintain.
58
  Thus, since Barbados was the first location to widely adopt a 
system of labor that required such huge numbers of unfree workers, the RAC and 
Barbadian planters, merchants, and farmers engaged in a mutually beneficial 
relationship that took advantage of a peaceful Atlantic to move a consistently large 
number of captive Africans from West Africa to the small Caribbean island.  
Table 3.5 reveals that Barbados, with at least 220 ships and 51,582 enslaved 
blacks arriving at the island over this twenty-one year period, represented 39.64% 
and 34.61% of the Caribbean-wide trade respectively.  In comparison, the French and 
Danish mercantilist companies combined for a mere 4.86% of the ships and 5.12% of 
the enslaved Africans involved in the trade.  The Dutch merchants posed the only 
real challenge to Barbadian supremacy, as they landed 47,168 Africans in only 117  
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Initial Stop  
Cost Per 
Slave (n) 
Barbados 220 64,077 51,582 234.46 49,301 95.58% 20.50 (71) 
Jamaica 134 42,319 32,774 244.58 31,476 96.04% 19.73 (43) 
Leewards 57 12,956 10,059 176.47 9,546 94.90% 24.75 (14) 
Dutch  117 53,619 47,168 403.15 47,159 99.98% NA 
French 24 7,856 6,114 254.75 6,114 100.00% NA 
Danish 3 1,475 1,324 441.33 1,256 94.86% NA 
Totals 555 182,302 149,021 268.51 144,852 97.20% 20.71(128) 
% 
Barbados 
39.64 35.15 34.61 234.46 34.04 95.58 NA 
Table 3.5: Eltis, TASTDB, TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, T 70/938-T 70/949, 1680-1700, and T 70/10-70/12. The 
figures in parenthesis in the final column represent the number of auctions that went into the calculation of 
each average.   
ships, numbers that accounted for 25.87% and 21.08% of the trade respectively.
59
  
Thus, Barbados, as a single island market, received a significantly larger number of 
enslaved Africans than the Dutch were able to supply to all of their Caribbean 
contacts over the same period, proving the immense size and scale of the trade in 
Bridgetown. 
Viewed through a more national lens, Barbados also functioned as the 
preferred destination for the RAC within the English Caribbean, receiving 86 more 
ships and over 18,808 more enslaved blacks than Jamaica, a larger island with 
fresher and more productive soil, between 1680 and 1700.  This disparity between 
the two island colonies is particularly surprising, as Jamaica sold enslaved Africans 
to the asiento for much of this period, and the subcontracting agent, Nicholas Porcio, 
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conducted most of his business from this location.
60
  The Leeward Islands, still in the 
process of converting an increasing number of resources over to sugar production, 
remained on the margins of the English Caribbean world, and received a negligible 
number of enslaved Africans in comparison, with the four Leeward Islands receiving 
only 57 ships and 10,059 enslaved Africans in total.  When these figures are 
combined with those from Jamaica, the five English islands still trailed Barbados’ 
totals by almost 30 ships and well over 8,000 enslaved blacks.  Thus, Bridgetown 
was unequivocally the leading Caribbean market for the slave trade during the late 
seventeenth century and Barbados emerged from this period as the best supplied 
location in the colonial world.   
  
Section II: A Yearly Breakdown of the Barbadian Slave Trade, 1680-1700 
 
The Barbadian slave trade, when broken down and analyzed on a yearly 
basis, shows a cyclical pattern highlighted by rapid expansion during the 1680s 
followed by a brief period of inevitable decline caused by the  Nine Years War.  As 
seen in Table 3.6, the first boom phase runs from 1680 to 1688 and coincides with 
both an era of peace within the English Caribbean and large sugarcane hauls that led 
to historically low prices.  During this nine-year period, 118 ships, carrying 
28,367Africans, landed at Bridgetown, from which the islanders purchased 27,099 
(95.53%).  This breaks down to annual averages of over 12 ships and nearly 2,710 
enslaved Africans.  In particularly profitable years, such as 1681 and 1683, white  
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 The Spanish had agreed to allow their ships to travel to Jamaica and participate in the slave trade 
starting in 1677.  This coincided with the ending phases of the Dutch War and a disruption of supply 
at Curaçao.  Curtis Nettels, ‘England and the Spanish-American Trade, 1680-1715,’ Journal of 
Modern History, vol. 3, no. 1 (March, 1931), 2-3 and Nuala Zahedieh, ‘The Merchants of Port Royal, 
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(Oct., 1986), 589-591. 
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% Traded to 
Barbados 
Average Cost 
in £ (n) 
1680 8 3,013 2,367 2,207 93.00% 17.18 (7) 
1681 18 5,256 3,892 3,866 99.30% 17.09 (10) 
1682 11 3,540 2,835 2,505 88.40% 17.08 (16) 
1683 21 5,484 4,212 4,188 99.40% 15.60 (1) 
1684 16 4,252 3,585 3,451 96.26% 16.99 (4) 
1685 8 2,324 1,997 1,975 98.89% NA 
1686 15 4,083 3,104 2,604 83.89% 18.40 (7) 
1687 8 2,459 1,902 1,886 99.20% NA 
1688 6 2,611 2,194 2,174 99.10% 18.05 (4) 
1689 7 2,788 2,279 2,243 98.40% 20.16 (3) 
1690 1 381 331 331 100.00% NA 
1691 5 1,644 1,340 1,319 98.43% 20.39 (4) 
1692 4 1,893 1,556 1,528 98.20% 19.47 (2) 
1693 2 972 488 488 100.00% 23.05 (1) 
1694 3 2,020 1,551 1,543 99.50% 22.39 (3) 
1695 6 2,049 1,877 1,877 100.00% 26.54 (2) 
1696 13 2,821 2,407 2,382 98.96% 32.18 (1) 
1697 16 3,853 3,510 3,238 92.25% 25.47 (2) 
1698 19 3,830 3,172 2,944 92.81% 22.26 (5) 
1699 13 3,978 3,068 2,871 93.58% 23.19 (2) 
1700 19 4,826 3,915 3,671 93.80% 25.45 (7) 
       
RAC 155 48,151 39,589 37,612 95.01% 21.43 (71) 
Inter. 65 15,926 11,993 11,689 97.47% NA 
Overall 220 64,077 51,582 49,301 95.58% 21.43 (71) 
Table 3.6: Eltis et al., TASTDB, TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1700, TNA, T 70/938-T 70/949, 1680-1700, and 
T 70/10-70/12. There were also large numbers of enslaved Africans legally bought by the Barbadians on a 
‘contract system.’  Usually working as syndicates based in England, merchants would agree in advance with 
the RAC to buy black laborers at a fixed price and then resell them on the open market.  Davies believed that 
the RAC supplied nearly 10,000 enslaved Africans at an average price of £15 per head through this system in 
the eighteen years between 1672 and 1689.  Davies, RAC, 294-299, ‘The Origins of the Commission System in 
the West India Trade’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 2 (Jan. 1952), 89-107, Anon., ‘That the 
Trade to Affrica, is only Manageable by an Incorporated Company and a Joynt Stock,’ (1690), TNA, T 70/10, 12 
May 1681, 9 November 1681, 2 March 1682, and T 70/12, 20 August 1685, 18 September 1683, 17 December 
1683, 19 February 1684, 20 August 1685, and 31 August 1688. 
Barbadians could see these numbers increase by as much as 150%.  Importantly for 
the island’s planters, with such a large number of new arrivals, the average price for 
enslaved blacks stayed consistently low throughout the era, ranging from £15.6 to 
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£18.4 between 1680 and 1688, proving that costs per head remained considerably 
lower than the £20 Littleton quoted as being typical of the 1680s.   
The subsequent bust period ran from 1689 to 1696, and occurred during a 
time of both great transition in the RAC and increased violence throughout the 
Atlantic.  As a joint-stock company with an official charter from a Stuart monarch 
and headed by the deposed James II, its position declined precipitously after the 
Revolution of 1688.  Furthermore, England had entered an international war and 
quickly lost control of both the Atlantic and the Caribbean during the initial stages of 
the conflict and, after a series of French attacks on English forts in Africa, failed to 
maintain a steady export trade from this continent.  When combined, these struggles 
greatly affected the ability of the Company to reach its previous levels of trade, as 
the records show that only 28 ships and 9,422 enslaved Africans completed the 
voyage between Africa and Barbados during the seven years between 1689 and 1695, 
representing annual averages of only 4 ships and 1,346 enslaved blacks.  This was a 
disappointingly low total for the island’s planters and one that, as will be shown, 
resulted in a substantial decline in the enslaved population on the island.   
As Graph 3.3 shows, the price for an average enslaved African, consequently, 
began to rise—slowly at first, as it hovered around £20 per head for the first four 
years of this period (1689-1692).  After a large jump in 1693 to £23.05 and a small 
decrease in 1694 to £22.39, the increase was rapid and peaked at £32.18 by 1696.  
With an average price per head of £23.16 during the first six years of fighting, each 
enslaved individual cost at least four pounds more than during the previous decade.  
As Graph 3.3 further shows, the rising cost of enslaved Africans coincides with the 
increasing price of sugar after 1688, surging from 10s 10d per cwt in 1690 to 21s 1d  
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Graph 3.3: Prices of Enslaved vs. Prices of Sugar on Barbados, 1684-1700 
 
Table 3.3: Eltis et al., TASTDB and TNA, T 70/938-T 70/949, 1684-1700. The sugar included in this table 
represents the amounts specifically sold to the RAC and the prices that the Company paid for it.  Therefore, it 
does not include any additional costs, such as freight.  The enslaved are priced in pounds sterling, while sugar 
is in shillings and pence.      
 
by 1694 and a period high of 24s 8d in 1696, possibly demonstrating a combination 
of the effects of a depleted workforce on the planters’ ability to produce the valuable 
cash crop and the inflated price of freight in the wartime Atlantic.
61
  Thus, the trends 
of rising prices for both the enslaved imported into the island and sugar exports 
shows how dramatic the burden of the Nine Years War could be for the Caribbean 
colonists, especially during what Graph 3.3 shows to be the war’s peak years 
between 1693 and 1696. 
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 The second boom phase occurred between 1696 and 1700 and corresponds 
with both the English reestablishing consistent control over the trans-Atlantic 
waterways and the opening of the slave trade to private merchants after 1698.  
During this short period, the slave trade quickly recovered from its wartime 
limitations and expanded beyond the averages of Barbados’ peak moment in the 
early and mid-1680s, as merchants successfully landed over 15,100 enslaved 
Africans on 70 separate voyages for annual averages of 3,021 and 14 respectively.  
Both of these totals exceeded the mean quantities established during the two earlier 
periods and allowed the islanders to rapidly replenish their depleted stocks to such an 
extent that a labor surplus occurred by the end of the century.  Table 3.6 
demonstrates, for example, that planters only bought 94% of the enslaved Africans 
that reached Bridgetown during this phase, a figure lower than both the 99.20% rate 
that had existed during the war and the 95.53% rate from the prewar era.  While 
individual years never fell into the 80% range as in the first boom phase, the 
Barbadians received enough enslaved Africans to comfortably send 941 to other 
markets between 1697 and 1700.   
The prices per head, however, mimicked the rising cost of sugar and 
surprisingly continued to increase after the war ended, surging from £22.16 in 1698 
to £25.45 in 1700.  This general price increase likely resulted from a variety of 
factors, including required fees for free traders, labor scarcity resulting from the war, 
and high freight costs.  Regardless of these obstacles, though, Barbadian planters and 
farmers witnessed a rejuvenation of the slave trade during the final five years of the 
seventeenth century, with the Royal Navy reestablishing its dominance in the 
Atlantic and securing the vital waterways that both RAC merchants and private 
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traders relied upon for safe and speedy movement between the island and the African 
coast.  This, along with a planter elite that maintained its huge appetite for enslaved 
labor, resulted in merchants soon selling over 3,000 Africans per year to white 
Barbadians and helped to reestablish the island as the most important slave market in 
the Caribbean 
 
Section III: The Effects of the Slave Trade on Barbados’ Enslaved Population 
        
Unfortunately, pure importation numbers, as displayed in Table 3.6, provide 
minimal insight into the changing nature of Barbados’ black population.  Moreover, 
the table only hints at the island’s demand compared to the supply and does not 
adequately address whether or not the Barbadians met their theoretical labor 
requirements.  To do this, mortality rates must be taken into account and compared 
against the known importation figures before relatively accurate population numbers 
can be tabulated.  While it is understood that unfree black laborers suffered from 
abnormally high mortality rates due to the squalid conditions and difficult work that 
the white planters forced upon them, the percentage itself is difficult to predict,  




 It is also necessary to account for the fact that conditions on the island during 
the peaceful 1680s were probably much different than those of the conflict-ridden 
1690s.  As such, a series of experimental calculations show that a varying mortality 
rate of 2% from 1680 to 1689, 7% from 1690 to 1697, and 2% from 1698 to 1700 
matches up reasonably well with the reported census totals of 46,602 enslaved 
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 Thomas Tryon, a planter and merchant, exaggeratingly claimed that between one-fifth and one-
quarter of the black population died annually.  Tryon’s numbers, however, are not realistic, and serve 
to emphasize his anti-slavery beliefs.  Tryon, Friendly Advice, 144.   
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Table 3.7: Slave Population Adjusted for Mortality Rates, 1680-1700 
Year Deaths Enslaved Bought by Year Total 
1680 746 2,207 38,776 
1681 776 3,866 41,866 
1682 837 2,505 43,534 
1683 871 4,188 46,851 
1684 937 3,451 49,365 
1685 987 1,975 50,353 
1686 1,007 2,604 51,950 
1687 1,039 1,886 52,797 
1688 1,056 2,174 53,915 
1689 1,078 2,243 55,080 
1690 3,856 331 51,555 
1691 3,609 1,319 49,265 
1692 3,449 1,528 47,344 
1693 3,314 488 44,607 
1694 3,122 1,543 43,028 
1695 3,012 1,877 41,893 
1696 2,933 2,382 41,342 
1697 2,894 3,238 41,686 
1698 834 2,944 43,796 
1699 876 2,871 45,791 
1700 916 3,671 48,546 
Table 3.7: BDA, BS 19, 1680 Census, Eltis et al., TASTDB, and TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1700. While this 
exercise has been conducted in the past by historians such as Richard Sheridan and Ann Carlos, this version 
includes updated totals from the slave trade and a varying mortality rate.  Thus, its results provide an 
enslaved population much closer to the aforementioned known totals and a more accurate overall snapshot 
of the effects of the slave trade on island population.   
Africans in 1683 and 42,000 in 1696.  This simulation also does not include island 
births within the enslaved population, as these rates are notoriously difficult to 
predict and no useful estimates exist for the seventeenth-century.
63
  Using the 1680 
census total of 37,315 as a baseline population, Table 3.7 shows the results of this 
simulation.  With a 2% mortality rate, the enslaved population increased rapidly 
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 There must have been a substantial enslaved creole population, as there were enough to plan a 
revolt against the island’s planter class in 1692.  Anon., ‘A Brief, but most True Relation Of the late 
Barbarous and Bloody Plot of the Negros in the Island of Barbados (1693).   
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throughout the 1680s, surging past 50,000 in 1685 and reaching a peak of 55,080 in 
1689.  As expected, the war wreaked havoc on both the black population and the 
slave trade, as the latter could not keep up with the 7% island mortality rate, causing 
the enslaved community to dramatically decline over the next eight years.  By 1696, 
for example, this population had bottomed out at 41,342 before rebounding during 
the war’s final year.  Over the course of the next three years, the slave trade returned 
to its earlier prominence, supplying a combined 9,486 enslaved Africans to the 
island.  Thus, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Barbados’ black population 
stood at well over 48,500.    
To complete this simulation, the enslaved African population needs to be 
examined against the island’s arable acreage in order to discern whether the 
Barbadian sugar planters bought enough laborers to adequately sustain production.  
The 1680 census provides a baseline for this too, as the document states that the 
island consisted of 87,579 productive acres of land.  As planters stressed that the 
ideal ratio of workers to land for sugar production was 1:2, the island would 
theoretically require a total enslaved population of approximately 43,790 to cover its 
labor needs.
64
  Table 3.7 suggests that the Barbadians approached this minimum by 
1682 and exceeded it until 1694, when the privations of war left them with just 
43,028.  After the conflict ended in 1697, the enslaved African population quickly 
expanded, passing 43,790 again by the next year.  Thus, even at its lowest, the total 
number of enslaved laborers on the island was never too far below the 43,790 
threshold and the depressed figures of the war were only temporary, increasing 
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 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, 94-95.  Not all of this land would have been planted with cane, as 
planters set aside a significant portion for provisions, secondary cash crops, or just to lie fallow.  
While these still required the use of enslaved workers, the numbers were far less than those needed for 
cane cultivation.  There were also numerous enslaved individuals who worked as domestics or in an 
urban setting.   
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quickly once the conflict ended.  Thus, after allowing for a mortality rate of 2% 
during the 1680s and 7% for most of the 1690s, the deliveries of enslaved Africans 
proved sufficient to maintain the desired ratio of one black worker for every two 
acres for most of the twenty-one year period examined and the island would have 
even experienced a significant labor surplus for many of the non-war years before 
1689 and after 1698, matching up well with the conclusions drawn from Table 3.7.
 Overall, the data from both Table 3.6 and 3.7 prove that Littleton’s 
description of an island starving for cheap labor was inaccurate and did not represent 
the true nature of the late-seventeenth century slave trade in Barbados.  In fact, many 
contemporary sources reported that the island actually experienced a saturated 
market by the early 1680s.  In 1684, for example, the island’s RAC factors noticed a 
‘glutt of negroes’ and that any resulting auction made ‘for a bad sale.’
65
  Edwin 
Stede, a former factor, spoke in more general terms of an expansive slave trade that 
frequently left island planters oversupplied, which forced merchants to seek other 
destinations to vend their human cargo:  
During the time of my being in Barbados, which wanted but few 
weeks of twenty yeares…there was for the most part of the time a 
very considerable number of negros yearly imported…and sometimes 
such numbers more then that island then seamed to want…& have 
been forced to retaile them to the Marchants & others that sold them 




According to Table 3.7, merchants frequently searched for alternate markets, as they 
sold less than 95% of the Africans they carried to Barbados in seven different years 
between 1680 and 1700, and less than 90% in two.  In 1684, for example, Captain 
William Deeron, an interloper from Madagascar, arrived in Carlisle Bay to glutted 
market conditions.  After selling only 70 of his 101 enslaved Africans, he left 
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Barbados and, after briefly stopping at the Leeward Islands, headed back to Africa, 
where he attempted to return the remaining enslaved captives and obtain a refund.
67
  
With many merchant captains experiencing similar situations and forced to attempt 
to peddle unsold enslaved Africans to mainland colonies such as Virginia and 
Carolina, or to try to penetrate into the well-protected fortress towns of Spanish 
America, the records depict a Barbados plentifully supplied with enslaved Africans 
at low prices throughout the 1680s and 1690s, and a white population that bought 
more black workers than any other country or colony in the Caribbean.   
 
Section IV: The Unrecorded Interloping Trade 
 
At first glance, Table 3.6 portrays a ten-year period between 1680 and 1689 
in which the RAC was at the height of its powers, organizing 99 of the 118 ships 
(83.90%) that are known to have arrived in Bridgetown during the decade.  The 
numbers, however, hide the commercial reality, as they do not include the ‘hidden’ 
illicit trade that often occurred on Barbados.  Much of this illegal commerce resulted 
from planter resentment towards the monopolistic Company.  Even as the RAC 
supplied the island’s planters and merchants with large numbers of enslaved Africans 
at cheap prices, many elite Barbadians continued to vigorously maintain their 
complaints of ‘the insupportable injuries done to the island’ by the RAC taking 
advantage of high local demand.
68
  Others critiqued the levels of supply, as Edward 
Thornburgh, an RAC agent, pointed out that the islanders ‘complain for want,’ and 
that they claimed that ‘they have not had above 600 [enslaved Africans] in 12 
months.’
69
  These feelings of resentment for high costs and low supply, when 
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 Eltis et al., TASTDB and TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698. 
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 TNA, CO 29/4, 18 February, 1675, Council and Assembly to his Excellency. 
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 TNA, T 70/10, 23 December, 1679. 
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combined with a general contempt for governmentally-controlled trade, resulted in 
many islanders continuing to support illegal interlopers and free trade throughout 
much of this period.   
During the late 1670s and the first half of the 1680s, the illicit importation of 
enslaved Africans was common across the island, as private merchants were able to 
take advantage of the Barbadian planters’ ‘design of prejudice to the Company’ and 
were quickly welcomed by elites looking for the lowest prices and greatest supply.
70
  
While it is impossible to accurately estimate the size of the illegal trade, Carlos 
suggests that interloper penetration approached 35% within the first year of the 
RAC’s operation, but quickly rose to 46% by the end of the 1670s and 50% by 
1683.
71
  Eltis, however, tempers Carlos’ claim and posits that interlopers were 
responsible for clandestinely transporting a more reasonable 22% of enslaved 
Africans to the island.
72
   
The most important reason for such success centered on the inability of the 
English government to effectively monitor those it empowered to enforce its will on 
Barbados.  The two factors selected to locally represent the RAC held almost no 
actual power on the island and could never adequately assert their authority, while 
the Commissioner of Customs, who benefitted little from enforcing the monopoly, 
could often make extra money by either turning a blind eye to illegal commerce or by 
participating in it, as well.  Furthermore, the two governors in charge of the island 
during the RAC’s early years, Jonathon Atkins (1674-79) and, to a lesser extent, 
Richard Dutton (1680-85), both sided with the planters and welcomed many varieties 
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of illegal trade.  In 1677, John Stanfast, a wealthy planter, reported to Stephen 
Gascoigne, an RAC factor, of the ‘arrival of an interloper belonging to Colonel 
William Sharpe, Chief Judge John Worsam, and Major John Hallet.’  The ship 
successfully transported 98 enslaved Africans who were ‘landed and carried to 
Colonel Richard Bailey’s plantation, close to the landing place, about an hour before 
the factors got there.’  As these four wealthy planters were in league with both Roger 
Cowley, the island’s Commissioner of Customs, and Governor Atkins, they were not 
punished for this breach of the rules, leaving Gascoigne to worry that this act would 
give ‘great encouragement to other people to take this liberty, seeing those that sit in 
great places and live by the King’s Commissions act as they do.’
73
  Three weeks later 
another ship owned by two other elite planters and part-time interlopers, Arthur 
Middleton and Richard Bates, managed to land 120 enslaved laborers on the island’s 
western Caribbean coast while the factors were busy working an auction in 
Bridgetown.  When officials did eventually try to prevent Bates and Middleton’s 
venture, a small hired mob attacked the factors and left them ‘beaten and wounded 
without any cause given.’  When the factors complained to the governor, Atkins 
refused to act against either planter.
74
  
Richard Dutton took the same lackadaisical approach to protecting the 
prerogative of the RAC as his predecessor, welcoming interloper participation in the 
slave trade from the very beginning of his governorship in 1680.  The oft-
exasperated RAC factors, Edwyn Stede and Stephen Gascoigne, voiced their 
frustration with Dutton’s lack of support in a series of letters that cover most of the 
early 1680s.  In November of 1681, for example, they reported that ‘two interlopers 
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have lately landed their negroes at the usual point to leeward; one carried ninety, the 
other a hundred and ten,’ and maintained that ‘we could not prevent it,’ as ‘no one 
will help us now the man-of-war is gone.’
75
  The factors were equally appalled that 
the leading Barbadian planters remained at the forefront of the illicit trade, as the 
governor again refused to take any action against them.  Two wealthy planters and 
government officials, James Carter and Thomas Hothersall, openly helped the illegal 
traders by supplying them with free provisions during their illicit sales, causing the 
factors to plead that ‘unless the King support the Company and discountenance those 
in places of trust who ought to support his rights, but instead thereof not only are 
breaker thereof themselves but encourage others, we shall never see the Company 
established in full enjoyment of its grant.’
76
   They further insisted that powerful 
planters, such as Henry Drax, John Peers, Christopher and John Codrington, and 
Samuel Husbands, frequently engaged in the interloper trade with Dutton’s aid, and 
that the King would be wise to ‘displace them from the honour and trust which they 
so much abuse.’
77
   
Stede and Gascoigne continued their attack on Dutton’s performance 
throughout the early 1680s.  In May of 1681, they reported the successful landing of 
an interloper, ‘which they cannot prevent because of the Governour’s slack,’ and 
followed this by recording in June that they continued to receive ‘noe assistance from 
the Governour against the Interlopers.’
78
  When specifically questioned about it, the 
two factors maintained that Dutton ‘pretend he hath noe particular Order about 
Interlopers,’ and that he would not ‘give orders…to meddle with Interlopers till he 
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hath further orders from his Majestie.’
 79
  In 1683, the factors sent home another 
letter that explained that the ‘pride of the interlopers makes them troublesome to the 
Government,’ but its members made no effort to ‘divert them from theire endeavors,’ 
and that nothing could really be done unless either the Company supplied them with 
a frigate to monitor the Barbadian coastline, or they forced Dutton to take some sort 
of stand against illegal trade.
80
  By 1685, the factors effectively gave up and 
concluded that ‘Sir Richard Dutton [is] no friend to the Company.’
81
 
The English government eventually responded by sending a ship to monitor 
the Barbadian coastline, but this only pushed the interlopers into finding more 
elaborate methods of avoiding detection and landing their enslaved Africans illicitly 
on the island.  In one common scenario, for example, black captives were ‘delivered 
by the Interlopers at the Leeward Islands [or Tobago] and from there fetched up’ by 
the planters themselves.  The Barbadian elite also regularly imported the enslaved 
from rival colonies, such as Dutch Curaçao and St. Eustace, allowing foreign 
competitors to handle the risk of transporting them across the Middle Passage.
82
  
Another typical ploy was for captains to hide most of their captives while the RAC’s 
factors boarded the ship and took stock of the cargo.  When questioned, the captains 
would blame disease or rebellion for the few survivors.  The captain and the crew 
then kept the hidden enslaved men and women to sell for their own profit.  On 12 
September 1684, for example, the Allepine, with an original total of 410 captives, 
arrived in Barbados claiming only 60 or 70.  Stede and Gascoigne became 
particularly suspicious when the captain refused to allow a search of his ship.  Under 
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pressure, the captain finally relented and the Company found 150 Africans hidden in 
the ship’s hold.
 83
       
As the 1680s wore on, the interlopers grew bolder and more organized, 
creating increasingly complex plans in order to cheat the Company.  Stede and 
Gascoigne recounted one clever ruse in which a group of slave traders pretended to 
masquerade their ship as a sloop of Governor Dutton’s to avoid detection.
84
  In 
another elaborate scheme, the crew from the Combination ‘imbezled the Brandy and 
Provisions for Negroes and gave them Mallagetta and water, which was the cause of 
their Mortality,’ sold the ship’s gunpowder for profit after replacing it with more 
malaguetta, stole 550 chests of corn and eight marks of gold, and sold ten enslaved 
Africans on their own account without proper authorization.
85
  Other interlopers 
carried enslaved Africans from the eastern coast of Africa and Madagascar, both of 
which lay outside the RAC’s jurisdiction.  14 entries from Madagascar appear in 




By the end of 1685, however, the sheer volume of interloping activity began 
to decline, as James II replaced his deceased brother as King earlier that year.  As the 
leader of the RAC, James II desired to encourage greater organization within the 
trade and to keep it free from illegalities.  One of his earliest steps to ensure this on 
Barbados was to replace the corrupt Dutton with Edwin Stede, the former RAC 
factor who had consistently acted as one of its strongest local proponents.  With 
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Stede in charge, the Company ‘dramatically curtailed the level of fringe penetration’ 
between 1685 and 1689.
 87
   According to statistics gleaned from the TASTDB, the 
RAC increased its proportion of the slave trade from 82.90% between 1680 and 1685 
to 85.71% between 1686 and 1690.
88
  Moreover, the references to interlopers 
dramatically declined in agent letters, shifting from what had been a regular feature 
of most reports in the early 1680s to a rarity after 1685.
89
  To some extent, these local 
improvements resulted from Stede’s personal ambition and desire to capture and 
punish any interloper that appeared off the Barbadian coast.  Upon being elevated to 
the governorship in June of 1685, he declared that he would ‘endeavor to suppress 
Interlopers.’
 90
  He promptly captured two within days of the announcement and 
continued this trend throughout his time in power.   In May of 1686, for example, his 
men caught two Dutch interlopers off the coast of Barbados, while also capturing an 
Irish and a Dutch interloper in December.
91
  Furthermore, he was also effective at 
catching illegal traders who had already landed and limited the number of enslaved 
Africans that others could get ashore.  On 16 May, 1687, Stede sent Captain Robert 
Hooper, a Barbadian sugar planter and militia officer, to seize an interloper who had 
just arrived on the island’s western shore, a quick action that resulted in the capture 
of both the ship and a number of disembarked Africans.
92
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Unfortunately, Stede’s progress only resulted in a temporary improvement, as 
he lost his lieutenant-governorship in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688.  
William III instead replaced him with a series of planter-friendly local leaders that 
included James Kendall (1690-94), Francis Russell (1694-96), and Ralph Grey 
(1697-1701).  These three governors looked to maintain strong ties with the planter 
and merchant elite in Barbados and consequently did little to maintain the vigilance 
Stede displayed against illegal trade during the late 1680s.  Between 1689 and 1697, 
for example, the island’s Customs Commissioner registered 30 of the 57 ships 
(52.63%) that arrived from Africa as private traders.  These ships became 
particularly prevalent after 1695, accounting for 74.28% of the trade, as the English 
Navy’s victories over the French had reopened Atlantic and Caribbean waterways.  
After the Treaty of Ryswick ended the war in 1697, a victorious William III could 
now turn his attention to colonial administration and started by denouncing the 
RAC’s monopoly and declaring trade with Africa both open and free.  In July of 
1698, the Barbadian Council and Assembly received word from England that the 
African Bill had been passed by the House of Commons and that the slave trade 
would no longer be legally dominated by a chartered Company.
93
  Any trader could 
now freely buy, sell, and transport the enslaved from English factories in Africa to 
the Caribbean on payment of a 10% duty on all African exports to support the costs 
of forts and other infrastructure in Africa.  
Initially, this was a great triumph for the elite Barbadians, as they believed 
that they could finally expand the slave trade, while pushing down costs, and achieve 
their decades-long dream of a seemingly endless supply of cheap labor.  As  
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Table 3.8: The Slave Trade in Barbados, 1701-1720 
Year Number RAC Private Traders Enslaved Average Price (n) 
1701 36 2 34 5,469 25.16 (8) 
1702 36 2 34 7,487 22.21 (11) 
1703 7 2 5 1,767 29.34 (2) 
1704 13 4 9 3,141 32.54 (6) 
1705 5 3 2 1,442 26.98 (2) 
1706 10 6 4 3,081 27.42 (6) 
1707 5 2 3 972 20.74 (5) 
1708 7 4 3 1,531 25.07 (3) 
1709 3 2 2 683 26.12 (2) 
1710 8 2 4 1,170 23.27 (2) 
1711 5 2 3 1,319 28.10 (1) 
1712 14 3 11 3,321 NA 
1713 21 1 20 4,467 NA 
1714 37 7 (3 SSC) 30 6,364 NA 
1715 37 2 (1 SSC) 35 5,792 24.15 (1) 
1716 25 0 25 4,084 NA 
1717 38 1 37 5,534 NA 
1718 40 3 (3 SSC) 37 7,767 NA 
1719 29 6 (4 SSC) 23 5,289 18.3 (1) 
1720 9 0 9 1,192 NA 
      
RAC/SSC - 54 - 14,851 26.43 (20) 
Private - - 300 57,021 24.43 (30) 
Totals 354 54 300 71,872 25.45 (50) 
Table 3.8: Eltis et al., TASTD and TNA, CO 33/15, 1708-1720. The only important difference between this table 
and the previous pre-1700 versions is the enslaved Africans brought over by the South Sea Company 
(abbreviated as SSC).  Created in 1711, the South Sea Company was a short-lived joint-stock venture that was 
meant to manage all trade between Great Britain and South America.  This Company was never profitable 
and was, in many ways, little more than a scam for its initial investors to make money off of the consolidation 
of the British national debt.  The SSC’s bubble burst in 1720 and ruined many who had invested in it. 
Table 3.8 shows, 36 ships, 94.44% of which were captained by private traders, 
arrived at the island in both 1701 and 1702, carrying 5,369 and 7,285 enslaved 
Africans respectively.  They also sold for decreasing prices, as the cost of an 
enslaved African dropped by almost £3.25 pounds between 1700 and 1702.  While 
most private traders originated in London, many Barbadians also actively 
participated in the slave trade.  Chart 3.1 demonstrates that they represented nearly 
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Chart 3.1: The Origins of Private Traders, 1708-1720 
 
Chart 3.1: Eltis et al, TASTDB, 1708-1720 
30% of all private traders, second only to England (67%) as a port of origin.  Planters 
and merchants, such as James Colleton, John Mills, George Andrews, George Peers,  
Benjamin Scott, Edward Searle, William and Melatiah Holder, and the Lascelles 
family all appear in the records as merchants who actively participated in the slave 
trade, many by sending their own boats to do business along the African coast.  In 
1702, for example, James Colleton sent The Lark to Africa and sold the 191 enslaved 
Africans that he transported across the Atlantic at Bridgetown for a total of £4,234.  
Melatiah Holder purchased a quarter-share of the Hanover during that same year and 
received over £1,050 for his investment.
94
  Thus, for wealthy planters such as Holder 
and Colleton, the opening of the slave trade represented yet another business 
opportunity that allowed the elite to diversify their income while maintaining access 
to cheap, unfree labor.   
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This rapid expansion of the slave trade, however, was short-lived and 
abruptly contracted in 1703, two years after Louis XIV’s initial attempts to put a 
Bourbon monarch on Spain’s throne launched Europe into yet another international 
war.  Like the Nine Years War from the previous decade, the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1713) initially limited Barbados’ access to all branches of trade, 
including its commercial relationship with Africa.  Table 3.8 shows that between 
1705 and 1711, the islanders received an average of only six ships and 1,028 
enslaved Africans per year.  With such reduced numbers, the price of enslaved labor 
inevitably increased after 1702 and remained high for the duration of the war, 
peaking at £32.54 in 1704.  After the Treaty of Utrecht formally ended the war in 
1713, English merchants, taking advantage of the typical postwar commercial boom, 
revitalized the slave trade and maintained it at an elevated level for the rest of the 
decade, welcoming 236 slave ships (almost 30 per year) and 40,489 enslaved 
Africans (an average of 5,061) to the island over the course of these seven years.  By 
1719, prices had also dropped, finally dipping below £20 for the first time since the 
1680s.   
Overall, Table 3.8 depicts a two-decade period between 1701 and 1720 that 
reflects and mimics the slave trading trends of the previous twenty years, with the 
island experiencing another cyclical pattern of peacetime expansion and wartime 
constriction, followed by a rapid and unparalleled level of growth in the immediate 
postwar years.  In total, this second twenty-year period resulted in the arrival of an 
additional 354 ships and 71,872 enslaved Africans between 1701 and 1720, leading 
to a well-supplied island and a black population that likely reached at least 60,000 by 
1720.  Furthermore, it was private merchants that pushed this branch of island 
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commerce to new heights, as both the RAC and SSC maintained a very limited role 
in the slave trade during this era.  According to a report from the Council of Trade 
and Plantations, private traders transported 160,950 enslaved Africans to the English 
Caribbean in the twelve years between 1698 and 1709, and accounted for about 80-
85% of the ships and black laborers that entered Barbados during the first two 
decades of the eighteenth century.
95
   
Yet, ambitious Barbadian planters and merchants still could not find 
satisfaction in this expansive trade, as by 1709 they were again sending complaints 
back to England.  Still fixating on supply and prices, elite planters now condemned 
the private traders and requested that the RAC’s exclusive trading monopoly be 
reinstituted:  
‘that unless the Trade of Africa be carried on by a Company of 
sufficient Joint-Stock, We have not the least ground to expect that we 
shall have either a sufficient Number of Slaves imported here; 
And…that the late high Prices given for Negroes has risen from no 
other Cause but the Liberty given to Separate Traders.’
96
   
 
The unhappiness with both the Company and private traders vividly displayed the 
fickle and impetuous nature of the elite Barbadians, as temporary difficulties due to 
wartime adversity caused them to see the entire slave trade as fundamentally broken, 
even though it quickly got back on track as the conflict raced towards a resolution in 
1712.  While they never convinced the English government to overturn its decision 
to open the slave trade, the islanders continued to look for other ways in which they 
could generate profit from this branch of commerce.  One such project focused on a 
renewed effort at capturing a part of the Spanish slave trade, with many Barbadians 
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siding with a rising belief that with ‘trade to Africa laid open, and Ships permitted to 




Part III: Barbados and the Anglo-Spanish Slave Trade 
The privilege of supplying Spain’s colonies with enslaved Africans 
represented one of the great prizes of the early-modern Caribbean world.  Willing to 
pay inflated prices and offering to deal in bullion payable upfront, the Spaniards 
were an ideal commercial partner for the mercantilist empires of Europe.  While the 
Portuguese and Dutch initially controlled the flow of labor into Spain’s colonies, 
their constant wars allowed others the opportunity to find a niche within this trade to 
exploit.  It was under these conditions that the Barbadian elite first attempted to 
establish and maintain a mercantile relationship with the Spanish Main.  In 1662, two 
Spaniards arrived at Barbados to begin discussing a strategy to supply enslaved 
Africans for transport to Peru in return for large amounts of bullion.
98
  On 26 
February, 1662, another Spanish ship on a similar errand ‘arrived and filled our 
island with money; 125 to 140 pieces of eight per head given for negroes.  The 
Spaniards bought 400 blacks and intend to make them 800.’  This initial encounter 
was beneficial to both sides involved and caused the islanders to believe that ‘if 
assured of free trade in Barbados, the Spaniards would undertake to bring 
commodities to the value of five million pieces of eight yearly,’ and would be willing 
to ‘pay ten per cent customs’ to trade enslaved Africans to ‘Peru where their  
market price was 1,000 pieces of eight per head.’
99
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These early forays into Spanish markets fit nicely within the trading schemes 
of Charles II and James, Duke of York, both of whom had dreamed of establishing 
important economic relationships with the great Spanish fortress towns of Cartagena 
and Portobello.  They hoped that English merchants could find buyers in these 
locations for surplus provisions, clothing, and luxuries, in addition to enslaved 
Africans, as they were traditionally undersupplied by their own metropole.
100
  To 
further promote this goal, the Royal Adventurers, with the aid of Richard White, a 
Spanish agent in England, obtained a subcontract for the asiento through Ambrosio 
Lemolini and Domingo Grillo, two Genoese merchants charged with delivering 
enslaved Africans to Spain’s colonies.  The Royal Adventurers agreed to send 3,500 
enslaved Africans for seven years to Cartagena, Portobello, and Vera Cruz, formally 
approving the deal in June 1664.  In preparation, Charles II lifted the Navigation 
Acts, granted the Spaniards permission to come to Jamaica or Barbados to buy 
enslaved Africans, and demanded an end to English privateering against Spain’s 
ships.  Sir Ellis Leighton also obtained permission for ‘the agents of Signor Grillo’ to 
reside in both Barbados and Jamaica ‘with the same liberty as the King's subjects.’
101
   
 Initially, the subcontract appeared to be satisfactory to both sides, with trade 
between Barbadian and Spaniard merchants quickly expanding.  The English 
government saw the elite Barbadian planters and merchants as a valuable part of a 
larger trading community with the Spanish.  They believed that the Spaniards could 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mean that the Spaniards were paying £250 pounds per slave or over ten times the amount paid in the 
English Caribbean. 
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receive ‘two-thirds [of their enslaved Africans] at Jamaica and one-third at 
Barbadoes…From Jamaica negroes may be easily transported to Sta. Martha, and so 
to all the ports leeward as far as La Vera Cruz, and from Barbadoes to all the 
windward parts of the Continent.’
102
  This strategy gave Barbadian merchants the 
task of supplying the Spaniards living in the eastern Caribbean and especially in 
modern-day Venezuela, while the Jamaicans would serve as an ideal market for the 
western half.  With these parameters set, England planned to reap a bounty of 
‘86,000l in Spanish silver per annum,’ while the Barbadian merchants hoped that 
Bridgetown would emerge as the primary hub for Anglo-Spanish trade.
103
  Moreover, 
elite merchants and sugar planters, such as John Reid, also hoped to participate in 
private trade that would result in them selling enslaved Africans to areas like Porto 
Bello, Cartagena, and even as far afield as Cadiz and Tenerife.
104
  Eltis claims that 
this early approach was quite successful, as by 1667, 15% of all enslaved captives 
arriving at Barbados left the island on Spanish ships.
105
   
The trade never developed for Barbados as expected, however, and the 
planters, fearing that the best enslaved Africans would be sent to Spanish colonies, 
quickly grew to dislike the arrangement.  Furthermore, the Anglo-Dutch War greatly 
limited the Company’s ability to send ships across the Atlantic.  As such, Barbadian 
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merchants sold few enslaved Africans to the Spaniards under the asiento, especially 
after 1665.  Zook found, for example, that only a single Spanish ship legally arrived 
at Barbados during the subcontract.  Even this voyage was a disappointment, as the 
Spanish captain desired to secure 1,000 Africans, but island agents could only gather 
800 to sell.
106
  By 1667, the Royal Adventurers realized that they could never fulfill 
their agreement with Grillo and Lamolini and, claiming that the contract had been 
broken by the unscrupulous brokers, were no longer liable to its terms.  In private, 
however, they admitted their failure, and acknowledged that no more than 1,200 
enslaved Africans had actually been delivered to Grillo’s and Lamolini’s agents.
107
  
As such, the Royal Adventurers were not able to control the Anglo-Spanish slave 
trade as they had initially intended and struggled to produce a profit as a 
monopolistic company.
108
  While the signing of the Treaty of Madrid (1670) inspired 
the English with some hope of reviving trade between the two countries, and likely 
formed one reason why the king granted another charter to the RAC in 1671-72, a 
general lack of available enslaved labor caused few Spaniards to visit Barbados in 
the early 1670s.  
By 1675, the RAC showed interest in reestablishing a supply of enslaved 
Africans to the Spanish, but decided that it would only be profitable if Barbados had 
no real role in the trade.
109
  In 1677, however, the Barbadian government rejected the 
Company’s decision and made their own effort to establish a commercial relationship 
with Spain, as Governor Atkins wrote to London informing the Committee of Trade 
and Plantations that it would benefit the island ‘to make a Trade with Cades,’ and 
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that the RAC ‘will thereby be furnish’d with money that they may pay their Debts 
the better and rid themselves at good rates of their refractory, dangerous and bad 
Negros.’  Furthermore, ‘the island by this Trade will increase in wealth, and…may 
grow to be so considerable that a duty of some advantage may accrue to His 
Majestie.’ Atkins further emphasized to the Lords that the Spanish strongly desired 
this trade as well: ‘Arrival of a Spanish ship from Cadiz desirous to trade for 
negroes….There will be always a stock ready upon the island for the Spaniard to 
come and buy within ten or twelve days sail of Havanna, where they carry them all.'  
To conclude, Atkins assured the Committee in a post-script that the trade was lawful 
and fit within the established Navigation Acts: ‘When I speak of the Spaniard 
Trading here, tis only for Negros and for ready mony, they do not bring one peny 
worth of goods.’
 110
   
While the trade took a few years to solidify, Spanish merchants had 
reappeared in the RAC’s records by 1679 as occasional visitors to Barbadian slave 
markets.
111
  One of the more unique cases was that of Captain Thomas Crocker.  
Crocker, captaining a small ship for the Company of Seville, had received a license 
from the Spanish government allowing him to engage in the Caribbean slave trade 
for two years.  He planned to buy hundreds of enslaved Africans in Barbados and 
transport them to Cartagena, where he could sell them to the Spaniards stationed 
there for a large profit.  He first appears in the records on 11 March 1680, as 
Gascoigne and Stede noted ‘Mr. Thomas Crocker whoe lately arrived here in a 
Tartan from Cadiz to buy about 200 Slave hath brought about £4,000 to pay for 
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  He returned to the island to participate in another auction only two weeks 
later, when, on 23
 
March 1680, he bought forty-nine men, twenty-three women, four 
boys, and two girls for £1,732.10s in ready money from the Samuell.
113
  He appeared 
again in the spring of 1681, when he bought ‘188 choice negroes’ and finished out 
his contract with a fourth and final trip in January of 1682 that resulted in him 
carrying away 870 newly-arrived Africans.
114
  Crocker, however, was not the only 
slave merchant sponsored by the Spanish to participate in the trade.  A month earlier, 
Señor Diego De Pamplona bought thirty-seven enslaved Africans for £865 from the 
Charles.
115
  In the same year, an anonymous merchant from Vera Cruz purchased 
600 more Africans in ready money.
116
  The combined efforts of these three 
merchants netted the Spaniards at least 1,936 enslaved Africans from Barbados in 
only a year and a half.  Yet, much to the chagrin of Barbadian planters and 
merchants, the Spanish slave trade shifted west after 1682.  By that time, Spain’s 
government had instructed its governors of Havana, Porto Bello, and Cartagena to 
send to Jamaica for enslaved Africans, and Spanish merchants unsurprisingly came 
to prefer the benefits of the island’s more centralized location.
117
  There were still 
opportunities for the Barbadian merchants trading south to the Spanish cocoa 
producers working in Venezuela, but these were infrequent and less than ideal, as 
Caracas, the only town of note, was a difficult-to-access regional capital.   
For the rest of the decade, trade with the Spaniards endured, but was 
inconsistent and unpredictable.  A single huge sale, for example, took place in 1683, 
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during which ‘the King having given a Spanish ship leave to trade and buy negroes 
in Barbados, the Governor exacted six pounds a head for every one of a thousand 
negroes sold,’ but proved to be a singular moment instead of a burgeoning trend. 
118
  
This, however, was not through a lack of effort by the Barbadian government, as its 
members regularly schemed to redirect Spanish slave merchants back to their island.  
In 1684, for example, they proposed a new trade with the Spaniards, who continued 
to show ‘many interests in our Shipps Negroes.’
119
  In 1686, the RAC factors further 
reported that the Barbadian government was sending out missives to Spain with the 
hope of ‘inviting the Spaniard to Trade thither.’
120
  The arrival of Sir James Castillo, 
a former agent for Nicholas Porcio, at Barbados in 1690 sparked a new confidence 
amongst island merchants, as he purchased dozens of enslaved blacks to trade to 
Spanish markets and left promising to buy more in the future, although he instead 
returned to Jamaica in 1691.
121
  While William III attempted to make it easier to 
trade with the Spaniards by passing legislation in 1692 that guaranteed that ‘the said 
Subjects of the King of Spain may have free liberty of trading to this Place for 
Negroes…and that no Tax or Duty shall be laid upon or required from them,’ they 
continued to look elsewhere for their labor supplies.
122
   
Jamaica remained as Spain’s main base of operation within the English 
Caribbean; accordingly, Sir James Castillo and Don Francisco Portio contracted with 
local merchants to deliver 86,014 pieces of eight worth of enslaved Africans to both 
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Porto Bello and Cartagena without applying to Barbados for any help or support.
123
  
Furthermore, the Spaniards preferred trading with the Danish in St. Thomas and the 
Dutch in Curaçao for their eastern Caribbean needs, as the merchants in these islands 
had a reputation of being easier to bargain with than the English.
124
  The Spanish had 
also become increasingly suspicious of England towards the end of the century, since 
they saw Whitehall’s role in the failed Darien scheme ‘as a mark of little friendship’ 
and used it to justify ‘a rupture of the alliance between the two Crowns.’
125
  Thus, as 
the Spaniards began to look to Barbados’ colonial rivals to satisfy their labor needs, 
most Barbadian merchants found themselves without a consistent niche in the 
valuable Spanish slave trade.   
This lack of trust and obvious preference for other locations, however, did not 
prevent Barbadian merchants from taking matters into their own hands and finding 
other ways to trade with Spain’s colonial fortress towns.  In 1698, for example, 
Thomas Piles landed in Barbados after a long and trying journey during which the 
original captain, Charles Cotterill, drowned in the Middle Passage.  After failing to 
sell all 131 Africans who had survived the trip, Piles decided to ‘proceed to 
Cartagena’ to take advantage of the labor-hungry population that resided within that 
important colonial center.
126
  Moreover, in 1700, Thomas Brewster and John Baty 
traveled from Barbados to Portobello to illicitly trade 108 enslaved Africans directly 
with the Spaniards.  In 1701, Solomon Merrett, another merchant, admitted that 
many English in the Caribbean ‘traded with Spain last war all the war, and were 
admitted into Port only on carrying Neutral Colours, altho’ the Spaniards well knew 
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the ships and the Commander to be English, and we may well expect the same Trade 
now.’
127
  Spanish and Portuguese ships likewise illegally accessed English ports by 
pretending that all ‘have English owners, but as they make foreign ports their place 
of clearance at every voyage, by paying off their men there, and laying out all the 
expenses of their voyage there.’  There is little reason to think that a similar strategy 
did not occur in Barbados.
128  Regardless of where they conducted their trade, 
Barbadian merchants still managed to profit from this relationship throughout the 
seventeenth century, as Eltis calculated that they sold 32,000 enslaved Africans to 
the Spanish between 1668 and 1700, for an average of at least 1,000 per year.
129
 
In 1701, however, the English seemed to suffer a significant setback when the 
French Compangnie des Indes Occidentales received the asiento to annually supply 
4,800 piezas de Indies for a ten year period effective in 1702.  The incensed English 
had worried that this would happen, as Peter Beckford, Jamaica’s governor, admitted 
that the ‘French have prevailed wonderfully with the Spaniard both in amity and 
trade for these 12 months past, for all their ports have been open to them and…have 
had particular orders for a Free Trade.’  In order to stifle this trade, the English 
considered adopting dramatic arrangements, such as the stationing of armed ships 
near Cartagena and Porto Bello to intercept foreign slave traders, effectively cutting 
the French off from the Spanish Main.
130
  These plans never materialized and, 
instead, the English countered the French by continuing to find ways to enter 
Spanish-American ports.  Furthermore, it also became clear that France could not 
meet its contractual obligations, as Lewis Galdy, a RAC agent in Jamaica, claimed 
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that the French were ‘short 7,000 slaves in their deliveries to the Spaniards,’ and that 
the time was ideal for English merchants to call at Porto Bello.
131
  Thus, according to 
Palmer, England’s merchants were able to successfully challenge France’s control of 
the Spanish slave trade and managed to carry between 1,500 and 3,000 enslaved 
Africans annually to Spain’s colonies.
132
   
With France struggling to meet contractual requirements, Barbadian 
merchants again attempted to reestablish a relationship with the Spaniards, this time, 
however, with the English monarch’s full support.  In 1707, Queen Anne sponsored 
the settlement of Manuel Menasses Guilligan, a merchant who had previously 
participated in the Spanish trade on St. Thomas and Curaçao, in Barbados with the 
belief that ‘he may be usefull in promoting the Trade of our subjects with those of 
the Spanish West Indys.’
133
  Guilligan’s residency on the island paid off almost 
immediately.  Thomas Pinder, president of the RAC, reported in June of 1708 that 
‘by the interest and influence of Gilligan, a considerable merchant of New Spain hath 
been at Barbadoes to purchase negroes, etc., and made offers of settling and 
promoting the Assiento Trade in that Island,’ in return for ‘sufficient quantities of 
bullion and pieces of eight.’
134
  Governor Milford Crowe recalled another visit from 
the Spanish: ‘Some days since a Spanyard came up in one of our trading sloops from 
Curracco with passports from the Agents of the Spanish Assento for two sloops with 
negros, if the merchts here would send any to Carthageen at £35 per head.’  Crowe 
saw this as a great opportunity and ‘encouraged the Traders to make an adventure, 
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soe soone as they can procure the vessels, in hopes of a more advantageous trade.’
135
  
Rowland Tryon, a Barbadian merchant, shared Crowe’s opinion, admitting in a letter 
that ‘Barbados is well scituated for all the trade in those parts of the Spanish West 
Indies that lye from the River Amasones to Rio [De la Hache]…for generally we can 
go and come between those coasts and Barbados upon a stretch with a Trade 
wind.’
136
  This would have effectively given Barbadian merchants control over the 
slave trade to the Spanish Main from just beyond the modern-day border between 
Colombia and Venezuela in the west to Suriname in the east. 
  The Council of Trade and Plantations initially responded positively to 
Crowe, maintaining that he would ‘do well to give all the incouragement possible to 
the Negroe trade with the Spaniards, having due regard to the Acts of Trade and 
Navigation.’
137
  They also believed that it was logistically necessary to add Barbados 
to the trade in order to maintain a good relationship with Spain.  Based on the 
Council’s calculations, Spanish colonies demanded nearly 12,000 enslaved Africans 
per year, a number far in excess of what the Jamaicans could provide alone.
138
  The 
Council was far less effusive to Queen Anne, however.  On the one hand, they 
admitted that ‘promoting and settling the Assiento trade in Barbadoes as proposed by 
the petitioner may be of such advantage to this Kingdom and to your Majesty’s 
Plantations that under the present state of affairs, we shou’d not object to your 
Majesty’s granting the passes desired.’
139
  Yet, the Council also argued that the trade 
would be illegal unless the Queen made special dispensations to the Navigation Acts: 
‘since the trade cannot be carried on in the manner proposed by the petitioner 
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without dispensing with the Act of Navigation…we are humbly of opinion that it is 
not adviseable for your Majesty to grant the passes desired.’
140
  Without the 
Council’s support, Queen Anne’s ardor also waned and the English government 
dropped their consideration of legally including Barbados in the commerce between 
the two nations. 
 The Anglo-Spanish relationship underwent a final significant shift in the 
aftermath of the War of the Spanish Succession.  The Treaty of Utrecht, formally 
signed in April of 1713, granted the asiento to the English South Sea Company at 
4,800 piezas de Indias for the next 30 years.
141
  To more easily maintain the 
contracted numbers of enslaved Africans, the SSC established two supply agencies, 
one in Jamaica and the other in Barbados.  At these two locations, the SSC purchased 
enslaved Africans from both private traders and the RAC, as well as from additional 
markets in the Leeward Islands, Curaçao, and St. Eustatius and sent them to their 
factories in Cartagena, Buenos Aires, Vera Cruz, Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Porto 
Bello, and Panama.  At first, the SSC regarded Barbados as an equal part of the 
asiento, and responsible for trade to the eastern half of the Spanish Main.  Yet, over 
the next five years, Barbadian merchants saw their role decline, as the predominance 
of Jamaica, who handled around 70% of the trade and served as an organizational 
base and refreshment depot for ships heading to Spanish colonial towns,  minimized 
the need for a second, more remote outpost on another island.
142
  Moreover, 
Portuguese, Dutch, and French interlopers continued to sustain high levels of illicit 
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trade throughout the decade, as the Spanish showed little hesitation in taking 
advantage of the cheaper prices and the willingness to supply distant markets offered 
by many foreign traders.  Thus, as long as Jamaica continued to function as a base of 
operations and foreign interlopers retained their ability to reach Spanish fortress 
towns, Barbados maintained no significant place within this trade.  
Barbadian merchants made one last attempt at convincing the Council of 
Trade and Plantations to filter Spanish trade through their island when Governor 
Robert Lowther wrote to them that ‘It has always been thought prudent to connive at 
a trade from Jamaica to the Spanish coast.  The merchants agree that a like trade 
from Barbados would be advantageous.’
143
 When this proposal also met with failure, 
most island merchants realized that they lacked the necessary domestic support and 
gave up on their attempts to secure an asiento contract, forcing them to resume their 
illegal trade with the Spaniards.  They were successful to a point, as the Council 
admitted that it was ‘apparent…that an illegal trade is carry’d on’ between Spanish 
and Barbadian merchants,’ but the practice became increasingly difficult and limited 
in its scope and Barbados was progressively phased out of this trade.
144
  The English 
government, now with greater enforcement mechanisms in place, kept their eyes 
open for those who attempted to continue to trade illegally and disciplined those it 
caught.  Governor Lowther, for example, faced punishment for allowing a single 
Spanish sloop to dock in Bridgetown to sell its wares and stock up on local goods, 
‘chiefly of flower and other eatables,’ a series of actions that were ‘a plain breach of 
the Acts of Trade and Navigation.’
145
  Wedded to a mercantilist ideal, the English 
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government of the post-Utrecht era maintained greater control over its Caribbean 
colonies and consistently refused to relax the laws and regulations that defined the 
nation’s commercial Empire.  Thus, while all sides recognized the benefits that 
existed through an open trade with colonial Spain, the English government forced 
Barbadian merchants to watch as their Jamaican rivals attained considerable wealth 




In 1689, Edward Littleton complained of the perceived evils of the RAC’s 
slave trade monopoly: ‘Of all the things we have occasion for, Negroes are the most 
necessary, and the most valuable.  And therefore to have them under a Company, and 
under a Monopoly, whereby their Prices are doubled; cannot but be most grievous to 
us.’
146
  Littleton’s infamous pamphlet was characteristic of the thirty-year debate on 
the validity of mercantilist control over the slave trade, as elite planters frequently 
petitioned the English government for open commerce in the hope that it would lead 
to lower prices and greater supply.  Yet, the petitions, pamphlets, and letters sent to 
England did not accurately reflect the overall state of Barbados between 1660 and 
1720.  
 A statistical analysis based on a variety of sources more accurately portrays a 
bustling, and oftentimes glutted, Barbadian market that stood at the very heart of the 
Caribbean slave trade.  In fact, the islanders received at least 638 ships and 135,518 
enslaved Africans between 1660 and 1720, totals that break down to minimum 
averages of 11 ships and 2,222 enslaved Africans per year for 61 years.  This meant 
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that the island was well supplied with cheap labor, with Barbadian planters and 
farmers welcoming more slave ships from Africa between 1680 and 1700 than all of 
the non-English Caribbean colonies combined.  Moreover, in contradiction to the 
historiography, this same period also saw the reinvigoration of both the legal and 
illegal trade in indentured servants.   At least 1,866 arrived at the island during these 
years, pheirushing the unfree white population to nearly 3,000 by the end of the 
century.  Thus, Barbados emerged from this period as the best supplied labor market 
within the Caribbean world.     
The key, however, to the islanders’ success in the unfree labor trade derived 
from the fact that they had figured out by the late 1670s and early 1680s how to best 
operate within a commercial world defined by archaic mercantilist theory and 
impractical legislation passed by a distant and uninformed Parliament.  They realized 
that the most successful path was often the one with the least resistance.  In the early-
to-mid 1680s, for example, they took advantage of both a peaceful Caribbean and 
planter-friendly governors to trade on their own terms.  They had no problem relying 
on the RAC when it offered large supplies of enslaved Africans at low prices.  Yet, 
they also did not hesitate to buy from illegal traders if the opportunity came their 
way, as they knew that there were few significant consequences for doing so.  
Moreover, some Barbadian planters supported and even sponsored the illegal 
capture, indenture, and transportation of innocent and free English, Scottish, and 
Irish youths to live in a servile state on the farms and plantations of Barbados.   
Others imported enslaved Africans as commodities that could be bought, 
transported, and sold at a whim throughout the Caribbean, including to nearby Dutch 
colonies or the fortress-towns along the Spanish Main, oftentimes in violation of the 
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Navigation Acts.  Several elite planters and merchants even maintained small fleets 
of their own that would illegally sail to Africa and trade rum and sugar for black 
laborers, who were then often sold again within the Caribbean for inflated prices.  
Those without their own ships could sometimes be found helping arrange shelter and 
provisions for the many interlopers that frequented the small cays and inlets along 
Barbados’ Leeward Coast.  The labor-hungry Spaniards also voyaged to Barbados in 
order to buy enslaved Africans, frequenting Bridgetown's markets in the early 1680s 
and offering ready bullion for their large purchases.  Their periodic arrivals 
continually wetted an elite Barbadian appetite for an expanded Anglo-Spanish trade 
and led to a fifty year conflict between the island and the home government over 
making it both official and legal.  This relatively free and open branch of commerce, 
that incorporated the best elements from both a legal trade featuring the RAC and an 
illegal one that relied on interlopers, caused Barbadian planters and farmers to 
experience a peak moment in their early unfree labor history, with supply reaching a 
contemporary high while prices dropped to an all-time low.   
The Nine Years War, however, caused the islanders to revert back to a 
relatively open and free slave trade.  With the French Navy establishing early control 
of the main Caribbean and African waterways, it became increasingly difficult for 
most Barbadian agriculturalists to meet their labor needs solely through the limited 
trade they maintained with the RAC, especially since the enslaved Africans that did 
arrive sold for very high prices.  Instead, they supplemented those that they received 
legally with additional black laborers acquired illegally.  By the 1690s, the island’s 
interloping networks were extensive and included the Dutch in Suriname, Curaçao, 
and St. Eustatius, the Danish in St. Thomas, and even neighboring English colonies, 
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such as the Leeward Islands.  Trade went in both directions, however, as Barbadian 
merchants would often send any surplus enslaved labor to other islands, as well.  The 
Duffields, a Barbadian merchant family, exemplified this trans-national approach to 
Atlantic commerce by openly trading and buying surplus black labor from colonies 
owned by a variety of countries, including Portugal, Spain, France, and the Dutch.
147  
 
This open approach caused the labor supply to steadily increase until it 
returned to normal levels by 1696 and remained especially high once William III 
opened the slave trade to all merchants in 1698.  With the legal addition of private 
traders, this branch of trade flourished over the course of the next three years, until 
another international war resulted in the return of significant limitations.  Thus, 
Barbadian planters, farmers, and merchants regularly attempted to manipulate and 
control both the indentured servant and slave trade for their own best interests, using 
their Atlantic-wide relationships to create a system that they could mold to best 
support their own idealized notion of an effective slave-society and that left them 
with the most labor rich island in the colonial world. 
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Chapter 4: Barbadian Import and Export Trade, 1680-1700 
 
Edward Littleton, in his Groans of the Plantations, offered a description of 
the economic conditions of Barbados that portrayed the island as financially unstable 
and under-supplied due to the Stuarts’ strict adherence to the Navigation Acts.  He 
writes: ‘In former times we accounted our selves a part of England and the Trade and 
Entercourse was open accordingly so that Commodities came [to England] as freely 
from the Sugar Plantations, as from the Isles of Wight or Anglesey.  But upon the 
King’s Restuaration we were in effect made Forrainers and Aliens.’  This greatly 
affected Barbadian planters’ and merchants’ patterns of trade, as ‘Heretofore we 
might send our Commodities to any part of the World…any Port, or Bay, or Creek; 
and at any time, either by day or by night.’  Yet, ‘now we must send them to England 
and to no place else,’ which, according to Littleton, ‘hath gone a great way in 
destroying the trade.’  The Acts also had a similar impact on the importation of 
goods to Barbados: ‘Before the things we wanted were brought to us from the Places 
where they might best be had.  But now we must have them from England.’  
Littleton concluded his grievances by channeling his fellow planters’ bewilderment 
and disdain for the lack of free trade, owning that it was ‘a Right, not a Priviledge,’ 
and that the idea that ‘English ships and English Men should not be permitted to 
trade to their best convenience and profit, is a thing we simply cannot understand.’1 
While Littleton’s account reflected the opinions of many on Barbados, it does 
not accurately portray the island’s commercial situation as it existed during the late-
seventeenth century.  Many historians have also struggled to properly ascertain the 
manner in which the islanders pursued their commercial ends.  The older 
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historiography tends to describe Barbados from a pure mercantilist perspective and, 
as David Hancock points out, depicts the island with ‘a one-center, England-
dominant model of influence in mind,’ with some seeing this as ‘the only way to 
formulate an Atlantic history that does justice to both British and colonial history.’2  
Other works offer similar descriptions that unimaginatively place the island into a 
conventional mercantilist model with the metropolitan center profiting at the expense 
of a dependent periphery.  These perspectives have continued to informed much of 
the historiography and have led to an image of Barbados as an obedient and 
complacent dependency that thrived specifically because of its willingness to 
participate within an ‘integrated empire, united by trade networks, commercial 
policies, and an imperial vision.’3  They further posit that white Barbadians must 
have profoundly understood their role within England’s mercantilist system and 
prospered specifically because they operated within the regulations and expectation 
set by Parliament.  
Another group of historians, however, view ‘mercantilism’ as a contentious 
term that holds little meaning and does not accurately describe the movement of 
trade throughout the English colonial world.  Instead, they depict Barbados’ 
economy as open, free, and flexible.  Christian Koots, for example, describes 
Barbados’ imperial relationship with England as ‘colonial-centric,’ and insists that 
the elite planters and merchants, maintaining a sense of their own power, operated 
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under the assumption that ‘before there could be a successful empire, there must be 
successful colonies.’  They used this logic to ‘pursue viable trade regardless of 
imperial boundaries’ and functioned as a central market for an ‘ad hoc cooperative 
reality’ within a collaborative and multi-ethnic Atlantic world.  Susan Amussen 
similarly claims that ‘it is difficult to escape the judgement that those in London did 
in fact believe that the colonies ought to serve their [own] interests,’ and 
consequently allowed them to act freely within the Caribbean.4  Jonathon Barth 
agrees, as he argues that it is anachronistic to ‘pit empire against periphery,’ since 
‘British mercantilists permitted a relatively open market for intercolonial trade.5  
Hancock echoes Koots by suggesting that Barbados was both ‘decentralized’ and 
‘opportunistic,’ and that its commercial system evolved specifically ‘through the 
efforts of individual adventurers and entrepreneurs.’ Finally, Eltis shows that 
London’s  ‘relative position’ declined significantly in the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century in favor of neighboring, and oftentimes foreign, Caribbean and 
mainland colonies, thereby keeping Barbadian trade surprisingly flexible and 
responsive to prevailing commercial conditions in the aftermath of the island’s initial 
sugar boom.6  Overall, this newer group of ‘free trade’ historians argues that the 
Barbadians purposefully neglected the Navigation Acts and engaged in an Atlantic 
commercial community in which self-interest and increased profits trumped 
nationality and empire.  
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Neither of these two interpretations, however, accurately represents the 
nuance involved in the realities of late-seventeenth century commerce in Barbados.  
This chapter argues that Barbadian planters and merchants took a pragmatic 
approach to trade that allowed for the flexibility to comfortably choose between the 
confines of England’s regulated mercantilist system and a largely open trade that 
relied on market conditions to dictate the movement of goods.  They utilized both 
‘formal and informal negotiations’ to reach a general consensus with the metropole, 
but also showed no hesitation to act on their own volition and for their own benefit.7  
Operating more like capitalists, who actively followed patterns of supply and 
demand, Barbadian planters and merchants were quick to take advantage of the 
protection, high prices, and guaranteed markets of the Navigation Acts when it 
benefitted their own agenda and profit-lines, as it did for a little over a decade after 
1675.  Yet, they were also willing to minimize this relationship and encourage illicit 
trade if Caribbean or Atlantic conditions made it sensible to do so.  They loathed the 
raw power that the central government represented and feared its implementation, 
whether through militaristic force or economic regulation.  Instead, they preferred a 
balanced and flexible commercial system governed by pragmatic choice.  Within the 
organizational network that emerged, the metropole represented a single option, one 
of many that planters and merchants had when trading throughout the Atlantic world.  
Thus, the elite Barbadians’ ability to avoid the restrictions of a single economic creed 
became one of their greatest economic strengths during the last two decades of the 
seventeenth century and led to an economic pragmatism that took advantage of a 
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variety of often competing commercial visions to meet the import and export 
standards necessary to survive and prosper in the Caribbean.   
This chapter analyzes the Barbadian planters’ and merchants’ pragmatic 
approach to trade during the late-seventeenth century and, through an analysis of the 
Naval Office Returns from 1680 to 1700, depicts how they altered their various 
economic relationships with both England and the rest of the Atlantic world in order 
to take advantage of the changing commercial conditions of the era.  This 
transformation is best represented by two particularly interesting historical moments: 
a peak period of early growth and expansion followed by one of wartime decline and 
depression.  In order to more effectively do this, the following chapter is divided into 
three sections.  The first offers a brief examination of the economic relationship 
between England and Barbados and the island’s place within the metropole’s 
regulated economy during the latter-half of the seventeenth century.  The purpose of 
this section is to provide a brief overview of how Barbadian planters and merchants 
reacted to the English government’s increasing oversight and how these opinions 
changed over time.  The second part examines Barbadian commerce between 1680 
and 1688, and discusses how the islanders’ obedience to the Navigation Acts helped 
to cause both imports and exports to rapidly expand during this peak moment in their 
early history.  The final section examines the effects of the Nine Years War on 
Barbadian trade and how the resulting limitations altered the island’s commercial 
networks.  It also considers how elite Barbadians responded to the wartime 
restrictions that they encountered with a brief examination of their increasing 
reliance on illicit trade and the development of the convoy system, both of which 
helped to maintain improved levels of imports and exports throughout this turbulent 
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era.  This chapter concludes with the island’s resumption of prewar trading patterns 
following peace in 1697 and contemplates how Barbadian commerce evolved from 
this point.   
  
Part I: Caribbean Mercantilism and the Navigation Acts 
Initially founded as a proprietary colony by Sir William Courteen, a London 
merchant, English settlement of the island was mercantilist in nature, but represented 
a newer approach to this economic philosophy.  For many contemporary economists, 
the core theory behind England’s mercantilism had shifted away from the collection 
of bullion when it appeared increasingly unlikely that English settlers would find 
untapped gold and silver mines.  Instead, it came to center on land and the production 
of valuable cash crops, as these added a ‘perpetual Addition’ to a country’s wealth, 
compared to the eventual depletion of all mines.8  John Cary, a seventeenth-century 
economist, posited, for example, ‘that Land and Trade are the vitals of a nation’ with 
the corresponding production and export of specific valuable agricultural goods as 
‘central to the new economic order.’9  The West Indian colonies smoothly fit within 
this updated vision of mercantilism, becoming great centers of cash crop production, 
and, as Cary maintained, were ‘the most profitable of any we drive.’  English 
merchants believed that a successful settlement in the Caribbean held many benefits 
for the nation, including an ability to ‘supply [England] with Commodities which 
may be either wrought up here, or Exported again, or prevent fetching things of the 
same Nature from other Princes for our home Consumption, imploy our Poor, and 
encourage our Navigation.’  Moreover, these islands were simultaneously limited in 
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size and resources, leaving them as dependencies ‘to take off our Product and 
Manufactures’ including necessary provisions, clothing, and supplies.10   
In order to properly reap the benefits of the West Indies, trade, according to 
economist Charles Davenant, must become a ‘Matter of State,’ and needed 
leadership from a group of experts who properly understood matters of production 
and could regulate the commerce of an increasingly complex empire.11  State 
intervention, according to Barth, ‘entailed a host of miscellaneous schemes’ that 
included creating and monitoring ‘prohibitive duties on foreign imports, subsidies for 
domestic industry, restrictions on foreign shipping, and the creation of a general 
‘regulatory policy’ for the colonies. Once a strong state bureaucracy was in place, 
economists projected that ‘England would become the Center of Trade,’ and stand 
‘like the Sun in the midst of its Plantations,’ where it would ‘not only refresh them, 
but also draw Profits from them.’12  Thus, the English government came to 
understand its role in the developing colonial trade as a vital one, and that only 
through their expert guidance could both the metropole and periphery hope to 
prosper.   
Most white Barbadians, however, never saw themselves as a part of the ‘new 
mercantilism’ being promoted by English economists.  Instead, they preferred to take 
a more capitalistic approach that centered on free trade and their abilities to make 
complex commercial decisions on their own, especially after the island-wide switch 
to sugarcane agriculture in the late 1640s.  Importantly, early white Barbadian 
settlers experienced great prosperity during an era of relatively open trade, as 
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England maintained an under-developed and unreliable fleet that was often distracted 
by domestic disputes and civil war throughout the 1630s and 40s.  The Dutch, 
consequently, ended up supplying the islanders with most of their needs, with as 
many as fifteen ships arriving annually by the late 1640s.  These foreign merchants 
provided the Barbadians with cheap provisions and supplies, while taking away the 
planters’ and farmers’ cash crops such as cotton, indigo, ginger, tobacco, and, 
especially, sugar.13  Thus, as Harlow writes, it was England’s lack of interest during 
‘these eventful years’ that led the island to ‘virtually become an independent state, 
owning the direct control of neither King nor Parliament.’14  
Cromwell’s Rump Parliament represented the first group to take a strong and 
aggressive stance against the free and open trade between Barbadian planters and 
their Dutch neighbors.  The government initially struck in September 1650 with 
economic legislation that forbade all ships ‘to come to, or Trade in, or Trafique with’ 
any of England’s colonies in America without a license, effectively outlawing Dutch 
trade within the English Caribbean.  Parliament followed this piece of economic 
legislation by imposing the first Act of Trade and Navigation in October of 1651.  
Focusing only on importations, it again specifically challenged the Dutch by 
proclaiming that goods must be carried either in ships from the country of origin or 
first shipment, or in English ships.  Hence, no commodities from English colonies in 
Asia, Africa, or America could be imported in foreign ships.  Moreover, while the 
colonists could still legally trade with foreign merchants, they could not deal with 
middle-men, like the Dutch, who operated from an entrepot and specialized in the 
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carrying trade.15  They accompanied this by sending a successful military expedition 
force under George Ayscue to both enforce the new legislation and to require the 
island’s submission to Parliament.   
The thirty-three members of the Barbadian Council and Assembly 
disapproved of this level of government interference and, along with Governor 
Francis Willoughby, drafted a pamphlet to better communicate their views.  In it, the 
Barbadians acknowledged the benevolence of the Dutch and their role in supplying 
the islanders during their first two decades of settlement: ‘We will never be so 
ungratefull to the Dutch…as to deny them or any other Nation the freedome of our 
Ports and Protection of our Lawes whereby they may still embrace a free Trade and 
Commerce with us.’  They also wrote of their strong belief in their right to free trade 
as English settlers: ‘We will not be wanting to use all the honest, honorable, and 
moderate meanes we can for the continuance of a free trade…so on the other side we 
will not so much degenerate from the ancient candour of true Englishmen as to 
prostitute those Liberties and Fredomes to the will and pleasure of any.’16  Luckily, 
the planters benefitted from England’s still ineffective navy and merchant marine, 
and continued to trade with foreign rivals such as the Dutch throughout the 
Protectorate.   
The Restoration of Charles II in 1660, however, made the relationship 
between the metropole and periphery more complex, as the new monarch and his 
officials viewed their nation’s colonial possessions as a ‘Spring of Wealth’ for an 
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administration in desperate need of funds.17  By working to increase their control 
over England’s various colonies, the Restoration government hoped to maximize its 
ability to profit from them, whether through restrictions placed on the carrying trade 
or a more scrupulous approach to the collection of duties and taxes.  To this end, 
Charles revoked Cromwell’s Navigation legislation and Parliament proceeded to pass 
an updated version of its own in 1660, with complimentary Acts enacted in1663 and 
1673 to close existing loopholes and strengthen their enforceability.  The initial 1660 
Act allowed for the unrestricted importation of all goods except those specifically 
enumerated, in which case they had to be either carried on an English-built ship that 
had an English master and a crew that was at least three-quarters English or Irish, or 
on a registered foreign-built vessel that had paid the proper duties.  No sugar, 
tobacco, cotton, indigo, or dyeing wood produced in the plantations could be carried 
to any port except those in England or its colonies under penalty of forfeiture.  
Parliament also enhanced the mechanisms of enforcement, requiring all naval 
officers to capture any ship violating the Act and required all colonial governors to 
take a solemn oath to effectively implement the updated regulations.18   
The Staple Act of 1663 required all vessels carrying European goods intended 
for sale in the colonies to go through an English port first, where it would be 
unloaded, inspected, assessed a duty, approved, and reloaded for final shipment on 
an English boat.  Furthermore, the Master and two-thirds of the crew had to be 
English.  The 1673 Act added duties on certain commodities when shipped from one 
plantation to another, while also appointing an official Naval Officer.  In 
compensation for the imposed restrictions, colonial planters and merchants gained a 
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protected domestic market, support from the Royal Navy, and a nearly complete 
refund on re-exported goods.19      
This left the merchant-planter elite stuck under an economic system that they 
neither supported nor wanted, while filling the government’s coffers with money that 
many islanders believed it did not rightfully earn.  Elite Barbadians responded almost 
immediately by sending a steady stream of petitions and letters to London voicing 
their complaints against the limitations and exclusivity promoted by the Navigation 
Acts.  In 1666, Governor Willoughby, tired of merchants sending ‘no goods to 
Barbadoes, but only empty ships to take away the sugar,’ appealed directly to 
Charles II regarding the ills of the Navigation Acts:  
Free trade is the life of all colonies, but such is the condition of the 
Caribbee Islands, that they have not clothes sufficient to hide their 
nakedness, or food to fill their bellies. Whoever he be that advised his 
Majesty to restrain and tie up his colonies in point of trade is more a 
merchant than a good subject….The people are much discontented, 
especially Barbadoes, who as they have merited much expect much to 
be done for them, especially a full supply of shipping. 
 
Willoughby concluded that ‘if your Majesty gives not an ample and speedy redress’ 
to this issue ‘you will lose famous Barbadoes.’20  Two further letters from the 
Assembly and Council, both sent in 1668, carried a similar message, claiming that 
the English government’s heavy-handed regulations and high duties left the island in 
‘inconceivable poverty,’ with the typical planter reduced ‘to a very meane Estate, his 
Courage brought low, his Labour Fruiteless,’ and his household ‘Most 
Impoverished.’21 




 TNA, CO 1/15, 10 July, 1661, Council to Nicholas and CO 1/20, 12 May 1666, Willoughby to 
Charles II. 
21
 BL, Egerton 2395, ‘An Account of the English Sugar Plantations,’ 1668 and TNA, CO 1/23, 3 
August, 1668, Assembly to the King.   
196 
 
Charles II and his government largely ignored the petitions and letters that 
arrived from Barbados and looked for ways to increasingly enforce England’s 
commercial laws on the island.  While the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1665-1667 and 
1672-1674 allowed many Barbadian planters and merchant the opportunity to again 
pursue inter-imperial trade on their own terms, the latter conflict represented the last 
significant moment of free trade on the island.22  With new enforcement policies put 
into place by the Naval Officers after 1673 and an uninterrupted period of national 
peace between 1674 and 1689, the English were able to provide unprecedented levels 
of control over its command and organization of its colonies, especially in Barbados.  
The success varied by the specific officials in charge, but England’s heightened 
ability to enforce legislation across great distances compelled Barbadian planters and 
merchants to adjust their commercial approach to fit within a new economic reality.  
Many welcomed this cooperation to some degree, as they sought greater 
acknowledgement from the metropole and hoped that their obedience would result in 
beneficial legislation, a reductions in duties, and a more open trade.  Thus, they 
forged a new, pragmatic commercial identity that was flexible enough to follow most 
of the regulations imposed by an increasingly organized metropole during the 1680s, 
while still building a series of relationships with foreign merchants and illicit traders 
that would prove to be important throughout the next decade.   
 
Part II: The Barbadian Economy: Imported/Exported Goods, 1680-1688 
 Initially, the complaints that emanated from late-seventeenth century planters 
such as Littleton appeared to be justified, as both contemporary residents and modern 
historians have defined the 1680s as an era of declining fertility, falling sugar prices, 
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inconsistent trade, and unprofitable plantations.  In 1685, for example, the Barbadian 
government claimed that the aforementioned conditions resulted in island plantations 
costing more to operate than they could expect to earn, as a ‘moderate calculation’ 
proved that ‘the profits are short by over two hundred pounds of the expenses.’23  
Littleton describes a similar situation in his Groans: ‘We find that what we pay 
yearly in Duties, is much more then the whole Rent of our Lands.’24  Yet, the raw 
macroeconomic data from the Returns suggest that the 1680s were a flourishing era 
of robust and expanding trade that resulted in a peak commercial moment for most 
Barbadian planters, farmers, and merchants, as they were importing and exporting 
more goods during this time than in any previous decade.  The Returns further show 
that the most substantial gains occurred in the island’s import trade.  Governor 
Jonathon Atkins estimated that in 1676, ‘about 150 sail come to the Island every 
year’ with ships ranging in size ‘from 20 to 300 tons.’25  By 1681, however, 234 
ships sailed into Carlisle Bay, with the numbers rapidly growing to over 300 the next 
year and over 400 by 1686.  Unsurprisingly, the total tonnage of these ships also 
increased, rising from an estimated 10,176 tons in 1676 to 20,657 tons by 1682, and 
peaking at well over 27,200 tons in 1686.26  This large and rapid expansion in trade 
made Barbados the second busiest port in the English world, easily surpassing the 
240 ships and 19,878 tons that Bristol, England’s largest outport, received during this 
time.27 
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Table 4.1: Quantity of Trade in Barbados, 1682-1688 









1682 100 356 23,904 67.2 43.8 56.2 57.4 42.6 
1683 100 338 25,774 76.3 40.0 60.0 55.0 45.0 
1684 100 308 21,307 69.1 41.6 58.4 51.2 48.8 
1685 100 384 24,263 63.0 39.1 60.9 57.3 42.7 
1686 100 423 27,262 64.4 40.0 60.0 58.7 41.3 
1687 80 371 23,723 63.4 42.2 57.8 60.6 39.4 
1688 75 311 17,578 56.5 37.6 62.4 54.6 45.4 
Avg. - 356 23,401 65.7 40.1 59.9 57.1 42.9 
Table 4.1: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1682-1688. The heading ‘% ships: England’ represents all ships that had 
originated in England and includes vessels carrying goods from London, the outports, Ireland, Scotland, 
Madeira and Cape de Verde.  Tonnage throughout this chapter represents the cargo-carrying capacity of a 
ship.  As ships often sailed without reaching full freight, the numbers presented are only approximations and 
describe the maximum capabilities of trade.  1681 is not included in this table because the Naval Officer did 
not begin to record the tonnage of shipping until June of that year. 
A look at the compiled statistics from the Returns for 1682 through 1688 
suggests that the islanders greatly benefitted from a near-decade long period of 
prosperity and commercial growth.  As Table 4.1 reveals, 2,491 trading vessels, with 
a carrying capacity of 163,807 tons, arrived in Barbados over the course of this 
period.  This meant that on average 356 ships, with a tonnage of 23,401 tons, 
participated in Barbadian trade each year between 1682 and 1688.  The Returns also 
depict a Barbadian market filled with goods originating from a variety of locations 
throughout the Atlantic world.  The intra-colonial trade was of the utmost importance 
to the island, with approximately 1,190 ships and 60,210 tons of goods (59.5% and 
42.9% respectively overall) coming from local sources (i.e. Caribbean and American 
mainland) over the course of the seven years.  In fact, Barbadian trade appeared to 
flourish most when the islanders maintained consistent ratios of 1.5:1 for colonial to 




Graph 4.1: Origin for Ships and Tonnage Imported at Barbados, 1680s 
 
Graph 4.1: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1682-1688.  The numbers listed from Africa do not match up with those 
from last chapter, as this graph only includes voyages recorded in the Returns.  The numbers in parenthesis 
represent the total number of ships and quantity of tonnage that reached the island from each location. 
Some colonies, such as Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, had 
relationships that went back to at least the 1660s.  The Carolinas supplied the island 
with timber, firewood, and small amounts of rice, while the Chesapeake colonies of 
Maryland and Virginia sent significant quantities of timber, basic ground provisions, 
meat, and most importantly, tobacco. 28  As Map 4.1 shows, the Chesapeake colonies 
of Virginia and Maryland combined to send 22 ships and up to 1,032 tons of  imports 
to Barbados in 1684, a quantity that easily exceeded those from the other middle and 
southern colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, and Carolina.  Moreover, the 
Barbadian trade in Chesapeake tobacco appears to have expanded greatly over the 
decade, as the crop became increasingly important on Barbados.  In 1684, for 
example, Barbadian merchants imported 145 hogsheads worth of tobacco, but 
increased this to over 1,000 hogsheads by 1688.  Finally, Pennsylvania, founded in 
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the early 1680s, had just started supplying Barbados with goods by 1684, but came to 
play a growing role in future trade.  One official reported to the Commissioners of 
Customs that early Pennsylvanian farmers had ‘improved tillage to the degree that 
they have made bread and flour and beer a drug in all the markets in the West 
Indies.’29   
New England, however, represented the single most important colonial 
market for Barbados, with a relationship that dated back to the early settlement 
period.   During that era, New England formed a valuable secondary supply source 
for those on Barbados when English ships could not regularly reach the Caribbean.  
The many coastal towns strewn along New England’s Atlantic coastline shipped the 
Barbadians a tremendous array of goods necessary for survival in a plantation 
society, making up 25.80% (559) of the ships and 24.83% (35,100) of the tonnage 
sent to the island during the 1680s.  They delivered thousands of barrels of ‘refuse 
cod’  each year, which formed the basis of the enslaved population’s diet, while the 
northern port of Piscataqua sent more expensive fish for the island’s wealthier 
settlers, such as ‘hake, hadock, and polock, and some mackrell, which are much 
larger than…in England.’30  The fisheries of New England, according to one 
contemporary author, were more valuable ‘than the golden mines of the Spanish 
Indies.’31   
They also offered Barbadian planters and farmers other much-needed basic 
staples, such as beer, bread, flour, peas, and small quantities of meat, while the 
wealthy also frequently sent ‘small ships and barks that go to New England for 
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provisions.’32  Boston and Rhode Island supplied large quantities of ‘horses and 
lumber to Barbados,’ while other local markets sent ‘linen and woolen cloth, shoes, 
hats, peltry…cider, boards, [and] pipestaves.’33  Finally, New England also delivered 
a variety of naval stores, since there was ‘good tar, pitch, and iron made in the 
country’ and ‘hemp and flax also grow well.’34  Contemporary planters realized how 
dependent they were on New England for their survival and success within the 
Caribbean.  A 1678 deposition, for example, claimed that New England was ‘the key 
of the Indies, without which Jamaica, Barbados, and the Caribbee Islands are not 
able to subsist,’ as they received ‘many thousand tons of provisions, as beef, pork, 
peas, biscuit, butter, fish,’ from this region.35  Josiah Child also pointed out the 
‘almost incredible supplies’ that the West Indian plantations received from New 
England.36 
The surrounding Caribbean also played a significant role in the Barbadian 
import trade, accounting for 18.69% of the ships (405) and 8.90% of the tonnage 
(12,575) received during the 1680s.37  These numbers suggest that the ships involved 
in local Caribbean trade were generally small, quick, cheap to operate, and highly 
maneuverable, with the average ship size ranging between 18 and 28 tons, while 
smaller vessels often carried as little as 6 or 8 tons.  Most of the imports received 
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from the Caribbean came from Bermuda and the Leeward Islands, especially 
Antigua, with Jamaica, Saltertudas, Tobago, and Suriname, a Dutch colony located 
on the South American coast, also contributing.  The materials that arrived from the 
inter-island trade was often of great value, as cargos from Saltertudas contained large 
amounts of salt, which the islanders used to preserve food, while those from St. 
Lucia, Tobago, or St. Vincent’s consisted of timber and fuelwoods.38  Bermuda 
supplied Barbados with livestock and some additional wood, and Suriname illegally 
sent rollers, the wooden mechanisms used to crush and extract the juices from the 
sugar cane.39  Thus, while the Returns suggest that only moderate amounts of trade 
took place between Barbados and the surrounding Caribbean, it played an important 
complementary role in supplying many of the natural resources planters needed to 
run their sugar plantations.  
Even though local colonial markets supplied the island with an array of 
needed goods, trade with England, and especially London, formed a critical 
component of a healthy economy and represented the single most important late-
seventeenth century trans-Atlantic commercial relationship for Barbados.  While 
London and the outports combined to send only 18.28% of the ships involved in 
Barbados’ import trade, they provided almost one-third of the tonnage (42,735 tons 
overall).  According to Littleton, the English offered the islanders essential 
manufactured goods and provisions, including ‘an infinite Quantity of Iron Wares 
ready wrought, tin-ware, earthen-ware, and Wooden-ware, English cloth, hats, shoes, 
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horses, saddles, bridles, bread, flour, beer, cheese, and butter.’40  London furnished 
the luxuries that the island’s wealthy sugar planters regularly requested, as well as 
the useful household goods that benefitted all parts of the white population.  For the 
island’s planters, London was also especially important for the pragmatic reason that 
its ships carried many of the bulkier, high freight items that were necessary 
components of sugar production.  In 1684, for example, Barbadians imported three 
worm casks, six ovens, eight coolers, 24 sheets and 2,500 pounds of lead, 40 coppers 
and stills, 111 rollers, 142 chaldrons of coal, 2,700 pots and drips, and tens of 
thousands of different pieces of wood specifically designed for the construction of 
wagons, barrels, and boats, all of which were essential components of the sugar 
production process.41   
Furthermore, English ships were also responsible for carrying goods from the 
Atlantic islands, which provided ‘wine from the Maderas and Horses, Cattle, 
Assinegos, from the Island of Cape Verde,’ both of which featured prominently in 
the records, and enslaved labor from the African littoral to Barbados.42  The trade 
from the Atlantic Islands was particularly prolific, with Madeira, Faial, and Cape de 
Verde combining to send more shipping and tonnage than all of England’s outports, 
as the wine and livestock found on the three islands were highly coveted by wealthy 
planters.    
The Barbadians also relied heavily on their commercial relationship with 
Ireland, which supplied 12.56% of the island’s overall tonnage throughout the 1680s, 
most of which consisted of salted provisions and beer.  During this era, Ireland 
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emerged as ‘the home to a provisioning industry that grew into the largest exporter of 
packaged foodstuffs’ within Europe and its ‘salted beef, pork, butter, and a variety of 
specialty goods, such as spiced salmon and pickled tongue, set the standard for 
quality and longevity in the Atlantic market.’43  The fifteen years of general peace 
and the resulting expansion of England’s merchant marine allowed the Barbadians to 
consistently benefit from the vast quantities of animal proteins that Ireland produced 
after the mid-1670s.  One visitor to Barbados noted that ‘the inhabitants are not able 
to subsist’ without ‘their bread, clothing, malt, flesh, and pease from Ireland.’44  
Edward Littleton also emphasized the scale of this trade by exclaiming that ‘we take 
thousands of Barrels of Irish Beef’ each year.45  As R.C. Nash shows, Ireland sent 
approximately £27,000 worth of salted meat to Barbados in the five years between 
1683 and 1687, with the value rising over 150% to £42,000 between 1698 and 1702.  
In 1684, for example, the Barbadians imported almost 14,500 barrels of beef and 
2,000 barrels of pork from this single location.46  Butter and cheese also arrived in 
considerable quantities, with the islanders importing between £3,000-£6,000 and 
£2,000-£5,000 worth of these two foods respectively.47   
Thus, Table 4.1, Map 4.1, and Graph 4.1 combine to provide insight into 
three important trends relating to Barbados’ late-seventeenth century trading 
networks.  First, the table shows how rapidly legal trade expanded in Barbados 
during the 1680s, growing from 303 ships and 20,657 tons in 1682 to a projected 464 
ships and 29,654 tons by 1687.  Since the Barbadians could access such a large 
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supply of goods by legally trading within the established regulations of the 
Navigation Acts, most had little reason to resort to illicitly conducting business with 
foreign merchants and generally avoided doing so, as the practice was often risky, 
expensive, and ultimately not worth the hazards involved.  Secondly, the table and 
graph also provide a basic representation of the legal trading networks utilized by 
late-seventeenth century Barbadian planters and merchants and how they 
opportunistically incorporated both trans-Atlantic and colonial trade into a single 
commercial system, while Map 4.1 adds a pictorial depiction of the movement of 
these goods.  Finally, the table, map, and graph all show that island trade appeared to 
function most effectively when approximately 40% of shipping and 60% of the 
tonnage originated in England, and 60% of ships and 40% of tonnage came from the 
colonies.    
Trade in Barbados, however, traveled in two directions, as the island’s 
primary role within English mercantilist theory was to supply the metropole and its 
colonies with valuable raw materials.  While the historiography generally portrays 
the 1680s as a time of declining fertility and depressed agricultural yields, the 
Returns instead suggest that the Barbadians participated in a robust export trade that 
showed signs of having expanded dramatically during the 1680s.  While most 
historians consider the island a cash-crop monoculture, the Barbadians actually 
exported a surprisingly diverse array of goods.   Governor Atkins claimed that 
besides sugar ‘the natural product and Commodities of the Country exported to other 
parts is Ginger, Indigo, Cotton, Wool, Tobacco, Logwood, Fustick, [and] Lignum 
Vitae.’48  Table 4.2, a list of select goods sent from Barbados to London and the  
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Table 4.2:  A Sample of Exports to England from Barbados 
Product Quantity (lbs., except when noted) 
Berries 10.5  
Coconuts 30,691 
Chocolate 170  
Aloes 5,479  
Ginger Green 1,711 
Ginger Dry 1,583,582 
Sugar Muscovado 23,125,256 
Sugar White 974,805 
Sugar Loaf 958 
Molasses 398,492 
Lemon Juice 244 (gal.) 
Indigo 1,281  
Lime Juice 2,148 (gal.) 
Oranges 1,000  
Potatoes 224 
Rum 89 (gal.) 
Shruff 16,296 
Succads 1,913 




Cotton 1,522.5 (bags) 
Table 4.2: TNA, Cust. 2/1, Barbados, 1696. This table represents a sampling of the more important goods 
produced in Barbados and sent to England within a standard year.  Importantly, the Customs Books only 
record trade shipped back to London and the English outports, and does not include any commercial activity 
to the colonial mainland.  Therefore, Barbadian merchants traded much greater quantities of many listed 
goods, especially rum and molasses. Most weights are in pounds (lbs.), but liquids are marked in gallons (gal.) 
and cotton in bags.  To ease comparison, the three categories of sugar combine to add up to 20,084 
hogsheads or 12,050 tons. 
English outports in 1696, highlights the variety of fruits, woods, plants, and other 
natural products that made up the island’s export trade.  Most of Barbados’ 
commerce, however, centered on three products: sugar, the most valuable colonial 
agricultural commodity, molasses, the waste product left over after the crystallization 




The latter two good were becoming an increasingly important element of 
island commerce during this era, as Eltis estimates that the Barbadians shipped five 
times more rum and ten times more molasses by 1700 than they had thirty years 
before.49   Out of a small sample of 40 inventories from deeds and wills signed by 
individuals of various social backgrounds between 1682 and 1696, 23 of them (58%) 
had at least one still and a separate still house in which they produced rum and all 
sugar planters produced molasses.50    Especially large volumes of molasses went to 
New England, Philadelphia, New York, and, to a lesser extent, South Carolina, 
where refineries distilled the dark, sticky syrup into cheap rum for the local 
populations.  Higher quality Barbadian rum went to Virginia.51  Barbadian farmers, 
predominately from St. Lucy’s parish, also maintained a small, but traditionally 
important, trade out of Speightstown in a variety of secondary items that included 
cotton, ginger, and tobacco.  In 1696, for example, this port exported approximately 
450,000 pounds of cotton, 1,585,293 pounds of ginger, and 42,000 pounds of 
tobacco.52   
Sugar, however, remained at the heart of Barbados’ export trade, as the 
valuable cash-crop made ‘this little Spot of Ground,’ according to John Oldmixon, 
‘as good as a Mine of Silver or Gold.’53  The planters of Barbados exported 
numerous grades of sugar, ranging from natural muscovado and semi-white clayed to  
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Table 4.3:  Exports from Barbados, 1681-1683, 1688 







1681 100 7,350 306,700 370,626 671 2,694 50 
1682 100 11,301 242,467 388,258 1,196 5,792 5 
1683 50 7,057 38,285 159,907 993 5,408 33 
1688 75 c. 1,928 218,829 133,802 NA NA NA 
Avg. - 8,503 248,086 323,875 1,144 5,558 35 
Table 4.3: BL, ADD MS 38714 (1681-1683) and TNA, CO 33/13, 1688.  The Returns for 1684-1687 are missing 
because exports were not officially recorded until 1688.  Lime juice is measured in barrels. 
 
‘refined, which is the standard of their trade Sugar and support of the island.’54  Some 
muscovado sugar went to the colonies, as a small number of refineries, primarily 
located in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, turned the cheap raw product into 
fine white sugar.  The majority, however, was sent across the ocean to the markets 
and refineries in London and to a few of the important outports, such as Bristol and 
Liverpool.55   
 Table 4.3 depicts just how central sugar and its two waste products were to 
the Barbadian export trade when compared to cotton, ginger, and lime juice for four 
years in the 1680s.  On average, the planters on Barbados legally sent a projected 
total of 10,922 tons (21,843,333 pounds) of sugar and a combined 568,145 gallons of 
rum and molasses to various ports across the Atlantic during the early years of the 
decade.  By comparison, they exported an annual average of only 1,284 bags of 
cotton (346,815 pounds), 6,434 bags of ginger (643,400), and 40 barrels of lime 
juice.  Furthermore, the export totals from the early 1680s support the notion that the 
era represented a peak commercial moment in early Barbadian history, as sugar 
exports appear to have stayed high until 1688.  The 22 million pounds of sugar  
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Graph 4.2: Price of Sugar (cwt.) in Shillings for Various Years, 1684-1700 
 
Graph 4.2 : TNA, T 70/938-T 70/949, 1684-1700.   
exported in 1682, for example, with at least as much likely being sent again in 1683, 
easily surpasses the 14,352,000 pounds from 1663 and 19,050,000 from 1669, while 
nearly approaching the earlier peak total of 24,000,000 pounds from 1665.56  
Importantly, though, the high totals from the 1660s would have only included a 
fraction of the molasses and rum being exported by the 1680s and, thus, represented 
a narrower and less diverse trade overall, even if sugar exports were occasionally 
higher.   
 The local price for sugar, as depicted in Graph 4.2, also suggests vast 
increases in supply, as it steadily declined throughout the early-to-mid 1680s.  A 
hogshead of sugar, for example, cost 10 shillings in 1684, but had dropped to 9.5 
shillings in 1686 before jumping back up to 13.83 shillings in 1688, with the threat of 
revolution and the onset of shipping limitations.  Thus, the evidence of declining 
prices between 1684 and 1687 suggest that Barbados continued to produce  
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Chart 4.1: Destination of Barbadian Exports, 1688 
 
Chart 4.1: TNA, CO 33/13, 1688.  The numbers in parenthesis represent the total number of ships that 
exported goods to each region.   
consistently large amounts of sugar, regardless of soil conditions, until national 
domestic disputes in 1688 resulted in fewer exports reaching London’s markets.  
 The movement of Barbadian exports throughout the Atlantic world often 
mirrored the previously described import trade, with the majority of participating 
vessels either sailing for the colonial mainland or to neighboring Caribbean islands.  
However, when a single year is broken down, as Chart 4.1 does for 1688, a few 
surprising differences occur that suggest the flexibility of trade within the Atlantic 
world.  New England, easily the most important destination for Barbadian imports, 
played a significant, but much reduced role in the export trade.  While it still 
represented 22.33% of all ships, it was only the third most frequented colonial group, 
as the New Englanders were generally only interested in cheap molasses.  Instead, 
the Chesapeake colonies and local Caribbean islands both proved to have a 















served as the most frequent buyer of Barbadian goods, with the colony’s merchants 
accounting for over 28% of all ships, as planters in these two locations bought 
considerable quantities of cheap rum and molasses to give to the enslaved African 
workers present throughout the region.  The Caribbean also figured heavily, with 
24.27% of the merchant vessels that left Barbados arriving at another island.  
Bermuda, located far to the north and outside of the Tropics, singlehandedly received 
18.44% of the entire export trade, welcoming considerable quantities of both 
Barbadian rum and molasses, which they likely re-exported to the nearby colonial 
mainland.  Overall, more than 60% of the ships involved in island exports came from 
the mainland, with another 24.27% from the Caribbean and Bermuda, meaning that 
five out of every six ships left Barbados for another English colony.   
 Yet, even though the distant trans-oceanic ports accounted for just over 15% 
of the ships involved, they still played a more important role, as they moved the 
majority of the island’s sugar across the Atlantic.  Utilizing high tonnage vessels that 
could carry a disproportionate percentage of the agricultural wealth generated by the 
island, merchants from London and the surrounding English outports transported the 
island’s sugar to either local refineries and markets in England or re-exported it to 
other European destinations.  As Barbados’ fame rested on the size and quality of its 
sugar production, and the consequent wealth that it generated, this branch of the 
island’s trade network stood out as particularly important if the plantations hoped to 
thrive. 
Thus, the data in this section depicts Barbados at the nexus of a complex and 
expansive trade network that incorporated the entire Atlantic world into a single 
commercial unit.  By taking a pragmatic and opportunistic approach to commerce, 
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Barbadian planters and merchants instituted a three-pronged economic system that 
connected the island to various markets in both England and the colonies and took 
advantage of this strategy during an extended stretch of peace to turn itself into the 
second busiest port in the English world.  The planters and merchants of this era 
realized that it was in their own best interests to maximize their trade with England 
and to operate within the confines of the Navigation Acts, as London represented a 
guaranteed and protected market with higher sugar prices than its chief rival, 
Amsterdam.  It furthermore allowed the planters access to a variety of provisions, as 
well as many of the manufactured products, luxuries, and plantation necessities that 
were desired by the isolated white colonists.   
Yet, they also continued to incorporate a variety of colonial markets into their 
networks, taking advantage of the additional imports these local ports offered, while 
using them as a secondary market for island goods, especially molasses and rum.  
Importantly, though, these colonies were English possessions and conveniently fit 
within the regulations of the Navigation Acts.  As such, the Barbadian planters and 
merchants of the 1680s did not partake in the same open and free economic system 
that their ancestors did twenty years earlier.   Instead, they largely consigned 
themselves to England’s commercial laws and were rewarded for doing so with an 
era of general prosperity and expansion.  This does not imply, however, that illicit 
trade did not occur during this decade.  As Chapter 3 contests, the Barbadian elite 
frequently engaged in the Caribbean’s illegal slave trade and some on Barbados still 
traded with the Dutch through Curaçao, Suriname, and St. Eustatius.57  Yet, evidence 
of Barbadian participation in illicit commerce during the 1680s, outside of the slave 
                                                          
57
 TNA, CO 1/40, May 1687, Report from St. Loe, CO 1/47, 2 June 1687, Commissioners of Customs 
to Lords of the Treasury, Ibid., 18 June 1687, Lords of Trade and Plantations to Johnson, and CO 
153/3, 22
 
January 1687, Russell to Lords of Trade and Plantations. 
213 
 
trade, was rare, as the benefit seldom exceeded the risks involved in capture.  Thus, 
the traditional mercantilist view of island trade as ordered and regulated held true 
through most of the decade and proved that Barbadian commerce worked best when 
England was a dynamic and central part of it.  It took the overthrow of James II and 
the years of international war that followed to pressure the Barbadian elite into 
returning to the more flexible, open, and oftentimes illegal commercial approach of 
earlier years.     
 
Part III: The Importation and Exportation of Goods, 1689-1697 
Section I: Collapse and Convoys 
 
The second decade of this study, encompassing the years 1689 to 1697, was 
far more complex than the previous period, as the robust and expansive trading 
networks utilized by the elite planters and merchants during the 1680s came under 
intense pressure as a result of domestic insurrection in 1688, followed by an 
international war that lasted from 1689 to 1697.  The overthrow of James II by a 
disgruntled Parliament and the rapid transition from the pro-French Stuarts to a 
Dutch Stadholder still concerned about his territorial holdings in the Netherlands 
triggered an alteration in foreign policy that made English participation in any war 
against France a foregone conclusion.  By the end of 1689, William III had forced 
England to join the Nine Years War, a growing conflict that had been raging on the 
Continent since the previous year.  Less prepared to fight than France, England’s 
position of strength in the Caribbean quickly deteriorated.  Louis XIV, ignoring a 
recently signed peace treaty, immediately authorized his fleet to attack both 
England’s and the Netherland’s Caribbean possessions.  France’s strategy in the 
western hemisphere centered on a two-part offensive: one half of the fleet was to sail 
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to Guiana and dislodge the Dutch from Suriname, while the other was to take control 
of colonies in the Windward Islands and the Lesser Antilles.   
At first, this plan succeeded, as Count de Blenac, governor-General of the 
French West Indies, took advantage of an unorganized English Navy to launch 
successful attacks on the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, an important harbor for illicit 
trade, and on the English half of St. Christopher’s.  By September of 1689, French 
privateers had also gained firm control over the important Caribbean waterways that 
connected the various islands together, taking 62 ships at a loss of £332,800 to 
English merchants and £73,050 to the King’s Customs.58  While the rapidity and 
severity of each French victory showcased the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the 
Royal Navy abroad, England also struggled to maintain supremacy in its home 
waters.  This culminated in the summer of 1690, when the English fleet suffered a 
catastrophic defeat at Beachy Head and lost control of the Channel to the French.  By 
the middle of 1690, England’s colonial system stood on the verge of collapse, as 
France had successfully cut off English communication and supply with its 
Caribbean islands, now stranded and seemingly helpless.59 
French naval success also posed a grave threat to Barbados, causing many 
islanders to live in constant fear of invasion, especially since their position ‘as the 
windwardest Island’ made them the ‘key to all the West Indies,’ and a logical 
military target.  Moreover, French success against Barbados would inevitably leave 
Louis XIV ‘master of all the European…trade in the West Indies’ as ‘the Danes, 
Brandenburgers, Dutch, and Spaniards would be absolutely shut out from their  
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% Tonn.:  
Colonies 
1690 75 146 4,859 34.3 19.6 80.4 49.2 51.8 
1691 100 327 17,081 52.2 41.0 59.0 70.6 29.4 
1695 50 96 4,639 48.3 34.4 65.6 53.9 46.1 
1696 100 198 10,845 54.8 41.4 58.6 55.8 44.2 
1697 100 165 15,294 92.7 33.9 66.1 50.1 49.9 
1698 100 356 37,731 105.9 43.8 56.2 61.3 38.7 
Avg. - 245.33 17,228.38 70.23 38.04% 62.96% 59.47% 40.53% 
Table 4.4: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1690, 1691, 1695-1698 
trade.’60  The islanders’ fear increased over time and eventually came to be much 
exaggerated through the scaremongering of an isolated population.  In 1694, for 
example, rumors persisted of a potential attack on the island, with one source 
claiming that the French ‘had 20 Saile of men of Warr gone for Barbados to take that 
place.’61  This armada, however, never arrived, as no such plan actually existed.   
Yet, French naval vessels and privateers were present in the Caribbean and freely 
roamed along highly traveled shipping lanes throughout the early stages of the war, 
reminding the colonists that such an attack was always possible.   
Barbadian planters and merchants especially felt the strain of French 
transgressions against English Caribbean shipping, with Table 4.4 distinctly showing 
the transformations that resulted from domestic and international upheaval.  During 
the early years of conflict, the merchants and planters of Barbados struggled to 
reestablish themselves within their disrupted trading networks and missed the trans-
oceanic ships that had previously delivered such a high tonnage of necessary goods.  
The nadir of the war era for Barbados came in 1690, as both the quantity of ships and 
overall tonnage dropped to distressingly low figures due to the success of France’s 
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informal blockade upon the island.  A desperate letter written by Lieutenant-
Governor Stede in February of 1690 describes the situation: ‘some French men-of-
war of thirty and forty guns visited us from Martinique.  I was forced to unload [our] 
ships and fit them out as well as we could as men-of-war, for the French within one 
hour had taken ships, with negroes and much needed provisions, before our eyes….’  
Stede concludes that ‘with the difficulty of finding ships, guns, and seamen and the 
poverty of the people we are hard bested.  We have no shipping to carry our produce 
and bring us necessaries.’62   
The records support Stede’s panicked letters home.  The extant numbers from 
the Returns for 1690 show a dismal total of only 146 vessels reaching the island with 
a maximum tonnage of 4,859.63  Trade had become almost entirely localized, as four-
fifths of all ships originated in the colonies, with small vessels carrying the majority 
of goods (34.3 ton average).  The additional men and guns needed for protection also 
placed further limitations on the storage available for cargo.  Worst of all, as Map 4.2 
depicts, of the 29 vessels that originated from a trans-Atlantic port, only three vessels 
arrived from Madeira, while a single provision ship came from Ireland, a country 
mired in its own three-year civil war between Jacobite and Williamite forces.64  As 
these trans-oceanic ships had been of integral importance to the provisioning of 
Barbados during the 1680s, their decreasing regularity forced Barbadian planters, 
farmers, and merchants to rely heavily on New England for supplies.   
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Graph 4.3: Ships Arriving at Barbados with Imports, 1690 and 1691 
 
Graph 4.3: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1690-1691.  This graph compares the different origins of imports during 
a year marked by scarcity with those from a more abundant year. The numbers in parenthesis are the actual 
number of ships that arrived at Barbados from each region, with the 1690 total preceding that from 1691. 
By the middle of 1690, this too had become increasingly difficult, as the 
trading vessels from ports such as Boston and Salem had to sail past numerous well-
guarded French islands and evade both privateers and foreign naval vessels in order 
to reach their desired destination.65  Instead of the bigger, bulkier ships that had 
previously been used, New England merchants now sent out smaller, faster ships that 
could more easily outrun or outmaneuver French patrols.  Regardless of the danger, 
New England remained as the most important local supplier, with 39.31% of all ships 
and 35.05% of possible tonnage deriving from this location.  These were also small 
ships, however, as the 57 vessels from New England only carried a maximum of 
1,703 tons, or just over 30 tons per ship.  A compounding reason for this decline in 
tonnage resulted from the fact that the Royal Navy had appropriated much of New 
England’s commercial fleet.  According to a petition from a group of local 
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merchants, ‘New England supplies the West Indies with provisions, but many New 
England ships are now laid up in England, while others have been taken by the 
French, so that the traders of the Colony are now in great want of shipping.’66  The 
surrounding Caribbean islands also played an important role in supplying Barbados 
in 1690, as over 20% of the ships and 13% of the total tonnage derived from this 
region.  Thus, New England and the nearby Caribbean islands provided nearly 
60.00% of the ships involved in Barbadian imports.    
 The limited movement of ships as depicted in the skeletal shipping chart from 
Map 4.2 makes it clear that many other colonies also seemed to suffer from a lack of 
shipping in 1690.  Newfoundland, for example, could not safely send a single ship 
out to Barbados, while the other mainland colonies only dispatched small vessels that 
carried few provisions.  14 ships safely arrived from Maryland and Virginia, but 
these barely averaged 20 tons and tended to carry mostly tobacco, staves, and a few 
barrels of fish, while Pennsylvania and the Carolinas sent a combined nine ships and 
202 tons, mostly of wood.  Short distance trade still functioned relatively smoothly, 
with Barbadian ports welcoming 18 ships from the Leeward Islands, but the 175 tons 
carried by these vessels made a minimal impact on island imports.  Overall, when 
compared to the 1680s, the islanders received less than 50% of the shipping and 
between 25-33% of the tonnage, resulting in an island-wide struggle for supplies, 
especially since those that did arrive were usually staves, headings, and hoops, 
instead of needed provisions and supplies.   
These limitations caused the food that did make it to the island to rapidly 
increase in price and would have rendered many goods unaffordable to a large 
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percentage of the island population.  By 1690, the Barbadian government complained 
that meat cost three times as much as before the war, increasing from an average of 
20 shillings a barrel for salt beef in the late 1680s to 60 shillings.  This was in 
conjunction with a 250% increase in the price of fish per quintal, a 1,700% rise in 
cost of Indian corn per bushel, and, as Governor Kendall reported, similar price hike 
in ‘all other commodities in like proportion.’67  While data for the last quarter of the 
year is missing from the 1690 Returns, tonnage most likely declined further, as in 
mid-September the English government put an embargo upon the trade of ‘all vessels 
except coasting craft and ships trading to Northern Europe.’68  This caused a group of 
concerned merchants based in London to lament that ‘Barbados depends now on 
England for subsistence, supplies from Ireland and New England being cut off.  
Fewer ships than can be sailed with six hundred men will not suffice to relieve the 
island’s necessities, and the planters will be ruined unless ships bring home their 
produce.’69  Governor Kendall painted an even bleaker picture of conditions on the 
island: ‘the high price of freight, and the scarcity of provisions, caused by a long 
draught and by the war, has caused great misery, and unless speedily relieved from 
Old or New England, the commoner sort of people and the slaves must starve.’70  
Thus, 1690 represented a true crisis period for all Barbadians, with the trading 
networks that had solidified themselves in the 1680s buckling under the pressures of 
war.   
The Naval Office Returns, however, show that by 1691 English and 
Barbadian merchants had adopted a series of tactics and adjustments that allowed  
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Graph 4.4: Origin of Import Tonnage Arriving at Barbados, 1690 and 1691 
 
Graph 4.4: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1690-1691.  Similarly to the previous example, this graph also compares 
the different origins of imports during a year marked by scarcity with those from a more abundant year. Once 
again, the numbers in parenthesis are the actual number of ships that arrived at Barbados from each region, 
with the 1690 total preceding that from 1691. 
them to successfully reopen trade on a scale that, under ideal conditions, could 
approach the totals from the early 1680s.  In that year, as Table 4.4 and Map 4.3 both 
depict, 328 ships, with space for 18,905 tons of goods, arrived in Barbados from 
across the Atlantic World.  While the increasing number of vessels was meaningful, 
it was the expanding points of origin for these crafts that was of the greatest 
importance.  London, the outports, and Ireland, specifically, reemerged as integral 
hubs of trade, sending Barbados 71.5% of its tonnage (11,549 tons) and 37.20% of 
all ships (53, 54, and 14 vessels respectively). This trade, once responsible for the 
island’s manufactured goods and clothing, now focused primarily on cheap 
provisions, especially biscuits, peas, wheat, and oatmeal.  More importantly, Ireland 
once again provided the all-important quantities of beef, pork, butter, cheese, bread, 
and beer that the Barbadians had lacked in 1689 and 1690.  Trade from the Atlantic 













(6.40%) and tonnage (6.88%), as elite Barbadians could again obtain the fancy wine 
and necessary livestock that had been missing from the island’s imports the last two 
years.  
Localized trade from the Caribbean and mainland colonies also remained 
substantial throughout 1691, but, as Graphs 4.3 and 4.4 show, had become less 
important as an overall percentage.  While trade with the mainland colonies only 
slightly decreased, remaining right around 18% of the shipping and 8% of the 
tonnage, the Caribbean declined to only 12.80% of the ships and 3.62% of the 
tonnage, a drop of about 8% and 7% respectively.  Yet, similarly to the year’s trans-
Atlantic shipping, island merchants had also reestablished many of the local trading 
networks that had previously nearly disappeared.  As Map 4.3 shows, Newfoundland 
fisheries again supplied Barbados with ten vessels and hundreds of tons of fish, and 
New York increased its own shipping to the island by 300%.  The Middle and 
Southern mainland colonies also contributed in greater quantities, with both almost 
doubling the number of vessels and tonnage sent between 1690 and 1691, and began 
developing and expanding their ability to grow edible crops to accompany the 
tobacco and naval stores that they already exported to the Caribbean.  Virginia 
reemerged as a particularly important source of provisions, sending with the usual 
tobacco consignments 633 barrels of beef and pork and 1,119 bushels of corn, along 
with some flour, peas, and beer.  Other colonies that had remained important to 
Barbados throughout the early years of the war expanded their trade to wartime 
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highs.  New England’s trade, for example, grew by over 33%, Carolina’s by 200%, 
Bermuda’s by 55%, Pennsylvania’s by 60%, and Saltertudas’ by 300%.71 
This sudden change of fortune resulted from a variety of causes, many of 
which had to do with a transformation in the international situation in the Caribbean.  
Initially, the English had done little to counter the aforementioned initial French 
victories.  In fact, the defeat at Beachy Head made them increasingly cautious and 
conservative in seeking retaliatory conflict.72  Yet, by the end of 1690, the English 
Navy had regained initiative in the West Indies and scored some considerable 
victories against the French.  First, a fleet under the command of Commodore 
Lawrence Wright landed at Barbados in May with both ships and soldiers, leading to 
better protection of the island’s trade.73  Moreover, Christopher Codrington, governor 
of the Leeward Islands, and Sir Timothy Thornhill, one of Barbados’ largest 
plantations owners, led forces that pushed the French out of both St. Christopher’s 
and St. Eustatius and captured Marie-Galante with such ease that they begged the 
Lords of Trade and Plantation for permission to continue their attacks against the 
French Caribbean, as ‘there was never so fair an opportunity to destroy the French 
interests in America as this.’74  Merchants and captains also took a more active role 
in defending transatlantic shipping by installing more guns onto their ships to protect 
their commercial investments.75   
                                                          
71
 TNA, CO 28/3, 8 September 1696, Council to Council of Trade and Plantations and TNA, CO 
33/13. 
72
 Morgan, ‘The British,’ 389-390. 
73
 TNA, CO 31/4, 14 May 1690, Council Minutes. 
74
 TNA, CO 152/37, 4 July 1690 and 3 August 1690, Codrington to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 
CO 153/4, 25 November, 1690, Codrington to Lords of Trade and Plantations. 
75
 While appearing sporadically and only on long-distance traders in 1688, by 1691 the Returns show 




On the European front, the Williamite war had effectively ended after the first 
week in July of 1690, with the lack of success by the Jacobites forcing James into 
another exile.  The English also benefitted from an indecisive Louis XIV, who failed 
to implement a cohesive policy in the West Indies.  After his initial successes, Louis 
neglected to follow up these victories and instead became increasingly interested in 
Hispaniola, while diverting most of his ships to the pursuit of Spain’s treasure 
fleets.76  Finally, domestic politics and public opinion in England pushed the 
government into taking a more aggressive approach to trans-Atlantic trade, which 
resulted in the decision to dispatch a series of convoys to protect both the import and 
export trades of the colonies.77  This strategy, however, hinged upon the removal of 
the embargo that the government had placed on most Caribbean trade. The Barbadian 
lobby and merchants in London convinced King William of the necessity of 
reopening trans-Atlantic commerce against Parliament’s wishes, as the islanders 
were ‘ready to perish for want of food and clothing.’78  Thus, by mid-September 
1690, the English government had successfully formulated a plan to institute a wide-
ranging convoy system by the end of the year that would protect merchant vessels 
trading throughout the American and Caribbean colonies.79  
By the end of the month, the King in Council had worked out the official 
arrangements for England’s mercantile armadas and assigned four groups of ships: 
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one to the Hudson Bay Company to protect the northern fisheries; another to the 
Royal African Company; a third to Virginia and Maryland tobacco merchants; and a 
fourth to the Caribbean planters of Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands.80  
Virginia and Maryland would receive 46 ships and 800 men; Barbados 31 and 400; 
Jamaica 14 and 200; the Leeward Islands 17 and 199.  The Hudson Bay Company 
declined their assigned convoy, as they wanted to wait until March for more supplies, 
and the RAC had their convoy cancelled, since their only request was for additional 
ammunition.  In place of these, the King decided to provide New England with six 
ships and 70 sailors and Newfoundland with four and 40. Overall, merchants in 
England planned to send 118 ships, 1,709 sailors, and tens of thousands of tons worth 
of goods to the Atlantic colonies.81   
The Barbadian convoy, packed and supplied during the fall months of 1690 
and scheduled to depart by the end of October, was only to accompany the merchants 
for ‘a sufficient distance out of the soundings.’  They were to be met on their arrival 
in Barbados with ships ‘from Captain Wright’s squadron, which should attend them 
there and return [home] with them.’ A single man-of-war was to convoy them on the 
full trip across the Atlantic. However, William III almost halted the convoy before it 
left the Downs.  The king reneged on his promise to cancel the embargo and initially 
delayed the Caribbean convoy’s date of departure for nearly six months, until May 
1691.  Timely petitions from both Chesapeake and Barbadian merchants, and the 
threat of losing as much as £40,000 per convoy ‘owing to the perishableness of part  
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Table 4.5: Convoys Sent from England to Barbados, 1680-1698 
Dates of Convoy Ships Tonnage 
Avg. Tons 
per ship 
% Eng. Ships 
in Convoy 
% English Tonnage 
in Convoy 
Jan. 7th, 1685 21 1,730 82.4 14 12.4 
Jan. 12th, 1691 5 350 70 3.4 2.3 
Jan. 21st-23rd, 1691 36 5,131 142.53 24.5 38.1 
Jan. 26th, 1691 7 600 85.71 4.8 4.5 
July 13th-14th, 1696 22 1,870 85 26.8 30.9 
Sept. 28th-29th, 1697 7 1,827 261 12.5 23.9 
May 16th-18th, 1698 10 1,637 163.7 6.4 7.1 
Table 4.5: TNA, CO 33/13 and CO 33/14, 1684-1698 
of the cargo,’ caused William to relent and give the order for the ships to sail 
sometime shortly after 9 December 1690.82   
The trip to Barbados was a resounding success.  Taking ten to twelve weeks 
to cross the Atlantic, the convoy arrived at the island in three separate waves.  The 
first, as Table 4.5 shows, landed at Bridgetown on 12 January 1691 with five ships 
and a carrying-capacity of 350 tons.  The main body began arriving a week and a half 
later, on 21 January.  Over the course of the next two days, 36 ships from London, 
each averaging over 142 tons, docked in Carlisle Bay and unloaded a plethora of 
goods, ranging from the expected barrels of beef, firkins of butter, and hogsheads of 
fish to items that were a bit more surprising for a nation at war, such as 301 periwigs, 
99 headdresses, 10 embroidered waistcoats, 70,000 gloves, 19 mirrors, 359 chairs, 
and the frame of a house.  Three days later, the last seven ships arrived with a 
substantial quantity of salt meat and other provisions.  In only two weeks, 48 ships, 
totaling 6,081 tons, arrived in Barbados from England, representing about 33% of all 
English ships and 40% of all English tonnage for the year.  The success of this 
convoy quickly restocked an island that had been in desperate need of goods with 
                                                          
82
 TNA, CO 1/68, 9 December 1690, Petition of the traders to Virginia and Maryland to House of 
Commons and Ibid., Petition of Barbadian merchants to the same. 
226 
 
quantities that approached the import totals from the halcyon prewar days of the 
1680s.   
Moreover, the convoy also allowed the islanders to export their valuable 
sugar crops back to England under the protection of warships.  Barbadian planters 
had first noticed a decline in the number of English ships towards the end of 1688, as 
the one islander recalled having seen ‘noe ships for two months from Europe.’83  By 
early 1690, the island’s RAC factors identified an obvious ‘scarcity of freight,’ and 
observed that ‘masters’ cannot ‘get freight anywhere.’  Warehouses sat ‘full of 
goods,’ and there was such a surplus that one could ‘lade a Shipp of 2 or 300 tons as 
fast as he can stow it.’84  Even when ships became available, the merchants lacked 
adequate protection, since the English government required that all returning vessels 
sail for England together under escort.85  Stede complained of 50 Barbadian ships 
laden with sugar that had been waiting months for English ships to arrive so that they 
could be escorted safely back to London.  The delay caused the ships to deteriorate 
so much due to teredo worms, marine mollusks that burrow into and destroy wooden 
hulls, that Stede dispatched this commercial armada on a mad dash to Europe, with 
two East Indian sails and ‘the largest and ablest ships to convoy the rest…binding 
them to keep company and assist each other.’86  By October, the factors admitted that 
planters ‘could get no more freight,’ and called for England ‘to thinke of some way 
to [supply it.]’87   
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Table 4.6: Exports from Barbados, 1691, 1695-1697 
Year %: Year Sugar (t) Rum (gal.) Molasses (gal.) Cotton (bags) Ginger (bags) 
1691 100 11,004 329,316 349,974 10,384 5,321 
1695 50 5,154 111,793 157,588 650 7,023 
1696 100 9,854 274,630 236,852 1,756 12,327 
1697 100 5,475 398,539 359,698 820 6,171 
Avg. - 9,160 306,518 315,425 3,565 9,466 
Table 4.6: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1691, 1695-1697 
The English government hoped that the convoy system would solve the 
island’s problems by allowing for the protection of Barbadian sugar exported to 
England.  The islanders, given four months to load their ships with a variety of cash 
crops and raw materials, successfully sent a fourteen-ship armada back to London on 
6 April 1691.88  Table 4.6 shows that this convoy helped Barbadian planters to export 
over 11,000 tons of sugar, 329,316 gallons of rum, and 349,974 gallons of molasses, 
as well as 10,384 bags of cotton and over 5,300 bags of ginger, quantities on par with 
some of the highest prewar totals.  Assuming that they legally packaged and marked 
all exported sugar (which is unlikely), planters and farmers generated an estimated 
£145,306 from sugar, £15,094 from rum, £4,470 from ginger, and £281 from cotton 
during this year, a huge increase from the value of exports in 1688, when sugar 
barely brought in more than £27,600.89  These totals represent changing commercial 
trends that once again placed the metropole at the center of the island’s export 
network, proving that planters and merchants prospered most when they had free and 
easy access to English ports, a privilege that had essentially disappeared from 1688 
to 1690.  Thus, the 1691 convoy helped rejuvenate the islanders’ export trade by 
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reopening trans-Atlantic markets to the planters’ valuable sugars reestablishing the 
island’s commercial vitality, even if only for a single year.   
Since the 1691 convoy to Barbados was so successful, the English 
government came to view this strategy as a permanent solution to the island’s supply 
problems and began to plan two more commercial armadas for the same year.  By 4 
May, the Lords of Trade and Plantations met with interested merchants and laid out a 
schedule that fixed 15 June and 15 August as the days of departure.90  The first 
convoy left on time, sailing out of Plymouth on 14 June.  Guarded by three large 
ships, it stopped at Madeira to load some wine on 11 July, and reached Barbados 
about a month later.91  The second convoy, however, proved to be a bit more 
problematic.  After local Barbadian merchants turned down participation in the 
convoy set for 15 August, they suggested the end of September as a better date, so 
that its arrival coincided with the planters’ production of their first batches of sugar. 
According to a 5 October entry in their Journal, the Lords reported that out of the 61 
ships that had been prepared for the West Indies, 53 had sailed by 30 September.92   
Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the success of the second convoy, as it 
did not arrive before the end of the year and the Returns do not survive for the years 
between 1692 and 1694.  Other records, however, hint that the convoy eventually 
made it to Barbados early in 1692, as the island’s Council of War ordered that a large 
number of newly arrived merchant ships from England ‘to be taken up as men-of-
war…and that they be despatched to engage the French fleet’ that had been reported 
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to the north-east.93  The records provide similar fragments of information for the next 
two years, with local merchants annually meeting with the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations in London to request a convoy for either September or October.  
However, without extant Returns for these years, it is difficult to tell how successful 
they were or what type of goods they carried to Barbados.94   
By 1695, the Returns once again provide specific evidence concerning 
Barbados and the convoy system, highlighting the successes and failures that plagued 
the practice over the next three years.  They show, for example, that 1696 
represented the only other instance in which the Barbadians received a complete 
convoy.  In that year, 21 vessels left London in early spring, picked up a single ship 
off the coast of Lyme Regis in Dorset, and arrived safely in Barbados during the 
middle of summer.  Like the convoy that landed in 1691, the 1696 group contained 
predominantly large ships that averaged over 85 tons each, with seven of at least 150 
tons.  The success of this convoy likewise guaranteed that most white Barbadians 
had enough goods to survive another year of wartime limitations.  
In both 1695 and 1697, however, the convoy system played a fairly negligible 
role in provisioning the island.  1695 stands out as an especially peculiar year 
because the island’s merchants in London decided to limit trade through its own 
initiative.  In April 1695, the Barbadian merchants first met with the Lords of Trade 
and Plantations to discuss convoys, and, by July, had submitted an ambitious plan 
that requested an expansion of the system.  The Barbadian merchants ‘desired their 
usual quota of 400 English seamen from the port of London,’ but hoped to add ‘200 
from the outports, and 300 landsmen and 50 seamen more to load wines at Madeira.’  
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In terms of ships, they asked ‘for two fourth-rates and a fifth-rate as convoy.’  They 
also demanded ‘protection for their men at home’ to limit impressment by the Royal 
Navy, and requested the fleet to be ready to sail after the 30 of November.  By 
August, they altered their plan by asking for three separate convoys and sent a third 
letter towards the end of September that informed the Lords that they had changed 
their mind again and ‘intended to send no ships at present.’95  While the merchants 
offered no explanation for their change of mind, it is likely that they were unable to 
properly organize their ambitious scheme within the limited time frame.  The failure 
of this convoy is reflected in the Returns, which portray 1695 as a year defined by 
low ship and tonnage totals.
96
 
 The 1697 convoy also failed to reach Barbados, foundering in the Atlantic 
due to an unexpected and untimely encounter with a still-potent French navy.  In late 
spring of that year, ominous news began to leak into Barbados of a ‘disaster of the 
London Fleet outward.’  As the Barbadian government later learned, four French 
men-of-war had attacked and dispersed their convoy.  For the islanders, the results of 
this encounter were potentially disastrous, as Governor Kendall pointed out: ‘What is 
become of them we do not know, for only three ships have arrived here.  If 
misfortune has befallen this long-expected fleet…we shall have no men-of-war to 
guard our coasts or convoy our ships, but shall be exposed to the insults and 
depredations of French privateers every day, in the very sight of our houses.’97  
While the Returns do not show how many ships originally made up this convoy, only 
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seven ultimately sailed into Carlisle Bay.98  Unsurprisingly, the surviving vessels 
tended to be very large, averaging 261 tons per ship, which helped to mitigate some 
of the loss.  The cargo carried by these seven ships, however, represented almost 
25% of the English tonnage for the entire year, making the numerous ships captured 
or sunk by the French navy a potentially catastrophic loss to the island economy.  
The failed convoy of 1697 represented the last wartime use of this system in the 
seventeenth century, as the Nine Years War ended later that year.  Yet, the 
organizational benefits of convoys had become obvious to the government and they 
continued to sanction them even after the conflict had ended, although these were 
often smaller in size and less heavily guarded.      
 Overall, the implementation of the convoy system in Barbados was generally 
inconsistent and unreliable, leading to widely mixed results.  When functioning 
smoothly, English merchants moved large quantities of ships and materials safely 
across the ocean to distant colonies further isolated through the vagaries of war.  The 
convoy system, however, existed within a delicate context that relied on effective 
planning and considerable luck.  The slightest mishap, such as unprepared 
merchants, disease, or rebellious traders, could cause the system to buckle.  Larger 
incidents, such as limited resources or an encounter with the French Navy, could 
result in its collapse.  Furthermore, the system became increasingly complicated and 
dominated by the self-interest of representatives from individual islands.  Merchants 
constantly requested changes to the frequency, timing, size, and resources planned 
for each convoy, taxing the abilities of an already limited and preoccupied 
government.  This resulted in scenarios such as the failed convoy of 1695, when an 
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ambitious group of Barbadian merchants tried to rig the system in their favor, but 
ended up unprepared and unable to send goods to Barbados.   
 Thus, three conclusions can be drawn in regard to the Anglo-Barbadian 
convoy system as utilized during the Nine Years War.  First, outside of the initial run 
in 1691, and possibly 1692 and 1696, convoys had a limited impact on Barbadian 
trade and, while helpful in supplying the island with some needed goods, often either 
failed to appear or arrived in a reduced state.  Yet, when they did successfully reach 
the island, they were a boon to the economy and could quickly replenish depleted 
supplies.  Secondly, this system reveals how much Barbadian planters and farmers 
relied on England and Ireland for even the most basic of supplies.  No matter how 
many vessels the islanders received from either New England or the other mainland 
colonies, they could not adequately replace the quantity of goods the large English 
and Irish ships could carry across the ocean.  Finally, the convoy system proves that 
Barbadian planters and merchants could neither limit themselves to the narrow 
confines of the Navigation Acts nor rely solely upon legal commercial channels 
when periods of conflict disrupted regular patterns of commerce.  Instead, they 
readily embraced a freer and more open style of trade that placed power and control 
into their own hands.  
 The import and export data compiled from the Returns for 1695 through 1697 
provide additional support for the latter two conclusions.  Barbadian planters, during 
these years, struggled without successful convoys and demonstrate how limited they 
were when relying heavily on legal local trade from the Caribbean and the mainland.  
Graph 4.5 shows, for example, that the number of ships arriving from New England 
remained high throughout the final few years of conflict, as over 30% of all arrivals  
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Graph 4.5: Origin of Imports to Barbados, 1695-1697 
 
Graph 4.5: TNA, CO 33/13, 1697 
originated from that region, while the other mainland colonies supplied 19.60% of 
the vessels and almost 13% of the tonnage, both period highs.  Trade relations with 
Pennsylvania became increasingly prominent, with Map 4.4 indicating that, in 1697 
alone, 14 ships with 1,100 tons of space arrived at Barbados from the newly-settled 
colony.  New York and the Chesapeake colonies also remained key trading partners, 
supplying a combined 18 ships and 810 tons.  The overall limited nature of trade 
proved to be more problematic, however, than its localization, as only 459 total ships 
and 30,778 tons of goods reached the island during these three years, numbers that 
would have been more than twice as high over a similar period of time in the 1680s.      
 Yet, the records also show signs of improving conditions of trade across the 
region.  With the English in control of the Atlantic, metropolitan merchants were 
again able to send supply ships to Barbados and reestablished rates of import 
conducive to the expansion of trade.   Between 1695 and 1697, for example, the ratio 













under 1.5:1, numbers that again approached the ideal ratios from the 1680s.  
Moreover, the average size of the ships involved in the trade almost doubled between 
1695 and 1697, increasing from an average of 48.3 tons to 92.7, greatly surpassing 
the 65.7 ton average from the 1680s.  Thus, the only commercial deficiency was that 
the overall volume was still low, with the islanders only receiving an average of 184 
ships a year, proving that available shipping was still hard to come by in both 
England and the colonies during the latter stages of this long war.  
 The Returns also show that the export trade experienced signs of recovery 
between 1695 and 1697, even with a convoy system that struggled to function 
efficiently.  While many Barbadian merchants still complained that the ‘few ships’ 
arriving from England after the cancellation of the 1695 convoy would ‘cause the fall 
of sugar,’ Table 4.6 actually shows both the projected totals from 1695 (10,308 tons) 
and actual figures for 1696 (9,854 tons) represent a respectable showing on par with 
or exceeding some totals from the 1680s.99  While these figures still failed to match 
the period’s best years, including 1682, 1691, or most years after 1698, it represented 
a considerable turnaround from 1688 and 1690.  Importantly, the secondary trade to 
the mainland colonies in rum and molasses was also recovering, and in some cases 
expanding, as these goods increased from a projected 223,586 gallons of rum and 
315,176 gallons of molasses in 1695 to 398,539 and 359,698 respectively by 1697.  
In fact, the 1697 rum exports surpassed all prewar figures by nearly 100,000 gallons 
and molasses exports remained only 7% behind the era’s highest total in 1682.    
 Chart 4.2 further shows the reemergence of trans-Atlantic commerce between 
1695 and 1697 by once again placing London at the center of the island’s export  
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Chart 4.2: Destination of Barbados’ Exports, 1695-1697 
 
Chart 4.2: TNA, CO 33/13, 1696 
trade, serving as the destination for 172 ships (25.60%) .  The English outports 
represented another 8.93%, meaning that well over one-third of all ships involved in 
the export trade sailed to England.  This trend was an important one, as the vast 
majority of the island’s sugar went overseas to London markets.  With an average 
Barbadian price of 24s 8d per hundredweight in 1696, the planters’ legal crop sold 
for approximately £244,379 in London, a sum that dwarfed those generated even 
during the high yield/low price era of the 1680s.  Consequently, the export trade to 
the colonial mainland saw a vast reduction in scale by the late 1690s.  While New 
England still captured 22.62% of the trade, the Chesapeake, mainland, and Caribbean 
colonies all remained below 15% for the three year period and experienced a general 
reduction in their importance.  Thus, by 1697, Barbadian planters and merchants had 
reestablished a position of strength within the Atlantic export trade, relying less 
extensively on moving goods to local destinations, while sending more ships across 
















to lack the sheer volume of the previous decade, it shows that the Barbadian planters 
and merchants had weathered the worst of the war and, with England again in control 
of the Atlantic, they could realistically expect to return to a commercial world similar 
to the one they experienced in the 1680s.    
 
Section II: Securing Additional Supplies during the War 
 
 Even with the occasional success of the convoy system and England’s 
increasing control over the Atlantic, life on Barbados remained difficult for many 
and reached a critical juncture during the early-to-mid1690s.  Some responded to the 
demanding wartime conditions by leaving the island for a more stable location, 
which resulted in a free white population that many feared was in decline.   The 
Council and Assembly, for example, wrote that ‘scarcities have forced many of the 
poorer planters to remove to North America,’ as they ‘suffered great losses’ from 
‘interruptions of trade and high taxes,’ while Governor Russell recalled that a great 
number ‘goe off the Island,’ as ‘Pennsylvania, and other new colonies tempts many 
from hence.’100  The majority of white islanders, however, had remained and 
survived by learning how to adjust their lifestyles to a Caribbean engulfed in combat.  
A variety of records show that there were at least two methods planters and 
merchants initiated in order to maintain access to the supplies and provisions needed 
throughout the Nine Years War.   
 The first was that both white and black Barbadians were far more self-
sufficient than previously thought and grew large quantities of food on their own 
plantations.  The English understood from the earliest stages of colonization the 
difficulties of settling a colony that was almost completely reliant on trans-oceanic 
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supply lines for provisions.  A 1682 pamphleteer, quoting Sir Francis Bacon, 
recommended that ‘In a Country of Plantations, first look about what kind of 
Victuals the Country yields of itself to hand…and make use of them.’101  In fact, the 
English government promoted the theory that every plantation ought to be self-
sustaining, especially in times of war, and that imported provisions from North 
America should be viewed as an emergency supply.102  The Barbadians partially 
followed this advice, as they ‘depended heavily’ on the foods crops and livestock 
produced by the island’s provision farmers and enslaved and indentured populations 
to such an extent that by 1680 Barbados grew more food than it imported.103  A 
report from the Council of Trade and Plantations in 1693, for example, further 
mentioned that until that point, ‘the Island has provided for itself.’104   
The second explanation hinged on both the pragmatic and opportunistic 
approach to trade that many islanders maintained and their willingness to repudiate 
the commercial regulations laid out by the metropole in the Navigation Acts when 
they no longer benefitted the Barbadian commercial reality.  Instead, they utilized 
their many networks and relationships throughout the Atlantic world and engaged in 
a system of illicit trade that brought in provisions and supplies not processed by 
government officers and have therefore gone unrecorded in the Returns and Customs 
Records.  Christopher Codrington noted that ‘there is so much ignorance, laziness, or 
Corruption in Naval and Custom house officers, and so general a Conspiracy in 
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people of all ranks and qualitys…to elude ye Acts of Trade, that I have ye 
Mortification of Knowing a hundred things are done everyday prejudicial to ye trade 
and interest in England.’105  William Sharpe, the Commissioner of Customs on 
Barbados, further admitted that ‘European goods, not from England, and foreign 
enumerated commodities are frequently run into bays and creeks here, where no 
officer is provided, also that vessels, cleared from the Custom-house here with little 
or no cargo, lie off the island and are further loaded by small vessels with goods 
which are to be carried to foreign markets.’106  Most importantly, few government 
officials showed a willingness to defend England’s commercial regulations, thereby 
giving it their tacit approval.  Some even participated in it themselves.  Governor 
Ralph Grey, for example, had capital invested in the interloping trade, owning at 
least a half share of a ship that sailed between New York and Barbados. 107   
By the time the war began, this tradition of illegal commerce was both 
familiar and routine to Barbadian planters and merchants and centered on two 
important Dutch entrepots.  The first existed on the small island of St. Eustatius, only 
twenty miles northwest of St. Christopher’s, where Barbadian planters traded much 
sugar, while receiving needed imports.  Dalby Thomas maintained that a ‘great 
quantity of Commodities are sent out…and sold to the Dutch at low prices, for 
private Lucre’ from this island, with the planters benefitting by ‘having Goods in 
Barter for them directly from Holland.’ 108  He further outlined how this system of 
trade worked:  The Dutch would buy large quantities of Barbadian sugar and sent it 
‘out of that back door for Holland [marked] under the name St. Eustace Sugar.’  The 
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Dutch merchants, once arriving back in the Netherlands, brought the illegal sugar 
‘produced’ in St. Eustatius to Amsterdam, allowing Barbadian planters to export 
large quantities of sugar free from English duties.  Thomas calculated that ‘over a 
Thousand and Five hundred Hogsheads of Muscovado Sugar’ (or approximately 900 
tons) reached the Netherlands each year through this ruse.109  St. Eustatius was also 
useful to the Barbadians as a nearby free port, where goods from all over the 
Caribbean could be bought, sold, or bartered with minimal risk and cheaper shipping 
rates.  It is likely not a coincidence that the period of French control over the island 
(1689-1690) directly corresponds with the years of greatest want in Barbados.  
Unsurprisingly, St. Eustatius was also one of the first locations that the English 
attempted to gain back during their counterattack in 1690, as the subsequent 
recapture and reestablishment under Dutch control coincides with the beginning of 
Barbados’ recovery.110   
 Besides St. Eustatius, island smugglers also used other Dutch ports to carry 
out their activities, namely Curaçao to the southwest of Barbados, and occasionally 
Surinam on the South American mainland.  Christopher Codrington maintained that 
by 1700 commerce with the former location was ‘at present…little less than an open 
trade.’111  One ship captain recalled that during the war, Barbadian merchants 
frequently sent ‘sugar, tobacco, and indigo to Dutch islands in exchange for dry 
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goods.’  He further explained that many island merchants would re-export mainland 
imports, especially provisions, to Curacao in exchange for French wine, cocoa, and 
textiles, while others carried ‘Rumm, beef, and sugar, from Barbados.’  Another 
source claimed that colonies like Barbados illegally supplied Curaçao ‘with 12 or 
1500 tunn of bread and flower, and as much beef, altho' such provisions one time 
with another were as dear in H.M. Islands as at Curaçoa, the returns whereof has 
been in European goods.’  The goods that the white Barbadians illicitly received 
from the island included ‘cocoa, linnens, muslins, silks and other goods for wearing 
apparel, with great quantities of rigging, sail canvas, anchors and other sorts of iron 
works, powder and shott.’112  Those on Barbados became so commercially reliant on 
Curaçao for goods that the captain estimated that if the island ‘was sunk under water, 
it would be beter for England by 5 or 600,000 pounds in one year.’113   
To get away with illegal trade in this port, a vessel would be sent ‘to Curacao 
laden with Sugar, Tobacco, Rumm, and bottle Liquors,’ but would be entered in the 
Returns as traveling for another legal destination.  In one example, another captain 
recalls that a ship bound for Curaçao listed that it was leaving ‘for Anguilla’ and that 
the illegal tobacco it carried ‘was entered for bottle beer and the Sugar for flower and 
the Rumm for Tarr.’114  This ruse allowed Barbadian planters to send desirable illegal 
goods through legal channels, while also limiting suspicion and minimizing the 
likelihood of merchants getting caught.  As such, trade to Curaçao became 
ubiquitous for much of the English West Indies, with wealthy planters, government 
officials, and even governors participating in it.  Gabriel McCrakan, a former sailor 
                                                          
112
 TNA, CO 5/1292, 20 February, 1710, Several Memorials related to the Sugar Trade. 
113





under the hire of Christopher Codrington, recalled that his powerful client frequently 
traded sugar, indigo, and cotton to the Dutch in Curaçao in 1691.115  A decade later, 
another report claimed that ‘Gov. Codrington did himself most notoriously break the 
Acts of Trade and traded with the Dutch at Curacao during the whole war.’116   
Suriname, once an English wood-cutting colony under the proprietorship of 
Francis Willoughby, and eventually transferred to the Dutch as part of the Treaty of 
Breda in 1667, represented a third center for illicit commerce.  As a part of yet 
another seemingly legal guise, merchants from New England and New York would 
regularly call at Suriname, conduct their business, and then stop at Barbados on the 
way back to the colonial mainland.  There, they would trade unsold provisions and 
lumber from North America and dry goods from Europe that they had just received 
from the Dutch for Barbadian sugar, which they would then take back to Suriname 
from where it was illegally re-exported to the Dutch Republic.117  The extant Returns 
for 1681 through 1698 inexplicably record the arrival of 41 ships with a combined 
tonnage of 1,757 tons from Suriname, ranging from a single vessel in 1697 to as 
many as 10 in 1686.  They brought a host of goods to Barbados, especially timber, 
provisions, wood for barrel construction, and rollers for grinding sugar.118  While 
trade with Suriname remained illegal, it was evidently still an active branch that was 
used to supplement Barbados with needed goods, especially supplies for the 
construction of sugar mills.  
Barbadian planters were also known to have illegally obtained a variety of 
goods, including provisions and enslaved Africans, from the Danish island of St. 
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Thomas, where they traded within a global emporium of Dutch, French, and Spanish 
merchants.
119
  Christopher Codrington admitted that the Danish represented a ‘great 
temptation’ to West Indian  merchants, ‘for they will give a third more’ for exported 
sugar than they would receive in the English market, and pay for it in ready money or 
rather negroes, Dutch linen and dry goods, which they sell fifty per cent cheaper than 
is afford among us.’
120
  Enough trade occurred between the Barbadians and 
merchants on St. Thomas that Governor Grenville worriedly explained that the 
Danish island had the potential to become ‘the Staple for all sort of indirect and  
illegal trade…in times of war.’
121
   
Barbadian merchants also relied upon England’s mainland colonies as 
important hubs for illegal activity, especially during periods of Caribbean conflict.  
Sir Thomas Laurence, Secretary of Maryland, wrote that Barbados utilized South 
Carolina as a major ‘centre for illegal trade,’ where they obtained ‘woollen and linen 
manufacture, make good stuff and have silk and cotton.’  He also believed that 
Barbadian merchants frequently traveled to Pennsylvania to acquire illicit goods, 
since the new colony received an array of material from both Scotland and the 
interloping merchants of ‘Holland…as well as Surinam and Curacao.’
122
  
Furthermore, since sugar became difficult to export during the war, Barbadian 
planters and merchants also participated in a scheme that allowed them to 
clandestinely export Chesapeake tobacco as their own product to London, Ireland 
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and the Netherlands without paying any duty on it.  According to Robert Quarys, 
Governor of Carolina,  
I have spent much thought and time to find out the reason of the great 
quantities of tobacco, which for three or fours years past hath been 
carried to Barbados from this place, Virginia, Maryland and New 
York. The consumption in Barbados is not so much as formerly and 
the quantity shipped thither is almost ten times more. At last I found 
out the intrigue and mystery of it. When the tobacco is landed there 
they repack it into boxes, casks, etc., and send it for England and 
Ireland. The conveniency of its package makes it very easy to run, 
especially since the officers do not expect tobacco on board Barbados 
ships, and the saving of the duty makes it a far better trade than any 
commodity they can carry from Barbados. There is a great deal also 
sent from that island, as shipping offers, to the Dutch settlements.123 
 
The Barbadians also traded with New York for a variety of cheaper luxury items 
obtained illegally from the Far East.  The Earl of Bellomont, New York’s governor, 
insisted that ‘a great trade’ existed ‘between this place and Madagascar from whence 
great quantities of East India goods are brought, which are certainly purchased from 
pirates,’ before being traded to planters on Barbados.  New York, with its former ties 
to the Netherlands, also served as another conduit for illegal trade with Dutch 
merchants.124  Occasionally, Barbadian merchants even dealt with illegal privateers 
and traders from as far away as the Red Sea and Russia in hidden coastal locations in 
New England, New York, and Pennsylvania.125   
Overall, the decade between 1689 and 1698 proved to be a difficult time for 
all Barbadians, as England’s participation in the Nine Years War effectively ended 
the substantial expansion of trade that characterized the island’s peak commercial 
moment during the 1680s.  Early French success cut the islanders off from most of 
their trans-Atlantic trade, which resulted in Barbadian markets receiving only a small 
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fraction of their usual salt-meat provisions, few of the luxuries, and none of the 
plantation equipment that generally arrived from England, Ireland, Africa, or the 
Atlantic Islands.  Thus, Barbados’ planters and merchants found themselves forced to 
change their approach to trade and adopt more pragmatic methods in order to survive 
and maintain some level of profitability.  Convoys represented one solution to this 
problem, as the English government worked with island merchants to send dozens of 
ships and thousands of tons of goods under escort to Barbados, while also taking 
much of their sugar back to London’s markets.  Unfortunately, the system did not 
always function smoothly and, outside of 1691, 1692, and 1696, proved to be both 
unreliable and unpredictable, forcing both white and black Barbadians to rely on 
their own ingenuity to secure supplies and provisions.   
Many responded by ignoring the Navigation Acts and participating in a 
widespread system of illicit trade that served as an alternative and supplemental 
source of supply.  The extensive networks maintained by Barbadian planters and 
merchants allowed them to turn to their French, Spanish, Dutch, and Danish 
neighbors to take advantage of commercial relationships that were more personalized 
and responsive to the islanders’ immediate needs.  Importantly, foreign merchants 
also served as an additional conduit through which planters could send a large 
portion of the sugar, molasses, and rum that would have otherwise sat as wasteful 
surplus in warehouses in Bridgetown.  By trading island exports illicitly, Barbadian 
planters continued to generate wealth regardless of whether England’s ships reached 
the island.  Moreover, they quickly learned that they could successfully ignore the 
Navigation Acts with almost no fear of punishment, while engaging in a level of free 
trade that had not been possible since the Third Anglo-Dutch War in the early 1670s.  
245 
 
Thus, the decision to engage in illegal trade, in combination with high levels of self-
production, placed influence and power into the hands of the islanders and allowed 
them the flexibility to pursue the advantages that gave them the greatest chance to 
both survive and profit during this difficult era. 
 
Conclusion 
 On 20 September 1697, France, England, Spain, the Dutch, and the Holy 
Roman Empire formally signed the Treaty of Ryswick and brought the Nine Years 
War to its anticlimactic end.  With rumors of peace sweeping through the island by 
27 September, most white Barbadians welcomed the war’s conclusion and, upon 
receiving the treaty’s conditions on 30 December, published the document ‘with 
great joy.’126  With an international desire to reestablish the status quo, little land 
changed hands in the conflict’s aftermath and life for many went back to its prewar 
condition.  This was especially true for those on Barbados, as merchants and planters 
once again pragmatically shifted their patterns of trade and confined themselves to 
the limitations set by the Navigation Acts in the hope of taking advantage of 
England’s depleted markets, high demands, increased merchant marine, and 
enhanced control of the Atlantic.  
 This resulted in a huge expansion of trade that easily surpassed many of the 
island’s best prewar totals.  In 1698, for example, the Barbadians welcomed 356 
ships carrying 37,731 tons worth of cargo space.  As Map 4.5 demonstrates, these 
vessels again arrived from all over the Atlantic world, as Barbados’ merchants and 
planters were able to renew the trading networks that they had previously utilized 
when island commerce had been at its most robust.  Much of this reestablished  
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Graph 4.6: Origins of Barbados Imports, 1698 
 
Graph 4.6: TNA, CO 33/14, 1698 
success centered on the additional numbers of ships involved in postwar trade, while 
continuing to maintain the England to colonial origin-of- trade ratios of 1:1.5 for 
ships and 1.5:1 for tonnage that had defined commerce throughout both the 1680s 
and the latter years of the war.  In 1698, as Graph 4.6 depicts, 43.8% of all ships 
originated in England and both London and the outports resumed their featured role 
within Barbados’ import trade, combining for 17.97% of the year’s total shipping 
and 31.75% of its tonnage.  England’s merchants were also responsible for the 
dramatic postwar revival of commerce between Barbados and both Africa and the 
Atlantic Islands of Madeira and Cape de Verde, as another 12.92% of the year’s 
ships and 15.39% of its tonnage came from these three locations.  More importantly, 
the merchants of New England and Ireland returned to their proper place at the head 
of the island’s provision trade, sending a combined 35.11% of all shipping and 
35.09% of all tonnage to the island.  These ships, along with an increase in tonnage  
 













Graph 4.7: Barbadian Exports, 1698-1709 
 
Graph 4.7: TNA, CO 33/13, 33/14, and 33/15, 1698-1709. This graph depicts the legal export trade that 
occurred between Barbados, England, and the colonies.  The molasses and rum totals correspond to the 
numbers that increase by a hundred thousand gallons on the left side of the chart, while sugar matches up 
with those in tons on the right side.       
from the farmlands of Pennsylvania and the fisheries of Piscataqua, led to a great 
bounty of provisions entering the island.   
 A high demand for sugar also caused the export trade to rapidly expand.  
Reaching a postwar peak of 20,190 tons in 1698, Graph 4.7 demonstrates that 
Barbadian planters consistently supplied at least 10,000 tons to both local and trans-
oceanic markets throughout the Atlantic world for most of the next twenty years.127  
This considerable output, combined with a low market supply and high demand, 
resulted in trans-Atlantic markets experiencing inflated prices.  The average price 
that the planters received for their product increased from 14s 8d per hundredweight 
in 1698 to 23s 10d in 1700.  In peak years of trade during the postwar era, sugar 
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legally brought in between £275,802 and £366,496 for the island.128  Secondary items 
such as rum and molasses also continued to sell well, with the island planters and 
merchants exporting an average of 475,724.39 gallons of rum and 289,329.46 gallons 
of molasses per year between 1698 and 1709.  Thus, by pragmatically reestablishing 
their trading networks throughout the Atlantic world and subjecting themselves to the 
regulations imposed by the Navigation Acts, many white Barbadians prospered, with 
both imports and export reaching record highs.  Unfortunately, this boom was short-
lived.  A new conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession, checked Barbados’ 
commercial expansion in 1701, causing sugar, rum, and molasses exports to 
precipitously drop, while forcing the islanders to once again adjust to life within a 
Caribbean at war.       
Overall, the last two decades of the seventeenth century represented an era of 
conflicting visions of success and prosperity in Barbados, and showed just how 
delicate trans-Atlantic economic networks could be for a small island in the 
Caribbean.  For most of the 1680s, Barbados was at the height of its commercial 
power, but operated under substantial metropolitan oversight and a general adherence 
to the Navigation Acts.  It relied on a vast trading network and the considerable 
number of relationships that it created to acquire an unprecedented quantity of 
imports, including provisions from both Ireland and England’s mainland colonies, 
wine from Madeira, assinegoes from Cape de Verde, and a mixture of luxuries and 
plantation necessities from London and the English outports.  Exports followed 
similar trends, with Barbadian planters and merchants sending an annual average of 
over 8,000 tons of sugar back to the metropole and considerable amounts of rum to 
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the plantations of Virginia and molasses to the distilleries of New England.  As long 
as the ratios of colonial to European trading vessels hovered around 1.5:1 and 
tonnage at 1:1.5, the system consistently worked and Barbados remained well-
supplied and well-fed, with few surplus exports left lying in warehouses. 
 The Revolution of 1688 and the Nine Years War, however, altered this 
delicate balance of trade.  From 1689-1690, the French Navy dominated the 
Caribbean and threw Barbados’ trading networks into disarray, making it both 
expensive and dangerous for smaller colonial ships to sail in the West Indies.  
Moreover, England lost control of the Channel in 1690, further disrupting established 
patterns of import and export.  By 1691, however, the situation improved markedly 
for the island’s inhabitants.  The introduction of the convoy system allowed 
Barbados to briefly reestablish high volumes of trade that mimicked those of the 
1680s.  These commercial armadas, when successful, supplemented Barbados with 
moderate imports and exports and relieved some of the pressures faced by a 
population that up until this point had been largely left to fend on its own.  Yet, the 
convoys were often unsuccessful, leaving both white and black Barbadians to rely on 
other means in order to secure their own supplies.  At a local level, the Barbadians 
countered the scarcity of imported provisions by leaning heavily on their own basic 
levels of self-sufficiency.  Planters and merchants also openly disobeyed the 
government’s Navigation Acts by engaging in high levels of illicit trade, traveling to 
St. Eustatius, St. Thomas, Surinam, Curaçao or even the English mainland to trade 
illegally with both domestic and foreign merchants.  These strategies appear to have 
kept the island reasonably well supplied during an era of limited trade and helped 
most islanders to survive a long and often dangerous war.      
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 Overall, this analysis shows the constantly changing nature of trade in a late 
seventeenth-century Anglo-Caribbean plantation society.  At their core, Barbadian 
planters and merchants refused to view themselves as simple cogs within England’s 
hubristic mercantilist machine.  Instead, they operated in a more nuanced and 
pragmatic way, taking advantage of the protection, high prices, and guaranteed 
markets offered by the Navigation Acts when it was in their self-interest to do so, but 
quickly complained if they received less shipping than expected from London and 
the outports.  In these situations, they resorted to a freer and more open trade that 
rejected the restrictions imposed by the Navigation Acts and knowingly took 
advantage of the feeble and impotent policies of enforcement put into place by a 
metropole that could not yet adequately overcome the distance between the two 
locations.  Unlike their predecessors, who often spurned London-based merchants 
and the metropolitan government, contemporary Barbadian planters and merchants 
welcomed a strong relationship with England, but still desired the power, right, and 
privilege of ‘choice.’  They viewed their commercial relationship with the English as 
a single economic option, one of many that they had when trading throughout the 
Atlantic.  This quickly became the island’s planters and merchants greatest economic 
strength, as their ability to rely on responsive, pragmatic, and flexible economic 
relationships that incorporated merchants, colonists, and English policy makers into a 
single commercial unit allowed the small island to emerge as one of the most 
important and influential colonies of the era.
Map 4.1: Barbados Importation Networks, 1684 
 
 
Map 4.1: TNA, CO 33/13, 1684.  While this map shows most of the locations contained in the Naval Office Returns, there are a few that lie outside of its limits.  Some of the actual 
locations, therefore, might appear to be inaccurate.  This applies most specifically to the Leeward Islands, Surinam, Guinea, and Madagascar.  I tried to be as accurate as possible, 
while also keeping the map legible.   
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Map 4.2:  Barbados Importation Networks, 1690
 
Map 4.2: TNA, CO 33/13, 1690. 
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Map 4.3: Barbados Importation Networks, 1691 
 
Map 4.3: TNA, CO 33/13, 1691. 
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Map 4.4: Barbados Importation Networks, 1697 
 
Map 4.4: TNA, CO 33/13, 1697 
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Map 4.5: Barbados Importation Networks, 1698 
 











































Chapter 5: The Barbadians’ Quest for Energy in the 
Seventeenth-Century Caribbean, 1680-1700 
 
While most of the grievances from Edward Littleton’s Groans focused on 
trade and taxes, he also identified a variety of other ‘lesser’ issues that affected the 
lives of late-seventeenth century Barbadian planters and farmers.  One of these was 
the increasing costs of the vital energy inputs necessary for the production of sugar 
on Barbados.  While Littleton voiced his dismay over the high freight prices 
merchants placed on the horses used to power some plantations and the inherent 
difficulties in maintaining the great windmills that had come to dominate the island’s 
skyline by the 1680s, he identified the challenges surrounding the infertile soil as the 
most pressing energy issue of his day.  To counter it, Littleton recommended the use 
of dung.   This, however, brought its own problems, as the retired planter 
acknowledged that ‘amassing the vast quantities of Dung we must use, the carrying it 
to the Field, and disposing it there; is a mighty Labour,’ as each ‘acre of ground well 
dress’d will take thirty load of Dung.’  Because planters needed so much fertilizer to 
reinvigorate their lifeless fields, the enslaved had to work to collect it like ‘Ants or 
Bees… and rake and scrape Dung out of every Corner,’ with some going to such 
extreme ends as using ‘the Urine of their People’ to bring life back to their fields.  
Thus, while Littleton’s concerns related to a very specific issue, he pointed out a 
larger problem that was a dangerous reality for those planting and farming on the 
island.  By the 1680s, the environment of Barbados had been altered in ways that 
caused planters to need greater quantities of energy from what they maintained were 
dwindling overall supplies.
1
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Originally, it was the planters’ easy access to natural energy in its various 
forms that made sugar production possible on Barbados in the mid-1640s.  
According to Jason Moore, there were three general inputs needed to successfully 
grow this lucrative cash crop.  First, there had to be an abundance of healthy and 
nutrient-rich soil.  When the overused soil began to show signs of infertility by the 
end of the 1660s, the planters were forced to figure out how to revitalize it with 
additional nutrients in order to keep it productive and to maximize scale efficiencies.  
Secondly, the enslaved Africans, indentured servants, and free whites that made up 
the island’s workforce needed enormous amounts of nutritional energy in order to 
perform the arduous tasks required by plantation and provision agriculture.  It would 
have been too expensive to have imported the majority of the foodstuffs needed to 
supply this energy, so planters and farmers had to figure out other methods of 
producing it locally.  Thirdly, the Barbadians needed access to large tracts of 
woodland, as ‘there had to be fuel for the boilers that cooked the cane juice,’ and that 
turned the sweet syrup into muscovado sugar.  Since the island’s natural forests had 
almost entirely disappeared by the end of the 1660s, planters naturally looked abroad 
to neighboring islands for cheap sources of fuelwood.
2
    
This constant search for a productive equilibrium between these three energy 
sources has defined the movement of sugar’s commodity frontier.  Historically, 
sugarcane’s relationship to the environment was parasitic at best; the perennial quest 
for the necessary inputs resulted in rapid biophysical transformation and resource 
exploitation.  As soon as planters exhausted the environment of one location, they 
wasted little time in abandoning the site and finding fertile soil and virgin forests 
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elsewhere.  This created a highly mobile and rapidly changing commodity frontier 
that moved from Cyprus in the late fifteenth century to the eastern fringe of the 
Caribbean in less than two hundred years.  Thus, the general refusal of Barbadian 
planters to flee their allegedly declining plantations was a unique occurrence in the 
history of the valuable cash crop. For the first time, sugar planters who had rapidly 
exploited and used up an area’s limited resources stayed and attempted to maintain 
similar levels of agricultural output through innovation and modernization.
3
  This 
meant that energy in its various forms took on a new meaning to the Barbadian elite, 
becoming a focal point of both their domestic and international policy, and one of 
their greatest daily concerns.
4
      
Despite the importance of this moment within the history of sugar, few 
historians have written much about the Barbadian elite’s quest for energy or the 
amount that it required to run the island’s sugar plantation complex.  David Watts 
and J.H. Galloway have both discussed how the changing environmental conditions 
on Barbados led to a transformation in the methods used by planters to obtain energy, 
but offer little information on their specific requirements.
5
  Jason Moore has 
addressed the issue of deforestation in his work, but does not produce the 
quantitative evidence to substantiate his claims with regard to Barbados.
6
  Richard 
Bean has looked at basic nutritional requirements by predicting intake in 1680 and 
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1698 through a limited analysis of the Naval Office Returns.  His work, however, 
centers on only two years, both of which show significant import surpluses and are 
not indicative of the complex situation on the island during the late 1680s and most 
of the 1690s.
7
  Thus, the islanders’ ability to adapt to the times, maintain access to 
their necessary inputs, and innovatively pursue alternative sources of energy must be 
addressed in order to better understand how Barbados transformed from a boom 
economy in the 1650s and 1660s to a more mature plantation society by the 1680s.   
By utilizing imports recorded in the Returns, as well as a sampling of 
inventories from deeds and wills, this chapter addresses, predicts, and analyzes the 
energy requirements of all late seventeenth-century Barbadians and suggests how 
some managed to meet their resource needs on a daily basis.  This chapter shows that 
the island’s inhabitants again relied on a flexible and pragmatic approach to 
gathering these materials that incorporated a combination of supplies from both local 
colonial and trans-Atlantic ports and through self-production.  The first section 
considers the quantities of nutritional energy needed by each of the three major 
population groups in Barbados, why they consumed certain foods, the extent to 
which they depended on alternative supplies of provisions to offset those that they 
imported from abroad, and how they might have attained some of this additional 
supply.   The second part covers the importation and use of animals, especially 
horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, and assinegoes, as another source of energy.  Their role as 
energy inputs was particularly interesting, as the Barbadians consumed some, while 
using others for an assortment of jobs that ranged from pulling carts across the island 
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and moving the rollers that crushed the cane to providing the manure that planters 
used to fertilize their crops.   
The third section addresses the issue of soil infertility and looks at how the 
planters managed to reenergize their dilapidated and worn-out fields.  Barbadian 
planters, while regularly complaining about the difficulty of achieving consistently 
large yields, remained at the forefront of the English sugar trade until 1720 and 
regularly produced impressive crops throughout this period.  Finally, the last section 
recognizes the difficulties planters had in attaining adequate quantities of fuelwood 
for their boiling houses, as they rapidly overexploited their own native resources and 
had to look abroad to supplement their local supply, which often proved problematic, 
expensive, and dangerous within a crowded Caribbean.  By examining these four 
areas, one can obtain a greater insight into the energy requirements of sugar 
production on Barbados, as well as a better understanding of the islanders’ ability to 
flexibly address ensuing challenges through their own innovation and 
experimentation. 
 
Part I:  The Quest for Nutritional Energy on Barbados 
John Parry writes that Caribbean history ‘should be the story of yams, 
cassava and salt fish, no less than sugar and tobacco,’ since the quest for food was 
always one of the greatest obstacles faced by those living in this region during the 
seventeenth-century.
 8
   For the first Barbadians, acquiring the necessary nutritional 
energy was relatively easy, as they found their new home to be surprisingly fertile, 
producing ‘oranges, lemons, limes, pomegranates, peeches, and such other fruits’ in 
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abundance, with a large population of native wild boars roaming the countryside.
9
  
After a series of failed experiments to raise wheat in the island’s salt-heavy winds, 
the settlers experienced a brief period of hunger, known as the ‘Starving Time,’ from 
1630-1631.  These struggles, however, paved the way for sustained success after the 
mid-1630s, as the settlers learned how to couple the island’s natural plenty with trade 
from the mainland colonies and Dutch merchants.  Moreover, they replaced the 
ineffective wheat with maize, the preferred cultigen of the aboriginal Arawaks, while 
also cultivating other Indian foods, such as plantains, cassava, and sweet potatoes.  
Many had also purchased or raised various species of livestock, and farmers added 
yams, pulses, and an assortment of fruits—ranging from bananas and papayas to 
melons and pineapples—to their fields and gardens.
10
  Thus, by the 1640s, Barbadian 
settlers were already working towards substantial self-production, locally growing a 
variety of fruits, vegetables, and meats that freed many from a heavy reliance on 
imported provisions. 
The island’s early elite enjoyed a particularly impressive range of local foods.  
Richard Ligon, a self-proclaimed gourmand, recorded the culinary wonders and 
exotic ingredients on the menu at a party hosted by Sir James Drax, the island’s 
leading planter, in the late 1640s.  Ligon described the first course as follows:  
This feast is alwayes when [Drax] kils a [cow]...and there are these 
dishes at either messe, a Rompe boyl'd, a Chine roasted, a large piece 
of the brest roasted, the Cheeks bak'd, of which is a dish to either 
messe, the tongue and part of the tripes minc't for Pyes, season'd with 
sweet Herbs finely minc't, suet, Spice and Currans; the legges, pallets 
and other ingredients for an Olio Podrido… a dish of Marrow bones, 
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Drax followed this course with another set of dishes containing different preparations 
of pork, chicken, goat, mutton, veal, capons, hens, Muscovy ducks, turtledoves, 
rabbits, Spanish bacon, and tongue, as well as oysters, caviar, anchovies, olives, and 
different pastries, fruits, cakes, and breads for dessert.
12
  While this description might 
not be representative of spreads found among the greater Barbadian population, 
Ligon provides a useful insight into both the plenteous nature of the island and the 
wide range of fresh local provisions available to the elite. 
By 1650, however, the wider shift to sugar had seemingly altered the fortunes 
of many islanders by turning the focus of production to the valuable cash crop 
instead of needed foodstuffs.  These changes also came during an era that saw the 
island’s population swell to unprecedented heights.  Dunn maintains that these 
changes ‘overtaxed the food supply, condemning most inhabitants of the island to a 
semi-starvation diet.’
13
  Higman argues that this occurred because Barbadian planters 
now participated in a monoculture and ‘did not attempt to produce food, clothing, 
and equipment’ for their enslaved and indentured work force, ‘but depended on 
outside suppliers.’
14
  Harlow similarly insists that most Barbadian planters moved 
away from provision farming, as Barbados became ‘little more than one large sugar 
factory, owned by a few absentee proprietors.’
15
  The historical records, however, do 
not support the existence of an island monoculture, but instead describe an 
agriculturally diverse society after 1650 that produced a large portion of the food and 
drink that it consumed.   




 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 115-116. 
14
 Ibid., 42-47 and Higman,‘The Sugar Revolution,’ 215. 
15
 Harlow, Barbados, 58-67. 
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In order to effectively analyze this claim, Barbados’ population has been 
divided into three separate groups based on racial and social composition: free 
whites, indentured servants, and enslaved Africans.  The representative population 
numbers for each group will come from two separate sources: the 1684 census, 
which lists 17,187 free whites, 2,381 indentured servants, and 46,602 enslaved 
Africans, will be used for the pre-war and early wartime years between 1680 and 
1691, while the government-suggested figures of 12,000 free whites and 42,000 
enslaved Africans take into account losses from the conflict and will represent 1695-
1698.
16
  The population numbers from these divisions will be compared against the 
known quantities of imported edibles, which will then be converted into calories.  
Thus, valuable estimates can be made concerning the percentage of imported calories 
that each group received between 1680 and 1698, and, consequently, the portion of 
each group’s diet that must have been secured from alternative sources. 
Before getting to the calculations, however, it is useful to understand how 
white Barbadians would have viewed the foods that they regularly consumed.  Early 
modern nutritional science and the Galenic model of humoral physiology heavily 
influenced the islanders’ approach to diet and dictated the specific foods and drinks 
best suited to each social group.  In this system, good mental and physical health 
consisted of a balance between four specific humors (blood, phlegm, choler, and 
bile), which resided in all bodies.  Scientists also divided food into four tastes—
bitter, sour, salty, and sweet—that had to be eaten in particular combinations in order 
to maintain gastronomical harmony.
17
  Different types of food could drastically alter 
this balance, meaning that people had to be very careful about the ways in which 
                                                          
16
 NLC, Ayers MS 827, 1684 Census and TNA, CO 29/2, July 1696, Council and Assembly to 
Whitehall. 
17
 Thomas Tryon, The Good House-Wife made a Doctor, (1692), 157-170. 
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they combined their taste groups.  The type of labor that an individual performed also 
played a significant role in one’s diet.  Galenic nutrition maintained that laborers had 
strong stomachs and required heavier and ‘hotter’ foods, while the wealthy had 
weaker constitutions that were better suited for lighter nourishment and white meats.  
A failure to properly adhere to these rules would lead to stomach pains, indigestion, 
or an alteration in mood, usually towards melancholy.  Thus, the English men and 
women on Barbados took a different approach to provisioning each of the three 
island groups, relying not so much on whether foods smelled or tasted good, but on 
how they affected the body and whether they allowed an individual to successfully 
perform his or her duty. 
The island’s first group, the free white population, was made up of a few 
hundred elite sugar planters, thousands of farmers and smaller plantation owners, and 
nearly 4,000 urban residents that lived in towns and villages.  The wealthy sugar 
planters, as relatively passive participants in plantation labor, maintained a very 
different diet from those who worked on provision farms.  Thomas Moffat, author of 
Health’s Improvements, wrote that the wealthy were naturally ‘tender persons’ who 
only needed ‘thin and light’ sustenance in order to remain healthy.
18
  He 
recommended that they eat lighter meats, such as ‘veal, lamb, capons, chickens, 
poacht’egs, partridges, pheasants, plovers,’ and small quantities of fresh fish.
19
  
Andrew Broode, a noted physician, recommended that wealthy individuals living in 
‘hote and moiste’ climates should center their diet on ‘fruytes and herbes and rotes as 
garlyke onyons and lykes.’  Furthermore, ‘they muste refrayne from eating of olde 
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 Thomas Moffat, Health’s Improvement: or, Rules Comprising and Discovering the Nature, Method, 
and Manner of Preparing All Sorts of Food Used in This Nation, (1655), 32. 
19
 Ibid., 285-286. 
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flesshe,’ and ‘Fysshe of muddy waters be nate good for them.’
20
  Physicians also 
maintained that the elite should avoid all salted meats, since large quantities of the 
preservative were not healthy for idle individuals.
 
 
Instead, the planter/merchant elite would have generally indulged in the fresh 
food produced on their own plantations.  To maintain a healthy diet, the wealthy 
almost universally kept an array of livestock on their lands, allowing them to eat 
large quantities of fresh pork, beef, lamb, mutton, and a variety of fowl.  They would 
have also taken advantage of the numerous fruits and vegetables that naturally grew 
on the island.  Furthermore, their many cattle would have yielded large volumes of 
milk and butter, the former being a particularly valuable commodity that was 
beneficial for individuals of all humors.
21 
 Father Antoine Biet, a French priest 
visiting Barbados in 1654, recalled the profusion of food on island plantations: For 
the wealthy, ‘everything is there in abundance….They lack no other meats and have 
all sorts of fowl.’
22
  Since the elites maintained a diet dominated by fresh local foods, 
the approximately 200 sugar planters that formed this group will be subtracted from 
the ensuing calculations concerning the importation of food for the free white 
population of Barbados.  
The remaining 17,000 white Barbadians, however, would have largely relied 
on imported provisions for their nutritional energy, as the food and drink that entered 
the island’s markets did so specifically to keep a laboring population healthy.  
Galenic nutrition maintained that the two staples of a laborer’s diet were salted meat 
                                                          
20
 Andrew Boorde, A Compendyous Regyment or a Dyetary of Healthe, (1542), Chapter 23.  Thomas 
Cocke, another physician, agreed with Boorde’s assessment, as he also recommended ‘English Hens, 
Cocks, Veal, Lamb, Chickens, Kid and Capons’ for those in hot and moist environments.  Thomas 
Cocke, Kitchin-Physick, (1676), 70. 
21
 Moffat believed that milk ‘nourisheth plentifully, encreaseth the brain, fatneth the body, restoreth 
flesh, asswageth sharpness of urine, [and] giveth the face a lively and good colour.’Moffat, 
Improvement, 119-125.   
22
 Antoine Biet, ‘Visit in Barbados,’ (1654), 68. 
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and bread.  Boorde wrote that ‘Beefe is a good meate for an Englysshe man…yf it be 
moderately powdered that the groose blode by salt may be exhaustyd, it doth make 
an Englysshe man stronge.’
23
  Moffat seconded this assertion, arguing that beef was, 
‘of all meats most nourishing…for sound men and those that labor or use exercise; so 
that it be also corned with salt before it is roasted.’
24
  The inclusion of salt with their 
meats went beyond preservation, as it was also a valuable staple of the laborers’ diet.  
An anonymous writer, in a letter sent to the Royal Society, wrote that foods ‘hardned 
with much Salt’ were a ‘necessary…preservative of Health and Life, and for the 
increase of people in ye English Colonies.’
25
  Bread was a close second in terms of 
importance, with Moffat describing it as ‘the meat of meats,’ while Thomas Cock 
wrote ‘had Gods providence confined us only to this Aliment…we had no cause to 
complain of his bounty.’
26
  
Other foods recommended for laborers included cheese, beans and pulses, 
butter, oil, and starchy vegetables such as corn.
27
  Cheese was particularly beneficial 
for this group, as Thomas Tryon wrote that it ‘is an hard tough strong Food, very 
nourishing and substantial, and excellent for healthy working People.’  When ‘eaten 
with good store of Bread, it endues those that commonly feed thereon with clean 
sound Bodies, and brisk lively Spirits, able to endure Labor and Travel.’
28
  The elite, 
on the other hand, ‘ought to eat Cheese sparingly,’ as their weak stomachs could not 
adequately handle the hardy fare.  Nutritionists also looked favorably upon oil as an  
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 Boorde, Regyment, Chapter 16.  Chapter 25 also discusses how laborers could ‘eate grosser meate’ 
than any other group on the island. 
24
 Moffat, Improvements, 59. 
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Table 5.1: Estimated Imported Provision Calories, 1680-1698 (in millions) 
Year % Data Meat Bread Peas Flour Butter Corn Cheese Prov. Oil 
1680 100% 4,783.00 309.00 196.60 578.90 1,094.00 210.60 165.70 110.74 331.70 
1681 80% 1,814.00 164.05 138.01 344.80 573.27 195.20 30.40 660.00 330.00 
1682 100% 4,478.00 972.59 251.35 555.20 3,457.50 1,216.00 60.00 756.00 482.00 
1684 100% 4,166.50 587.57 224.36 1,074.40 513.18 455.20 116.00 242.50 662.00 
1685 100% 6,495.00 836.16 308.40 900.00 1,414.50 392.80 92.80 163.00 1,022 
1686 100% 3,857.50 560.79 217.42 102.24 745.42 881.60 125.60 595.50 1,140 
1687 80% 4,754.00 440.80 317.65 988.00 669.09 960.80 173.60 288.80 588.00 
1688 75% 6,800.00 203.39 221.28 440.00 490.45 1,518.40 51.20 196.80 440.00 
1690 60% 907.50 248.59 151.89 629.60 152.66 132.80 24.80 145.00 418.00 
1691 100% 5,839.20 494.67 408.63 1,058.40 703.19 104.00 139.20 3,812 406.00 
1695 50% 634.50 144.80 56.28 355.20 144.54 42.40 16.80 40.00 108.00 
1696 100% 8,549.11 192.80 40.09 179.20 1,565.54 38.40 66.40 NA 2.00 
1697 100% 3,527.20 669.60 58.60 599.20 591.14 20.00 44.80 640.00 356.00 
1698 100% 7,603.20 418.50 117.96 894.40 2,304.46 390.40 552.80 27.20 572.00 
Avg. - 5,140.22 500.02 215.74 693.24 1,158.03 520.63 132.43 617.24 548.25 
Table 5.1: For this table, I used the Returns (TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14) to calculate the quantities of goods 
imported and then multiplied them against the caloric values provided by Bean in his work. (Bean, ‘Food 
Imports,’ 584).  The above numbers should be viewed as minimums, as they do not include any illicitly 
imported goods and only represent entries marked with actual numbers.  If an entry of cheese, for example, 
read either ‘cheese’ or ‘some cheese,’ I did not include it in my tabulations, as there is no way to ascertain a 
reasonable approximation for this quantity. 
ideal additive to food, especially when combined with bread.  Tryon argues that 
‘Amongst all Fruits or other things eatable, Oyl is one of the best, being of a brave 
nourishing clean Nature, mild and friendly to most Constitutions, far exceeding 
Butter or the Fat of Flesh.’  It led to ‘a finer and cleaner Nourishment, better Blood, 
and purer Spirits,’ than could be had from meat or butter substitutes, although the 
latter was also a beneficial part of a laborer’s diet if consumed in moderate quantities 
and at certain times of the year.
29
  Thus, the free white farmers, planters, and artisans 
of Barbados had a very specific diet built around not only the kind of work that they 
performed, but the heat and humidity of the environment in which they lived.  By  
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Chart 5.1: Percentage of Each Provision Imported into Barbados, 1680-1698 
 
Chart 5.1: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698.  Using the average calories from Table 1, I calculated the 
percentage of calories that each imported item represented to the island’s free white population. 
following this regimen, they would remain healthy and productive while living in the 
trying conditions of the tropical Caribbean.   
The imports recorded in the Returns reflect the theories of the era’s leading 
nutritionists.  By the 1680s, the majority of the free white population’s imported 
nutritional energy came from salt meat, which merchants regularly carried from  
Ireland or New England in the form of beef, pork, or, less commonly, bacon and 
mutton.  Salt meat was particularly important for laborers because it was both high in 
energy, at 1,000 cal/lb. and offered the proteins, amino acids, and animal fats they 
needed to work their fields.  In an average year, meat accounted for over 5.14 billion 
calories and, as Chart 5.1 shows, made up 53.94% of the island’s imported 
nutritional energy.  Butter (12.14% and 1.16 billion calories per year [cpy]), flour 
(7.46% and 693.24 million cpy), and general provisions (6.48% and 617.24 million 
cpy), made up the next three most important import groups, as white Barbadians 
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preferred to use imported flour to make their own bread and to use butter, the 
cheaper and more familiar spread, over oil.  Regardless, oil still made up 5.75% of 
the provision import trade and represented an average of 548.25 million cpy, while 
peas and corn, the most common vegetables, made up another 2.26% and 5.45%, or 
215.74 and 520.63 million cpy respectively.  Finally, bread (5.23%) and cheese 
(1.39%) made up the two least imported staples, as both suffered during the trans-
Atlantic crossing and could instead be easily produced locally.   
Solid food, however, was not the only way that the free white population 
could attain its nutritional energy.  Many also participated in the hard-drinking 
lifestyle that had become synonymous with the English West Indies and drank 
hundreds of calories worth of alcohol on a daily basis.  While some fell for the 
‘Intoxicating Enchantments´ of ‘Rum-Pots… Punch-Bowls…and Brandy-Bottles,’ 
others consumed alcohol because Galenic physicians believed fermented beverages 
to be far healthier and more nourishing than water or fruit juice, especially for white 
farmers laboring in their fields.  Cock, for example, argued that ‘raw cold water… 
being drank at once in great quantity may cause obstructions, and many dangerous 
Diseases, as Dropsies.’
30
  In order to avoid the consumption of water, the white 
Barbadians produced many types of liquor locally, as Ligon recalled encountering 
‘Mobbie, Beveridge…kill-Divell, [and] Drink of the Plantine,’ as well as perino, an 
alcohol distilled from cassava.
31
  The islanders also imported large quantities of beer, 
cider, ale, and other forms of distilled spirits from England, Ireland, and the mainland 
colonies.       
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 Cock, Kitchin-Physick, 46-47. 
31
 Ligon, History, 43.  The Barbadians produced mobbie from red sweet potatoes and beveridge from 
oranges.  ‘Kill-divell’ was a local name for rum.  
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While the elites likewise consumed many of the aforementioned drinks, they 
also heavily imbibed Madeiran wine, an imported luxury item that most poor whites 
could not regularly afford.  Physicians praised Madeiran wine as a perfect drink for a 
‘weaker constitution’ and recommended it as a necessary part of an elite person’s 
well-rounded diet.  As Broode wrote, Madeira wine, when ‘moderatly 
drunken…doth quycken a mans wyttes, comfort the herjt, scowre y
e
 lyuer… reioyce 
al the powers of man... ingendre good bloude,,…[and] nurysshe the brayne and all 
the body.’
32
  Elite planters could also drink ‘Brandy, Claret wine, White wine, and 
Renish wine,’ as well as ‘Sherry, Canary, [and] red sack’
33
  Yet, most elite 
Barbadians rarely imported Continental alcohol, as nutritional theorists considered 
other wines, especially French and Rhenish, to be less ‘fulsome,’ since they ‘neither  
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 Broode,  Regymnet, Chapter 10. 
33
 Ligon, History 33-38. 
Year % Data Wine Ale Cider Spirits Beer Totals 
1680 100% 1,090.50 428.40 106.90 83.20 NA 1,709.00 
1681 80% 1,210.20 45.00 45.80 90.00 215.83 1,606.83 
1682 100% 880.40 50.33 2.56 27.00 225.76 1,186.05 
1684 100% 1,201.00 18.72 10.97 132.27 46.20 1,409.16 
1685 100% 1,001.20 40.97 10.86 176.40 202.75 1,432.18 
1686 100% 1,517.20 66.47 8.41 240.60 133.70 1,966.38 
1687 80% 1,345.00 80.12 7.88 238.80 179.54 1,881.35 
1688 75% 1,133.80 160.82 54.91 21.94 130.20 1,501.67 
1690 60% 279.80 6.88 4.47 4.80 88.43 384.38 
1691 100% 1,006.60 325.66 44.12 24.39 45.60 1,446.37 
1695 50% 585.00 0.0 1.70 42.00 48.32 677.03 
1696 100% 470.20 128.16 12.70 6.60 5.40 623.07 
1697 100% 250.60 36.77 10.12 2.77 1.80 302.06 
1698 100% 902.00 61.98 9.26 4.37 99.00 1,076.61 
Avg. - 1,027.46 116.86 26.33 86.71 114.10 1,371.46 
Table 5.2: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698, and Bean,’ Food Imports,’ 585.  See the footnote for Table 1 
for information on the methodology used to calculate these figures. 
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Chart 5.2: Percentage of Each Alcohol Imported into Barbados, 1680-1698 
 
Chart 5.2: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698 
keep nor agree well with our stomachs, if so constantly dranke as in England.’
34
  
Hard liquor, in moderation, was also a helpful source of energy for the wealthy.  
While they considered distilled drinks to be for a lower class, they nevertheless 
frequently mixed rum with some sugar and water and consumed the resulting rum-
punch in prodigious quantities.
35
     
The data from the Returns support the centrality of alcohol to the lives of free 
white Barbadians.  Table 5.2 shows that merchants carried enough to Barbados to 
account for an average addition of more than 1.5 billion cpy to the free white diet 
throughout the 1680s and 1690s.  The majority of this energy came from imported 
Madeiran wine, as Table 5.2 shows that this drink added nearly 1.03 billion cpy to 
the Barbadian diet and, according to Chart 5.2, represented 74.92% of all liquid 
calories imported into the island during these decades.  Beer, ale, and cider, sent 
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from England and Ireland and heavily consumed by free white laborers, made up a 
combined 18.76% of liquid calories and added an average of 257.29 million cpy to 
the island.  The Barbadians also imported another 86.71 million calories (6.32%) 
from other spirits, such as brandy, aqua vitae, and champagne.  Thus, alcoholic 
beverages continued to represent a vital addition of calories to the Barbadian diet, 
supplying another 1.97 billion cpy during the 1680s, and at least another 300 million 
cpy even after the Nine Years War cut off Caribbean access to the Atlantic Islands. 
With such high levels of nutritional energy reaching Barbados, it would seem 
reasonable to predict that the traditional historiography is accurate in claiming that 
the free white islanders imported enough calories from abroad to nutritionally sustain 
themselves during most of the 1680s and 1690s.  However, in order to calculate the 
veracity of this hypothesis, a daily caloric baseline first needs to be established.  An 
average man performing moderate to high levels of farm-based labor, such as 
weeding, ploughing, hoeing, and occasionally digging, will need approximately 
4,500 calories a day to cover his expended energy.
36
  Since it is unlikely that all of 
the island’s free white men reached their ideal nutritional requirements on a daily 
basis, their average calories per day will be conservatively reduced by 33% in all  
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 There is an extensive debate among social historians over just how many calories an average 
laborer needed to remain healthy.  Oxley and Meredith considered 3,000 calories a day to be ‘a very 
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Table 5.3: Caloric Intake for White Barbadians, 1680-1698 





% of 2,172 
Cal. Diet 
1680 100% 7,779,940,000 1,709,000,000 9,488,940,000 1,513 69.66% 
1681 80% 4,249,733,000 1,186,046,500 5,435,779,500 867 39.92% 
1682 100% 12,228,636,000 1,606,901,000 13,835,537,000 2,205 101.52% 
1684 100% 8,041,719,000 1,408,882,000 9,450,601,000 1,506 69.34% 
1685 100% 11,625,666,000 1,432,179,000 13,057,845,000 2,082 95.86% 
1686 100% 9,146,228,000 1,966,381,500 11,112,609,500 1,771 81.54% 
1687 80% 9,180,740,000 1,881,345,500 11,062,085,500 1,763 81.17% 
1688 75% 10,800,356,000 1,501,673,500 12,302,029,500 1,961 90.29% 
1690 60% 2,810,832,000 384,382,000 3,195,214,000 509 23.43% 
1691 100% 12,965,289,000 1,446,364,500 14,411,653,500 2,297 105.76% 
1695 50% 1,542,520,000 677,027,000 2,219,547,000 354 16.30% 
1696 100% 10,633,540,500 623,065,500 11,256,606,000 1,794 82.60% 
1697 100% 6,506,532,000 302,059,500 6,808,591,500 1,085 49.95% 
1698 100% 12,880,919,000 1,076,609,500 13,957,528,500 2,225 102.44% 
Avg. - 9,635,610,848 1,371,446,601 11,007,066,449 1,755 80.80% 
Table 5.3: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698.  The data in Table 3 reflect the combined totals from Tables 
1 and 2. 
subsequent calculations in order to account for the thousands of poor planters who 
might not have been able to afford adequate levels of food.  Thus, the caloric 
baseline for an average free white man in Barbados will be 3,000 calories per day.  
The Atwater scale, commonly used for differentiating between the calorific needs of 
different ages and genders, suggests that a white Barbadian woman would require 
approximately 2,400 calories and a child 1,500.
37
  When applied to a hypothetical 
demographic breakdown using the 1716 census, the average free white Barbadian 
required 2,172 calories per day.
38
  Basing subsequent calculations on this number, 
the conservative calculations from Table 5.3 suggests that the free white population 
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of Barbados only received a portion of its daily energy needs from legal imports of 
food and drink.   
With peace and economic expansion dominating the 1680s, Table 5.3 shows 
that free white Barbadians were able to obtain at least 69.34% of their calories from 
abroad, with peak import years, such as 1682, 1685, and 1688, reaching between 
90% and 101%.  During the 1690s, however, the Nine Years War inhibited much 
trans-Atlantic trade and, consequently, the islanders obtained less nutritional energy 
from distant ports.  While the successful convoys of 1691 and 1696 brought wartime 
highs of 105.76% and 82.60% of the white population’s required nutritional energy, 
these years represented anomalies, as the islanders often struggled to even reach 
50%.  Fortunately, this downturn was only temporary.  By 1698, the importation of 
food and drink surged back up over 100% and allowed the free white population to 
restock before heading into the new century and another war.  Overall, each free 
white islander received an average of 1,755 calories per day from abroad during the 
nineteen year period between 1680 and 1698.  This meant that imported provisions 
supplied the greater free white population with 80.80% of the nutritional energy that 
they required each day, a substantial total that, despite the conservative nature of 
these calculations, proves that an impressive quantity of goods arrived at Barbadian 
ports throughout this period.  Yet, this also means that free white settlers were still 
responsible for finding the remaining 19.20% on their own. 
Contemporary sources, however, suggest that this might not have been as 
difficult for the island’s white population as the historiography would lead one to 
believe, as they regularly depict its attempts at establishing a substantial level of self-
production.  In the 1640s, for example, Ligon describes a planter-class that realized 
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the importance of setting aside some of its own land to grow basic provision crops.  
He wrote that 70 acres were set aside on the 500 acre Modiford/Hilliard plantation 
for ‘corne, potatoes, plantines, cassavie, and bonavist,’ as well as ‘some few acres of 
which for fruite, pines, plantines, milions, bonanoes, gnavers, water milions, limons, 
and limes.’
39
  Forty years later, Barbadian planters continued to routinely emphasize 
the importance of self-production.  Both the island’s Assembly members and Dalby 
Thomas wrote that a standard plantation of 100 acres should have at least twenty ‘set 
apart for Pasture, Provisions, and a Nursery for Canes….’
40
  In fact, English 
scientists held Barbadian farming in particularly high esteem, with the island’s 
planters and farmers both gaining a domestic reputation for their skill  In 1680, John 
Beale, a Fellow of the Royal Society, wrote to Robert Boyle claiming that it would 
be worthwhile to have the successful white ‘workmen’ of the island ‘showe use 
Howe to…rayse [our] own food,’ due to the island’s consistent production of ‘such a 
surplus.’
41
   
Island inventories further show that Nathaniel Blackiston’s 200 acre 
plantation in St. Andrews included ‘2 acres of potatoes, 2 acres of yams, 39 acres of 
corn, a pigeon house, gardens and orchards.’  Joana Cleaver, Michael Wiley, and 
Thomas Spiar had separate corn houses for storing the harvested vegetable, while 
Ann Searle had a separate building dedicated specifically to cassava.  The inventories 
also show that the islanders kept considerable numbers of livestock for food, with 
planters often building pigeon houses, hog sties, sheep yards, fowling grounds, and 
duck pens on their plantations.  Philip Price even maintained a small pond full of 
fish, a corn mill, and stored a wide variety of provisions produced on his plantation 
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to help feed his 116 enslaved laborers, including 120 bushels of Guinea corn, 6 
bushels of Indian corn, 130 gallons of rum, and 500 gallons of molasses.  The 
islanders also produced many of their own alcoholic beverages, as nearly 60% of the 
inventories surveyed show a planter in possession of at least one rum still.  They 
could also make a variety of non-alcoholic fruit juices, primarily from plums, 
pineapples, and oranges.
42
  Thus, the records suggest that the free white Barbadians 
could not have legally imported all of their provisions from abroad and made up at 
least a portion of this deficit by producing a variety of different foods on their own 
plantations and farms, proving that the island was actually an agriculturally diverse 
society that produced far more than would have been possible within the sugar 
monoculture depicted in the historiography.   
Unfortunately, the situation was very different for the forty to fifty thousand 
unfree laborers that performed most of the work on Barbados’ plantations and farms.  
The unfree population was composed of two groups: a large community of enslaved 
blacks from Africa and a much smaller body of white indentured servants.  The 
unfree white population is particularly difficult to assess in terms of nutritional 
energy, since it is unclear how many resided on the island after 1684 and to what 
extent their experiences were similar across hundreds of different plantations.  It is 
well-known, though, that many contemporaries considered their diet to be especially 
poor.  Sir Thomas Montgomery, for example, related to the English government that 
white servants were ‘used with more barbarous cruelty than if in Algiers.  Their 
bodies and souls are used as if hell commenced here and …they want the merest 
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necessaries of food and raiment.’
43
  Governor Russell described similarly vile 
conditions in 1695: ‘I dare say that there are hundreds of white servants in the Island 
who…have never a bit of fresh meat bestowed on them nor a dram of rum. They are 
domineered over and used like dogs.’
44
     
Henry Pittman’s account of his time as an indentured servant in the mid-
1680s gives a more specific insight into the diet of the island’s unfree white laborers.  
Pittman reported that his notoriously cruel master fed his servants a meager diet of 
‘five Pound of salt Irish Beef, or salt Fish a Week for each man, and Indian or Guiny 
Corn ground on a Stone and made into Dumplins instead of Bread.’
45
  Based on this 
account, each servant would have received approximately 260,000 calories per year, 
or 712 calories per day, in imported proteins.
46
  Since indentured servants fulfilled a 
variety of roles on a plantation, with some working in the field alongside the 
enslaved and others engaged as artisans, domestics, overseers, or managers, they 
would have had different nutritional requirements, likely needing between 2,500 (for 
those involved in more sedentary pursuits) and 4,500 calories per day.  It was very 
common, however, for white servants to be drastically underfed, meaning that they 
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would have more realistically consumed only 50%-60% of their ideal totals.  Thus, 
even with this conservative estimate, the island’s white servants still had to locally 
obtain between 800 and 1,500 calories daily.  Some of this would have come from 
the corn that plantation owners provided, but not all would have supplied their 
workers with this vegetable, especially in the quantities needed to make up the 
aforementioned deficits.  Even worse, indentured servants were not guaranteed to 
receive any food at all.  While the Barbadian government had passed a law in 1682 
that required each servant to receive five pounds of meat or fish per week, the courts 
rarely enforced it and plantation owners, trying to cut costs, often left their unfree 
white workers to fend for themselves and obtain over a thousand calories worth of 
their own food each day, an arduous task after a strenuous ten-hour workday that 
likely left many servants severely malnourished.
47
   
The 46,602 enslaved Africans faced even greater struggles in obtaining their 
nutritional energy, as elite planters were not legally obliged to provide them with any 
food at all.
48
  The trend of mistreatment and malnutrition began in sugar’s earliest 
days, as Ligon recalled that in the late 1640s, ‘Negroes were allowed each man two 
Maquerels a weeke and every woman one; which were given out to them on 
Saturday in the evening, after they had their allowance of Plantines,’ with ‘nothing 
but faire water’ to drink.  On special occasions, such as Christmas, the enslaved 
could be given small quantities of meat and ‘if any cattle dyed by mischance, or by 
any disease…the Negroes [eat] the skinnes, head, and intrails which was divided 
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amongst them by the overseers.’
49
 Such a poor diet led Father Biet to complain that 
‘there is no nation which feeds its slaves as badly as the English,’ as they only 
received ‘potatoes, which serve them as their bread, their meat, their fish, in fact, 
everything.’
50
    
Thirty years later, little had changed in the provisioning of enslaved Africans 
on Barbados.  In 1679, Henry Drax, in a set of instructions left for his factor, 
provided a detailed list on what to feed the plantation’s black laborers.  He 
recommended, ‘Every Negro have Weekly one pound of ffish or two Mackrell, if 
Large, othervise three, and owerseers and head Boylers Duble that allowance.’  To 
supplement this small amount of protein, ‘Every Negro two quarts of Molases 
Weekly…you must allow Saltt when they want it and twice or thrice every year 
geive a barrel of palm oyle amongestt them if Easely to be procured.’  Drax allowed 
his enslaved Africans to regularly imbibe, as he recommended supplying field 
workers with ‘Rum Every Morning and att other times as you shall See Conveniantt 
and for the Incoragmentt of Ptickler (sic.) Negros what you shall think fit and 
according to theire Early Rysing and their work.’
51
  Drax appears to have 
provisioned his slaves comparatively well, as those on a nearby plantation received  
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Table 5.4:  Imported Calories for the Enslaved, 1680-1698 









% of 3,000 Calorie 
Diet 
1680 100% 3,751 1,875.5 48.36 132.49 4.42 
1681 80% 2,637 1,318.5 34.00 93.14 3.10 
1682 100% 5,112 2,556 65.91 180.57 6.02 
1684 100% 3,762 1,881 40.36 110.58 3.69 
1685 100% 4,924 2,462 52.83 144.74 4.82 
1686 100% 4,574 2,287 49.08 134.45 4.48 
1687 80% 3,905 1,952.5 41.90 114.79 3.83 
1688 75% 3,989 1,994.5 42.80 117.26 3.91 
1690 60% 3,335 1,667.5 35.78 98.03 3.23 
1691 100% 5,653 2,826.5 60.65 166.17 5.54 
1695 50% 984 492 11.71 32.09 1.07 
1696 100% 716 358 8.52 23.35 0.78 
1697 100% 2,915 1,457.5 34.70 95.08 3.17 
1698 100% 8,028 4,014 95.57 261.84 8.73 
Avg.   - 4,347 2,173.5 46.64 130.19 4.34 
Table 5.4: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698.  The Naval Officer broke down imported fish into six 
different categories: salmon, sturgeon, and cod, which rarely appeared in the records and were more 
expensive, and herring, mackerel (both red and white), and the eponymous ‘fish.’  For this chart, I have 
combined the imports of all six types of fish and converted them into hogsheads.     
almost no protein and ate little more than ‘yams, pumpkins, and pigeon-peas out of 
their calabashes,’ for their evening meal.
52
     
Thus, the better-provisioned enslaved received approximately two pounds of 
imported salt fish as their primary protein, as it was generally cheap and plentiful.  In 
1685, the Assembly complained that they had to set aside £35 per year to spend on 
imported fish for every 50 enslaved Africans, or 0.46 pence per day per person.
53
  
The Returns, however, show that the prices mattered little, as island merchants rarely 
imported enough salted fish to reach Drax’s recommended figure of a pound per 
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enslaved worker per week.  To ‘properly’ feed the island’s 46,602 enslaved Africans 
with an average of 52 pounds of fish per person per year, planters would have had to 
purchase at least 4,847 hogsheads of the protein.  As Table 5.4 shows, this only 
happened twice during the peak years between 1680 and 1688 (1682 and 1685), and 
became an unrealistic standard to maintain once war broke out in 1689.  Even when 
the English regained control over the Atlantic in the mid-to-late 1690s, Barbadian 
planters still only received at most 34.7 pounds of fish per enslaved African.  It took 
until 1698 before the Barbadians could again surpass the ‘52 pounds of fish per 
person’ threshold, reaching a period high of 95.57 pounds in that year.  Regardless of 
quantities, though, a diet centered on imported salt fish provided very little overall 
sustenance to the average enslaved African.  As they worked long ten-hour shifts and 
consistently performed the most difficult tasks on a plantation, many would have 
ideally required at least 5,000 calories each day, although 2,500 to 3,000 calories per 
day would have been far more realistic for yet another group of islanders that were 
consistently underfed.
54
   
By either metric, imported salt fish represented a negligible contribution to 
the enslaved laborers’ daily caloric intake.  In 1682, for example, fish added only 
180.57 daily calories to the average enslaved person’s diet, representing only 6.02% 
of a 3,000 calorie standard diet; in 1698, when trade hit its peak, it accounted for just 
8.73%.  In most years, however, this percentage rarely reached over 4.5%, and even 
fell as low as 0.78% in 1696.  While these proteins could be supplemented with 
additional fish or turtle meat caught along the shallow shores of the island, local 
fishing was unlikely to provide much of an impact, as ‘fishing in Barbados [was] not  
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the best,’ and turtles had become a rare sight in Barbadian waters by the 1680s.
55
  
Instead, enslaved blacks had to produce most of their food locally on the island.  
Guinea corn and, to a lesser extent, Indian corn were the two most important 
local staples for the enslaved African population’s diet.  Most corn was grown on 
plantation fields specifically set aside for it, with some alternatively interspersed 
between sugarcane.  Local production, however, could be unreliable and was heavily 
influenced by both climatic and environmental conditions, as well as the enslaved 
African’s general disdain for the vegetable.
56
  In bad years, planters and farmers had 
to split a limited corn crop in order to feed both laborers and livestock, forcing up 
prices and making the valuable staple unaffordable to many.  The manager for the 
Codrington estate admitted that ‘It is the greatest misfortune in this Island that few 
Planters give [their enslaved Africans] a Belly full,’ as their population was often ‘so 
great and Corn so dear, that they can’t afford it.’
57
  Planters occasionally provided a 
variety of other foods that included yams, taro root, potatoes, and cassava, but these 
root vegetables were all similar in nature and provided little diversification in 
nutrients.   
Table 5.5 suggests a best case scenario for the enslaved, as this ‘ideal’ diet 
provided a laborer with three to four pounds of various local foods in addition to 0.43 
pounds of salt fish.  Yet, while high in protein and phosphorus, this group of 
provisions netted an individual just over 3,200 calories, a quantity far less than what 
he or she would have needed to maintain optimal health at the peak of growing 
season.  Besides its bland and boring nature, and the unrealistic likelihood of an 
individual consistently obtaining this much food on a daily basis, most of this fare  
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Table 5.5: Example of Average Enslaved African’s Diet with Basic Nutrients 
Nutriments Calories Protein (g) Fat (g) Calcium (mg) Phosphorus (mg) 
0.43 lb. Salt Fish 440 67 1 311 790 
1 Pint Corn meal 884 22 8 42 544 
1/2 lb. Yams 197 4 0 39 135 
1/2 lb. Taro 236 3 0 187 218 
1/2 lb. Bananas 193 2.5 0 18 59 
1/2 lb. Plantains 270 2.5 0 16 68 
1/4 Cup Molasses 225 0 0 170 26 
4 fl. oz. Rum 257 0 0 0 4.4 
2 Large Potatoes 556 14 0 80 418 
Totals 3,258 15 9 863 2,262.4 
Table 5.5: Kenneth F. Kiple, The Caribbean Slave: A Biological History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 78.  Kiple’s table does not specifically account for the Barbadian enslaved population, as it more 
generally compares the English and Spanish sugar islands.  I constructed this table to emulate a diet specific 
to one that might be found on Barbados. 
was marginally nutritious and would have resulted in nutrient deficiencies and 
general malnutrition.  With a diet based around fish and corn, the enslaved Africans 
would have received dangerously low levels of fat, thiamine, and vitamin A, low to 
very low quantities of niacin, riboflavin, and iron, and barely adequate levels of 
vitamin C and calcium.
58
  Furthermore, fish proteins are extremely unstable, and 
many of the essential amino acids likely broke down as the barreled fish sat for 
prolonged periods of time in the holds of ships traveling between Newfoundland and 
Barbados.  When the fish did arrive, it was ‘a mass of fetid matter’ and contained ‘as 
little nutrition as the brine in which they lie.’
59
  Thus, while Table 5.5 is not an 
exhaustive list of the different provisions available on Barbados, as it does not take 
into account some liquid calories or most fruits, it does suggest the types of food an 
enslaved African ate and how deficient this potential diet was in the nutrients needed 
to maintain basic health.  
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To help ameliorate this problem, and to limit their own expenditures, 
plantation owners across the island launched an initiative in the 1660s to give the 
enslaved the necessary time and resources to plant their own provisions and to fulfill 
a portion of their caloric needs.  This forced the enslaved Africans into becoming 
what Beckles called ‘petty proto-peasants,’ who were given little house spots of 
generally no more than 25 yards square to grow their needed provisions.
60
  As Felix 
Christian Spoeri, a Swiss physician who visited Barbados in 1661, described: ‘[in] 
each household the master assigns a parcel of land on which the slaves plant their 
food and from which they have to maintain themselves without burdening their 
master.’
61
  Some planters, however, resisted this innovation.  Thomas Tryon wrote in 
1684 that many would not allow the enslaved ‘any sufficient time to manure,’ 
forcing them to resort to planting ‘upon the Sabbath Day.’
62
  Others, however, 
recognized the immediate benefits, as it allowed Barbadians planters and farmers to 
limit their dependence on outside food sources and reduced overall expenditures on 
both imported and local provisions, while promoting greater island security.  Drax 
warned of the importance of this twice in his instructions, telling his factor that in 
order to protect against rebellion there ‘Must be greatt Care that they have plantation 
provision Enough,’ and later, ‘the Negro Must Not by any means Ewer want.’
63
   
In order to provide such large quantities of food, Drax required that his factor 
set aside three separate fields on his plantation for provisioning the unfree.  He gave 
the first to the enslaved to grow their own food while the second contained an array 
of different crops planted for the consumption of both white and black workers.  On 
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the latter, Henry Drax demanded that ‘Theire Most be Care tane to plantt all the 
ground you Can with Corn,’ which was ‘wery good for negros,’ and ‘when theire is 
no want of that Every Thing in the plantation will be fatt.’
64
  A third field was to 
function as a reserve supply, so that if a specific provision failed to grow as expected, 
there would be adequate amounts in storage to keep the workers fed.  Drax 
recommended to ‘have Constantly a reserve of 12 or 15 acres of Cossava for fear of 
the others fayling that being a certaine provision and will Ly four or five years in the 
ground and Still Improve.’  He further advised ‘yearly put some remote Caine pece 
att Drax hall into potatos which being welle trached Seldom fayls….’
65
  The smaller 
planters who could not afford to sacrifice separate fields for provisions often allowed 
the enslaved to intercrop their produce with growing sugar cane.  Others allowed 
their enslaved to hunt lobsters and crabs in the shallows nearby, while some black 
communities also raised their own livestock, keeping ‘one or two pigs and/or sheep 
or goats,’ and small numbers of ‘feathered stock of all kinds, including chickens, 
ducks, guinea fowl, pigeons, and geese.’  By the early 1700s, the enslaved owned so 
much livestock that they became the ‘essential contributors of meat and poultry’ to 
the island, even selling surplus animals to the white community.
66
   
Finally, many enslaved workers also participated in an internal marketing 
system that allowed them to sell the excess provisions they raised in return for small 
amounts of money or for other needed goods.  Playing a vital social, economic, and 
cultural function, these markets quickly became ‘Barbadian institutions,’ and a 
‘major device’ by which the enslaved ‘acquired cash or goods to satisfy a variety of 
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consumption needs, including additional foods to diversify their monotonous’ and 
nutritionally limited diets. This also gave many enslaved Africans the opportunity to 
own some small pieces of property and to travel across the island and partake in a 
social life that would have otherwise been far more restrictive.
 67
   They also 
benefitted white communities, as they were ‘essential for the urban population of 
Barbados,’ and allowed many of the indentured servants, enslaved blacks, and even 
free whites the opportunity to buy a wide variety of affordable foodstuffs.
68
  
Therefore, outside of some flour, occasional rice, basic vegetables, salt fish, and corn 
meal, planters expected the enslaved to provide their own produce and meat, while 
others tacitly allowed their unfree laborers to obtain many of their own necessities.  
While it seems unlikely that the enslaved could obtain all of their remaining 
nutritional requirements on their own, many found some provisions through their 
own vibrant local economies based upon the trading basic food allocations, raising 
poultry and livestock, and intensively cultivating the little plots of land that 
surrounded their huts with the intent to utilize some for subsistence, while trading the 
rest.  This resulted in a population that, while still always underfed, could at least 
partially sustain itself with an innovative combination of general self-production and 
a basic reliance on the island’s plantation owners.
69
 
When the data derived from the Returns for free whites, indentured servants, 
and enslaved blacks are aggregated together, the limitations of importing nutritional 
energy into Barbados become particularly evident.  Based on the conservative caloric  
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Table 5.6: Imported Calories as a Percentage of a 2,758 Calorie Diet 
Year %  Data Total Calories 
Calories: 
Person 





1680 100 10,757,040,000 445 16.13 83.87 
1681 80 6,754,279,500 280 10.15 89.85 
1682 100 16,391,537,000 679 24.62 75.38 
1684 100 11,331,601,000 469 17.01 82.99 
1685 100 15,519,845,000 643 23.31 76.69 
1686 100 13,399,609,500 555 20.12 79.88 
1687 80 12,943,431,000 536 19.43 80.57 
1688 75 13,857,689,500 574 20.81 79.19 
1690 60 4,862,714,000 201 7.29 92.71 
1691 100 17,238,153,500 714 25.89 74.11 
1695 50 2,711,547,000 138 5.00 95.00 
1696 100 11,614,606,000 612 22.19 77.81 
1697 100 8,266,091,500 419 15.19 84.81 
1698 100 17,971,528,500 912 33.07 66.93 
Avg. - 13,102,291,912 568 20.59 79.41 
Table 5.6: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1680-1698.  For this table, I combined the results from Table 1 and Table 
4 and divided them by the known 1684 population of 66,170 for 1680-1691 and the estimated population of 
54,000 for 1695-1698.  ‘Island-Produced Calories’ suggests the percentage of their nutritional energy the 
Barbadians locally attained for themselves.   
needs outlined above for each of the island’s three social and racial groups, 
Barbados’ 66,170 residents required an average of at least 2,758 calories per person 
per day.  As Table 5.6 shows, at no point during the nineteen years between 1680 and 
1698 did the Barbadians receive more than 33.07% of this total from imported 
provisions.  While Table 5.1 shows that the free white population was occasionally 
capable of purchasing 100% of their general energy needs from English and colonial 
markets, they only formed about 26% of the overall population and made a limited 
impact on the aggregate totals depicted in Table 5.6.  Instead, it was the tens of 
thousands of malnourished servants and enslaved blacks that had the greatest 
influence on the data.  1682, for example, represented the most successful year in 
terms of the tonnage of provisions landed and purchased during the pre-war period.  
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The average free white inhabitant had claim to approximately 2,205 calories per 
person per day.  In comparison, the indentured servants accessed approximately 700 
calories per person per day, while the enslaved black laborers attained 181.  When 
stretched across the entire population, the overall average for calories per person per 
day in 1682 equaled 679 (24.62%), a total that was not even enough to make up a 
quarter of the energy needed for a hard-working islander.  This, however, represented 
a peak moment and was not truly indicative of the rest of the decade, as each 
Barbadian received an average of only 520 imported calories per day (18.85%) from 
legal imports during the eight recorded pre-war years.   
The situation only deteriorated during the Nine Years War.  From 1689 
through 1697, with the entire island population receiving limited quantities of 
provisions from abroad, the average Barbadian struggled to attain even 15% of his or 
her calories from imports, with lows of as few as 201 calories (7.29%) for 60% of the 
year in 1690 and 138 calories (5.00%) for half of 1695.  Even during the last full year 
of the war, the Barbadians could only acquire 419 calories (15.19%) per person.  In 
fact, it took European peace, a smaller island population, the expansion of the 
English merchant marine, and a record high in imports for the colonists to even 
breach the 30% mark in 1698.   
Overall, the Returns suggest that the standard historiography has misjudged 
how most seventeenth-century Barbadians procured their provisions and, 
consequently, their nutritional energy.  Many scholars still present the late 1600s as a 
period when ‘planters and managers had grown sugar to the exclusion of all else’ and 
maintain that a ‘far more balanced and diversified plantation agriculture’ did not 
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emerge until the end of the eighteenth century.
70
  Yet, the records show that this was 
not the case.  By the 1680s and 1690s, both the white and black inhabitants of the 
island lived within a matured plantation society that did not legally import the 
majority of the provisions they consumed.
71
  Instead, a range of sources describe the 
islanders as surprisingly effective at producing an array of fruits, vegetables, liquors, 
and meats that released many from a complete reliance on the metropole for supplies.  
Indentured servants and enslaved blacks had become especially adept at partially 
provisioning themselves, as they received a fairly negligible amount of nutritional 
energy from salt fish, the only import that they regularly consumed.  Responsible for 
obtaining a majority of their calories on their own, they planted and maintained small 
gardens of basic root provisions, grew a variety of fruits, raised their own livestock, 
caught local marine life of the coast, and created a widespread and elaborate system 
of underground markets that became a ubiquitous part of island life and that 
eventually represented an important source of food for all island groups.  Moreover, 
while the free white population received more of its calories from abroad than the 
island’s other two groups, they still only received an average of 80.80% per year, 
meaning that even some of the island’s wealthiest inhabitants were responsible for 
securing a fifth of their own calories, most of which would have likely also been 
locally produced in the fields, trees, pens, and stills of neighboring planters and 
farmers. 
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Thus, the Barbadians did not fit into the classic mercantilist narrative of an 
English West Indian plantation society that single-mindedly produced sugar while 
remaining reliant on a distant metropole for goods and provisions.  Currently, some 
historians are beginning to see past this archaic interpretation and to explore the 
complexity of the island’s agricultural past.  J.R. McNeil maintains that for most 
English Caribbean societies ‘food (that is their energy) came from gardens, fields, 
and fisheries on and around the plantation,’ and that most imported provisions tended 
to be seen as supplements to their diet.
72
  Moore takes this even further by 
specifically describing Barbados as a ‘complex of economic activities, from slave-
trading to cattle-ranching to shipbuilding to foodstuff agriculture.’
73
  This varied 
nature of Barbadian food production, in combination with its frequent imports, 
created a unique situation for the island in relation to the rest of the Caribbean world, 
as it maintained, according to the abolitionist James Stephens, an uncommon ‘middle 
character’ when it came to provisioning its population.
74
   
Most Caribbean islands generally fit into one of two distinct patterns of 
supply.  Those living in either larger English-held islands, such as Jamaica, or in 
French and Spanish colonies actively attempted to produce the majority of the 
foodstuffs they consumed.  With ample space and resources, they could devote 
hundreds of acres per plantation to vegetable provisions and livestock grazing.  In 
1688, for example, Jamaican merchants, according to Richard Bean’s calculations, 
imported just under eight billion calories from abroad, while those on Barbados 
brought in a projected 18.5 billion.  Since most imported calories went to white 
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planters, these totals break down to averages of 2,614 imported cpd for each of 
Barbados’ 17,000 free white inhabitants compared to only 2,060 imported cpd for 
Jamaica’s 10,000.  Thus, white Barbadians had access to almost 600 more imported 
calories each day, which suggests that the island relied more much more heavily on 
imports than a large English island such as Jamaica.
75
   
However, smaller islands, such as the English Leeward Islands or those 
controlled by the Dutch, did not have the luxuries of space or abundant resources and 
consequently developed a much greater dependence on imports.  Barbados, at only 
166 square miles, should have fit within this latter description, and most of the 
traditional mercantilist historians have described its economic habits as if under the 
assumption that it did.  Yet, the importation data from the Returns prove that 
Barbados did not adequately fit within either model, as its large overall population 
meant that it was infeasible to import the food needed to support it, while its small 
size prohibited the islanders from ever becoming completely self-sufficient.  Thus, 
the island’s 66,170 settlers had to implement a system that incorporated both 
methods of supply within what became a diversified agricultural society.  This gave 
the island its own distinct ‘middle character’ by the 1680s and 1690s that ultimately 
allowed for the creation of a unique and creolized diet that mixed English meats with 
American vegetables and Caribbean fruits for a fare that was different from 
anywhere else in the world.
76
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Part II:  Importing Animal Energy  
The Barbadians have always shared their island with a substantial animal 
population, few of which are actually indigenous to the Caribbean. When the original 
settlers first arrived at Barbados in the late 1620s, they found it already heavily 
populated by enormous feral hogs, left behind by the Spanish, which had grown fat 
off of the abundant flora and made for an excellent early source of protein.  Twenty 
years later, the range and variety of locally produced meat available on the island had 
greatly expanded.  Ligon described the numerous farm animals he consumed, and the 
quality of their meat, during his visit in the late 1640s:  ‘next to Swines-flesh in 
goodnesse, are Turkies, large, fat, and full of gravie. Next to them, Pullen or 
Donghill-foule· and last of all, Muscovia-Ducks, which being larded with the fat of 
this Porke…are an excellent bak'd-meat. All these, with…Chickens, we eat.’ 
Furthermore, Ligon also recalled the planters ‘breeding Hoggs, Sheep, Goats, Cattle, 
and Poultry, to furnish the rest of the Iland, that want those Commodities.’
77
  Father 
Biet, who attended numerous feasts hosted by the elite during his travels, describes 
his typical meal:  ‘At these feasts there is nothing lacking in the ways of meats which 
are found in the country, such as suckling pigs, turkey hens, capons, chickens, and 
wood pigeons…. They lack no other meats and have all sorts of fowl with which 
their farm yards are filled….Very good mutton is eaten there.’
78
  Spoeri also noted 
the quality of the meat on the island, especially from local goats: ‘the goats are a 
particular kind and remain quite small, but their meat is first-rate.’
 79
  
By 1680, however, Barbadian planters and farmers used the local livestock 
for far more than just consumption, as they formed an integral part of the agricultural  
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Table 5.7:  Animals Imported into Barbados, 1681-1698 
Year Sheep Hogs Cattle Turkeys Fowl Horses Asses 
1681 6 0 0 0 0 301 363 
1682 6 0 4 0 0 937 607 
1684 518 195 89 154 200 498 300 
1685 364 106 122 148 60 401 130 
1686 97 148 38 86 0 499 532 
1687 112 100 117 22 0 357 679 
1688 198 0 107 0 0 428 291 
1689 60 0 5 0 0 98 0 
1690 9 0 0 0 0 83 0 
1691 0 0 1 0 0 211 0 
1695 0 0 0 0 0 124 177 
1696 0 0 0 0 0 319 119 
1697 0 0 0 0 0 215 181 
1698 0 0 8 0 0 435 284 
Totals 1,370 549 499 388 260 4,906 3,663 
Avg. 98 39 36 29 19 350 262 
Table 5.7: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1681-1698.  Mules are not included in this table, as the records show 
that Barbadians only purchased one in 1686 and six in 1687.  They also imported a single deer in 1687. 
process.  Many sugar planters, especially before the 1670s, used horses and cattle to 
provide the energy that turned the cane-crushing rollers in the mills.
80
  Provision 
farmers would have also used horses and cattle as draught animals, relying on them 
to help sow their fields with corn, potatoes, and cassava.  These two animals, along 
with assinegoes, were also responsible for transporting goods across the island.  The 
durable, hard-hooved assinegoes were especially effective at clambering over the 
uneven, hilly terrain of the island’s east coast.  Finally, all animals produced valuable 
dung that was routinely collected for use as fertilizer on the increasingly infertile 
soil.  Thus, their role on the island was a vital one and planters needed animals that  
could both provide the necessary protein that made life on a Caribbean island 
possible and the labor that allowed for the profitable production of sugar. 
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Throughout the 1680s and 1690s, the Returns show that Barbadian planters 
and farmers imported large numbers of animals from friendly ports throughout the 
trans-Atlantic world and that Barbados was, consequently, an island bristling with 
animal life.  Table 5.7 shows that merchants shipped 10,270 animals to the island 
within the eighteen years between 1681 and 1698.  The majority of these were for 
sugar production purposes, as horses (4,906) and assinegoes (3,663) made up about 
75% of all arrivals.  Horses were the most important animals on the island, serving as 
‘the sinews of a plantation.’
81
  They effectively filled numerous roles, including the 
transportation of goods and people across the island and provided the energy needed 
to crush sugarcane.   
The planters generally preferred utilizing horses in their mills, as they 
produced the greatest amounts of power and would have been able to crush more 
cane than the mule (0.7 Horse power), bull (0.75 H.P.), cow (0.4 H.P.), or undersized 
donkey (0.4 H.P.).82  It was this occupation, though, that forced the Barbadian 
planters into continuously buying the animal, as driving the mills was a particularly 
onerous task that came to ‘destroy so many horses that it begors the planters.’
83
 Their 
high death rates, when combined with the fact that they tended to reproduce less 
frequently in the tropics, made it uneconomical for the planters to breed horses in any 
capacity.  Instead, they imported hundreds on a yearly basis to make up for the 
deficits caused by their exploitation.  The horse trade originated from a variety of 
different ports, with the majority arriving from Virginia, New England, and Rhode  
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Table 5.8: Livestock Inventoried in a Sample of Wills and Deeds, 1681-1695 
Owner Year Parish Acres Cattle Asses Horses Pigs Sheep 
William Robinson - St. Michael's 186 12 5 2 Yes Yes 
Timothy Mascoll 1681 - - 18 NA 7 23 39 
John Barwick 1682 St. Thomas 256 29 NA 5 23 NA 
Thomas Spiar 1682 St. Philip's 271 41 6 NA NA NA 
Henry Evans 1682 St. George's  106 13 2 5 26 NA 
Richard Barrett 1683 St. John's 80 9 NA 3 NA 19 
Anne Searle 1683 Christ Church 400 30 18 3 26 NA 
Elizabeth Gritton  1683 St. Michael's  56 Yes NA 2 15 20 
Nicholas Prideaux 1683 St. Michael's - 18 5 2 Yes Yes 
William Dyer 1684 St. James 317 36 
 
7 30 47 
Philip Price 1684 St. Philip's 244 33 NA NA 7 33 
Philip Checke 1684 St. Joseph's 240 2 5 NA 20 4 
Michael Wiley 1687 St. George's 10 2 NA 2 NA NA 
Sarah Tode 1690 St. John's 78 14 NA 3 16 9 
Richard Morris 1691 St. John's 250 7 Yes 1 Yes NA 
Hilliard Holdip 1691 St. George - 58 NA 11 44 110 
Michael Terrell 1691 St. Lucy's 184 1 NA NA 20 35 
Thomas Richards 1692 St. James 40 14 1 1 1 4 
Nathaniel Blackiston 1694 St. Andrew's 200 33 2 2 32 17 
Thomas Humphrey 1695 St. Philip's 250 20 NA 5 15 NA 
Ferdinando Gorges 1695 St. John's 331 31 NA NA 13 24 
John Cantrell 1695 St. Thomas 24 2 3 3 NA 12 
         
Totals - - 3,523 423 47 64 311 373 
Averages - - 185.4 19 2 3 14 17 
Table 5.8: BDA, RB 3/12, 3/13, 3/16, 3/18, 3/20, 6/13.  While I looked at hundreds of individual wills and 
deeds for the entire twenty-year period between 1680 and 1700, only a small percentage included 
inventories.  If an inventory did not list a specific animal, I marked this in the table with a ‘NA.’  Other 
inventories listed that a specific animal was present, but did not include an exact number.  This is denoted by 
a ‘Yes.’  Therefore, the overall totals calculated in this table should be higher than the number given. 
Island, while smaller numbers made the trans-Atlantic journey from England and 
Ireland.
84
   
During the 1680s, an average of just under 500 horses arrived each year, with 
a high of 937 in 1682.  Interestingly, the Nine Years War had little effect upon their 
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importation.  While other animals disappeared entirely from island markets, the horse 
trade instead shifted to more local ports-of-origin.  Even with this resulting in a large 
decrease in the numbers sent to the island, Barbadian markets still received 211 
horses in 1691, 319 in 1696, and 215 in 1697.  The inventories from a small 
sampling of hundreds of wills, organized in Table 5.8, show the consistent 
prevalence of horses on Barbados, with 22 plantations owning a total of 64 horses, or 
about three per household.  The wealthiest planters in the sample, such as William 
Dyer or Hilliard Holdip, possessed the most, as these two men maintained seven and 
eleven respectively on their extensive plantations.  Horses, however, were not simply 
owned by the rich, as most small farmers also had at least one.  Michael Wiley, the 
smallest landholder in Table 5.8 with only ten acres, kept two horses and John 
Cantrell, who worked 24 acres, had three, indicating that they were a necessity for 
farms, as well as plantations. 
Cattle held a similarly important place within the Barbadian economy.  Most 
of the 382 heads of imported cattle would have been used, like horses, to either pull 
material around the island or to crush sugarcane.  Cattle typically came from 
Bermuda, with a smaller number arriving from the mainland colonies.  In times of 
peace, they came to Barbados in large quantities; merchants landed over one hundred 
in both 1685 and 1688.  But, unlike horses, the importation of cattle almost 
completely ceased once the Nine Years War broke out.  The comparatively small 
overall numbers of cattle imported into the island is surprising, as planters considered 
them to be almost as valuable as horses and owned them in greater numbers.  The 22 
landowners in Table 5.8, for example, maintained a total of 423 cattle among them, 
for an average of 19 per plantation or farm.  Importantly, all planters and farmers 
298 
from the sample, no matter what their acreage, had at least one, with the largest 
landowners owning over 30.  Thus, they appear to have been far more abundant 
throughout Barbados than the Returns suggest.   
The likely reason for this was that planters and farmers raised most of their 
cattle locally on the island.  One way to test this hypothesis is to calculate how many 
horses and cattle the Barbadians imported into the island based on the standard 
minimums required to successfully run a sugar plantation.  Dalby Thomas maintains 
that each planter would need five or six horses and eight cattle per 100 acres of 
cultivated cane fields.  The island had approximately 89,306 acres in various forms 
of cultivation by 1684, 40% of which was actually planted in sugar at any one time, 
with perhaps another 10% planted in provisions.
85
  Thus, the island would 
theoretically require 4,465 to 5,358 horses and 7,144 cattle to live on the island.  
Based on the totals in Table 5.7, the 4,549 horses that the Barbadians bought 
adequately covered the lower end of this estimate, implying that the islanders 
imported enough of this animal to meet their needs during this period.  For cattle, 
however, Table 5.7 depicts a very different story.  As planters only purchased 382 
cattle from 1681-1698, a mere 5.35% of the number needed to effectively run the 
island’s plantations, it is unlikely that importation was their only source of supply, as 
the few arrivals would have struggled to keep pace with natural mortality rates.  
Inventories offer further support for the localized reproduction of cattle, with some 
specifically listing the different ages and sexes present on a plantation.  Thomas 
                                                          
85
 Dalby Thomas provides the ratio of cows and horses per 100 acres that I used in my calculations in 
his 1690 pamphlet.  By using these ratios and the known cultivated acreage of the island from the 
1684 census (89,306), I can calculate how many horses and cattle were ideally needed on the farms 
and plantations of Barbados.  Since sugar plantations required more animal labor than provision 
farms, these numbers are only suggestive and are meant to prove planters’ breeding habits.  NLC, 
Ayers MS 827 and Thomas, West Indian, 15. 
299 
Spiar, for example, owned 20 adult and three young bulls, seven cows, two old cows, 
three young calves, one old bald mare, and five oxen.  Anne Searle’s inventory lists 
an undisclosed number of working bulls, nine oxen, eight cows, three heifers, eight 
yearling bulls, and two young bull calves.
86
  The wide range of ages and the presence 
of both sexes suggest that breeding did take place on Barbadian plantations.  Thus, it 
is logical to conclude that the islanders appear to have raised most of their cattle on 
Barbados, as they likely needed too many to make buying them from abroad cost 
effective.   
Sheep also proved to be a popular livestock option in Barbados, with many 
planters owning at least a few by the 1680s and 1690s.  Already present by the late 
1640s, Ligon recalled seeing two different species on the island.  The first were from  
Europe, and ‘do not like well the pasture, being very unfit for them…they never are 
fat, and…their flesh when we tried any of them, had a very faint taste, so that I do 
not think they are fit to be bred or kept in [Barbados].’  The second species was 
‘brought from Guinny and Binny,’ but were considered strange by planters because 
they had ‘haire growing on them, instead of wool,’ more ‘like Goates then sheep.’
87
  
The white Barbadians disliked both types, as the European breed frequently fell ill 
and provided tasteless meat, while those from Africa were small and seen as bizarre.  
Instead, some intrepid islanders began to experiment with crossbreeding the two 
species in an attempt to create an animal that had the best qualities of each.  The 
result was the Barbados Blackbelly, a hair-covered sheep well adapted to the hot 
weather of the southeastern Caribbean.  It was also larger in size than the standard 
African species, reaching average weights of 106 pounds for a ewe and 125 pounds 
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  Developed in the late seventeenth-century, this sheep was already 
prevalent by 1700, and the only species present on the island by 1750.   Griffith 
Hughes’ natural history from that year refers exclusively to the Blackbelly, 
describing it as being ‘hairy like goats,’ and ‘the sheep that are chiefly bred here,’ 
while making no reference to the presence of any other breeds.
89
     
 Before the Blackbelly became the prominent species of sheep on Barbados, 
many continued to import the European version to the island during the 1680s.  After 
horses and assinegoes, the Returns show sheep to be the next most popular animal.  
Planters bought 1,370 overall, and as many as 578 in a single year.  Most seem to 
have been bred in other Caribbean locations, with a majority of the sheep coming 
from the nearby islands of Antigua and Barbuda, with a smaller number coming from 
mainland colonies like Rhode Island.  As there was little need for woolen clothing in 
the tropics, the Barbadians primarily kept sheep as a source of dung and food, 
providing fresh mutton to a population that could only infrequently import this meat.  
The inventories sampled in Table 5.8 show how prevalent the ownership of sheep 
was amongst both elite planters and smaller provision farmers.  Out of the 40 
examples included in this study, 15 (38%) specify the ownership of sheep.  
Interestingly, sheep seem to appear most frequently on farms of less than 100 acres 
in size, with five out of the six such landholders (83%) owning at least four sheep, 
compared to 10 examples from the 15 plantations larger than 100 acres (67%).  John 
Cantrell, for example, had 12 sheep roaming his 24-acre farm, while Elizabeth 
Gritton had 20 on her 56-acre homestead and Richard Barret had 19 on his 80-acre 
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plantation.  Larger planters, however, often owned even greater numbers of sheep, 
with Hilliard Holdip having 110, William Dyer 47, and Michael Terrell 35.      
Domesticated swine represented another important source of native protein 
for Barbadian planters and farmers.  By the end of the 1630s, the English had hunted 
the ‘native’ wild boars  into extinction and replaced them with imported 
domesticated pigs: ‘We have here in abundance, [hogs] but not wild or loose, for if 
they were they would do more harm then their bodies are worth; they are enclos’d, 
and every man knows his own.’
90
  As Table 5.8 shows, even more farmers and 
planters owned pigs than sheep, with 18 out of the 22 Barbadian plantations 
represented keeping at least one pig, although larger numbers was the norm, as most 
had 15 to 20 and the wealthiest 30 to 45.  Some Barbadians continued to import 
swine, as Table 5.8 shows that islanders purchased 382 of them over a three-year 
period between 1684 and 1686.  Aside from this brief splurge in the mid-1680s, 
however, merchants did not regularly bring swine to Barbados.  Instead, planters and 
farmers likely bred and consumed their own.  This would have kept population 
numbers up and would have explained the presence of the different ages and sexes of 
pigs on many farms and plantations.  
Merchants also carried to Barbados small numbers of turkeys, ducks, pigeons, 
fowl, cats, dogs, and other animals requested by the planters.
91
  The Returns disclose 
that merchants shipped 388 turkeys and 260 fowl to Barbadian markets between 
1684 and 1686.  The inventories categorized in Table 5.9 also exhibit a variety of 
smaller animals that made up the island’s livestock population.  Michael Terrill  
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Table 5.9: Additional Livestock in a Sample of Deeds and Wills, 1682-1695 
Name of Seller Date Parish Acres 
Evidence of Additional 
Animals 
Thomas Spiar 1682 St. Philip's 271 Turkey Perch and Duck House 
Anne Searle 1683 Christ Church 400 10 Turkeys, a pigeon house 
Philip Price 1684 St. Philip's 244 
A flock (60) of pidgeons, a 
pond with scale fish 
Philip Checke 1684 St. Joseph's 240 
A Parcell of ducks and dunghill 
fowls, 2 dogs 
Michael Wiley 1687 St. George's 10 A hen house 
Michael Terrell 1691 St. Lucy's 184 
Poultry of all sorts, a 
convenient quality 
Nathaniel Blackiston 1694 St. Andrew's 200 Pidgeon House 
Thomas Humphrey 1695 St. Philip's 250 
Some few Ducks, fowls, and 
rabbits 
Table 5.9: BDA, RB 3/12, 3/13, 3/16, 3/18, 3/20, 6/13, 1680-1695. 
owned ‘a convenient quantity’ of ‘Poultry of all sorts,’ while Thomas Humphrey had 
‘Some few Ducks, fowls, and rabbits,’ and Philip Checke maintained ‘A Parcell of 
ducks, dunghill fowls, and two dogs.’  Others, like Philip Price, kept flocks of as 
many as 60 pigeons, and Thomas Spiar built both a turkey perch and duck house on 
his plantation.  Finally, Henry Drax owned a variety of animals that included 
‘sheeps, hogs, turekeys, Dung hill fouls, Ducks, pigons, and Rabbets,’ all of which 
were to serve as provisions.
92
   
Thus, by the 1680s and 1690s, livestock formed an integral part of Barbadian 
life, as planters and farmers owned a variety of animals that provided energy to the 
islanders, whether by working in the fields or providing a valuable source of fresh 
meat.  Handler, in a study on plantation production habits, found over 12,000 skeletal 
specimens of fauna on numerous different plantations across Barbados, confirming 
that Barbadian planters and farmers bred and ate huge quantities of fresh local 
livestock and poultry.  Sheep and goats appeared to be the two most consumed 
animals on the island, equaling 25% of the remains, while pigs accounted for another 
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21%.  The other 54% of the bones represented a variety of different animals, 
including assorted poultry, rabbit, and, in rare cases, cattle.
93
  With a little 
forethought and planning, many planters and farmers could breed enough animals to 
free themselves from relying on England or nearby colonies for their protein, and 
becoming increasingly self-sufficient in the process.   
The only drawback to such a large animal population, however, was that it 
also required an enormous amount of caloric energy in its own right.  According to 
Paolo Malanima, the average animal consumed between 2,870 k/cal. and 4,500 k/cal. 
of fodder per day.
94
  Using the lower end of this estimate and applying it to only the 
number of animals imported to the island between 1680 and 1698, Barbados’ 
livestock would require almost 10.8 billion calories per year, most of which would 
have come from corn.   The Returns, however, show that the Barbadians imported 
just under 6.7 billion calories for the entire period.
95
   This meant that the vast 
majority of the fodder consumed by the animal population also needed to be 
produced locally, requiring ever larger expenditures of time, money, and human 
energy in the process.  Yet, the islanders inevitably decided that these costs were 
worth it, as the contributions that animals made to Barbadian society caused them to 
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Part III: The Islanders’ Battle against Declining Soil Fertility, 1680-1700 
For many planters, decreasing soil fertility defined the plantation experience 
in the late-seventeenth century, greatly hindering their consistent production of both 
provisions and sugar. This was not a new problem on Barbados, as planters had 
complained of decreasing crop yields since the sugar industry’s earliest days.  In 
1661, for example, the Council sent a letter to London explaining their plight: ‘The 
land is much poorer, and makes much less sugar than heretofore, and much worse; 
the people generally poor and vainglorious, making ostentation of riches which they 
have not.’96  By the 1680s, the issue had become a legitimate crisis.  In 1687, for 
example, the General Assembly and Council came together to compose a letter for 
King James II that singled out increasing infertility as the era’s greatest problem, 
pointing out that ‘many Estates...now disabled from making Sugar and become 
reduced into meer Pastures,’ now produce ‘but a poor Income unto the Owner.’97   
Another planter claimed that the island was little more than ‘barren, rocky 
gullies, runaway-land, [and] wasteland’ and ‘much worn out, and not so Fertile as it 
was.’98  A decade later, the Council and Assembly maintained that the soil had 
further deteriorated.  In a letter sent back to England, they complained that ‘Our land, 
by long tillage and being every year opened and exposed to the violent heat of the 
sun, is become so barren that it will not produce sugar-cane unless forced 
by…extraordinary husbandry and labour.’  Furthermore, ‘many of the best 
plantations, which once made great quantities of sugar, now make little or none, and 
near fifty other plantations are ruined and discontinued,’ with ‘one third of the sugar- 
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Table 5.10: Tons of Sugar Produced Per Enslaved African, 1683-1700 
Year Sugar Exported Enslaved Population Tons of Sugar/Slave 
1681 7,350 41,866 0.18 
1682 11,301 43,534 0.26 
1683 c. 14,000 46,851 0.30 
1688 c. 1,928 53,915 0.04 
1691 11,004 49,265 0.22 
1696 9,854 41,342 0.24 
1697 5,475 41,686 0.13 
1698 20,190 43,796 0.46 
1699 11,888 45,791 0.26 
1700 15,399 48,546 0.32 
    
Average 10,839 45,659 0.24 
Table 5.10: For this table, I used the exportation totals already presented in Tables 3 and 6 from Chapter 4 
and divided it by the total enslaved population as listed in Table 8 from Chapter 3. It is understood that not all 
enslaved Africans worked in sugar producing activities, but my figures on the black population are likely to be 
much lower than reality due those born on the island or that arrived through illicit means. 
cane land lies waste and over-run with weeds.’99  Thus, it was an inevitable truth for 
most Barbadians that the soil simply could not produce sugarcane as readily as it 
once did.  In the late 1640s, for example, Richard Ligon reported that ‘an acre of 
good Canes will yield 4,000 pound weight of Sugar, and none will yield lesse then 
2,000 weight.’  By 1690, however, Dalby Thomas predicted that an acre on a  




The statistics from this era, however, describe very different conditions, as 
planter claims of soil infertility are juxtaposed with rising exports of sugar that 
surged to record highs by the end of the 1690s.  For the ten years represented in 
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Table 5.10, the average quantity of sugar exported was 10,839 tons, produced by 
approximately 45,659 enslaved men and women.  This gives a period average of 0.24 
tons of sugar produced per enslaved worker, a number that matches or exceeds the 
productivity levels of other post-boom sugar producers and shows that Barbadian 
planters could still effectively manufacture sugar regardless of island conditions.101  
In fact, the total tonnage of sugar produced per year throughout the 1680s and  
1690s—except for 1688 and 1697—easily top the best years from pre-1670.102     
After over thirty to forty years of constant sugarcane production, the ability to 
continue to yield such large crops would have been an impossible task if the planters 
had not realized that they needed to adapt themselves to their environmental reality 
and innovate new methodologies that would allow for increased control and 
manipulation of their natural world.  Instead of reaping what the landscape allowed 
them to sow, they forced nature to bend to their entrepreneurial will. To do this, 
Barbadian planters pioneered a variety of planting techniques that effectively solved 
some of the island’s infertility problems and came to be fixtures of the greater 
plantation regime.  Some changes consisted of small, simple tweaks in the growing 
cycle that helped to offset the initial signs of soil infertility.  By 1667, for example, 
planters had extended the growth period of planted canes from fifteen to eighteen 
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months in an attempt to give the plant more time to mature and for the roots to soak 
up additional minerals.   
The two most important innovations, however, included the increased use of 
manure to offset the soil’s exhausted nutrients and the development of the cane 
holing approach to planting.  The earlier of these two modifications was the 
consistent use of a nutrient-rich manure to artificially nourish and reenergize the 
island’s depleted soil.  The concept behind manuring was not new to the island’s 
planters, as most Europeans already understood its agricultural benefits.  The 
Barbadian planters and farmers, however, were the first to introduce this technique to 
the Caribbean and were heavily manuring their own fields by the 1670s.  Henry Drax 
wrote in 1679, ‘Now theire is no Producing good Canes withoutt dunging every 
holle.  It Most be one of your Cheifestt Cares.’103  Initially, the preferred manure 
consisted of the marl and mould culled from local gullies.  The planters quickly 
learned, though, that this supply was finite and not as effective as other equally 
available types.  Perhaps the most useful was animal dung, mainly produced by the 
large numbers of cattle that the planters kept on the island.  Cattle waste introduced 
valuable nitrogen, phosphoric acid, and potash to the ground, making the soil 
healthier and more nutrient-rich.104   
Some planters, however, had worked together to invent a unique recipe from 
local waste products that was famous for its fertility and became the standard product 
used throughout the West Indies.  For the base of this mixture, they collected dung 
from their cattle, pigs, and horses.  To this, they added large quantities of random 
plantation waste materials, including extra vegetables and plant matter, molasses, and 
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bagasse that combined to form a potent and effective blend.  Henry Drax created his 
own specific recipe that ‘by my Certaine Experience I know to be Exelent Manure.’  
To make this, Drax had a pile of cattle and pig dung from his stables laid over a 
draining hole from his still house.  To this he added both the ashes of burned cane 
and trash, and ‘let into itt the liqwor from the Still when no longer fit to be Returned 
into the Cistrons.’  When the mixture was completely saturated, he let it sit for two 
months before being loaded into carts for transportation to his fields.105  For distant 
fields far from the animal sties, Drax also recommended building a kiln, where lime 
could be burned and its ashes used as another form of fertilizer.106   
Having two forms of effective fertilizer was useful for the elite planters, as by 
the 1680s and 1690s the soil required huge quantities in order to produce good crops.  
Edwin Stede and Edward Littleton both suggested that a smart planter would have 
his enslaved workers spread 30 baskets of dung on each acre of land.
107
  If an 
enslaved African could carry 50 pounds worth of dung per basket, each acre of land 
therefore required 1,500 pounds of manure to properly fertilize a field.  If this was 
done at least two times a year, as Drax recommended, then the quantities needed rose 
to approximately 3,000 pounds per acre.  For a hypothetical 100-acre plantation, with 
40 acres set aside to grow cane, planters needed 60 tons of manure in order to 
fertilize their fields twice annually.  Large planters would have required far more 
than this, though, as Henry Drax’s 200 planted acres would have theoretically needed 
300 tons of manure.  The cost of dunging such vast estates could be exorbitant.  An 
anonymous pamphleteer claimed that most plantation owners allowed at least £10 
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per acre for purchasing manure.  This means that the aforementioned hypothetical 
planter would be spending £400 a year on manure, while a planter of Drax’s 
significance would have had to invest nearly £2,000, neither of which were 
reasonable expenditures if one hoped to turn a profit.108  Thus, the nature of 
Barbados’ soil was limiting for many planters, as its infertility proved costly for most 
to overcome, making its self-production a necessity if a plantation was to remain 
profitable into the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
 After the expanded use of dung, the second important innovation developed 
by Barbadian planters was the cane-hole planting technique.  Created in the late 
1690s and early 1700s as an alternative to the trench system of agriculture that was 
then widely in use, it effectively cut down on soil erosion and made it easier to 
properly care for each crop.109  Additional advantages to the system included regular 
spacing that allowed for a more even distribution of manure, greater protection from 
strong surface winds, and an increased retention of soil moisture that resulted in 
improved crops during dry seasons. While beneficial to the preservation of the 
island’s soil, the system itself required a huge amount of labor to clear and prepare a 
plantation, with planters forcing their enslaved workers to bore 60 to 100 holes per 
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day.  For each individual cane, the enslaved would dig out a single six-inch crevice 
in the middle of a square that was between two to three feet long on each side and 
five to six inches deep.  This shallow pit retained the soil and prevented erosion 
regardless of weather or terrain.  Workers then piled up the displaced earth next to 
the square to create a raised area of land called the ‘straight bank,’ which mimicked 
the two to three foot length of the adjacent square, but had a width of five feet to 
create separation between two plants. Once the holing process was complete, 
plantation owners would use both the land between two cane squares, called the 
‘saddle,’ and the land between two straight banks, called the ‘square,’ to grow 
additional provision crops, such as taro, yams, corn, or peas.  Moreover, the design 
of the cane squares was effective enough to again support ratooning, allowing some 
planters to produce quality crops for two consecutive years without replanting.110  
Thus, the cane hole system also allowed for a huge increase in the production of 
sugar, as well as provision crops, which helped planters achieve greater yields, 
increased nutritional self-production, and, consequently, helped to maintain a 
healthier and better-fed population.  
By the end of the seventeenth century, Barbados was in a precarious 
environmental position, as its soil was worn out and heavily eroded through years of 
rampant exploitation and abuse.  As the first Caribbean island to produce sugar, 
planters had been growing great quantities of the cash crop for almost 35 years by 
1680 and the soil had lost the initial fecundity that had allowed early producers to 
generate such incredible wealth.  Thus, Barbadian planters and farmers  had to begin 
to innovate and experiment with different planting methodologies and farming  
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Table 5.11: Sugar Sent to London from the English Caribbean, 1697-1720 
Year Barbados Jamaica Antigua Nevis Yearly Totals % Barb. 
1697 12,236.12 1,995.83 1,856.55 1,458.70 18,599.56 65.79 
1698 13,615.50 6,414.01 2,272.31 2,949.13 26,485.70 51.41 
1699 10,239.01 4,890.65 4,003.89 3,307.03 23,438.71 43.68 
1700 13,545.84 5,272.59 2,955.41 3,464.47 26,903.02 50.35 
1701 10,119.55 5,704.94 2,910.59 3,349.20 24,116.94 41.96 
1702 3,465.46 3,160.48 3,258.03 2,694.83 13,950.81 24.84 
1703 8,114.19 5,323.30 3,795.06 3,174.26 21,661.57 37.46 
1704 5,068 5,315.97 2,516.70 2,760.96 16,770.76 30.22 
1705 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1706 10,966.77 4,635.05 977.60 654.07 18,187.06 60.30 
1707 7,165.80 6,203.33 6,203.26 748.70 21,758.66 32.93 
1708 8,121.34 6,805.92 2,495.10 874.52 19,457.30 41.74 
1709 9,095.90 6,624.51 3,627.25 369.48 20,969.44 43.38 
1710 8,458.06 6,202.09 6,301.32 3,757.95 27,367.67 30.91 
1711 9,411.40 5,479.51 1,587.08 1,227.15 19,444.48 48.40 
1712 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1713 6,117.20 7,343.17 6,618.85 3,999.25 27,467.59 22.27 
1714 11,364.09 7,097.25 4,892.08 2,432.18 28,257.16 40.22 
1715 14,569.17 7,154.03 6,130.11 3,253.15 34,309.09 42.46 
1716 11,876.47 9,319.88 6,792.08 3,649.26 33,136.07 35.84 
1717 14,119.14 11,761.90 7,598.75 2,942.18 42,087.51 33.55 
1718 12,759.11 11,499.23 2,217.39 1,095.56 31,191.73 40.91 
1719 6,418.42 8,455.85 6,390.47 2,726.60 30,009.94 21.39 
1720 11,544.84 11,736.24 6,339.04 2,744.36 39,020.42 29.59 
       Totals 218,391.38 148,395.73 91,738.92 53,632.99 564,591.19 38.68 
Table 5.11: TNA, Cust. 3/1-3/21, 167-1720.  These records only represent the export trade between four 
English Caribbean islands and a combination of London and the English outports.  Exports shipped from both 
Montserrat and St. Christopher’s have been removed from this table due to space restrictions, as they are the 
two smallest producers of sugar.  Their annual figures, however, are included in the ‘yearly totals.’ 
techniques in an effort to maintain their place as the most important and profitable 
colony in the English West Indies.  At first, their efforts were successful, as the 
adoption of a new agricultural methodology and the application of Old World 
farming techniques rejuvenated the island’s soil and gave many planters a temporary 
reprieve that allowed them to remain at the forefront of West Indian sugar production 
for another three decades.   
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However, with the dawning of the eighteenth-century, Barbadian planters and 
merchants realized that they could not continue to control 60% of England’s sugar 
market as they had done in the 1680s, a value that was worth more than the 
combined total domestic exports from all the mainland North American colonies.111  
Table 5.11 shows, for example, that Barbadian planters and merchants exported an 
average of 9,247.04 tons of sugar per year to England between 1697 and 1710, 
equaling 42.98% of the sugar that reached the domestic market.  This percentage 
easily surpassed the contributions from other English sugar islands in the Caribbean, 
with Barbados’ totals over 10% more than the four Leeward Islands combined 
(32.50%) and 18% more than Jamaica (24.51%).    
 After 1710, however, the younger sugar producers in the region began to 
approach Barbados’ high yields and gained control of an increasingly large 
percentage of the market.  Interestingly, the Barbadian planters, with vast experience 
at fending off the natural decline of their plantations, while enhancing the 
productivity of their soil and, became even more productive, with their average yield 
for the ten year period between 1711 and 1720 actually exceeding that from the 
decade before, as the islanders now grew over 10,908.87 tons per year.  Yet, the 
Barbadians’ were disappointingly losing ground in England’s sugar trade.  During 
the 1710s, Barbados’ overall market share dropped to 34.46%, and, while they still 
remained ahead of Jamaica’s 28.02%, fell behind the Leeward Island’s combined 
total of 37.52%.  Even though they still produced more sugar than any other 
individual English Caribbean island, island planters no longer dominated the market 
and began to realize that they could not cheat their old and over-exploited fields 
                                                          
111
 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 201-204. 
313 
forever.  George Lillington, a Councilman during this decade, noted that it was ‘the 
General Decay’ of the soil that led to a drop in market share and that inevitably 
resulted in the many ‘Melancholly instances of the Poverty of the People.’
112
  Thus, 
it was only a matter of time before Barbados’ economic shortcomings and limited 
space would result in the sugar commodity frontier shifting 1,200 miles northwest to 
the more extensive and plenteous fields of Jamaica, a transition that the records show 
to have occurred shortly after1720. 
 
Part IV:  Importing Fuelwood into Barbados 
 In 1722, Jean-Baptiste Labat published a history of the West Indies that 
included a sketch of an idealized Caribbean sugar plantation.  At first glance, Labat’s 
image looked very similar to many of those already present throughout Barbados: a 
large estate located along the coast; rows of sugarcane planted in neat rectangular 
fields; a mill at the center of all cane-growing operations; and a mansion house with 
enslaved workers’ quarters and animal pens nearby.  At the very edge of the sketch, 
however, stood endless rows of trees.  Labat posited that an ideal sugar plantation 
should be ‘left as far as possible in virgin forest, which would provide a ready source 
for its future timber requirements.’
113
  Barbados, however, had been largely 
deforested by the late 1660s.  This posed a problem for the island’s 350-400 mill 
owners, as cheap fuelwoods were a necessity for a productive sugar plantation 
complex and one they had to solve if they wanted to remain economically significant 
after 1670.
114
  Many responded by looking abroad for their supplies, a task that 
became increasingly difficult with the escalation of conflict in the Caribbean during 
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the 1690s.  This made finding continuous access to cheap fuelwood one of the great 
challenges for late-seventeenth-century planters. 
 Initially, Barbados was covered with thick aboriginal woodlands and gigantic 
trees that pushed all the way down to the beaches.  By the mid-1640s, however, the 
switch from tobacco and cotton farming to sugar resulted in the rapid destruction of 
the island’s naturally wooded landscape.  Some of this loss was essential and came 
from preparing the ground for planting.  As John Davies noted, ‘if the plantation be 
but newly establish’d, it is requisite that it should have been cleer’d of wood some 
considerable time before’, to the extent that ‘there remain not any wood, nor bark, 
nor leaf, nor so much as the least grass.’
115
  Many trees were also converted into 
timber and used in construction.  Planters, however, used the rest as fuel in the 
boiling house furnaces.
116
   A standard boiling house called for a row of four to five 
copper cauldrons of differing sizes, each over its own separate fire of varying 
intensity.  The great furnaces burned almost nonstop, except for Sundays, from 
January until May or June, for an average of 180-250 days per year.   The boiling of 
the raw cane juice served two functions: the clarification of the juice from impurities 
and the evaporation of water to the point in which granulation could occur.  After 
being transferred to the first kettle (the clarifier) from the receiver—a large vessel 
that held the juice after it was squeezed from the crushed canes—the syrupy liquid 
began to separate from nonsaccharine materials when subjected to a low flame.  
Enslaved black workers would then skim the congealing scum off the top before 
adding an alkali, usually lime, to the mixture to enhance the clarification process.  
Upon the completion of this step, trained enslaved workers were responsible for 
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transferring, or skipping, it to the next slightly smaller kettle with a large ladle.  They 
repeated this sequence at each of the next three kettles, until transferring it to the last 
and smallest vessel, the teache.  In the teache, the remaining liquid cooked over the 
strongest heat in the battery until it had reduced enough to be considered ready for 
striking, or removal from the copper cauldrons.  It was then put aside into the cooler 
to finish crystalizing.
117
     
With the furnaces running continuously for at least half a year, plantation 
boiling houses required immense quantities of wood, as ‘any attempt at sugar 
production without a ready stockpile of forested land would not succeed no matter 
how favorable other environmental factors’ were for the islanders.
118
  Moore 
hypothesizes that a large and busy mill could consume as much as twelve to thirteen 
thousand pounds of firewood per day and required almost two acres of forest to 
process a single acre of sugar.  Thus, if Barbadian planters planted approximately 
32,150 acres with sugar, they would need nearly 64,300 acres of available woodland 
annually to maintain their boiling houses.
119
  Broken down to an individual level, the 
planter elite would have in some cases required dozens of tons worth of wood per 
day.  Based on Moore’s ratio of 1 unit of sugar to 60 units of wood, lesser elites such 
as Abel Allyne (316 acres) and Michael Terrell (210 acres), would have required an 
average of 9.06 and 8.49 tons of fuelwood respectively each day, while the island’s 
greatest planters, such as Samuel Newton (581 acres), Richard Howell (605 acres), 
and Tobias Frere (604 acres) would have needed 21.45, 33.54, and 26.52 tons per 
day respectively.  Small planters, such as Richard Adamson, who owned 15 acres,  
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Table 5.12: Tons of Fuelwood Needed Based on Quantity of Sugar Exported 
Year Sugar Exported Fuelwood Required Per Year Fuelwood Required Per Day 
1681 7,150 429,000 2,145 
1682 11,145 668,700 3,343.5 
1683 c. 14,000 840,000 4,200 
1688 c. 1,928 77,460 387.3 
1691 11,004 589,500 2,947.5 
1696 9,854 527,880 2,639.4 
1697 5,475 293,280 1,466.4 
1698 20,190 1,081,620 5,408.1 
1699 11,888 636,840 3,184.2 
1700 15,399 824,940 4,124.7 
    
Avg. 10,803 648,198 3,241 
Table 5.12: TNA, T/70 938-949, CO 33/13 and 33/14, BL, ADD MS 38714, 1681-1683, and Moore, ‘Conquest, 
Part I,’ 375-377 and ‘Conquest, Part II,’ 7-10.  I calculated fuelwood totals by using Moore’s ratio of 1 unit of 
sugar per 60 units of fuelwood.   
would have still required well over a ton of fuelwood per day.
120
  For plantation 
owners such as these, firewood was, after enslaved workers, the second largest 
expense in their budget, accounting for as much as 20% of their yearly operating 
costs.  By 1700, a successful planter with a medium-sized plantation might be 
spending the equivalent of £200 to £350 a year solely on acquiring enough firewood 
to keep the boiling houses running.
121
 
By the 1680s, a combination of huge energy requirements and a lack of local 
sources meant that the Barbadians had to rely on obtaining almost all of this energy 
from abroad.  Table 5.12 shows that an average sugar crop of 10,803 tons would 
have demanded an annual total of 648,198 tons of fuelwood to convert cane juice 
into muscovado sugar, or just over 3,240 tons per day, with peak needs reaching over  
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Graph 5.1: Importation of Timber and Firewood into Barbados, 1681-1698 
 
Graph 5.1: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1681-1698.  Using the Returns to accurately measure fuelwood imports 
is a difficult task, as the officer’s entries are inconsistent and, at times, have no real value, especially when he 
uses the terms ‘feet,’ ‘pieces,’ or ‘logs.’  I have not included these figures, as the Barbadians likely used most 
‘feet’ and ‘pieces’ of wood for construction, and logs for either ship masts or tail poles for windmills. 
5,408 tons in 1698. The Returns, however, suggest that the Barbadians could not 
have possibly acquired such huge quantities of timber through legal trade alone.  
While the islanders made the acquisition of fuelwood an important focal point of 
their commercial activity, with an average of 34 ships participating in this trade each 
year, the Returns show that they only managed to transport 6,188 tons of timber or 
firewood to the island over a ten-year period, with a meager high of 1,630 tons in 
1698.  As such, the quantity of fuelwood imported into the island would have barely 
supported Barbados’ plantation complex for two days.  Moreover, the fuelwood trade 
was also extremely volatile and was often one of the first sacrificed when trade 
became difficult.  In 1682, for example, Barbadian planters imported nearly 1,120 
tons of wood during a year of particularly high trade volumes and peaked at prewar 
high of 1,401 tons in 1688.  Once the Nine Years War broke out, however, Barbadian  
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Table 5.13: Importation of Fuelwood, Barbados, 1681-1698 
Origin Ships Timber-Tons Firewood-Tons Logs 
Africa 1 3 - - 
Bermuda 32 131 - 20 
Carolina 54 691 - 400 
Crab Island 1 60 - - 
Curacao 2 - - - 
Jamaica 8 141 9 - 
Leeward Is. 52 360 334 40 
London 10 15 - 150 
Maryland 7 10 - 3 
New England 76 1,180 - - 
New York 2 20 - - 
Pennsylvania 6 50 - - 
Providence 5 43 - - 
Saltertudas 1 - 20 - 
St. Lucia 38 1,085 83 - 
St. Thomas 1 10 - - 
Surinam 34 158 233 - 
Tobago 49 571 332 - 
Virginia 13 - 19 14 
Table 5.13: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1681-1698 
planters and merchants made little effort to maintain this trade and quickly 
abandoned it after the French established a strong naval presence in the Caribbean.  
Quantities during this era dropped to lows of 9 tons in 1690, 20 tons in 1691, and 23 
tons in 1697, only to recover to 1,630 tons in the year after the war ended. 
Regardless of the limited size and scale of the fuelwood trade, it was an 
important branch of commerce for Barbadian planters, causing them to utilize a 
variety of ports throughout the Atlantic to meet their needs.  Table 5.13 illustrates the 
extent of their quest for energy, showing the origins of their fuelwood supplies, as 
well as the quantities that came from each location.  Three trends emerge from this 
commercial data.  First, the search for fuel encompassed the entire Atlantic world: 
six mainland colonies supplied 137 ships, while a total of 12 Caribbean islands sent 
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189.  10 vessels even made the trans-oceanic voyage from London, an unexpected 
discovery considering the bulk of the items in question.  The range of Caribbean 
islands that supplied the planters’ wood is also surprising, as they not only traded 
with other English colonies, such as Jamaica and Bermuda, but appear to have 
openly received ships from Dutch Curaçao (2 ships) and Suriname (34 ships), as well 
as Danish St. Thomas (1 ship).  Secondly, the endless expanses of virgin forests in 
the Carolinas served as one of two key fuelwood suppliers from the English 
mainland colonies, sending 54 ships and up to 691 tons of timber to Barbados, the 
second highest amount (behind New England) from any one location during this 
period. 
 Lastly, the two small, neighboring islands of St. Lucia and Tobago, when 
combined, represented the heart of the Barbadian fuel trade, with 19% of the vessels 
and 25% of the wood originating from these two locations between 1680 and 1698.  
These numbers, however, greatly underrepresent the actual number of ships that 
sailed between St. Lucia, Tobago, and Barbados, as the majority of wood imported 
from these islands was done so illegally, with many planters routinely sending their 
own small ships to gather fuelwood.  The Barbadians’ reliance on these two 
neighboring islands is unsurprising, as they had always maintained a special 
relationship with both St. Lucia and Tobago and had attempted to formally claim and 
settle both of them at various points throughout the seventeenth century.  Tobago, for 
example, housed a temporary community of Barbadians for a few years in the 1630s, 
fixing it as a place that ‘the people of Barbados have continually sent…for Timber, 
and fish’d for Turtle.’
122
  The claim to St. Lucia was even more substantial, as the 
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Barbadian government bought the island by a deed of conveyance signed by 
Annawatta, the chief of the local Carib natives, and Thomas Warner, the original 
‘founder’ in 1663.
123
  They proceeded to attempt to establish colonies on the island in 
1640, 1644, 1645, and 1667, with each inevitably failing due the ‘unhealthinesse of 
the aire.’
124
  Lord William Willoughby later repurchased St. Lucia from the native 
inhabitants during his governorship to use ‘not for planting thereon but for 
convenience of wood’ and resettled it with small groups of settlers that lived in 
scattered woodcutting communities across the island.
125
   
By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, these two islands had become 
an unofficial part of Barbados’ insular empire and the elite Barbadians felt justified 
in their extensive use of all natural supplies.  Contemporary records show that they 
considered both St. Lucia and Tobago as ‘a piece of woodland,’ one that they could 
‘use in common to supply themselves with wood.’
126
  For the last ‘20 or 30 years,’ 
according to local agents, the islanders were ‘sending thither frequently every year 
for timber.’
127
  Edwin Stede, for example, sent ‘two or three ships’ to St. Lucia in 
1686 ‘to cut timber for the public use of this Island.’
 128
  Tobago became especially 
necessary to Barbadian planters by the 1680s, as ‘without timber from [this island] it 
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will be impossible for Barbados henceforward to carry on their sugar works.’
129
  
Moreover, with few indigenous Indians and ‘a very good port’ Barbadian 
entrepreneurs utilized the lush deforested sections of Tobago to grow additional 
provisions.  Planters also sought fuelwood at other nearby islands, such as Dominica 
and St. Vincent’s.  Edward Littleton reported that Tobias Frere, an elite planter, went 
to ‘Dominico…to fetch timber, as he hath done several times, and as hath been 
practised for many years, there being always a trade and correspondence between the 
people of Barbados and the Indians of Dominico.’
130
  Frere, along with other 




Yet, a reliance on the naturally abundant resources of Tobago and St. Lucia 
had drawbacks.  It was costly to fit out an expedition to these islands, since it 
required many laborers and a great number of supplies to cut down the large trees 
that formed the ancient forests.  Moreover, it could be dangerous.  In January of 
1682, Governor Dutton reported to the Lords of Trade and Plantations that a vessel 
had recently returned from St. Lucia, where it had been to cut wood, ‘but the natives 
had killed four of the [woodcutters] and forced them to retire.’  Even though attacks 
from the natives were rare, a nervous Dutton subsequently ordered ‘that no more 
ships are to go thither but such as are sufficiently armed and manned to protect the 
labourers against such attacks.’
 132
  The greatest threat to Barbadian security on St. 
Lucia, however, occurred four years later, when Lieutenant-Governor Stede angrily 
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shared with London some disturbing intelligence that he had received: ‘I learn from 
Captain St. Loe…that the French begin to make settlements, build houses and inhabit 
on St. Lucia…. The French settlers assert that they are there under the French King, 
who is the lawful owner of the Island.’
133
  Stede later found out that the French had 
also claimed Tobago, with the Count de Blenac, Governor-General of the French 
West Indies, justifying his action by claiming that ‘I was present when we took it 
from the Dutch, and I don’t remember that the English took any part in the 
capture.’
134
  James II ordered Stede to take a hard stance on the matter and ‘fall down 
as soon as may be to the Island.’
135
   
This quickly escalated into violence on the English side, as Stede sent 
Captain John Temple on the H.M.S. Mary Rose to St. Lucia and St. Vincent.  
Landing at the former, Temple proceeded to ‘set fire to all houses in the bays in these 
parts, and destroyed the plantations,’ while he exchanged bullets and arrows with 
native Indians at the latter, resulting in the death of two of his men.  In retaliation, the 
English ‘burnt their houses and went off.’
136
  The French refrained from violence on 
their part, but irked the Barbadian government when they celebrated the arrival in 
Martinique of the heads of the two Englishmen murdered in St. Vincent.
137
  The 
debate over the ownership of the two isles continued for the next three years, until 
the Nine Years War unofficially solved the issue by turning the Caribbean into a 
free-for-all that resulted in the French leaving the islands.  While this contested 
ownership never culminated in a truly violent situation, the possibility always 
existed, with tension and deceit causing both governors to turn a suspicious eye 
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towards the other.  This episode also greatly affected trade between Barbados and the 
small ‘wood’ islands for the second half of the 1680s, as it became difficult to safely 
cut fuelwood in a hostile environment.  After the war, the islanders again received 
word from the H.M.S. Speedwell that the French had resettled on St. Lucia and had 
reestablished numerous plantations on the island, a move that both renewed a 
nationalistic debate between the two countries and continued to threaten planter 
access to fuelwood well into the next century.
138
   
These challenges caused the Barbadian planters to consider using other 
materials to power their boiling houses.  Throughout the 1680s and 1690s, planters 
experimented extensively with two forms of natural energy and produced an 
innovative alteration to the boiling process that offered cheaper fuel costs and greater 
production efficiencies.  Plantation owners began to implement the first of these 
strategies as early as the late 1660s.  In 1669, Nicholas Blake, owner of Bilbao 
Plantation, complained to Charles II about contemporary conditions on Barbados, 
specifically describing the deforestation problems that were starting to be felt across 
the island: ‘a great part of the Sugar Plantations begin to want wood to boil off their 
crops, so that we must of necessity make use of Newcastle or Welch coals.’
139
  For 
planters like Blake, coal represented an important alternative to wood that was 
relatively cheap and easy to obtain.  Primarily shipped from London and Newcastle, 
Barbadians imported hundreds of tons of coal per year during the late-seventeenth 
century and were able to gain billions of calories worth of energy through its use.   
 Table 5.14 shows all coal imports to Barbados between 1681 and 1698, the 
energy that the islanders gained from this alternate source, and how it compared to  
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Table 5.14: Coal Imported to Barbados, 1681-1698 (in Tons) 





Ratio kcal Coal: 
Wood 
1681 490 2,123,510,256 2,149,590,000 0.99:1 
1682 1,121 4,857,000,419 3,044,799,000 1.6:1 
1684 1,601 6,936,715,139 1,262,544,000 5.49:1 
1685 1,958 8,483,502,962 1,221,729,000 6.94:1 
1686 1,252 5,424,589,228 1,202,682,000 4.51:1 
1687 653 2,829,278,567 2,593,113,000 1.09:1 
1688 704 3,050,248,256 3,812,121,000 0.80:1 
1689 47 203,638,733 1,112,889,000 0.18:1 
1690 45 194,973,255 24,489,000 7.96:1 
1691 1,641 7,110,024,699 54,420,000 131:1 
1695 297 1,286,823,483 97,956,000 13:1 
1696 1,113 4,822,338,507 397,266,000 3.24:1 
1697 1,766 7,651,617,074 62,583,000 122:1 
1698 2,530 10,961,829,670 4,435,230,000 2.47:1 
  
   
Overall 15,218 65,935,622,102 21,471,411,000 3.07:1 
Table 5.14: TNA, CO 33/13 and 33/14, 1681-1698.  The Returns generally lists coal in chaldrons, a unit that 
weighed approximately 5,936 pounds.  I converted all quantities of coal into tons for ease of comparison.  The 
kilocalories for each year’s coal imports is calculated using the conversions of 1 ton of coal equaling 4,332,739 
k/cal and 1 ton of wood equaling 2,721,000 k/cal.  The conversion for coal is based on a very low-grade 
version of the product (20 MJ/kcal) and thus represents a minimum.  Kander et al., Power, 136. 
the island’s legal fuelwood supply.  The movement of coal into the island followed 
the general trends already established by food, wood, and livestock.  The years 
between 1682 and 1688 represented a peak moment for coal imports, as they reached 
consistently high totals that ranged from 1,121 tons in 1682 to 1,985 tons in 1685.  
After war broke out, the coal trade collapsed, with only 92 tons of coal arriving at 
island markets for both 1689 and 1690.  Coal imports generally remained depressed 
until greater English control over the Atlantic allowed for a rapid increase in 1696 
and 1697.  After the war, Caribbean commerce blossomed under the expansion of the 
Royal Navy and coal imports soared to a period high of 2,530 tons in 1698.  Overall, 
14,656 tons of coal entered Barbadian ports during this period, for an average of 
1,120 tons and 4.8 billion calories per year.  When spread evenly over the 358 mills 
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that dotted Barbados’ landscape in 1684, each sugar planter could obtain 
approximately 3.15 tons (13.4 million calories) annually.  Moreover, the energy 
provided by coal regularly exceeded that supplied by the legal fuelwood trade by an 
average ratio of 3.07:1, making it a far more efficient source of heat.  It was also 
cheaper than wood, generally costing less than a pound per ton.  Thus, coal served as 
an ideal alternative source of power, since it was consistently inexpensive, packed 
with energy, and easily found in Barbadian markets.
140
   
By the 1680s, Barbadian plantation owners also began to utilize a second 
biological material as a substitute for wood.  Cheaper than either coal or timber, and 
far more plentiful, the Barbadians turned to bagasse, the semi-dried, fibrous by-
product of processed sugar cane.  Before sugar’s commodity frontier reached 
Barbados, bagasse was unreliable as a fuel source, as the primitive grinding wheel or 
dual-rollers system used by many early sugar planters was often too light, leaving 
many of the crushed stalks damp with cane juice.  With the invention of the three-
roller grinder in Brazil in the early seventeenth century, and its subsequent migration 
to the Caribbean, planters could now extract three times as much juice from each 
stalk, leaving behind consistently drier bagasse.  By the late 1680s, the Barbadians 
began to build large storage shelters immediately adjacent to the mills, collecting the 
used stalks and allowing for them to fully dry out in the hot equatorial sun.  Bagasse 
proved itself a particularly important alternative fuel source for mill owners because 
it freed the Barbadians from relying on distant fuelwood supplies that were limited 
by the Caribbean’s dangerous waterways, increasing prices, and a general lack of 
English shipping, especially after war broke out in 1689.  Thus, the use of vast 
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quantities of a locally produced waste product as fuel enabled the elite planters to 




The third strategy represented a strategic alteration of the sugar production 
process by Barbadian planters.  For most of the seventeenth century, it had been the 
general custom to keep five separate fires, one for each of the copper cauldrons, 
burning at any given time in the boiling houses.  All five were maintained at a 
separate heat, which allowed those working in the mill to have greater control over 
boiling temperatures and the cane juice’s reaction to the flames, but used large 
amounts of fuelwood in the process.
142
  However, by the end of the1690s, the 
Barbadians had developed and perfected the ‘Jamaica train,’ a modification of the 
heating system that employed only a single intense fire under the teache and a long 
covered flue that carried the heat down the line to the rest of the coppers.  What the 
planters lost in temperature control, they made up for in fuel efficiency and 
decreased their dependence on imported timber and coal.
143
   
Thus, by the 1690s, Barbadian mill owners had an array of different energy 
options at their disposal.  Based on legal island imports, the average planter could 
obtain almost 10 tons of fuelwood and just over three tons of coal per year, as well as 
an almost endless supply of bagasse.  The wealthier planters supplemented these 
totals by organizing their own woodcutting trips to the nearby islands of St. Lucia 
and Tobago, both of which the Barbadians had ‘claimed’ for their exploitation.  
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Furthermore, they developed a new method for boiling sugar that used at least two-
thirds less fuel, freeing themselves from the expense and burden of finding a nearly 
endless supply of combustible material.  By addressing these issues on their own, 
Barbadian planters managed to utilize their extensive trading networks to create an 
economic approach to obtaining energy inputs that was both flexible and pragmatic.  
When the planters had easy access to neighboring wooded islands or to coal from 
distant London or Newcastle during the 1680s, they exploited these readily available 
materials, leading to a peak moment in terms of imported energy.  With the outbreak 
of war, however, they changed their approach by placing a greater emphasis on the 
utilization of local resources and a manipulation of their own natural world in order 
to obtain needed fuel.  They realized that they had the experience and knowledge to 
change the way that they produced sugar, introducing key innovations to the process 
that resulted in smaller operational costs and greater overall efficiencies.  These ‘new 
Improvements and Experiments’ in the collection of energy, defined the Barbadian 
planters, in Dalby Thomas’ words, as the masters of the ‘Art of Planting,’ proving 
that they were neither cautious nor conservative, and were willing to embrace the 
entrepreneurial risks that allowed them to modernize their industry and create a 
system of self-supply that best suited their needs.’
144
 
   
Conclusion 
 The consistent acquisition of the energy necessary to fuel both large sugar 
plantations and smaller provision farms represented one of the greatest daily 
challenges on Barbados, as no other contemporary society required as much power 
per capita as the small Caribbean island.  Barbados’ energy requirements during this 
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era can be divided into four separate categories: the nutritional energy needed to 
power the servants, enslaved laborers, and white farmers that worked the land; the 
muscle and meat provided by local livestock; the dung used to add nutrients and 
rejuvenate an otherwise depleted soil; and the wood required to fuel the great fires of 
the boiling houses.  Traditionally, historians have misunderstood the Barbadian 
planters’ and farmers’ approach to energy, with some describing the island as a sugar 
monoculture that imported most of their necessary energy sources from elsewhere in 
the English-Atlantic world, while others portray a static society that resisted basic 
change and improvements because its inhabitants had already established a profitable 
system that had been put into place by the astonishingly successful local planter and 
merchant elite.
145
   
Both of these standard mercantilist interpretations, however, are inaccurate 
and reductive depictions of Barbadian society, as by the 1680s and 1690s the island’s 
planters and farmers had become largely self-sufficient in supplying their own 
energy needs.
146
  In an ongoing effort to make their plantations and farms more 
efficient and profitable, they actively experimented with different planting 
techniques and production methodologies in order to overcome the many 
disadvantages and limitations imposed by isolation, expense, and natural constraint, 
especially after the Nine Years War broke out in 1689.  To reduce their reliance on 
imported or foreign food, the Barbadians produced many of the provisions that they 
consumed on local farms and plantations.  Enslaved Africans and indentured 
servants, for example, were expected to find or produce most of their own foodstuffs, 
as they only received small amounts of imported proteins, usually salted fish, and a 
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little corn.  The wealthy sugar planters, however, had the ability to be picky about 
what they ate.  They believed that most of the heavily salted and fatty provisions that 
arrived at the island from abroad were beneath their social standing and instead 
preferred to eat fresh local fare, such as the vegetables and fruits that they produced 
and the livestock that they raised.  Thus, even during the island’s peak trading 
moment in the 1680s, nearly 49,200 out of the 66,000 Barbadians (73.45%) must 
have produced a significant percentage of the nutritional energy that they needed to 
survive.  Therefore, it was the remaining 17,000 non-elite free whites, the individuals 
that Galenic scientists said benefitted most from the salty meats and dairy products 
that arrived from abroad, who consumed the majority of the imported provisions. On 
average, more than 80% of their daily caloric intake entered the island by boat.  
Overall, however, this latter segment of the population had little actual impact on 
island statistics, as those who were expected to produce own provisions greatly 
outnumbered those who generally relied on imports.  Thus, the average late-
seventeenth century Barbadian was responsible for producing almost 80% of his or 
her own calories every single day.  While not self-sufficient in the traditional sense, 
most Barbadians engaged in considerable levels of self-production and grew 
significant quantities of their own food. 
The island’s animal population formed another important source of energy 
for those living and working on Barbados.  As a ubiquitous part of island life, the 
livestock population numbered in the tens of thousands and included both laboring 
animals and livestock bred strictly for consumption.  The island’s large horse, cattle, 
and assinego populations formed a considerable workforce that the islanders relied 
upon to perform a variety of roles across the island.  Rarely consumed as food, they 
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instead served as horsepower for the transportation of both people and supplies, 
pulling plows around the fields, occasionally turning the rollers that crushed the 
sugarcane, and producing the large quantities of mineral-rich dung that fertilized the 
island’s soil.  Almost all landowners owned at least one horse, cow, and donkey, as 
they, like the enslaved Africans that worked alongside them, provided the labor that 
made both provision and sugar production possible.  Other barnyard animals, such as 
sheep, goats, swine, rabbits, and fowl were also prevalent throughout the island, but 
were instead used as a source of fresh meat for a population that needed a steady 
supply of proteins and vitamins to conduct the hard work that defined a plantation 
society.  While less commonly owned than the aforementioned laboring animals, 
they were still present in great numbers on many farms and almost all plantations.  
Thus, animals represented another form of energy frequently utilized by many 
Barbadian planters and farmers, as the labor and calories that they provided were 
necessities that made life in the Caribbean profitable and worthwhile. 
Plantation owners and provision planters also aggressively tackled the many 
challenges posed by the progressive decline of the island’s soil fertility.  For the first 
time in Europe’s historical relationship with sugar, the planters did not rapidly 
abandon an over-exploited landscape once production began to decline.  Instead, 
most stayed in Barbados and worked to innovate ways in which they could combat 
the widespread lack of fecundity that plagued them throughout the 1680s and 1690s.  
They instituted a variety of different strategies that ranged from quick and easy fixes, 
such as altering the length of the planting schedule, to long-term changes that 
transformed the theory of sugar planting and overthrew previous notions of best 
practice.  The islanders also implemented Old World farming techniques, like 
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dunging, and conducted extensive experiments to figure out what combinations of 
local organic matter could produce the most effective fertilizer for the worn out soil.  
By doing this, they forced the environment to bend to their will and, in doing so, 
discovered that they could push their plantations to unexpected levels of production 
that soared past the highest outputs of the earlier boom period.   
Finally, with such a large percentage of land being cleared for either 
agriculture or pasture, and with the growing needs of planters’ boiling houses, the 
Barbadians had callously destroyed the island’s once plentiful woodlands.   To 
counter this, they searched abroad and incorporated the nearby islands of St. Lucia, 
Tobago, Dominica, and St. Vincent’s into a small unofficial ‘insular empire’ that 
they actively exploited.  When access to these islands proved to be too pricey, 
difficult, and dangerous, Barbadian planters experimented with new materials, such 
as coal and bagasse, both of which were reasonably cheap and easy to obtain.  They 
also applied their extensive experience as planters to the sugar production process, 
implementing innovative changes to the boiling house furnaces so that they required 
less combustible material in order to do the same amount of work.  The resulting 
Jamaica train increased overall efficiency, while significantly lowering fuelwood 
costs and freeing many plantation owners from a reliance on either foreign or distant 
suppliers.  Overall, these adaptations and innovations allowed those on Barbados to 
push an island that was worn out and increasingly unfit for a cash crop as 
exploitative as sugar to remain as a relevant, dynamic, and profitable force within an 











































Conclusion: A Look Ahead to the Eighteenth Century 
 
Edward Littleton, after pointing out the many grievances that the planter class 
had with England’s governance of Barbados, the excessive costs associated with the 
production of sugar, and the great benefits that plantations brought to the metropole, 
concluded his Groans with a final lamentation to the Lords of Trade: ‘It is now that 
we put an end to this sad Discourse.  Having made it appear, that the Plantations are 
brought to a miserable and ruinous Condition…We have laid before you such a 
Series of Calamities, as are not easy to be parallell’d.’  He finished by pleading: ‘Let 
us not be denied the common liberty and privilege of Mankind, to groan when we dy.  
Let not our Complaints seem troublesome and offensive; but be received with 
Compassion, as the Groans of dying Men.’
1
  Littleton’s conclusion highlighted the 
great concern he appeared to feel as an agent for late-seventeenth century Barbados, 
with his work vividly depicting a worn-out plantation society ruthlessly exploited by 
a greedy metropolitan elite intent on confiscating the planters’ hard-earned wealth for 
its own coffers.  Importantly, these views were not only the ramblings of a retired 
plantation owner living in England; they also reflected the perspectives of many of 
his contemporary planters.  The Assembly sent a letter to England in 1690 
specifically thanking Littleton for making the metropole aware of the island’s 
desperate plight.  They praised the author of this ‘too truly titled’ pamphlet for his 
‘lively representation of our present state,’ while making clear to all the ‘unparalleled 
insupportableness of our Conditions.’
 2
   
While it is unsurprising to see that Littleton’s bombastic descriptions had a 
significant impact upon those who stood at the center of England’s mercantilist 
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empire, it is remarkable to consider that this highly flawed and distorted 
interpretation of island conditions has informed the way that multiple generations 
have understood the history of Barbados’ late-seventeenth century.  Many scholars 
continue to see the Groans as an indication of a society in turmoil, depression, and 
decline.  Harlow, for example, wrote that the island was experiencing ‘social and 
economic decay’ by the 1680s, as the ‘position of the planter had altered 
considerably for the worse,’ with many ‘seriously afraid of general bankruptcy’ by 
1685.  This inevitably pushed the desperate islanders into greater levels of 
subordination to the ‘interests…of the Mother Country.’
3
  Almost fifty years later, 
Dunn echoed Harlow, describing the 1680s as a time of a ‘deteriorating economic 
and political situation on the island,’ with their sugar fields ‘showing signs of soil 
exhaustion, their annual shipments… beginning to decline, and their profits…eroded 
by the steady drop in sugar prices, which hit bottom in 1685-1686.’
 4
  Patricia Molen 
agreed with Dunn’s conclusions, portraying the era’s white Barbadian population as 
‘doomed to permanent decline,’ regardless of their attempts at ‘adapting to the social 
and economic realities’ of life in the Caribbean.
5
  Finally, Puckrein, twenty years 
after Dunn, writes that the late-seventeenth century Barbadians were unable ‘to 
improve the economic situation’ throughout the decade and that the ‘social and 
military problems’ that defined this era meant that ‘their dependency on England was 
further solidified.’
6
     
 This dissertation, however, refutes the works of those historians who have 
incorrectly portrayed this era as one of decline and dependency, while proving that a 
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careful look at the statistical record actually depicts a plantation society that reached 
a peak economic moment in its early history.  The Naval Office Returns, for 
example, show that the Barbadian economy was rapidly expanding by 1680 and 
continued to do so until at least 1688, when domestic revolution and international 
war halted this growth.  The island’s import trade nearly tripled in the ten years 
between 1676 and 1686, with their shipping and tonnage increasing from 150 ships 
and approximately 10,176 tons to 423 ships and 27,200 tons.  Exports also reached 
high levels during this era, passing 11,300 tons worth of sugar in 1682 and a 
projected 14,000 tons in 1683.  While the profits derived from these sugar exports 
were likely minimized due to the low prices that resulted from the increasingly 
glutted London market, the planters’ attempts at diversification through the expanded 
production of both rum and molasses allowed them to reach new levels of economic 
prominence.  Eltis calculates that this diversified approach resulted in greater returns 
per islander during the late 1680s than for a similarly expansive era in1665 and 1666 
and that each islander exported an average of £7.3 worth of goods throughout this 
decade, a figure almost 4.5 times higher than the tobacco trade in the Chesapeake 
and twice as high as contemporary sugar planters in Brazil.
7
  This success caused 
Eltis to label late seventeenth-century Barbados ‘the Hong Kong of the pre-industrial 
age’ and the most successful exporter of raw materials ‘proportionate to its size and 
population…in the history of the world up to that point.’
8
   
A key reason for this increased success was that the Barbadians’ commercial 
connections grew during this period to encompass new colonies, such as 
Pennsylvania, and included increased traffic with others like New York, Bermuda, 
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Carolina, and Virginia.  Moreover, their trade networks also featured a growing 
number of trans-Atlantic locations such as Africa, the Atlantic islands of Cape de 
Verde and Madeira, and, most importantly, London, Ireland, and the English 
outports.  Combined, imports from the Caribbean, English mainland colonies, and 
Europe gave the Barbadians access to nearly everything that they needed to survive 
in the tropics.  It was both the balance achieved by the Barbadians inside this 
network and their freedom to move within England’s mercantile system that allowed 
for such rapid and expansive commercial growth.  Even though the islanders 
complained incessantly about the constricting and unfair nature of England’s 
Navigation Acts, they were decidedly advantageous to most merchants and planters 
at this time, as they helped ensure that the island’s elite shipped out large quantities 
of goods by guaranteeing a valuable market for its sugar in London and provided 
protection for ships heading across the Atlantic.  This gave Barbadian planters and 
merchants little motivation to work outside of its regulations and appeared to have 
kept illicit participation in the import trade to a minimum throughout the 1680s.  
Thus, while Littleton complained of an English government that set out to ‘pare us 
close, and keep us low,’ the island’s strong relationship with England was mutually 
beneficial to both sides during this decade and was a key component of the economic 
expansion that defined the era.
9
 
This dissertation has also shown that the importation of unfree labor into 
Barbados also underwent expansion during the 1680s and reached a peak commercial 
moment of its own at this time.  The indentured servant trade, described as both 
antiquated and in decline in much of the historiography, experienced a rebirth during 
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this era, with the projected population increasing from 2,381 in 1684 to over 3,100 
by 1688.  Furthermore, the Barbadians’ importation of enslaved Africans also grew 
dramatically during the 1680s, with the trade expanding from a legal average of 4 
ships and 1,200 black laborers a year between 1674 and1679 to 12 ships and 2,710 
black laborers throughout the 1680s.  This huge influx of labor caused the average 
cost per head to decline, dropping from £18.84 in the late 1670s to £15.60 by 1683.  
In fact, so many enslaved workers arrived at the island during this era that a natural 
glut occurred by 1686, when the islanders only bought 83.89% of the Africans that 
survived the trans-Atlantic voyage.  The Barbadians were also constantly attempting 
to reestablish trade with the Spaniards and sell extra enslaved blacks to South 
America, where the Spanish colonists would often pay inflated prices in ready 
bullion.  This additional branch of the slave trade flourished in the early 1680s, when 
Spanish merchants bought thousands of enslaved Africans for tens of thousands of 
pounds in silver, but it decreased significantly after 1683 and always seemed to 
remain just beyond the Barbadians’ ever-reaching grasp.  Thus, Littleton was once 
again inaccurate in his assessment of the era, as his complaints of an inability to 
‘procure and keep White Servants’ and of the limited importation of enslaved black 
labor at an overly expensive £20 per head covered up a very different reality.   
 Barbados’ economic expansion, however, came to a definitive halt by the 
early 1690s.  The most obvious reason for this stemmed from the limitations placed 
on trade by both England’s Revolution in 1688 and the nation’s ensuing participation 
in the Nine Years War.  With the French Navy rapidly taking control of both 
Caribbean waterways and the English Channel by 1690, the islanders found 
themselves cut off from many vital Atlantic markets, with the disruption of trans-
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oceanic links to England, Scotland, and Ireland representing the most devastating of 
these losses.  Unable to cheaply and easily receive needed goods, they lost access to 
thousands of hogsheads worth of food per year, with Irish meat, butter, and cheese, 
English beer, cider and ale, and Madeira wine infrequently arriving at island ports.  A 
limited slave trade also caused problems for island planters, especially during the 
early-to-mid years of the war.  Between 1690 and 1695, for example, Barbados’ 
ports received an annual average of only 3.5 ships and 1,493 enslaved Africans, 
numbers that could not offset the increased mortality rates that defined much of the 
war for this segment of the island’s population.  Furthermore, prices per head surged 
upwards after 1698 and continued to do so throughout the war, reaching £26.54 by 
1695 and £32.18 by 1696. 
 Barbadian planters and farmers, however, countered these wartime challenges 
by relying on three separate measures that helped to keep them supplied with needed 
goods throughout the conflict.  England instituted the first after much encouragement 
from colonial merchants, establishing an annual convoy system in 1691 for each 
region of the empire.  The Barbadian convoy, specifically, achieved a mixture of 
both great success and frustrating failure during its eight years in operation.  In 1691, 
for example, 48 ships and up to 6,081 tons worth of goods arrived as part of the 
convoy, while the 1695 version never actually left England and the still-potent 
French Navy nearly wiped out the1697 commercial armada.  Thus, while unreliable 
and occasionally sporadic, especially during the latter stages of the war, both white 
and black Barbadians appear to have received a much-needed boost in trans-Atlantic 
provisions from England’s annual convoys during its first few years of operation. 
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 The islanders also implemented two other supply techniques on their own, 
both of which were more local solutions that did not require metropolitan 
interference.  The first centered on the continued goal of insular self-production.   As 
chapter 5 proves, the Barbadian population produced anywhere from 65% to 95% of 
their own calories each year. They grew a variety of vegetables, including potatoes, 
corn, and cassava, raised livestock for fresh meat, maintained fruit trees, occasionally 
caught fish and other types of seafood, and distilled many different forms of liquor.  
Thus, when war cut them off from their established trans-Atlantic food sources, the 
islanders turned to locally produced provisions to overcome a significant percentage 
of their nutritional and caloric deficiencies.  Secondly, Barbadian planters and 
merchants resorted to expanding the scale of their interloping trade by taking 
advantage of the nearby Dutch, French, Spanish, and Danish colonies to obtain many 
of the supplies no longer accessible from England, while in return supplying them 
with hundreds of tons worth of sugar for eventual sale in Amsterdam.  The Barbadian 
elite also participated in illegal trade with mainland English colonies, meeting 
friendly and enterprising merchants in the many cays, bays, and inlets that lined the 
North American coast in order to buy and sell goods without having to pay duties or 
other taxes.  While it is impossible to measure the quantity of goods that entered 
island markets through illegal channels, the records do provide enough anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that it reached particularly high levels during the 1690s and 
remained an important source for Barbadian trade throughout the decade.   
Thus, the Nine Years War caused a significant and important change in the 
way the islanders approached trade, as trans-Atlantic commercial voyages became 
both expensive and difficult.  With a major branch of their network essentially cut 
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off, Barbadian planters and merchants had to find other ways to receive imports and 
exchange exports, even if it meant directly violating the Navigation Acts by trading 
to both economic and political rivals.  It was this pragmatic, responsive, and flexible 
approach to trade that defined the changing white Barbadian commercial habits of 
the 1680s and 1690s.  They happily operated within England’s mercantilist system 
when it benefitted them to do so and gladly took advantage of the convoys sent to the 
island, but refused to follow a single economic model.  Instead, they approached 
trade from a more nuanced, pragmatic, and capitalist point-of-view that stressed 
doing what was best for their own survival and profit.  They wanted the right to 
choose their own economic destiny and, when able to do so, managed to create a 
matured plantation society that reached new levels of expansion and production. 
 This dissertation further argues that the changing environmental and climatic 
conditions on the island were also responsible for bringing Barbadian economic 
expansion to a temporary, but rapid, end by 1690.  Mired in a particularly bad stretch 
of the Little Ice Age, the islanders complained of weather patterns that oscillated 
wildly between excessive rains, unnatural cold, and drought.  Furthermore, they dealt 
with an increase in the number of hurricanes that hit the island and trade winds that 
unexpectedly shifted directions.  The increasing infertility of the soil and the lack of 
native forest also complicated matters, as these two key problems had to be 
successfully dealt with if the island’s planters, farmers, and merchants wanted to 
remain productive.  Moreover, the changing climatic patterns and resulting wetness 
proved to be dangerous to many on Barbados, as disease became one of the defining 
features of the island after 1690, especially in St. Michael’s parish.  While many 
established white Barbadians avoided the deadly fevers that flourished as a result of 
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the cool and wet weather, the newly arrived soldiers and sailors were not as fortunate 
and died in the thousands.  Barbadians of all races and social classes also suffered 
from a variety of other deadly diseases, including small-pox, dysentery, and, 
especially, the dry belly-ache. 
To counter the results of these environmental and climatic challenges, the 
island’s white population implemented a series of adjustments and innovations that 
allowed for them to gain greater knowledge and control over their tropical home.  
Some conducted scientific experiments, testing barometers and possibly 
thermometers to help predict bad weather.  Others, like Captain Langsford, turned to 
nature and learned that by studying the sun, moon, and sea they could predict storms 
and uncharacteristic conditions before they occurred.  They also incorporated a 
variety of different strategies to overcome the island’s changing environment and 
increasingly infertile soil, ranging from simple alterations of the growing schedule 
and experimenting with different planting techniques and materials to incorporating 
Old World agricultural methods, such as dunging, when it seemed advantageous to 
do so.  Furthermore, Barbadian planters also figured out how to make dried-out cane 
trash into a viable form of energy for their boiling house fires and reconstructed their 
furnaces in a manner that utilized less fuelwoods when the French threatened access 
to their traditional sources. 
The white Barbadian population also turned to nature to better understand the 
many diseases that ravaged their island and to learn how to best cure them.  First, 
they freed themselves from the early-modern view that disease derived from miasmic 
or peccatogenic origins and instead hypothesized that the island’s poor hygienic 
conditions, such as the regular consumption of rotten food, dirty and littered streets, 
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and fouled water, were more reasonable culprits.  Secondly, they began to understand 
that European medicine contained serious flaws in its administration and, with 
guidance from an enslaved population already learned in non-traditional remedies, 
turned to the natural world to experiment with effective local cures.  Both white and 
black he islanders used the Silk Cotton Tree, the Varvain plant, and the Palma Christi 
to cure fevers, the Arrowhead root, Iron Vine, and Pigeon Pea to fight dysentery, the 
Soldier’s Bush and Aloe plant to reduce swelling, and the Crab Eye Vine to 
minimize the symptoms of consumption.  Thus, by the end of the 1690s, the white 
Barbadians emerged from the Nine Years War in a better condition than before the 
conflict began and now lived within a matured plantation society that they had built 
and organized for their own benefit and welfare. 
While this work fleshes out the experience of those on Barbados during the 
late-seventeenth century, there is still much work that still needs to be done on the 
island, as other eras are also underrepresented in the historiography.  One such time 
period is the first two decades of the eighteenth century, another moment in 
Barbadian history defined by economic expansion, greater social maturation, and 
international conflict.  By 1701, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) 
threw the Caribbean into turmoil once again and tested whether or not the Barbadian 
planters’ and merchants’ experience from the Nine Years War informed their ability 
to overcome another extended period of challenges and limitations.  Initially, both 
black and white Barbadians suffered from many of the same problems that had 
plagued them during the previous conflict.  The French Navy again had substantial 
success in controlling the movement of trade throughout the Caribbean, with one 
report stating that ‘the Caribbee Isles are so much troubled with the French…from 
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Martinico, that no vessells can pass in or out for them.’  They further threatened the 
island’s illegal supplemental import trade by having again ‘plundered the Dutch 
Island named Stacia.’
10
   
Even more troubling, however, was the fact that the New England merchants 
initially decided to completely withhold trade from Barbados, further magnifying the 
already substantial limitations experienced on the island.  In the early years of the 
war, most New England ports refused to take Barbados’ sugar, rum, and molasses as 
a form of payment, as the merchants claimed that they readily obtained cheaper 
tropical staples from foreign producers.  Instead, the New Englanders demanded 
monetary payment, which became increasingly difficult after a forced cessation of 
trade with Spanish America cut them off from needed bullion.
11
  This led to the 
islanders experimenting with their own paper money in 1706, a disastrous innovation 
that inevitably destroyed the credit of many, drove others into bankruptcy, and 
convinced some to abandon the island in hopes of escaping their debts.
12
  One 
contemporary letter relates that having ‘nothing but paper for silver’ caused many of 
the ‘miseries of this country.’  The resulting inflation caused the price of sugar on the 
island to skyrocket from £8 per hundred to £20 per hundred by August of 1706.
13
 
The New Englanders’ refusal to trade with Barbados also hurt the islanders’ 
ability to access needed provisions.  George Lillington, acting-Governor of the island 
from 1710-11, wrote to London ‘that without the constant supplys from [New 
England] of flower, bisket, beef, pork, salt fish of all sorts, we would not subsist but 
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   The islanders also saw their export trade threatened by both the lack 
of commerce with New England and the significant limitations placed on trans-
Atlantic shipping, as wartime conditions within the Caribbean made the movement 
of goods difficult over long distances.   Sugar exports, for example, dropped from 
15,399 tons in 1700 to approximately 10,000 tons in 1701 and only 2,731 tons for the 
first half of 1702.  These restrictions ensured tough times for many smaller farmers 
and poor whites on Barbados, as the widespread ‘want of money,’ in tandem with an 
overall ‘dearness of all sorts of provisions,’ resulted in conditions that either 
‘distroy’d or banish’d most of the poorer sort’ still living on the island.  By 1706, the 
Assembly wrote of ‘the visible, eminent, and universall desolation of this once 
flourishing, but now poor, decayed Island.’  Another letter communicated to London 
that ‘Low merkets,’ along with ‘our scarceity of money here is very 
mortifying…..We must live in hopes to see happier times.’
15
  Governor Crowe also 
complained of the ‘great violence and oppressions’ that ‘miserably distract, 
discontented, and impoverished and disabled us even beyond the hopes of recovering 
ourselves out of the labyrinth of our amazing confusions.’
16
    
Yet, Barbadian planters and merchants, by relying on many of the same 
innovations and experiences from the 1690s, managed to counter their early wartime 
struggles by creating a productive and well-provisioned society by the middle of the 
war that remained successful for years after the Treaty of Utrecht.  The Returns 
show, for example, that the islanders overcame the limitations placed on their 
exports, as they sent an average of 13,853 tons of legal sugar to the Atlantic world  
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Graph 6.1: % of Sugar Shipped to England by Caribbean Colony, 1697-1720 
 
Graph 6.1: TNA, Cust. 3/1-3/21.  The data is missing for both 1705 and 1712, so all resulting numbers should 
be higher.    
between 1706 and 1709 and, according to the Customs records, sent over 11,000 tons 
per year to England between 1713 and 1720.  While their domestic colonial rivals 
also increased their sugar production after 1700, they could rarely compete against 
the experienced planters of Barbados.  As Graph 6.1 depicts, Barbadian planters 
continued to ship almost 40% of England’s sugar exports between 1697 and 1720, 
sending home 70,000 more tons than Jamaica and 127,000 more tons than Antigua 
over that period.  Moreover, the island’s sugar industry appeared to continue growing 
throughout the war, as the Barbadians owned 1,309 plantations and operated 409 
mills by 1710, a 14.25% increase since 1683.
 17
     
The island’s demographics also reflected an expanding society for many 
white Barbadians, as they benefitted from better weather conditions and improved 
overall health.  In fact, the 1712 and 1716 censuses reveal that the island’s 
population continued to grow throughout the latter stages of the War of the Spanish  
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Table 6.1: 1712 Census 
Parish Plantations Men Women Children Total Enslaved 
St. Peter's 52 339 436 611 1,386 3,708 
St. Lucy's 156 302 345 561 1,208 2,742 
St. Philip's 268 421 588 996 2,005 5,991 
St. John's 156 276 231 352 859 3,813 
St. Joseph's 184 274 229 419 922 2,418 
St. Thomas' 179 261 253 446 960 3,524 
St. Michael's 155 830 918 1,251 2,999 8,551 
St. Andrew's 42 257 200 325 782 3,307 
St. James' 33 262 96 94 452 2,652 
St. George's 84 315 233 407 955 5,264 
Ch. Church NA NA NA NA NA NA 
     
 
 
Totals 1,309 3,537 3,529 5,462 12,528 41,970 
Table 6.1: DAB, Pam. C283, 1712 Census 
Succession.  Reaching a reported low of 12,000 in 1696, the free white population 
increased over the course of the conflict to approximately 14,000-14,500 by 1711 
and 17,018 by 1715.  Surprisingly, the latter figure totaled a number only a few 
hundred less than in 1683, meaning that conditions had stabilized on the island well 
before the war ended.  The censuses also prove that the demographic trends of 
individual parishes experienced few large-scale changes since the 1680s.  According 
to the 1712 census, the southern parishes of St. Michael’s and St. Philip’s remained 
the largest, with populations of 2,999 and 2,005 respectively.  The two northernmost 
regions, St. Peter’s and St. Lucy’s, were the next-most populated, as Speightstown’s 
presence in the former and the many small farmers of the latter resulted in 1,386 and 
1,208 white settlers.  The central parishes of St. John’s, St. Andrews’, and St. James’, 
all located in a region limited by poor soil composition and hilly terrain, continued to 
have the fewest inhabitants, with 859, 782, and 452 respectively.  However, when 
these numbers are compared to the 1716 census, most parishes show evidence of 
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Graph 6.2: The 1715 Census 
 
Graph 6.2: DAB, BS 19, 1716 Census 
considerable peacetime population growth, with St. Michael’s, St. Philip’s, and St. 
James’ exhibiting particularly impressive gains of 37%, 34%, and 71% respectively.  
St. Michael’s, for example, now contained over 4,000 inhabitants, while Christ 
Church had 1,914, St. Peter’s 1,452, St. Andrew’s 903, and St. James 775. 
Additionally, the island’s white adult population nearly reached equilibrium 
in regard to gender distribution, with men (3,537) only slightly outnumbering women 
(3,529) by 1711, a trend that would reverse itself for the first time four years later 
(4,641 to 4,978).  The island population was also quite young, with Governor Crowe 
and George Lillington both reporting to England that 1,103 total baptisms occurred 
between 1708 and the summer of 1710, versus only 848 burials.
18
  With so many 
baptisms taking place, children came to dominate the island, making up about 43.5% 
of the free white inhabitants tallied in both censuses.
19
  This represented a great 
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demographic change for Barbados, as until this point the white population had a 
reputation for being predominantly young, unmarried, and male. 
20
  Youth was still 
the trend, however, as the median age for both sexes was 19 and only 16% of the 
white inhabitants were over 40 (with 3% being over 60). Yet, the island was no 
longer a man’s world, as demographic statistics reveal a sexual equilibrium that 
allowed for an increasing importance in the role of women and families and provided 
additional proof of the continued maturation of this plantation society. 
The enslaved black population also continued to increase in size throughout 
this period.  While the 1712 Census reported the total as 41,970, which likely 
reached nearly 47,000 with the addition of Christ Church’s totals, a hypothetical 
projection based on 2% mortality rates during years of peace and 7% during the war 
gives population figures of 48,525 by 1715, and 66,672 by 1720, a total that would 
have easily represented the largest enslaved workforce on the island up to that point 
and a huge 45% increase in the forty years since 1680.  The continued expansion of 
the island’s black population was a vital component of the success experienced by 
white planters, merchants, farmers, and artisans during this era, as it was the cruel 
and dehumanizing exploitation of this community that allowed for increased 
production of not only sugar, molasses, and rum, but also the ground provisions and 
livestock needed to feed all races and social groups on the island, as well as the 
cotton used for clothes.  It was their labor that gave planters political power in both 
Barbados and London, earned them the wealth and prestige that made the great sugar 
plantation owners some of the richest men in the English world, and that freed the 
island from a restricting reliance on an overreaching and domineering metropole.  
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Moreover, the island’s black enslaved black population also taught its white owners 
about life in a tropical environment and showed them the incredible medicinal 
qualities of their natural surroundings.  They did all of this for a racist and cruel 
social class that openly despised and feared them, while continuing to push for their 
own basic human rights, producing most of their own food and general household 
materials, and maintaining an important sense of community that could provide 
strength and some semblance of stability within a brutal and violent world.  Thus, to 
a considerable extent, it was the enslaved Africans who were responsible for much of 
the ‘maturity’ that defined Barbadian society in the late-seventeenth century, as the 
intense, but systematic, exploitation of this unfree population created the necessary 
conditions for continued success and expansion to sweep across the island. 
Overall, this brief preview of the period between 1700 and 1720 proves that 
Dunn was wrong when he claimed that Barbados existed as a ‘demographic disaster 
area’ that depended on constant in-migration to sustain a healthy and naturally-
increasing white population.
21
  Additional research needs to be conducted to 
definitively show that, by 1715, both the white and black populations were growing 
across the island, and that the numbers had rapidly recovered from the disruptions 
caused by involvement in two international wars.  More information also needs to be 
provided on the island’s early-eighteenth century approach to better health care, 
sustainable agricultural practices, continued access to imported provisions, the 
infertility issues that plagued many farms and plantations, and an improved 
understanding of the causation between disease and filthy local conditions.  Finally, 
future work must address the fact that the balanced, young, and growing free white 
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population, and the growing community of enslaved Africans that were increasingly 
able to naturally reproduce, both helped to create a Barbados that displayed a 
creolized maturity that boded well for the creation of a relatively stable and 
sustainable eighteenth-century plantation society for the wealthy white planters that 
controlled the island.   
Thus, the image of Barbados that emerges from this dissertation does not 
resemble the one described in much of the older historiography and proves that the 
white Barbadians were not actually living within a ‘poor and impoverished’ society, 
struggling through ‘a period of depression,’ or dealing with an ‘era of uncertainty.’  
Instead, this dissertation treats the 1680s as a crucial time period in the island’s early 
history, as it was during this decade that Barbadian society reached a substantial state 
of maturity for the first time.  Furthermore, this dissertation shows that it was during 
the 1680s that the wealthy white islanders attained the height of their seventeenth-
century economic power and importance by establishing a peak commercial moment 
for both imports and exports that lasted throughout most of the decade.  Moreover, 
by the 1680s and 1690s, they had developed a deep understanding of how the 
English colonial system worked and a mastery of how to best benefit from it.  They 
knew when to follow the Navigation Acts and when to blatantly disobey them, had 
established an illegal commercial network that tied the English, French, Spanish, 
Danish, and Dutch into a single flexible commercial unit, and dominated and 
manipulated the slave trade to suit their own ends.   
Finally, they also proved during this era that they were neither the 
‘dependents’ of a controlling and omnipotent metropole, nor the ‘primitive’ and 
‘wasteful’ colonists that possessed an aversion or hostility to innovation.  They were 
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instead masters of the ‘Art of Planting’ and the contemporary leaders of the English 
West Indies.  As early capitalists, they created an updated and altered notion of what 
‘empire’ actually meant, showing the English government that the small, rocky 
outcrops of land randomly scattered throughout the Caribbean were not simply the 
‘golden geese’ for a wasteful and greedy monarchy, but individual societies with 
their own economies, political institutions, and social structures, and a sense of duty 
to their own preservation and prosperity that superseded any allegiance to a distant 
metropole.  They maintained a distinct sense of what Ivan Roots termed ‘localism,’ 
giving priority ‘to the apparent needs of a community’ rather than to the larger state 
or nation.
22
  With Barbados at their head, the English West Indies came to embody 
many of the Whiggish economic theories popular at the time, including an open and 
generally free trade, an early capitalist approach to commerce, a strong mercantile 
relationship with the Dutch, an empire built on commerce and labor instead of the 
narrow-minded production of unrefined raw materials for metropolitan markets, and 
a great disdain for trading monopolies.   
This self-serving interpretation of empire gave the elite Barbadian planters 
and merchants a considerable sense of their own power and place within the Atlantic 
world, and helped them push away from a dependent and unequal relationship with 
the metropole.
23
  The Barbadians did not need London as much as England’s 
government wanted to believe that they did and preferred general self-sufficiency to 
a distant dependency.  They, like the rest of the English Caribbean, forged their own 
paths, instituted their own governmental regulations, followed their own economic 
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ideals, and formulated their own solutions to the variety of unique problems that they 
regularly encountered.  Thus, the Barbadians’ success was their own accomplishment 
and both the peak commercial moment that they experienced during the 1680s and 
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